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ABSTRACT
It has often been argued that post-colonial immigration in France has posed new
challenges to the so-called French Republican model of integration. Indeed, French
popular, and to a large extent political and media, discourses have presented post-
colonial migrants (especially Maghrebis) and their children as constituting a population
which is more difficult to integrate than previous, mainly European, migrants. At the
core of this widely held belief lies the idea that Maghrebi immigration is a relatively
recent phenomenon, and that their cultural, religious traditions and social practices
(which are often described in vague and reifying terms) are irreconcilably different from
those of the French, thereby ignoring the long and complex historical links that have tied
France to North Africa since the colonial era. Equally, the lack of political
representation of Maghrebis in France is not so much attributed to the discrimination to
which North Africans are subjected as to their lack of political tradition.
This thesis aims to challenge these two widely held beliefs by carrying out a
detailed analysis of the discourse and mobilisation processes of two important political
movements which developed within North African immigration in France in the
twentieth century. The first one, the Etoile nord-africaine (ENA), later to become the
Parti du peuple algerien (PPA), developed during the inter-war period and became the
strongest voice of Algerian nationalism during those years. The second one, the
Mouvement des travailleurs arabes (MTA), which was created in the early 1970s in
France, saw itself as an Arab nationalist movement which fought for the liberation of
the Arab people and against racism within France and beyond.
Many academic studies posit the development of the ENA/PPA within the wider
framework of colonial liberation movements and as a phenomenon which is linked with
the history of Algeria. And further Maghrebi political movements such as the MTA,
which have emerged in the post-colonial period, are somehow viewed as rooted in the
social history of immigration in France. This thesis challenges this dichotomy and
shows that, in spite of their specificities and different socio-historical contexts, these
two Maghrebi political movements which developed during the colonial and post-
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colonial eras form part of a consistent political tradition established by the Maghrebi
diaspora in France. This study also focuses on the central question of identity and
examines the complex social, historical and political processes which shaped Maghrebis'
sense of national and ethnic identity during these two periods.
Both movements' discourses and actions are analysed through a large corpus of
archival documents and publications produced by the ENA/PPA and the MTA on the
one hand, and secondary sources pertaining to these two organisations on the other. The
primary documents which are examined in detail include newspapers, tracts, reports
from militants, personal correspondence, minutes of meetings, posters, as well as police
and government reports.
This thesis shows that both the ENA/PPA and the MTA viewed Maghrebi
national identity as rooted in Arabness. However, their sense of identity was informed
by different markers and shaped their political agenda in different ways. On the one
hand, the ENA/PPA's sense of ethnic identity marked a nationalist discourse rooted in
history and religion which aimed to challenge France's oppressive colonial rule, and
establish a modern nation-state within the confines of the colonial territory. On the other
hand, the MTA's sense of ethno-national identity was informed by North Africans' anti-
colonial struggle, by the Palestinian Revolution and by a strong sense of class
belonging. Its nationalism encompassed the Arab World and transcended the boundaries
of nation-states which had failed to defeat imperialism and its corollary, racism. In spite
of these differences, this analysis shows that Maghrebi immigrants, who have been
present in France since the early twentieth century, have developed a consistent and
original political tradition and discourse in France.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction: theories of ethnicity and nationalism
1.1 Introduction
L'immigration [est] le revelateur d'une
crise profonde qui affecte l'idee meme
d'Etat-Nation. (Bouamama 1992: 153)
From the "malaise des banlieues" to the question of the integration of immigrants and
their children, and from the future of France as a multicultural society to the persistence
of xenophobia and the continuing popularity of the Front National's ideas, much of the
media and political debate has, over the last two decades, focused on the "problem of
immigration". 1 The term immigrant itself has been diverted from its original meaning to
encapsulate mainly non-Europeans, and in particular North Africans, regardless of the
fact that many amongst them were born in France and are French nationals (Sayad
1985).2
In this process which posits immigration as a problem (Silverman 1992: 70-78),
the question of religion is frequently evoked and inexorably tied to the "immigrant's
persona. 3
 Images of Islamic fundamentalism are conjured up. The headscarf affairs of
1989 and 1994 (see, for example, Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 1995, Siblot 1990), the
"Affaire Kelkal" in 1995, and the suspicion and surveillance that Maghrebis were
subjected to by the French authorities who feared that they might constitute a fifth
I In spite of the recent split of the Front National into two rival parties, prejudice remains strong in
France. The annual report of the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'Homme on the fight
against racism and xenophobia which was produced in March 2000 for the French Prime Minister, Lionel
Jospin, shows that more than two-thirds (69%) of French people declared that they were "plus ou moms
racistes" (Le Nouvel Observateur, 15 mars 2000).
2 Sayad calls those French people of immigrant origin "[les] qimmigres» de nationalite francaise" (1985:
19).
3 In the French public opinion and media, the correlation between immigration and Islam has, over the
last decade, become an even closer one than that described by Bariki in 1984. He stated then that "Islam
et immigration sont, pour l'opinion publique francaise, deux sujets tres sensibles, que leur association
rend encore plus explosifs. L'Islam, essentiellement percu sous son aspect religieux, est devenu pour
beaucoup de medias synonyme de fanatisme, de terrorisme et de totalitarisme. II est designe comme l'une
des grandes menaces exterieures. L'immigration, quant a elle, est assimilee a insecurite, delinquence,
chOmage, atteinte a l'identite francaise. Elle fait de plus en plus figure de menace interieure" (Bariki 1984:
427).
2column in France during the 1991 Gulf war are just a few illustrations of the way in
which North Africans have become and remain the embodiment of alterity in France.
And in a twist of history, images of the tragedy of the current Algerian civil war (which
some authors have called "la deuxieme guerre d'Algerie") have come back to haunt
France (Provost 1996).
In the face of the racism and socio-political, economic and cultural segregation
experienced by Maghrebis and other post-colonial ethnic minorities in the 1980s, a
number of antiracist organisations were created: associations close to the French
Socialist Party such as the media-friendly SOS-Racisme and the "assimilationist"
France Plus, or the more ethnically and regionally-based Jeunes Arabes de Lyon et sa
Banlieue (JALB). 4 Maghrebis developed their own political action such as the Marche
contre le Racisme et pour l'Egalite of 1983 and played a leading part in the multi-
ethnic, and somewhat less successful Convergences March of 1984, as well as the so-
called "Troisieme Marche contre le Racisme" of 1985. 5 In the 1990s, the emergence of
new social movements such as the Mouvement de l'Immigration et de la Banlieue (MIB)
reflected a desire amongst migrants and their children to be more autonomous and
proactive in fighting discrimination and racism.
In spite of their so far limited, but nevertheless worthwhile, success in obtaining
improvements in the rights and life of ethnic minorities in France, these movements
have been seen by the media and politicians alike as marking a new era of affirmative
action amongst immigrants and their children in France. They have also been
interpreted as signs that "les jeunes de la deuxieme generation" are entering the realm of
French polity (Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden 1988).
However, what is more problematic is the fact that their action has often been
depicted as inherently "new" amongst ethnic minority populations, and in particular
Maghrebis, in France. Indeed, even though their political mobilisation was, and still is
innovative, it does not constitute the first sign of structured affirmative socio-political
action amongst the North African migrant population. The general view which seems to
4 Malik (1990) provides an insightful analysis of the close relationship between the PS and SOS-Racisme.
5 For a detailed account of the Marches, see for example, Bouamama's Dix ans de niarche des Beurs,
chronique dun mouvement avorte (1994) and Jazouli's Les annees banlieue (1992).
3persist in France is that North African immigration started to become "visible" with the
coming of age of the "second generation" from the late 1970s/early 1980s onwards
(Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 68). As for the "first generation", which was
marginalised in bidonvilles, cites de transit, SONACOTRA foyers and other hostels,
and later in fruq , it was essentially seen as being composed of "invisible" and passive
workers who lived mostly lonely and quiet lives well away from the gaze of most of the
French population.
This lack of historical perspective on the part of the media and politicians may
be less innocent than it appears as it constructs Maghrebi immigration as a relatively
recent phenomenon and "problem", and as radically different from previous migrant
groups. It also conveys implicitly the idea that previous immigrations from European
countries have successfully "integrated" into French society without much difficulty
thanks to their cultural and religious affinities with the French, when they clearly
suffered from racism and segregation in their own time (Gallissot 1985c: 61-62, Mestiri
1990, Schor 1996: 24-27) and experienced similar choices and difficulties in the face of
France's assimilationist message. 6
 It allows the French to present their "modele
d'int6gration" in an unproblematic way and to put the onus on the "latest" arrived to
assimilate. And their failure to do so is explained not by their socio-political, economic
and cultural exclusion in France whose assimilationist machine clearly worked so well
for previous migrants, but by the fact that they are culturally and religiously too
"different" or reluctant to integrate. As Sayad points out:
L'espece d'edenisme (social et politique) qui s'attache au mot "integration" porte, non seulement
a magnifier sous ce rapport l'histoire passee (et l'histoire des "integrations" passees, déjà
accomplies) et correlativement, a "noircir" l'histoire presente qui est l'histoire des conflits
presents. (Sayad 1994: 9)
Equally, Maghrebis' absence from the political spheres and decision-making process
can, therefore, be presented by the French as reflecting the lack of maturity of a
6 See Ponty (1985) for a study of the difficult "integration" of Polish immigrants in France.
4community more prone to instinctive rather that coherent action and lacking in political
tradition, rather than as another illustration of their marginal status in French society.
The aim of this study is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to challenge those widely held
beliefs and expose the processes by which Maghrebis have, since the early twentieth
century, 7 developed a consistent and original political tradition and discourse in
emigration. 8 The second objective of this thesis is to emphasise the central role that
emigration played, during the inter-war period, in developing a nationalist discourse
which laid the foundations for the independentist movement which won Algerian
independence, and in the 1970s a nationalist stance which challenged the totalitarian
rule of regimes in North Africa and beyond. Too many historical studies of North Africa
which have focused on the emergence of nationalism and politics in that region have
indeed paid little attention to the continuity of a political tradition in the Maghrebi
immigrant community in France, and underestimated the often influential role that the
diaspora has played in the politics of change in their home country.
Admittedly, many historians acknowledge the contribution that Messali Hadj's
movement, born in emigration, made to Algerian independence and politics, but (and
this is part of their limitation) the emergence of political activism in the diaspora in the
inter-war period is, generally, bound to the colonial history of Algeria and somehow
fades from the Maghrebi migrants' "map" after Algerian independence was achieved
(see for example Droz and Lever 1982, Ageron 1968b & 1993, Julien 1972, Aron 1962,
Le Toumeau 1962, Noushi 1962, Lafont 1980, Kaddache 1981, Kaddache and
Guenaneche 1984 & 1985, Yacono 1973 & 1993).
By contrast, political organisations which developed amongst North Africans in
the post-colonial period before the late 1970s are rarely, or too briefly studied, and
mostly within a French socio-political context (see, for example, Jazouli 1986 & 1992,
Wihtol de Wenden 1988, Hargreaves 1995, Cordeiro 1981). My aim here is to challenge
this artificial dichotomy, reconcile both spheres of analysis and show that the hybrid
7 Political action amongst Maghrebi migrants in France can be traced back to as early as in the interwar
period (see, for example, Stora 1992a, Gallissot 1985b: 217).
8 Girardet broadly defines political tradition as "tout phenomene de permanence a travers le temps dun
systeme relativement coherent d'images et de representations, de souvenirs et de comportements,
d'allegences et de refus" (1987: 6).
5political discourse of those political movements born in the Maghrebi migrant
population are rooted in the politics of both France and North Africa. My aim is also to
contribute to a better understanding of the underlying political themes developed by
political activists in the North African diaspora this century, and particularly in the
1970s, an area on which very little academic work has been carried out.
This thesis will focus on the political discourse and mobilisation of two key
autonomous movements which grew within the North African migrant population
during two distinct periods. The first one is the Etoile nord-africaine (ENA), 9 a
movement born in June 1926 in France and which grew at the apogee of French
imperialism. 10
 My analysis of the Etoile and the PPA will particularly, but not
exclusively, focus on the 1930s." The second movement is the Mouvement des
travailleurs arabes (MTA), 12
 created in 1972 out of the Comites Palestine, and which
became one of the strongest independent political voices in the Maghrebi immigrant
population in the 1970s.
The "discours nationalitaire" amongst immigrants did not end with the
independence of North African states in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Both
movements claimed to be nationalist and became prominent in decades (the 1930s and
the 1970s) marked by economic recession and the rise of racism affecting migrants and
other ethnic minorities. They are also anchored in two key eras, the ENA/PPA in the
colonial, and the MTA in the post-colonial period.
By studying those two organisations, this thesis aims to outline some of the main
characteristics of Maghrebis' political discourse and mobilisation in France during those
two decades. To be more precise, this study will focus on the central question of identity
and on the processes by which Maghrebis in the diaspora constructed a sense of
nationality rooted in ethnicity. It will also look at how the ideological substrate
underpinning their sense of identity has been consistent or otherwise over the years. Of
9 The ENA soon became a mainly Algerian nationalist organisation.
10 It was dissolved by the Front Populaire on 27 January 1937 and continued its political activity as the
Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA) until the leadership's decision to transfer the movement's headquarters
from Paris to Algiers in November 1938 (Stora 1992:37-44).
II The Etoile nord-africaine became a truly autonomous nationalist movement during the 1930s.
12 The MTA was composed of Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians.
6course, one has to acknowledge the different contexts within which those two
movements emerged and developed, and how their respective socio-political
environments affected and shaped their outlook. However, the strong correlation which
exists in some of the key aspects and themes of their discourse and action illustrates the
extent to which the experience of Maghrebis in France remained a shared one, and was
marked by racism, socio-economic and political alienation.
The main body of the thesis is divided into two parts, each focusing on one case
study: the first part on the nationalist discourse and actions of the Etoile nord-africaine
(ENA) and the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA) in the inter-war period in France, and
the second part on that of the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes (MTA) in the 1970s.
Each movement was rooted in what Sayad (1977) defines as a distinct "age" of
emigration.13
Each part has a similar architecture which consists of two main sections. The
first one focuses on how ethnic and national identity is shaped in the discourse of each
movement (the "ins"). The second one looks at the ENA/PPA and the MTA's discourse
on external parameters which marked Maghrebis' diasporic experience such as racism
and international political events, but also their relationship with the French, with other
immigrants and with political organisations (the "outs"). This structural framework is
largely inspired theoretically by Hughes' definition of ethnicity:
An ethnic group is not one because of the degree of measurable or observable difference from
other groups: it is an ethnic group, on the contrary, because the people in it and the people out of
it know that it is one; because both the ins and the outs talk, feel, and act as if it were a separate
group (Hughes 1994: 91).
13 Sayad has analysed the complex processes of emigration in a number of studies (see, for example,
Sayad 1975, 1981, 1993, 1994a, 1999). In 'Les trois ages de remigration' (1977), he describes Maghrebi
migration to France in the inter-war period as the first "age" of emigration, a migration of older and more
able men forced by the collapse of traditional socio-economic structures brought about by colonisation
and whose aim was to enable rural communities to survive. From the 1950s onwards, the second "age" of
emigration marked a shift from the previous generation and from traditional norms and practices. It was
characterised by the desire amongst an increasingly larger number of younger Maghrebis (not only from
rural communities, but more often from urban environments) to emigrate for more individualistic reasons.
7Paraphrasing his definition, Jenkins convincingly points out that "ethnic cultural
differences are a function of ethnic groupness ... identity is a matter of the outs as well
as the ins" (Jenkins 1997: 11). As the present study will show, this contention is
particularly pertinent within the context of diasporic North African political movements
struggling to build a sense of ethnic and national identity within spatial and historical
contexts marked by alienation. However, I extend this conceptual dichotomy between
the "in" and the "out". Indeed, my analysis includes not only human groups, but also
concepts, themes, socio-political phenomena and political power structures.
The first area upon which this thesis focuses is the inner constitutive elements of
Maghrebis' ethnic identity underlying their sense of nationality," and looks at how the
markers of ethnicity (kinship, but also class, religion, culture, as well as history and
memory) shaped their discourse.15
The second area examines what I refer to as "the outer constitutive elements of
identity", that is to say the movements' tense and complex relationship with, and
discourse on themes, concepts, organisational structures, and political groups, some
constructed negatively (such as racism and colonialism) and some positively
(relationship with the Left, with the French people, with other immigrants and anti-
imperialist groups, with the Palestinian struggle, and so on) which affected them. Even
though these markers were posited as being outside the boundary of identity, they
played a crucial role in the shaping of both movements' ethno-national identity and
political discourse. Chapters four (ENA/PPA) and seven (MTA) look at Maghrebis'
discourse on racism and at the antiracist strategies that they developed, and at the way in
which universalism as an ambivalent concept both inspired them at an ideological level
and underpinned the oppressive forces which alienated them as immigrants. Chapters
five (ENA/PPA) and eight (MTA) assess both movements' discourse on, and
relationship with, French political parties of the Left, trade unions and French
intellectuals, as well as other immigrants in France. They also look at the way in which
the socio-political situation in their home countries in North Africa and international
14 Chapter two for the ENA/PPA and chapter six, sections two to three for the MTA.
15 Chapter three for the ENA/PPA and chapter six sections four to seven for the MTA.
8events, such as the Palestinian question, are evoked and inform their ideology, political
discourse and process of mobilisation. Part two will include a comparative dimension
which will highlight some of the similarities and dichotomies in the key political themes
developed by the two movements. In chapter nine, I will draw some conclusions on the
overlap and differences that marked the discourse of the ENA/PPA and the MTA.
1.2 Exploration of some theories of ethnicity and nationalism
The aim of this section is to survey some key aspects of the two main areas (namely
ethnicity and nationalism) which traversed the political discourse of my two case
studies. Methodologically and theoretically, this research is based on the premise that,
even though nationalism can be founded on political membership (Jenkins 1997: 142,
Verdery 1993: 38), North African nationalism, like most nationalisms, was rooted in
ethnicity (see Connor 1978). However, it could be argued that the former and the latter
forms overlap, as the construction of ethnicity is, to some extent, a political process.
Those two fields of research have been the subject of considerable interest
amongst social and political scientists. My objective here is not to map out the entire
corpus of academic work which has been produced, nor to analyse in detail the complex
debate which has been and still is taking place in those two areas, but rather to introduce
and discuss some key authors and trace some of the more important theories that have
inspired this work.
1.2.1 Theories of ethnicity
This survey will focus mainly on studies of ethnicity which have been carried out
outside France because, as Rinaudo points out, "la recherche francaise s'est longtemps
caracterisee par un desinteret general a l'egard de cette question avant d'en arriver ces
dernieres annees a etablir des constats d'ethnicisation de la societe" (1999: 7).
Marginalised at an academic level until the 1980s, the issue of ethnicity became the
prerogative of economic and political circles, and particularly of the Front national
9(Rinaudo 1999: 7). The work of social scientists such as, amongst others, De Rudder
(1982, 1992, 1996) and Rinaudo (1999) and the more "intimiste" work of Kristeva
(1988) have since shown that ethnicity has become a valid theoretical framework for the
study of immigration and of French people of foreign origin in France.
Ethnicity is a complex and sometimes elusive concept. The word "ethnic" was
first used by Vacher de Lapouge in France in 1896 to describe distinct "races", and was
also employed in 1935 as a synonym for "race" by the pro-nazi author Montandon, and
as the equivalent for "tribu" and "peuplade" by colonial administrators, always relating
it to biological attributes (De Heusch 1997: 185). Connor (1978: 386) notes that it
derives from the Greek word Ethnos which means "nation" in its original sense (as a
group marked by common descent). Weber was one of the first social scientists to
explore the meaning of this concept. His early work on ethnicity emphasises the process
by which an ethnic group is the result of its members believing that they are of common
descent: "We shall call 'ethnic group' those human groups that entertain a subjective
belief in their common descent ... this belief must be important for the propagation of
group formation" (Weber 1978: 389). He also argues that the formation of ethnicity is a
subjective process which is very much the result of contact and/or antagonism with
"members of an obviously different group" (Weber 1978: 385, Jenkins 1997: 9-10).
Until the 1960s, the dominant approach to ethnicity in social anthropolology,
which was first described by Shils in his article 'Primordial, personal, sacred and civil
ties' (1957), had been to ascribe specific cultural traits to particular groups. This school
of thought, which has been referred to as primordialism, was led by Geertz (1963) and
developed by authors such as Isaacs (1975). Geertz described how the "primordial
attachment" of groups hindered the development of modern citizenship and conflicted
with the establishment of modern states. This approach is problematical in that it
opposes those primordial feelings (which are linked with tribalism and communalism),
and those of loyalty to the modern state (Geertz 1963: 107-113). Indeed this
interpretation of ethnicity naturalises, and even reifies ethnic groups as cultural entities
which are fixed, and it presents the ethnic attachment and the sentiment of citizenship as
stemming from different sources which are to a large extent irreconciliable. It could on
10
the contrary be argued (and the analysis of ethnicity in this thesis shows this) that ethnic
ties, however constructed and imagined they may be, can contribute, and even be at the
core of the development and construction of nationality (or loyalty to one's nation),
particularly in new states, which are the main subject of Geertz's study. Furthermore, in
his listing of some of the more important markers of primordial ties potentially
undermining citizenship (presumed blood ties, race, language, region, religion and
custom), he does not take into account the fact that most of them, with the exception
perhaps of "region", may actually have constituted the very basis for the creation of a
nationalist discourse and mobilisation leading to independence and upon which calls for
citizenship were based in newly independent North African states.
The limits of primordialism have been highlighted in a number of academic
works (see for example Olzac 1983: 356, Eller and Coughlan 1993, Jenkins 1997: 44-
45, Eriksen 1992: 28, Bentley 1987: 26). Eller and Coughlan in particular, criticise
primordialism for being unintelligible and unsociological as it "presents us with a
picture of underived and socially-unconstructed emotions that are unanalysable and
overpowering and coercive yet varying" (Eller and Coughlan 1993: 187, see also
Jenkins 1997: 45) and call for the term to be dropped from the sociological lexicon
(1993: 183). They object to the term because it provides "no mechanism for the genesis
of its phenomena", and does not explain the relationship between ethnic attachment and
the social experience of members of a given ethnic group (1993: 194). They argue that
Shills (1957), who is credited for being the first anthropologist to develop such a
concept, based his theory on an erroneous interpretation of Nock's work (1933) on
traditional and prophetic religions (Eller and Coughlan 1993: 184-185).
Another model of ethnicity has been developed by authors such as Wallerstein
(1960) and Cohen (1969) who are referred to as instrumentalists. For them, the evolving
economic and political context affects the established order and new groups of interests
emerge. Bentley points out pertinently that in this interpretation of ethnicity,
People with common interests coalesce into groups in pursuit of those interests. Robing interest
groups in ethnic (cultural) garb takes advantage of the legitimating nationalist ideologies of
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modern states and/or renders such groups less vulnerable in the face of numerical or political
inferiority. (Bentley 1987: 25)
This model is useful in understanding some aspects of ethnicity in the discourse of the
North African political movements discussed in this thesis, and Wallerstein's work is
used to shed light not only on these organisations' ideology, but also as racism as a
socio-economic phenomenon which marked the society within which those two
movements evolved. 16 However, instrumentalism fails, to some extent, to take into
account many of the complex processes that shape ethnicity, and reduces it to a
phenomenon marked by the pursuit of short-term economic interest (Patterson 1975,
Bentley 1987: 26).
A more recent and convincingly laid out interpretation of ethnicity is the
situationalist approach developed by Barth in his introduction to Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries (1969a), which has constituted the broad theoretical framework within
which my research on ethnicity in the North African migrant population in France has
been conducted. It opposes the previous analysis in many respects. Barth challenges
convincingly the premise that ethnic groups should be defined solely according to
common cultural characteristics, and calls for a better understanding of the processes by
which ethnic groups are constituted and of the nature of the boundaries between them
(1969a: 9). He points out that it is "the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the
cultural stuff that it encloses" (1969a: 15), and therefore shifts the emphasis from
cultural traits to boundary maintenance:
although ethnic categories take cultural differences into account, we can assume no simple one-
to-one relationship between the units and cultural similarities and differences. The features that
are taken into account are not the sum of 'objective differences, but only those which the actors
themselves regard as significant ... some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and
emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are
played down or denied. (Barth 1969a: 14)
16 See chapters four and eight.
12
This perspective on the field of ethnicity marked a change in the way in which social
anthropology worked. As Jenkins, drawing on Cohen (1978: 384), points out, it
involved a shift "from a Western interest in the uncivilized peoples of the colonies and
ex-colonies, to a more equitable concern with the heterogeneity of all societies" (Jenkins
1997: 18). In other words, the concept of ethnicity was not only freed from the narrow
context within which it had been used previously, it also enabled the widening of the
field of anthropological exploration and highlighted the salience of ethnicity as a
concept and analytical tool in all societies.
A significant number of authors have adopted the situationalist or transactional
interpretation of ethnicity in their research. Amongst them is Wallman whose definition
of ethnicity has inspired my analysis of the discourse of the Etoilel PPA and the MTA:
ethnicity is the process by which 'their difference is to be used to enhance the sense of 'us' for
purposes of organisation or identification ... Because it takes two, ethnicity can only happen at
the boundary of 'us', in contact or confrontation with them. And as the sense of 'us' changes, so
the boundary between 'us' and 'them' shifts. Not only does the boundary shift, but the criteria
which mark it change. (Wallman 1979: 3)
Wallman's understanding of ethnicity, which in some ways echoes that of Hughes
(1994), has enabled me to map out some of the key processes of ethnic identity
formation in the North African immigrant population in the inter-war period and during
the 1970s.
In his study of culture and society in Trinidad and Mauritius, Eriksen (1992)
also uses the situationalist approach (which he refers to as formalist) which posits
ethnicity as a form of social process. But he does so in a more cautious way. According
to him, the formalist interpretation offers greater flexibility and theoretical
sophistication than the primordialist interpretation. However, he notes pertinently that it
has two important limitations which prevent it from fully understanding ethnicity. The
first one is that as a concept, it is ahistorical, and therefore diverts analytical attention
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from the wider social and political context. He highlights the fact that "ethnicity is
always a property of a particular social formation in addition to being an aspect of
interaction" (Eriksen 1992: 29). My research attempts to address that limitation in two
ways: firstly by looking at the process of identity formation in my two case-studies as a
transactional, synchronic process which is 'context-sensitive', that is to say rooted in the
socio-political context of its time, and secondly by examining diachronically, by
comparing and contrasting those two socio-political formations whose nature and
discourse share some significant common ground with one another.
The second limitation that Eriksen highlights in the Barthian model is that it sees
ethnicity as an "empty vessel", in other words that it marginalises the role that cultural
specificities play in the way the interaction is shaped (Eriksen 1992: 30-31). Again, my
study of the North African nationalist discourse in France adapts the situationalist
approach to take into account the cultural (in the wider sense of the word) dimension of
the discourse of both movements on ethnicity in order to better highlight the
transactional processes at work in the process of ethno-national identity formation.
Starting from a similar viewpoint, Cornell (1996) acknowledges the important
contribution that both situationalists (for example Cohen 1974a & 1974b, Steinberg
1981, Herbstein 1983) and constructionists made to this field of research by moving
away from the previously dominant primordialist model which considered ethnic
identities to be fixed. He calls constructionists those anthropologists (such as Sollors
1989, Nagel 1994) who adhere to a model of ethnicity stemming from situationalism
(which he also refers to as circumstantialism), and who treat "ethnic groups as agents in
their owh construction, shaping and reshaping their identities and the boundaries that
enclose them out of the raw materials of history, culture, and pre-existing ethnic
constructions" (Cornell 1996: 266). However, Cornell challenges the prominence given
by circumstantialists/situationalists to the transactional processes and calls for a new
approach which strikes a balance between cultural content and circumstance. His
definition of an ethnic group reflects this. He sees it as "a social group distinguished by
a claim to common descent or some approximation of it and the assertion of either a
history or a present of shared culture" (1996: 269). He argues convincingly that the
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circumstantialist approach, which focuses on ethnic identity as being derived from
convenience or efficacy, does not explain why some groups remain attached to
identities which do not serve their objectively determined interests, and adds that:
Positional interests may indeed shape collective identities, but surely the reverse is true as well:
our self-concepts shape our perceptions of the world around us and therefore, our perception of
our interests. This in turn, shapes action often with transformative consequences for
circumstance. (Cornell 1996: 267)
While Cornell recognises that the constructionists' approach focuses far more on the
content of ethnic identities than the circumstantialists', he criticises their basic
contention that self-construction of ethnic identity is by and large "driven by factors
external to the group" (1996: 267).
Another polemical, and I would argue problematic, view of the concept has been
proposed by van den Berghe, which is worth mentioning briefly. Drawing on analysts
such as Hamilton (1964), his socio-biological interpretation of ethnicity is based on the
idea that socio-biology supplies "the main genetic mechanism for animal sociality,
namely kin selection to maximize inclusive fitness" (1978: 403). He considers that kin
selection is a strong bond of sociality between humans, as it is between other animals,
but that in the case of the former, two more bases of sociality can be observed, that is to
say reciprocity and coercion (1978: 403). He goes on to suggest that ethnicity and 'race'
are extensions of kinship, and that "ethnic and race sentiments are an extended and
attenuated form of kin selection" (1978: 403). He distinguishes two types of human
collectivities: the first one being ascriptive and defined by common descent and the
second one whose membership is informed by the defense of common interest. This
explication of ethnicity as a socio-biologically-grounded phenomenon has been
pertinently criticised by a number of analysts, who have accused him of naturalising a
concept which is, in essence, socio-cultural (see for example Sahlins 1976, Jenkins
1997: 77).
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From a markedly different perspective, Bentley (1987) tries to address the
limitations of both instrumentalism and primordialism (which he refers to as the
"instrumentalist-primordialist dichotomy") by drawing on Bourdieu's "theory of
practice" (1992), and more specifically on his concept of "habitus". I7
 He states that his
proposition is based on the contention that "consciousness of affinities of interest and
experience embodies subliminal awareness of objective commonalities in practice [and]
provides the objective grounding for ethnic subjectivity sought by both instrumentalists
and primordialists" (Bentley 1987: 27). He argues that his theory addresses what he and
other anthropologists (such as Eriksen 1992: 30-31) view as an important weakness of
the Barthian model which treats ethnic identity as
empty vessels whose content is anchored externally in conventional but arbitrary oppositions
between categories. The theory of practice posits a different kind of dialectic whose poles are
constituted by affective affinities based on shared habitus and symbolic differentiations both
cognitively and affectively generated. (Bentley 1987: 36)
Bentley applies his model to his case-study (a young Philippino Muslim woman called
Soraya Monap who belongs to the Maranao ethnic group) which illustrates the
relationship between practice and sensation of ethnic affinity. Her personal "parcours" is
marked by her will to combine both dimensions of her identity, her "traditional"
Maranao identity and the "modern" values and norms which she acquired during her
years at school and university in Manila. He goes on to suggest that as ethnic identity
stems from situationally shared elements of a multi-dimensional habitus, people can
have several "emotionally authentic identities and symbolize them in terms of shared
descent" (1987: 35).
17 Bourdieu defines habitus as follows: "the structures constitutive of a particular type of environment
(e.g. the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce Izabitus, systems of
durable, transposable dispositions ... The habitus is the product of the work of inculcation and
appropriation necessary in order for those products of collective history, the objective structures ... to
succeed in reproducing themselves more or less completely, in the form of durable dispositions, in the
organisms (which one can ... call individuals) lastingly subjected to the same conditionings, and hence
placed in the same material conditions of existence" (Bourdieu 1977: 72, 85).
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This idea is of particular relevance to the question of the negotiation of identity
for Berbers in the two political movements studied in this thesis, which both leaned
heavily towards Arabness as an ethnic referent. However, his analysis fails to tackle the
important question of hybridity (see, for example, Melucci 1997: 63-66, Grossberg
1996: 91-92, Bhabha 1986: 198-205 and 1990: 207-221) and pays too little attention to
racism which may, to some extent, have informed such identity (for instance, during
Soraya's years in predominantly Christian Manila).
Also, even though Bourdieu's argument is that the habitus can evolve, produced
as it is by different modes of generations (Bourdieu 1992: 78, Bentley 1987: 29),
Bentley's application of his theory of practice does not provide an entirely suitable
analytical framework for the study of nationalist political movements in the colonial and
post-colonial diasporic populations, whose ethnic identity is as much shaped by the
habitus (established not only within the diasporic community itself, but also by the
cultural practices and norms which are inculcated by the dominant "host society") as it
is marked by discursive processes of transgression of the habitus in colonial and post-
colonial contexts (and we are coming back here to the complex issue of hybridity).
In his article entitled 'New Ethnicities', Stuart Hall (1988) addresses this issue in
an interesting way (within a cultural studies perspective), and also highlights the
dangers of ethnicity as a concept and its recuperation by British and other racisms
(1988: 29). He identifies two "moments" of black cultural politics. The first moment,
which was traversed by binary oppositions and substitutions, was when the term
"black" encapsulated the common experience of racism and marginalisation in Britain
which provided the framework within and against which a new politics of resistance
emerged (1988: 27). The second moment marks a new phase ("new ethnicities"), which
is by no means a break from the first moment. To some extent, it "displace[s],
reorganise[s] and reposition[s] the different cultural strategies in relation to one another"
(ibid). Hall argues that the new politics of representation he has witnessed in black
culture and politics in Britain since the 1980s is very much informed by an awareness of
the black experience as a diaspora experience rooted in a process of hybridisation,
which is also referred to as "the process of diaspora-ization" (Hall 1988: 29-30). His
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interpretation of ethnicity highlights the role played by history, culture and politics in
the construction of ethnicity:
If the black subject and black experience are not stabilised by Nature or by some essential
guarantee, then it must be the case that they are constructed historically, culturally -and the
concept which refers to this is 'ethnicity'. The term ethnicity acknowledges the place of history,
language and culture in the construction of subjectivity and identity, as well as the fact that all
discourse is placed, positioned, situated, and all knowledge is contextual. (Hall 1988: 29)
Hall emphasises the contextual/situational character of ethnicity, and welcomes what he
sees, in Black British cultural output, as a process of contestation of the dominant
conception of ethnicity underlying the essentialist English ethnicity (which has too often
been associated with notions of "race" and "nation"), and the beginning of a "positive
conception of ethnicity of the margins, of the periphery" (1988: 29).
While Hall's analysis is clearly rooted in a British socio-cultural and political
context, a number of his observations would prove salient in the French situation, and
more specifically in the case of the two political movements studied here. Indeed, it
could be argued that the ENA/PPA and the MTA's discourses were not only rooted
within what Hall defines as the first moment of ethnicity, but were also hybrid
discourses informed by the diasporic experience of the North African migrants who
militated within those organisations. I would go further and assert that this process,
which he coined "diaspora-ization", did not start in emigration. It may indeed have
started much earlier in the colonies, as an epiphenomenon of colonialism and post-
colonialism, and of the politics of displacement, dispossession, alienation, and
construction of identity.
Other authors have analysed the concept of ethnicity using and combining
different approaches. Hagendoom (1993), for instance, who is clearly influenced by the
situationalist interpretation of ethnicity, draws on anthropology, sociology and social
psychology to build a pertinent multi-disciplinary model explaining the processes by
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which negative ethnic attitudes develop and ethnic hierarchies are constructed in
society. The first field allows him to assess the extent to which those negative attitudes
can be the result of cultural misunderstanding, the second one to understand how those
negative ethnic attitudes are a reflection of a struggle for power between ethnic groups,
and the third field to examine how ethnocentrism is the result of identity being defined
through their own ("ingroup") and other groups ("outgroups") (Hagendoom 1993: 26-
27). At the core of those negative attitudes is the issue of prejudice which, according to
him, is characterised by the fact that "the behaviour of outgroup members is not
evaluated on the basis of its cultural meaning, but on the basis of ingroup values" or
alternatively, can be defined as a justification "of the influence, power and wealth of
and by the powerful" (1993: 27-28). However, it could be argued that this interpretation
does not account for prejudice that ethnic minorities can encounter on the part of those
within the "dominant" ethnic group who are themselves socially, economically and to
some extent culturally marginalised (so called "working-class racism").
Interestingly, the question of prejudice leads Hagendoorn to tackle the issue of
racism. He notes that new forms of racism have emerged which Barker (1981) referred
to as "new racism". Two types of new racism are described, which he argues are
interconnected, and related to classical racism (which is the expression of the ingroup
seeing the outgroup as racially inferior). The first one, which developed in the USA
after World War Two, is categorised as symbolic racism or ethnocentrism, a
phenomenon that he views as a veiled form of racism which considers the outgroup as
unfairly privileged. The second one is aversive racism where the aversion for the
outgroup is expressed through avoidance (1993: 28-29).
Within a French context, new racism has been broached in a different way.
Balibar sees it as a phenomenon which has developed in "Anglo-Saxon countries" and
which has gained influence in France. It focuses on immigration and can be seen as a
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"racism without races". It is a racism shaped during a period of decolonisation, of
migration of post-colonial populations into France and marked by the "scission de
l'humanite a travers un seul espace politique" . Its dominant theme is not biological
heredity, but the irreducibility of cultural differences (1988: 32-33). Balibar's definition
of new racism reflects that of Taguieff, who also refers to it as a "racisme
differentialiste". 18
 Taguieff defines new (or neo) racism as follows:
Les nouveaux modes de legitimation du racisme derivent ... de deux operations
fondamentales: d'une part, la production de nouvelles presentations recevables
centrees sur la « defense des identites culturelles »; d'autre part, la mise au point
de nouveaux arguments acceptables tournant autour de l'eloge immoderee de la
difference. En second lieu, c'est sur la question de l'immigration, et de
l'immigration instituee en probleme social et politique majeur par les effets
combines des propagandes anti-gauche (1982-1986), que se sont cristallises tous
les nouveaux lieux communs de la rhetorique de l'identite culturelle et de la
difference, dont la hantise du metissage, percu comme genocide indirect et
ethnicide a moyen terme, constitue le fond affectivo-imaginaire plus ou moms
voile dans les discours produits. (Taguieff 1991b: 49-50)
Another important development in this field has been the study of ethnic mobilisation.
Mobilisation as a theme has been the subject of a significant number of studies, and it
would require too much space within this thesis to map out the entire body of work
carried out in this field. It would be useful however, to mention some of the key trends
and analysts who have shaped that concept. According to Chazel, Karl Deutsch, in
Nationalism and Social Communication (first published in 1966) was the first theorist to
discuss and place the question of mobilisation in direct relation with modernity. In his
18 Footnote: For further discussion of new racism, see chapter seven, section one. See also Silverman
1992: 122-124, and Guillaumin 1972: 69-79.
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work, mobilisation is equated to a process of change which reflects a shift from tradition
to modernity (Chazel 1975). On the other hand, Etzioni (1968: 243-253) challenges the
close relationship between mobilisation and modernisation and views mobilisation as a
process which is independent from the latter. Chazel considers that Obershall's theory
(1973) is the most convincingly developed. Unlike Deutsch, Obershall posits
mobilisation within the politics of conflict and argues that it is often directed against the
authorities and the state. Its efficacy is dependent on its grounding in a community (a
family, a village, or an ethnic group) or in a complex network of professional, political
or religious associations (Obershall 1973: 28,121,133, Chazel 1975: 511-512). His view
further contradicts that of Deutsch when he states that the most efficient mobilisation
comes from groups which have best resisted the disintegration of traditional structures
and from associations with communitarian underpinnings in spite of their apparently
modem character (1973: 123-124, Chazel 1975: 512).
The question of political mobilisation has also become the subject of studies
within the field of ethnicity. Olzak's (1983) detailed analysis of the various approaches
to contemporary ethnic mobilisation provides a useful insight into such a socio-political
phenomenon. She defines ethnic mobilisation as "the process by which groups organize
around some feature of ethnic identity (for example skin color, language, customs) in
pursuit of collective ends" and agrees with analysts such as Connor (1972) and Smith
(1979) that in some circumstances modernisation creates and sustains contemporary
ethnic movements (1983: 355). Olzak, whose own work could be said to be inspired by
situationalism, points out that a distinction should be made between ethnic solidarity
and ethnic mobilisation. The former is understood to be a process of conscious
identification with an ethnic population and is about the maintenance of "strong ethnic
interaction networks and institutions" (1983: 356). She also notes that there are four
main theoretical approaches to ethnic mobilisation. The first one (developmental
theories), whose proponents include, amongst others, Deutsch (1966) and Rokkan
(1970) views such a phenomenon as a reaction from the periphery (marked by a
reinforcement of primordial traditional ties) against the centralising core during
development (Olzak 1983: 358). Olzak challenges the main hypothesis underlying this
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theory by arguing that development may actually lead to assimilation rather than
mobilisation. The second theory encapsulates internal colonialism and cultural divisions
of labour. The internal colony is the result of a richer and culturally dominant core
exploiting and dominating an ethnically identified periphery. In that context core-
periphery conflict increases, and cultural and economic exploitations reinforce each
other when cultural differences correspond to differences in development between core
and periphery (Olzak 1983: 359, see also Gellner 1969: 168-70).
This process, marked by segregation along cultural and ethnic lines, and which
assigns the dominated ethnic minority to lower status socio-economic positions, can
lead to ethnic mobilisation which combines with "class-based interest" (Olzak 1983:
359). Olzak criticises that approach for focusing mainly on economics and for not
determining which boundary (ethnicity or class) underlies some collective action (1983:
360). The third approach (split and segregated labour markets) emphasises the
importance of economic roles in ethnic solidarity processes, and either views ethnic
conflict as the result of the competition of two or more ethnic groups within the same
labour market ("split labour market") (Olzak 1993: 360, Bonacich 1972: 558) or
interprets the maintenance of ethnic boundaries and solidarity through the existence of
strong specialised institutions and networks which sustain ethnic solidarity ("segregated
labour market"). Olzak criticises the latter for not explaining how ethnic solidarity
affects ethnic mobilisation (1983: 361). The fourth theory ("competitive models of
ethnic mobilisation") which is supported by Olzak and by other analysts such as
Despres (1975) and Young (1976) links in with the previous approach, but goes further
by arguing that ethnic mobilisation will happen through increasing access to political,
economic and social resources (Olzak 1983: 362).
Olzak's detailed overview of the theoretical framework and limitations of studies
on ethnic mobilisation contains nonetheless some arguments which need to be briefly
discussed and challenged. Firstly, her suggestion (which is consistent with that of
Glazer and Moynihan 1975) that studies of that process should concentrate on the post-
war years because that period was characterised by increasing politicisation of ethnicity
(1983: 355) is problematic. Examples such as the development of the Etoile /lord-
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africaine and the Parti du peuple algerien in the inter-war decades would tend to show
that such ethnic mobilisation had taken place before that period. Secondly, she asserts,
in her assessment of the segregated labour market theory, that ethnic conflict in France
(as well as in Germany and Switzerland), with the exception of Algerians, has been
more "contained and routinized" than in Great Britain, where ethnic tensions have been
marked by violence and their racial content (1983: 361). It could be argued that ethnic
conflict in France has not necessarily been more contained and routinised, and less
"racial" than in Britain. It has been violent not only with regard to Algerians, but also to
Tunisians and Moroccans, as our study of the MTA shows. Furthermore, ethnic
conflicts involving other migrants such a., Mauritian immigrants in the 1970s and Sub-
Saharan African in more recent years, would tend to suggest that tensions also involved
ethnic groups other than Maghrebis. 19 If her timescale were to include ethnic
phenomena since the end of the nineteenth century, further examples of violent ethnic
conflict (anti-Semitism, and the Aigues-Mortes racist attacks against Italian migrants in
1893 are a case in point) would also problematise her argument.
Within this thesis, my analysis of the discourse of the ENA/PPA and of the
MTA on ethnicity is developed firstly through a situationalist perspective (Barth 1969a,
Wallman 1979). But I argue that defining ethnicity simply as being shaped at the
boundary between "us" and "them" gives only a limited understanding of the complex
processes of ethnic identity formation. I also incorporate a context-sensitive approach to
the study of ethnicity which also takes into account the socio-cultural, economic,
religious and historical context within which ethnicity is shaped. I also study the
phenomenon of ethnic mobilisation in the EtoileIPP A and the MTA as a process
whereby groups organise around ethnicity in pursuit of collective ends, and that
modernisation plays a key role in creating and sustaining contemporary ethnic
movements (Connor 1972, Smith 1979, Olzak 1983).
19 For instance, the mobilisation around the sans-papiers at the St Bernard Church in Paris in the mid
1990s.
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1.2.2 Theories of nationalism
Equally wide in its theoretical and practical scope is the concept of nationalism. It
would be beyond the remit of this section of the thesis to discuss the extensive body of
research which has been carried out in this important field, in which no analytical
consensus and no widely accepted definition exists (Anderson 1996: 1). Students of
nationalism could nonetheless refer to some of the works of influential authors such as
Renan (1882/1992), Durkheim (1975), Anthony Smith (for example 1979, 1981, 1986,
1988, 1993, 1996), Kedourie (1985), Gellner (1983, 1996), Hobsbawm (1973, 1988,
1996), Anderson (1983), Breuilly (1982, 1996) and Hroch (1985, 1996), amongst
others. 2° With the exception perhaps of Anderson, Gellner and Smith, most of the works
on nationalism have focused mainly on the study of the phenomenon in Europe.
Echoing what was said above about ethnicity, the study of nationalism as a
concept, since the work of Renan and Durkheim, seems to have been largely ignored in
French academic circles until fairly recently. To a great extent, it remained the preserve
of the discourse of nationalist political organisations (in the extreme-right). However,
over the last decade marked by the "retour des nations" authors such as Birnbaum
(1997), Delannoi and Taguieff (1991), Delannoi (1994) and Touraine (1997) have
become aware of its salience as a sociological concept, and have joined the circle of
predominantly non-French analysts working on nationalism. 21 Others, such as
Bouamama (1992) and Tassin (1994), have focused on the complex and often
conflicting relationship between nationality and citizenship.
My aim here is to present critically some of the more relevant and recent works
on nationalism which have influenced this thesis in a specific way. But before doing so,
it would seem important to discuss the overview, which Breuilly (1996) has carried out,
of some of the trends in research on that concept. He considers that historians have
20 Smith is acknowledged to be the main guide in this field for readers of the English language"
(Hobsbawm 1990: 2).
21 Birnbaum points out that "nombreux sont ceux qui aujourd'hui, dans un monde anglo-saxon plus
sensible aux sociologies des valeurs, s'engagent dans des recherches de tous genres: l'industrie du
nationalisme remplace dans les preoccupations de beaucoup celles du corporatisme ou de l'Etat" (1991:
2).
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focused on three main areas: doctrine, politics and sentiments (1996: 146). Kedourie
(1985), for instance, focuses on the emergence of doctrine and its political uses to
analyse nationalism. This model implies positing nationalism as a phenomenon which is
informed by ideas generated in particular by the intelligentsia (Breuilly 1996: 147).
Kedourie examines nationalism through the work of intellectuals such as Kant (and his
theory of self-determination which features prominently in his book), Montesquieu,
Fichte, and the Egyptian political leader Abd-el-Nasir (Kedourie 1985: 21-31). For
Breuilly, this approach has little value as in many cases, nationalist politics are
dominated by groups other than intellectuals and national sentiments arise through
complex processes, and not as a result of the spread of a doctrine by intellectuals in the
population (1996: 147). Secondly, there is the development of national sentiments
within the population (the "nation"), which is considered to be at the core of nationalism
by analysts such as Seton-Watson (1977). Breuilly argues that there are limitations to
this model as doctrines and nationalist politics can develop in regions where there is a
lack of national sentiments among the population, and there are cases where there are
strong national sentiments amongst the population but these do not lead to the
development of nationalist doctrines or movements (1996: 147-148). The third model
applied to the study of nationalism, which is favoured by Breuilly, centres not so much
on the intelligentsia or the people, but rather on politics as the process of nation-
building. He argues that "there exists a nation - a special group which is set apart from
all other human beings - ... Political identity and loyalty are, first and foremost, with and
to the nation ... The nation should have political autonomy, normally in the form of a
modern state" (1996: 149).
Breuilly goes on to describe, within those areas, the four approaches adopted by
authors to understand nationalism. The three approaches that he criticises are firstly, the
primordial approach which sees the nation as rooted in history (which encapsulates the
discourse of nationalists themselves and which has, to some extent also influenced
Anthony Smith's work), secondly the functional approach, which informed the work of
Kedourie (see Smith 1996: 185), and which views nationalism as fulfilling the need for
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an identity after the collapse of tradition and religion (1996: 155-156), and thirdly the
narrative approach, which he considers of little analytical value :
Academic historians frequently accepted the narrative as the proper form of an historical
account, the national as providing the boundaries and identity of their subject matter, and the
emergence, expansion and success of national movements as the principal story ... The problem,
of course, is that a narrative explains nothing. It is built on dubious assumptions. (Breuilly 1996:
157)
The final approach — and the one which he advocates — focuses upon modernity, upon
"transformations in the nature of power which leads to the production of nationalist
politics" (1996: 159). I would agree with Breuilly that nationalism is inherently rooted
in modernity (and the development of the Etoile and the PPA shows this), and that the
three areas which have been highlighted (doctrine, politics and national sentiments)
should not be considered as discrete, but as part of a tension, with different cases of
nationalism stressing different aspects of that tension. However, his theoretical
framework (which focuses mainly on the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century in
Europe) does not take into account more recent, and possibly more culturally complex
nationalist phenomena, particularly those which involve non-European regions,
societies and cultures. Furthermore, his interpretation of the phenomenon through
politics is, to some extent, problematical as it posits the existence of the nation as a
given ("there exists a nation") rather than as construct, and the result of a shifting
process. More importantly, his proposition that a distinction should be made between
ethnie and ethnicity on the one hand, and nationalism on the other (1996:148) is
questionable. One of the problems within studies of ethnicity is that they have for a long
time (at least until the early 1980s) developed quite separately from the field of
nationalism (and vice-versa). As Connor argued in 1978:
a review of the indices and bibliographies found in those ethnic studies that do deal with a
national or potential national group, illustrate all-too-often that the author is unaware of the
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relationship of his work to nationalism. The student of nationalism and the student of ethnicity
seldom cross-fertilized. (Connor 1978: 387)
Gellner is another important theorist of nationalism who has been influential in my
work. He also views this phenomenon as inherently modern and grounded in national
sentiment (1983). His emphasis on culture as a crucial repository of identity underlying
the development of nationalism is convincingly presented, and so is his argument about
the invention of nations:
Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed
political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns
them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a
reality, for better or for worse, and in general an inescapable one. (Gellner 1983: 48-49)
Also, Gellner's assertion about religion, particularly Islam, as a high culture forming the
basis for national sentiment, and conflicting with the locally-rooted vernacular forms of
religious practices (1983: 73-87) is consistent with my first case study. He is one of the
few social scientists to have discussed, although too briefly, the question of nationalism
within a diasporic context (1983: 101-109). However, his analysis is mainly devoted to
the "traditional" Jewish model of the diaspora and does not really relate to more recent
diasporic groups of the industrial era whose socio-economic position in the "host-
society" was, and still is, in many respects, markedly different. Furthermore, his
discussion of the development of Algerian nationalism does not acknowledge the role
played by Algerian migrant workers in France and his work also pays little attention to
the role that ethnicity plays in nationalism and, in the primordialist tradition, posits
ethnicity as a synonym of culture (1983: 102). The role played by religions such as
Catholicism, Judaism and Islam in nationalism is also briefly, but pertinently, discussed
by Kedourie (1985) who highlights the process by which religion is transformed into
nationalist ideology by drawing on old religious loyalties (1985: 75-77).
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Equally useful for my argument is some of the work of historian Eric
Hobsbawm, in particular his introduction to The Invention of Tradition (1983a) where
he argues that traditions which appear to be ancient are in fact a relatively recent
creation. This proposition is applied to the study of the discourse of the North African
nationalist movement to understand the processes by which traditions are
(re)constructed to enhance the nationalist project. In the final chapter of his edited book,
Hobsbawm analyses that process of invention within a European context (1983b), while
Ranger discusses the use made by colonists of those invented traditions in order to
impose their imperial rule on Africa, and its impact on the colonised (Ranger 1983).
Hobsbawm defines "invented traditions" as "a set of practices, normally governed by
overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to
inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically
implies continuity with the past" (1983a: 1). This continuity with the past is, to a large
extent, fictitious. Traditions differ from customs in that they are presented as fixed and
invariant, and from convention and routine as they belong to the ideological, rather than
technical sphere (1983a: 2-3). The focus on the past to understand the national process
is also what infouns Hobsbawm's other studies (see, for example, 1990, 1996).
His work on nationalism, which focuses particularly on its spread (national
sentiments) within the wider population (1992: 12-102) is, I would argue, more
problematic. Indeed, it establishes too much of a distinction between old (and mostly
European) democratic nations with new "unhistorical" (and by that may be implied
inauthentic) nations, particularly in ex-colonial territories when, as Anderson (1983: 15)
shows - and this is a contention Hobsbawm acknowledges too briefly in his book (1992:
46) - all nations are imagined communities. Furthermore, his emphasis on the
importance of ethnicity (and language) in the nationalism of those newer nations (1992:
102) is pertinent, but he somewhat downplays its role in older nations, arguing that the
emergence of ethnicity occured mainly after the establishment of the nation-state
(through racism) (1992: 64-66). As my discussion of the ENA/PPA shows, some
conelation exists between the way in which ethnicity (or a certain political
representation of it) and language were used to shape the nation in Algerian nationalist
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discourse and the manner in which they had been mobilised in France, not only after the
birth of the modern Jacobin nation-state, but also long before its emergence in the case
of language. Hobsbawm's argument that "cultural movements like pan-arabism ... were
not nationalist even in this limited sense, but supra-nationalist" (1992:137) fails to
acknowledge that pan-arabism could also consitute a wider ideological framework of
"ethno-political" solidarity within which nationalisms, such as in Algeria, could develop
and find support (as was shown by the relationship that the ENA and the PPA
maintained with Chekib Arslan in Lausanne, with Syrian nationalists, and by their
attendance to the Congrês Islamo-Europeen on 12 September 1935).
Three further remarks concerning his discussion of the Algerian case, which he
often cites, could be made. Firstly, he did not discuss how Algerian nationalism was
different to many other anti-colonial nationalisms in that it developed not amongst "an
exiguous minority of evolues" (1992: 137) but to a large extent, in the working class
diaspora. 22 Secondly, the discourse of the Algerian nationalist movement in the inter-
war years in France contradicts his argument that "the appeal of such 'nations' and
'national movements' [which emerged after anti-colonial struggles] was the opposite of
the nationalism [in older nations] which seeks to bond together those deemed to have
common ethnicity, language, culture, historical past and the rest" (1992: 179). These
references (and one could add religion) were precisely the claims upon which Algerian
nationalism was based. Finally, Hobsbawm's assertion that tensions between the
component parts of the Algerian independence movement (Arabs and Berbers) soon
developed after independence is partially incorrect. Those tensions already existed
within the Etoile as early as 1934 (conflict involving Kessaci), 1934 (Fodil) and 1936
(conflict between Messali Hadj and Imache) and culminated with the "crise berberiste"
within the PPA in 1945-1946 (see, for example, Carlier 1984: 363-364, Harbi 1980: 31-
36).
Let us now turn to Benedict Anderson, whose key book on nationalism,
Imagined Communities (1983), is drawn on in this study. He considers nationality (or
22 In other parts of the colonial empire such as Senegal, the evolues played a more pro-active political
role (see, for example, Conklin 1997).
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nation-ness) and nationalism as cultural artefacts, and the nation as an imagined
community and as a modern phenomenon. What distinguishes nations is not their
authenticity or falsity, but the manner in which they are imagined. Nations are imagined
as limited and sovereign, and conceived as a deep comradeship traversed by a sense of
kinship which can command the highest of loyalties, and ultimately command the
sacrifice of one's life (1983: 15-16). This interpretation of nation and nationalism has
informed much of my work and is discussed at length within the analysis of my two
case studies.
However, even though Anderson argues that kinship is a key marker of nation-
ness, he does not examine explicitly the role that ethnicity plays or, according to some
historians such as Breuilly (1996), does not play within the nationalist process. A
number of authors have, relatively recently, developed an approach to nationalism
which incorporates the question of ethnicity. Probably the most prominent writer on
nationalism and ethnicity is Anthony Smith. Other important analysts include Connor
(1978, 1990, 1993) and Horowitz (1985). Often considered as a proponent of
primordialism, Smith criticises the argument that nations - and by extension ethnic
identities - are constructs, a product of modernity and asserts that nations have formed
around pre-existing ethnic cores rooted in concrete culture and history (Smith 1989).23
My study of discourse and political action within the Algerian nationalist movement in
the inter-war years (but also of the MTA in the 1970s) would tend to contradict this
perspective and infer that ethnic and national identity were indeed shaped by modernity
and, to a certain extent at least, imagined and constructed within the colonial context.
From this brief and clearly not exhaustive review of theories and writers on
nationalism, it appears that the issues of nationalism and nation continue to be the
subject of sustained academic debate, mainly between "primordialists" and proponents
of an interpretation of nationalism as a product of modernity (Birnbaum 1997). No
broad consensus seems to have been reached even on the most fundamental
understanding of what nationalism actually is. What also comes out of this discussion is
that the theoretical and case study-based work on such a phenomenon has focused
23 See, for example, Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) for an exposition of a differing viewpoint.
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essentially on the emergence of anti-colonial independence movements, even in Algeria,
along monolithic lines, presenting it as led by the elites, the evolues, those whom Homi
Bhabha calls pertinently the "mimic m[e]n ... the authorized version[s] of otherness"
(1986: 201). However, the Algerian case (and there may be other comparable examples)
provides a different script altogether. Furthermore, my second case-study appears to fall
foul of much of the work which has been carried out in this field. The MTA was a post-
colonial diasporic movement presenting itself as nationalist. What are we to make of its
claim? What form(s) did its nationalism take? The second part of my study provides a
tentative interpretation of this movement's discourse and ideology. To conclude, it is
worth noting that, to my knowledge, no study tackles the question of nationalism
amongst colonial and post-colonial migrants in a diachronic and systematic way.
1.3 Questions of Method
In this thesis, I will examine a number of archival documents. In the case of the Etoile
nord-africaine and the PPA, my first case-study, the primary sources which will be used
include mainly the newspaper published in France by the nationalist movement (El
Ouma) and tracts, but also other publications produced by (or for) the North African
population in France (such as El Ikdam and L'Ikdam de Paris) and by the French
Communist Party and the CGTU (the communist trade union). Pertinent references
from the French national press in France (and some from the French press in Algeria)
will also be analysed. I consulted those documents and publications at the Bibliotheque
nationale de France and the Archives nationales in Paris. The other key primary
sources pertaining to my first case-study are the official and police reports on the ENA
and the PPA produced by French police and government bodies. I was able to access
these mainly through Archives et Musee at the Prefecture de police de Paris and
Archives nationales.
Unfortunately, my request to consult the police archives on the MTA, my
second case-study, was turned down. The reason that the Renseignements Generaux
gave me (through Archives et Musee at the Prefecture de police de Paris) was that the
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information on that movement was still far too sensitive to be made available to
researchers. However, the large corpus of primary sources on that movement which will
be used in this thesis compensates for this. 24 I consulted the archives of the MTA at the
Bibliotheque de Documentation internationale contemporaine (BDIC) at the University
of Nanterre in Paris. These include some of the movement's publications such as Akhbar
el Haraka and La Voix des travailleurs arabes, reports from leading militants, personal
correspondance, minutes of meetings, tracts and posters, etc. I analysed other sources,
such as publications from the French national and regional press, North African
newspapers and magazines, as well as antiracist newspapers at the Bibliotheque Cujas,
Bibliotlzeque Sainte-Genevieve, the Bibliotheque nationale de France and the
Bibliotheque de Sciences politiques in Paris.
This thesis is multidisciplinary in its approach and fairly wide in scope. It is a
historical, ethnographic and political analysis of aspects of immigration in France. As
stated above, it focuses to a large extent on ethnicity, nation-ness and political
mobilisation within two North African movements set within specific historical
contexts. More importantly, this study will be carried out through a comparative study
of the discourse and actions of these movements and their militants, but also of other
social, political and institutional actors/factors affecting them. In her study of the
militant weekly Sans frontiere (1979-1985), created by ex-militants of the MTA, Polac
(1994) highlights the "unconventional" character of political practices amongst
immigrants (before the 1980s), as well as the importance of discourse in their political
activism which, drawing on Memmi (1985), she refers to as "participation discursive".25
She also points out pertinently that:
Prives du droit de vote, les immigres sont presents dans la sphere politique comme objets dun
discours et comme enjeux de lutte, bien plus que comme acteurs de l'espace politique. Aussi, le
passage au politique signifie-t-il pour beaucoup d'entre eux la prise de parole. (Polac 1994: 360)
24 It is worth noting that most of the documents, tracts and publications of the ENA/PPA and of the MTA
were written in French.
25 Memmi argues that "en dehors des decisions politiques emanant dun tres petit nombre de
professionnels de la politique ayant un pouvoir d'initiative, en quoi consiste l'activite politique? En une
production et reproduction de discours" (Memmi 1985, quoted in Polac 1994:360).
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It would therefore seem important to state briefly what theoretical framework I have
used to explore the complex political discourse of those two movements. Discourse
analysis is a field which is not easy to define for, as van Dijk argues, "the notion of
discourse is essentially fuzzy" (1997a: 1) and has been used in different ways and for
different purposes in a number of areas. Indeed, the different disciplines in which
discourse has been adopted and analysed (or used as an analytical tool) include,
amongst others, philosophy (with the work of Alain Bachelard), linguistics (Ferdinand
Saussure and Emile Benveniste), literary criticism (Jacques Derrida), psychoanalysis
(Jacques Lacan) and Marxism with the works of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault
(Burton and Carlen 1979: 15). Foucault's writing has been most influential in that field,
particularly amongst discourse analysts such as Mills, who argues that:
One of the most productive ways of thinking about discourse is not as a group of signs or a
stretch of text, but as 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak'
(Foucault 1972:49). In this sense, a discourse is something which produces something else (an
utterance, a concept, an effect), rather than something which exists in and of itself and which can
be analysed in isolation. A discursive structure can be detected because of the systematicity of
ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving within a particular context. (Mills
1997:17)
However, systematicity does not mean linear stylistic, semantic, representational or
even ideological coherence and stability in discourse. 26 Apparent contradictions,
variations and shifts can indeed be characteristic of a discourse, and are reflections of
the complex social processes within which text and talk are rooted (van Dijk 1997a, see
also van Dijk 1984, 1992, 1997c & 1997d).
Furthermore, it is important to note that language, which is the core medium of
discourse, is used as a way into ideology (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998: 32). In
26 Indeed, it could be argued that it is one of the tropes of ideology that it can evolve, fluctuate, be
displaced and/or repositioned to perpetuate itself.
33
this study, I will focus on discourse in broadly defined terms. Firstly, discourse will be
apprehended not so much in its structural dimension, but as a cognitive process:
language is constructed, understood, interpreted, hierarchise and branded with meaning
through socio-cultural and religious beliefs, knowledge, gender, ethnicity and ideologies
(amongst others), and can therefore be perceived in different ways. Secondly, discourse
analysis is understood here as more than the study of the structural and cognitive
characteristics of language. Discourse is also viewed as (to use van Dijk's terminology)
a 'context-sensitive' process of action and interaction in society:
If we want to explain what discourse is all about, it would be insufficient to merely analyse its
internal structures, the actions being accomplished, or the cognitive operations being involved in
language use. We need to account for the fact that discourse as social action is being engaged in
within a framework of understanding, communication and interaction which is in turn part of
broader sociocultural structures and processes (van Dijk 1997a: 21).
Therefore, discourse is conceived here in broadly-defined terms and is looked at from a
multi-disciplinary perspective. This study concentrates on discourse and on the
cognitive, social, political structures and processes that inform its 'context', and
highlights the multiple relationships between text and context (van Dijk 1991: 4), and
also between discourse and action.
Within this wider framework, it could also be said that discourse is a
representation, that it structures our sense of reality (both diachronically and
synchronically) and the way in which we perceive our and other people's identity
(Pecheux 1982, Mills 1997). It can constitute a tool of power and hegemony, and a
means of establishing consensus around the dominant ideology. Also, access to public
discourse is, in a number of ways, limited and controlled by the powerful (van Dijk
1997b).
In that context, it would also be pertinent to our study of the discourse of the
ENA/PPA and the MTA to highlight the fact that ideological struggle is the essence of
discourse structure (Pecheux 1982, in Mills 1997). I would go further and argue that
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discourse is one of the key terrains where ideologies (and identities) can be constructed,
shaped, negotiated, and where they can clash. Control and domination often imply some
form of resistance and counter discourse. My study will examine and illustrate the
complex processes and strategies underlying the discourse of the dominated (such as
ethnic minorities),27
 and how it can also constitute an empowering tool and be
appropriated by them as a means of challenging dominant discourse and ideology.
1.4 Theoretical and methodological framework, and main results of analysis
This study aims to analyse the discom ses of the EtoileIPPA and of the MTA, and
examine the complex processes by which the North African diaspora was able to
establish and develop a strong political voice and tradition in France during the inter-
war period and the 1970s. The analysis will focus more specifically on the concepts of
ethnicity and nation-ness which were particularly salient, and inextricably linked to one
another in their discourse, and highlight the hybrid character of their ideology and the
way in which it was enunciated.
In broad terms, my analysis of ethnicity in both organisations is developed from
a situationalist perspective (Barth 1969a, Wallman 1979), but is also informed by the
contention that ethnicity cannot be fully understood if it is viewed exclusively as being
shaped at the boundary between "us" and "them", as it does not fully account for the
complexity of this concept. This perspective also needs to incorporate another
dimension of ethnicity: the fact that it is also marked by the social, cultural, political,
economic and religious context within which it is developed and posited (this could be
called a "context-sensitive" approach).
The second concept which shaped both movements' discourse is that of nation. It
is understood here as a modern concept and phenomenon rooted in politics (Breuilly
1996), but also in ethnicity, and is viewed as an imagined community (Anderson 1983)
shaped by nationalism.
27 This also applies to other dominated groups, including women.
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The analysis of the ENA/PPA and the MTA's discourses is based on the
contention that it is a cognitive process, and that language, which is at its core, is a way
into ideology (Blommaert and Vershueren 1998:32). It is also a "context-sensitive"
process of action and interaction in society (van Dijk 1997a: 21) which can empower
and mobilise the dominated and allow them to contest the dominant discourse and
ideology.
Two important aspects of the discourse of the EtoileIPP A and the MTA are
discussed in this thesis and inform its structure. The first section of each case-study
looks at the ways in which ethnicity and nation-ness were shaped in the discourse of
both movements, and how they were informed in sometimes overlapping, sometimes
differing ways, by key markers of kinship (class, religion, history and memory and
culture). Both nationalist movements viewed Maghrebis' ethnic and national identity as
grounded in Arabness. In the case of the Etoile and the PPA in the inter-war period, this
ethnic identity was posited as a means of countering the colonial narrative which aimed
to divide the North African Muslim population along ethnic lines, and as the
justification for the creation of an Algerian nation-state built within the borders of the
colonial territory. As for the MTA, the aim of its revolution was to establish an Arab
nation encompassing the whole Arab world and transcending the modern structures of
nation-states which they viewed as dividing the Arab people and serving the interest of
imperialism.
The ENA/PPA's ethno-national claims were grounded in religion and history.
Islam was constructed as a high culture capable of mobilising North Africans around the
movement's nationalist agenda, and as the foundation of a once great Arabo-Islamic
culture that their nationalist project aimed to restore. In the case of the MTA, religion
was reduced to its visible and cultural dimension. In the discourse of this movement
which was very much influenced by the struggle of North Africans (and particularly
Algerians) for independence and marked by May 1968, far more emphasis was put on
the concept of class as a key marker of their ethno-national identity, as well as on
culture and cultural practice as a means of mobilisation.
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The second section of both case studies looks at the nationalist movements'
relationship with, and discourse on the Other, that is to say on socio-political
phenomena and ideologies, governments, polical groups, parties and individuals, as well
as national and international events which were seen as affecting the movement
positively and/or negatively. Such a process of interaction and conflict implied that
these markers of what could be coined the "out", informed in various and complex ways
the shaping of identity in both organisations. Racism was one of those markers. It
traversed all aspects of Maghrebis' life, epitomised all the forms of oppression that they
were subjected to, and informed the way in which militants within those movements
mobilised. In the inter-war period, it was seen as the driving force behind the colonial
project of domination and dispossession, and therefore justified Muslims' fight for
independence. In the 1970s, the MTA viewed racism as being present at all levels of
society and as underpinning the West's imperialist agenda. Mobilisation for rights along
ethnic and class lines, and solidarity with the French people, seen as the true heir of the
Revolutionary legacy, were perceived as the only way to fight racism and oppression
effectively. This vision was somewhat problematic as it established a dichotomy
between universalism and racism, and between racism and nationalism when it could be
argued that these concepts are linked in some ways. This may, to some extent, explain
the sometimes tense relationship between the nationalist organisations and the major
French left-wing political organisations and unions.
In this context marked by racism, solidarity with the dominated was also seen as
crucial. The ENA/PPA established links with Moroccan and Tunisian nationalist
parties and student organisations, as well as with Black and Annamese organisations.
The MTA supported and participated in protest and strike actions involving
Mauritanians and Pakistanis, and had established contacts with other parties of the Arab
left. Those North Africans who did not support the action of both nationalist
organisations were often depicted as betraying the Arab people and serving the interest
of imperialism. 28
 Finally, for the ENA/PPA and even more so for the MTA, the
28 These included Algerian reformist parties and student organisation in the case of the ENA/PPA, and
the Arnicales and illegitimate governments in North Africa for the MTA).
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Palestinians' fight against Zionism epitomised the Arab people's, and by extension their
own struggle for rights and freedom, and against imperialist oppression.
To conclude, my aim, in this thesis, is to draw upon this theoretical framework
and to carry out a detailed analysis of these dimensions of the ENA/PPA and the MTA's
discourses and assess the complex processes by which Maghrebi immigrants in France
were able to develop a complex and shifting discourse on ethno-national identity rooted
in their diasporic experience. This study will place the discourse of the coloniaux nord-
africains and that of post-colonial Maghrebi immigrants within the same analytical
framework. In doing so, my aim is to reconcile these two social, political and historical
phenomena which have, too often, been broached in a dichotomous way (one belonging
mainly to Algeria's struggle for independence, the other to that of post-colonial
immigration rooted in a French context), and to highlight the process by which
Maghrebi immigrants were able to build a consistent political tradition in France.
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Part 1
North African nationalism in the inter-war period in France:
the case of the Etoile nord-africaine and the Parti du peuple alggrien
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Chapter 2
Ethnicity and nation-ness
2.1 Introduction
In the inter-war period in France, the discourse of the North African nationalist
movement on the nation was characterised by its focus on Maghrebis as an ethnic group
and on ethnicity as the underlying mobilising force behind their nationalism. But what
ideological function did this concept fulfil? How was ethnicity invoked in relation to
nation-ness? The aim of this chapter is to try and answer these questions. I will first
assess whether the North African migrant community constituted - and still constitutes -
a diaspora, and by extension whether we can describe the Algerian nationalist discourse
as diasporic. Secondly, the concept of ethnicity which is so central to North Africans'
nationalist discourse, will be defined. Thirdly, we will examine the function that
Frenchness/Otherness fulfilled in the process of identity construction. And finally, we
will look at the role played by race and ethnicity in the construction of a national
consciousness.
2.2 The Maghrebi diaspora
Algerian nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s - in its modern form - was born and
evolved within the North African migrant community and was shaped by their
experience in France. However, can the case be made for defining Maghrebi migrants in
France as part of a diasporic community, and for considering their experience and
discourse as diasporic? Safran's wider definition of diaspora would suggest that it can:
I suggest that ... the concept of dispora be applied to expatriate minority communities whose
members share several of the following characteristics: (1) they, or their ancestors have been
dispersed from a specific original "center" to two or more "peripheral", or foreign regions; (2)
they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland -its physical
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viewed as being inscribed in diasporic terms. During the colonial period, many had left
the Maghreb to go to France and the Middle East. They perceived their experience in
France as an abnormal period in their life, comparable with "warfare in an 'infidel'
land", as Paz described it (Le Populaire, 10 avril 1938). El Ouma (Numero 58,
decembre 1937) referred to North African workers in France as "[des] proletaires nord-
africains de France, des deportes economiques que le colonialisme exploiteur chassa de
leur foyer et de leur patrie". As a political movement, the Etoile nord-africaine, in spite
of its focus on North Africa, was very much anchored within the North African
community in France, and its political philosophy was informed by a realisation that the
exile of Maghrebis in France was the direct result of colonial oppression. In a meeting
organised by the Club du Faubourg on 18 March 1936 on the "malaise algerien" which
gathered most of the parties involved in the Algerian question, Dr Ben Sliman,
representing the Etoile, defined his movement as follows:
Quest-ce que l'Etoile Nord-Africanze? Une organisation qui groupe les travailleurs alg6riens,
tunisiens et marocains émigrés en France et qui a pour but leur education politique pour leur
permettre de travailler a remancipation nationale et sociale de l'Afrique du Nord. Elle defend
aussi les Nord-Africains traqu6s par la rue Lecomte [i.e. the Brigade nord-africaine which was
the police unit in charge of the surveillance of North Africans in Paris], les chOmeurs radies et
tous ceux qui sont brimes par l'administration. (El Ouina, Numero 39, mars-avril 1936)
The Etoile was therefore described as a movement born in exile whose main aim was to
educate and mobilise North African migrants in order to achieve independence and
restore their homeland.
North African migrants could also be regarded as a diaspora because of the very
nature of their migration process. Colonialism had contributed to the cultural alienation
of the indigenous population and had destroyed the communal system and behavioural
code that were essential in maintaining social cohesion (Khellil 1979: 63). 30 The
For a detailed study of colonialism in North Africa, see, for example, Berque (1970), Cohen (1972),
Marseille (1984), Djilali (1975).
42
introduction of the Code de l'indigênat (a segregationist and punitive code applied to the
Muslims), the imposition of the European taxation system and of individual ownership
devitalised and dislocated the pre-colonial economy (Cordeiro 1971: 48). Dispossession
of the more fertile land by the French colonial authorities resulted in a large-scale rural
exodus (Bourdieu and Sayad: 1964), and increasing pauperisation and debt, lack of land
and demographic growth led to more farmers becoming day labourers in French farms
or in towns and cities.
In that context, emigration was described, in the discourse of the ENA/PPA, as
Muslims' best option to escape the oppressive realities of colonialism. It could offer
some reprieve from the forces of dispossession as many worked in France to help
financially their families and communities in North Africa. 31 Their act constituted what
Stora calls "Fechappee hors du ghetto colonial" (1992b: 14). Contrary to a frequently-
held belief, migrants did not represent the least able amongst the North African
population. The best were chosen to carry out such a important task (Sayad 1977: 61).
The colonial context within which migration took place, which was evoked by the
nationalist movement, showed that emigration was, to a large extent, a political act. In
1933, in an article denouncing the racist comments about Kabyle immigrants made by
the French press and the dispossession and oppression endured by Muslims in North
Africa, Imache Amar, then General Secretary of the ENA, compared emigration with an
"exode des martyrs ... qui ont fui l'enfer" and described the process of migration as
follows:
Je voulais dedier cet article A tous mes freres. A ceux qui souffrent la-bas, en Afrique du Nord,
de l'oppression imperialiste, obliges de courber la tete sous l'autorite feodale, sous la Republique
democratique qui fait couler a flots la ojustice et la paix», et aussi a mes freres expatries, A ceux
qui fuient devant l'odieux code de l'indigenat et qui paient cher le droit d'aller en exil Je
pensais A la douleur qui etreint les cceurs A la veille du depart et au dechirement a l'heure de se
31 Sayad refers to the process of migration of North Africans in the inter-war period as the first "age" of
emigration: "consequence en meme temps qu'indice de la ruine de l'equilibre ancien dans lequel
perseveraient la societe et l'economie paysannes traditionnelles, l'emigration en France avait pour
fonction premiere de donner aux communautes paysannes les moyens de se perpetuer en tant que
telles" (1977: 61).
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separer, car pour nous la seule solution est de partir: a cOte du colon heureux et riche dune terre
quit nous a volee, ii n'y a pas de place pour nous. (El Ouma Numero 19, decembre 1933)
The nationalist movement's discourse on emigration conjures up notions of exile,
separation and oppression, as well as an awareness of the racism and hostility that North
Africans were subjected to, not only in the colonies but also in metropolitan France. It is
a discourse which is imbued with diasporic feelings of loss and memory, and of hopes
that their eventual return to their homeland will be marked by their emancipation and
freedom. The economic imperatives which motivated their migration were inextricably
linked to their social, political and economic marginalisation in North Africa.
2.3 Definition of ethnicity: at the boundary between "us" and "them"
Defining ethnicity, and by extension understanding what an ethnic group consists of,
can be a complex exercise given the fact that various schools of thought have offered
different (sometimes conflicting, sometimes overlapping) interpretations of the concept.
For instance, Wallerstein's view that the ethnic group is a "categorie culturelle, definie
par certains comportements persistants, transmis de generation en generation, et qui a la
difference de nation ne sont pas en theorie circonscrits dans la frontiêre d'un etat"
(Balibar and Wallerstein 1988: 105) reflects many anthropological studies which have
traditionally equated ethnic groups and cultures. Barth, on the other hand, distinguishes
between the former and the latter and focuses on ethnic boundary maintenance rather on
culture as a marker of ethnicity (1969a: 15). 32
 Of the two definitions, Barth's is the most
pertinent, as it puts an emphasis on the transactional, negotiated and shifting nature of
ethnic boundaries. Wallman's interpretation of ethnicity (1979: 3), which is inspired by
Barth's, will be used as a working definition in this chapter in order to evaluate the role
that it played in the formation of an ethno-national identity amongst North African
nationalists in France.33
32 For Barth's definition of ethnicity and ethnic boundaries, see chapter 1, section 1.2.1, p. 11.
33 For Wallman's definition of ethnicity, see chapter 1, section 1.2.1., p. 12.
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If ethnicity can be defined as a process which is articulated at the boundary
between "us" and "them", it should also be understood, within the framework of this
study, as a constitutive part of a wider process. It was indeed at the point of contact, at
the boundary between the ethnic and the political that Algerian national identity was
constructed. Algerian nation-ness was shaped by a binary process: on the one hand,
ethnic membership facilitates group formation in the political sphere, and on the other
hand, it is the political community that inspires the belief in common ethnicity (Weber
1997: 19).
2.4 Nation-ness and difference
The interplay between ethnicity and nation-ness which was at the core of the formation
of the ethno-national bond in the North African diaspora needs to be examined in order
to better understand the processes of construction of the community's identity. By
nation-ness, a term borrowed from Anderson (1983: 13), is meant nationality or the
sense of belonging to a "nation". Even though "nation-ness", "nationhood" and
"nationality" are terms which, for stylistic reasons, will be used interchangeably in this
study, there is a case for selecting/privileging a distinct word such as "nation-ness" in
order to highlight the specificities of the diasporic context within which Algerian
national identity was constructed by North African nationalist militants in France in the
1920s and 1930s. The path followed by them was, to a large extent, distinct from the
more "traditional" processes of nationality formation which marked most other anti-
colonial nationalist movements, that is to say the ones which were spatially rooted in
what was to become the independent state.
Before returning to our study of the North African nationalist movement, it is
necessary to define briefly the concept of nationalism, as well as those of nation and
nation-state which tend to be used widely and interchangeably, and assess the
relationship that exists between them. Giddens interprets pertinently "nationalism" as
being "a phenomenon that is primarily psychological - the affiliation of individuals to a
set of symbols and beliefs emphasising communality among the people of a political
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order" (1992: 116) and the "nation-state" as a "bordered power container" (1992: 120).
However, his reference to the "nation" as a "collectivity existing within a clearly
demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored
both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states" (1992: 116) is more
problematic because it is limited to those cases where there is an equivalence between
the nation and the established state. It does not allow for a better understanding of other
forms of the nation that still exist outside the state structure - the Kurdish nation comes
to mind - or within the historical context of colonialism prior to the formation of post-
colonial states.
Connor (1978), who favours an ethnic rather than political interpretation of
nation, argues that the terms "nation" and "state" have too often been used
synonymously when there is, most of the time, no direct correlation between the two.
He also criticises the broadly used designation of "nation-state" to describe all
established state structures, even when the majority of them contain several nations. He
defines the state as the major political subdivision of the globe, which is readily defined
and easily conceptualised in quantitative terms (Connor 1978: 379). On the other hand,
Connor sees the essence of a nation as intangible and argues that "this essence is a
psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious
conviction of its members, from all other people in a most vital way. The nature of that
bond and its well-spring remain shadowy and elusive" (ibid). Anderson, however,
challenges this somewhat primordialist reading by clarifying the nature of that bond,
and takes the concept of nation further when he defines it as an imagined community
(1983: 15).
This interpretation can shed some useful light on the processes of ethno-national
formation within the North African migrant community during the inter-war years.
Indeed, if one accepts his contention, then it is worth exploring the way in which the
Algerian nation was imagined. In a tract announcing a political rally on 16 June 1933,
the nationalist movement referred to itself as "l'Etoile nord-africaine, votre organisation
nationale" (Note sur l'activite de l'Etoile Nord-Africaine depuis sa creation jusqu'au 15
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novembre 1934: 61) ( 1 ) . 34 But what nation did nationalists invoke, and how did they
define it? Was it built on a sense of ethnic belonging or on other foundations?
Firstly, it could be argued that the movement's sense of nation-ness was very
much informed by what it was not, or rather what it was against. Indeed, much of its
discourse focused on rejecting the idea that Algeria was French and by extension, that
Muslims in Algeria could one day become French. The nationalist newspaper often
reminded militants that "L'Algerie ne fut jamais francaise, elle nest pas francaise elle ne
sera jamais francaise de par la volonte de ses enfants" (El Ouma Numero 25,
Septembre-octobre 1934) and condemned the concept of a French Algeria in an article
hostile to a pro-colonialist association created by the French authorities, called Algerie
francaise, which recruited amongst North African immigrants in France :
L'« Algerie francaise » quelle derision! L'Algerie, en quoi est-elle francaise, par quoi est-elle
francaise? Non, vraiment, ii n'y a pas d'Algerie francaise, ii y a une Algerie dominee par les
Francais, oui! mais l'Algerie restera eternellement algerienne ... nous preferons et combattons
pour rester « Algeriens... algeriens ». (El Ouma Nurnero 58, decembre 1937)
Becoming French, which implied a renunciation of one's Muslim status, was perceived
as a betrayal of Islam. In a meeting organised by the ENA on 9 September 1934, Imache
Amar called for "la mise a l'index de tous les naturalises, traitres a l'Islam" (Note sur
l'activite de l'ENA: 101) (1). The "naturalises", who usually belonged to the Algerian
elite, were also relentlessly condemned in the nationalists' newspaper. In an article
published in El Otuna, the movement expressed its indignation to see the French
Commission Inter-Ministerielle des Affaires Musulmanes control the Muslim faith and
Law in North Africa with the assistance of leading North African reformist politicians
such as Khalifat El Djerad and Dr Ben Jelloun:
Comment M. le Docteur Ben Jelloul qui a declare solennellement plus dune fois qu'il pense en
francais, qu'il réve en francais et qu'il parle en francais, comment peut-il, diable! s'occuper des
34 From now on, I will refer to this source as Note sur l'activite de l'ENA.
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questions juridiques islamiques? Certes, il est bien facile au Kalifat [El Djerad] et h son jeune
partenaire [Ben Jelloul] de faire des declarations d'amour a Marianne, meme quand celle-ci les
repousse avec repugnance, de &biter sans cesse ses declarations de loyalisme et d'attachement A
la « Mere-Patrie » Allez donc avec votre Mere-Pali ie, serrez-la, sacrifiez-vous pour elle, mais
nous vous defendons de parler de nous et de l'Islam. Vous etes indignes de l'Islam et de la
societe arabe, partez! qu'ils se fassent naturaliser qu'ils nous laissent travailler pour la
construction de notre Patrie, qui saura aimer ses enfants en mere, et non en maratre. (El Ouma
Numero 39, mars-avril 1936)
The gendered and sexual metaphors used in this extract to differentiate between French
and Algerian nation-ness is worth highlighting. Here, French nationality is personified
by Marianne, and the declaration of love made to Marianne by those "notables
naturalises", symbolising their love for France and their desire to become French
citizens, is constructed as belonging to the sphere of the unnatural and of perversion
(through the ambiguities of the term "maratre"). It is a one-way relationship which is
only met with disgust by the loved one (Marianne). By contrast, the nation-ness which
they, as nationalists, are longing for is also personified, but it is presented as the natural,
generous and disinterested love of a mother for her children ("notre Patrie, qui saura
aimer ses enfants en mere").
Naturalisation not only meant betraying Islam, it was also equated with
christianisation. In the Algerian nationalist discourse, the relationship between
nationality and religion was constructed as a binary process; naturalisation implied
christianisation, whilst Algerian nationalism was equivalent to the preservation of Islam
and the Muslim identity of North Africans. This point is illustrated by the speech made
by a militant, Amar, during a political meeting of the Levallois-Perret section of the
Etoile on 12 September 1933:
Le peuple [n']est avide que dune seule aspiration: etre libre et independant, quant aux hypocrites
allies des missionnaires ... qui essayent d'engouffrer les musulmans algeriens dans la
christianisation. En disant: «nous voulons une place dans la grande famille francaise, et nous
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voulons etre des Francais musulmans». Ceux-la se heurtent a la colonne solidement edifiee de
l'Etoile qui ne desire que la tradition des Arabes, et la divine doctrine ... Nous sommes Algeriens
musulmans ... nous en sommes fiers. Et pour rien au monde nous accepterons d'être francais. (El
°tuna Numero 15, octobre 1933)
The assertion that the best way for Algerian, and more broadly North African, Muslims
to preserve their religious identity was to adhere to their nationalist programme was
reiterated on a frequent basis by the movement. In 1935 the Etoile asked all Muslims to
open their eyes to the "danger de christianisation et de naturalisation" (El Ouma
Numero 34, octobre 1935), and a further article published in El Ouma entitled
"Musulmans... Alerte!!!" written under the pseudonym "El Ancari" by the Moroccan
student leader El Kholti who was himself a Berber, denounced the attempts made by the
"Peres Blanes" to spread Christian faith amongst the Kabyles
Mais nous voulons mettre en garde nos coreligionnaires contre les charlatans et les hypocrites,
de ceux qui profitent de la misere du peuple musulman pour les christianiser et qui obligent, dans
les domaines composes de milliers d'hectares de terre volees aux musulmans ... les ouvriers
musulmans a faire la priere devant eux, sous menace de renvoi Voici que le Pere Blanc Jean
Lemoine nous demande de chanter la «Marseillaise», au lieu de «linternationale» ... Nous
aurions a la rigueur chante la «Marseillaise», si elle etait encore le chant de ceux qui
proclamerent les principes de 1789 et de ceux qui, en 1792, la chanterent pour apporter la liberte,
et non l'esclavage, aux peuples. Et pour nous, Musulmans, aujourd'hui nous preferons mieux
chanter «Beni-El Ouatani». (El Ounia Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935)
Under a colonial rule which had dispossessed Maghrebis from their land and
undermined much of the traditional socio-cultural fabric of North Africa, nationalists
viewed their Muslim heritage as the last and most important marker of identity. In this
extract, Christianity is equated with the colonial oppression that North Africans are
subjected to. They brushed aside accusations made by Jean Lemoine that their
nationalist agenda was part of a communist plot ("voici que le Pere Blanc ... nous
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demande de chanter la «Marseillaise», au lieu de «l'Internationale»") (El Ouma Numero
29, fevrier-mars 1935). Their rejection of French nation-ness was symbolised by the
evocation of France in historically binary terms: the France that oppressed them bore no
resemblance to that of the French Revolution whose values and principles they, as
nationalists, adhered to. The latter had ceased to exist, and their salvation lay in their
nationalist struggle for an independent Algeria (as implied by their reference to "Beni-
El Ouatani", the Algerian national anthem).35
Another theme developed in their discourse was the rejection of the belief held
by some North Africans that they would gain materially if they obtained French
citizenship. The political vision developed by the movement illustrates the extent to
which many North African immigrants had developed a class consciousness during their
presence in metropolitan France. They had clearly been influenced by their contact with
the French working class and by their involvement in union activity and protest actions
in the workplace. They also realised that in the class-system, they belonged to and
would remain part of the "sous-proletariat" whatever their legal status, and this for as
long as the colonial order was in place and Algeria was not independent:
Les Musulmans n'ont jamais et6 francais, ne le sont pas, et ne le seront jamais, jamais, au
GRAND JAMA1S ... Car nous savons pertinemment que ce nest pas la citoyennete qui nous
sortira de la misêre dans laquelle nous pateaugeons, puisque nous constatons la situation
desesperee de nos camarades ouvriers francais... nous puiserons la douleur d'aimer notre chêre
Algerie, au fond de ces gdhennes que sont nos taudis de la Metropole, et les gourbis et les tentes
du bled. (El Chima Numero 29, fëvrier-mars 1935)
Even though this study will show later that the reference to class did not appear
frequently and explicitly as a key element in the construction of their identity, class
awareness, as shown above, constituted nonetheless a reason not to be assimilated into
the French nation as, to them, French citizenship did not imply better living conditions.
35 An early version of the national anthem was translated by the police (see 'Hymne national algerien', 20
mai 1937) (1).
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North African nationalists' sense of belonging to a nation was marked by a
discourse belonging to the sphere of the family, and by a sense of affiliation and
faithfulness to one's religion. It was a nation where ties of fraternity were seen as
crucially important. Dr Ben Sliman insisted in his speech at the "Club du Faubourg" on
18 March 1936 on the fact that national emancipation could only be achieved by ending
the colonisation of the Algerian people by a minority of foreigners who had no feeling
of fraternity with Muslims (El Otuna Numero 39, mars-avril 1936). The nation also had
to love all her "children" as a true and generous mother, not as a "maratre". France's
colonial domination of Algeria therefore disqualified her as a possible repository of
nation-ness for Muslims. Here, as well as in the following extract, identity is articulated
in terms of difference, by positioning one's identity as inherently and irreconciliably
different from the other's:
Nous ne serons francais ni par la race, ni par la langue, ni par la religion. Non et mule fois non,
l'Arabe sain d'esprit ne sera jamais francais, quoique vous fassiez, messieurs les assimilateurs! II
ne peut pas le devenir du jour au lendemain. (El Ouma Numero 64, 27 mai 1938)
However, defining nationhood simply within those dichotomous parameters would be
too limited. Indeed, marking it out in contrast to, or against, otherness may be a
necessary step in the process of identity formation as it clarifies the boundary of
selfhood, but it hardly provides a viable reference or blueprint for the construction of
what could be called the "inner" substance that makes up nation-ness. It is worth noting
here that given the shifting nature of that boundary, identity is not a unidimensional
construct, but rather the multifaceted and unstable product of a process of negotiation,
transaction, exchange and conflict.
If Algerian nationalists rejected unequivocally the idea that North African
Muslims could become French, they argued nonetheless that their newly born
nationalist feelings should not turn into hatred for the French people and more
ambiguously for French nationalism - nationalism in the sense of love, loyality and, as
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Connor points out, identification with one's nation (October 1978: 384). An El Ouma
article written in 1938 and entitled "L'Algerie vivra" illustrates this point clearly:
Mais ne croyez pas, mes freres, que l'amour de nou e pays doit nous amener a detester celui des
autres. Non, au contraire, nous ne pouvons avoir que de l'admiration pour les peuples qui ont su
garder leur independance ou qui Font obtenue par leur courage et leur devouement. Cela ne doit
pas nous amener a attaquer ou a blamer la patrie et le peuple francais si herdique et Si juste. (El
Otuna Numero 62, ler avril 1938)
This passage raises a number of questions about the way in which nationalists perceived
their own identity. The Algerian nationalist movement had developed largely as a result
of French colonial domination. This domination, as expressed through a colonial project
which declared that Algeria was part of France, was clearly a manifestation of French
nationalism. However, the PPA, as it was then called, still described the French people,
and more importantly French nationalism, with admiration ("l'amour de notre pays ne
doit pas nous amener a detester celui des autres"). 36 How can this apparent contradiction
be explained?
Firstly, it could be argued that Algerian nationalism bore many of the tropes of
its French equivalent, as will be seen in the following section (reference to French
revolutionary principles, to the "Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen", to
pride in national independence and to the concept of the "Republique une et
indivisible", etc.). It was essentially a modern political concept of nation that was
adopted. 37
Secondly, the ENA/PPA still made a distinction between, on the one hand, the
people of France, whose claim to national sovereignty they considered legitimate and
which they wanted to emulate, and on the other hand, French imperialism. The
36 The Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA) was created on 11 March 1937 by Messali Hadj after the
dissolution of the Etoile nord-africaine by the Front Popula ire Government on 27 January of the same
year (Stora 1992b: 49-50).
37 Further on in this section, our discussion of the movement's attempt to construct the Algerian nation
along "ethnic" lines is shown not to be contradictory with this point. The "ethnic profile" that nationalists
attributed to the ideal Algerian nation could not hide the fact that the process and substance of nation-
building as it appeared in their discourse was inherently modern and political.
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distinction made between the two seems to imply that they might have been unaware of
the fact that both were inextricably linked. It is also interesting to note that this
dichotomous interpretation was made at the apogee of the French colonial empire,
which coincided with the development of Algerian nationalism in its modern form.
Clearly, there had been previous expressions of nationalism in colonial Algeria, such as
Abd el-Kader's war against the French between 1840 and 1847 and the 1871 Kabyle
uprising, but unlike Messali Hadj's movement, they were not articulated along modern
lines.
Let us now assess the content of the movement's nationalism. How was it shaped
and what was it composed of? Did it aim to establish a North African state which would
destroy the colonial border established by the French, a state that all Maghrebis would
embrace all the more willingly and "naturally" as it corresponded to their national
aspiration of building a state based on the "homogeneous ethnic make-up" of North
Africans? This was certainly one of the options on the Etoile's agenda when it was
created by the French Communist Party on 20 March 1926. Its mission then was to
unite all North Africans against colonialism and during the early years of the movement
(until the late 1920s), its discourse often called for the mobilisation of all Maghrebis in
order to gain the independence of North Africa. However, as a police report noted, the
ENA never really managed to establish a common front between Algerians, Moroccans
and Tunisians (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 172) (1).
Even though solidarity between the different "national" groups w as constantly
displayed, the action and discourse of the Etoile shifted rapidly to focus mainly on
Algerian issues. The reasons for this relative rupture in North African unity of action are
multiple. One of them had to do with the nature of North African immigration to
France: Algerians dominated numerically and Algerian issues were probabl), giN en
more importance than those affecting other North African workers, thus alienating many
of them. 38 It can also be explained by the fact that differently perhaps from Morocco
and Tunisia, where part of the elite was developing quite a radical agenda (the Jeunes
38 Within the wider context of immigration in France in the inter-war period, Carlier points out that
"[m]inoritaire dans l'immigration, mais majoritaire dans l'immigration coloniale, l'immigration algero-
maghrebine est la plus differenciee et la plus sujette au fantasme"(1985: 156).
53
Marocains in Morocco and the Destour in Tunisia), the Algerian nationalist movement
was, during the inter-war years at least, anchored in the working class Algerian diaspora
in France, and not in the educated middle-classes in Algeria who had adopted a more
reformist stance.39
During a meeting organised on 30 July 1933, Radjef Belkacem, then member of
the central committee and treasurer of the ENA, and someone the police described as
the most devoted and active lieutenant of Messali Hadj (ibid: 149-151) made a speech
in which he called North Africans to rally around one programme: "L'Algerie aux
Algeriens, le Maroc aux Marocains, la Tunisie aux Tunisiens" (ibid: 64). How can this
slogan be interpreted?
Let us first concentrate on the countries mentioned here and note that the borders
established by the French colonial authorities were not challenged as a further legacy of
the divisive French imperialist project. On the contrary, they seemed to have been
adopted as valid frameworks for the creation of independent North African states. The
ethnic make-up (or "imagined" ethnic make-up, to use Anderson's term) of a nation was
therefore not necessarily considered to be the indispensable foundation and justification
for the shaping of a similarly imagined nation-state. In as much as ethnic boundaries
could shift and encompass the whole of North Africa, the struggle for the establishment
of an independent state seemed to dictate that the frontiers of the nation had to be
defined and shaped in order to fit into the rigid borders of the ex-colony. This choice
was itself fraught with problems and, as history has shown, would create further unrest
and instability (for example, the post-independence semi-official wars between Algeria
and Morocco triggered by a dispute over borders).
The second question which needs to be explored here in order to better
understand the process of national formation and nationalism in this case-study is to
assess who nationalists referred to when they used the terms "Algerians", "Moroccans"
39 However, it is worth noting that the leadership of the ENA usually belonged to the more educated
section of the working-class migrant population, and that the profile of ENA and PPA militants in Algeria
was different, as nationalists had developed a significant audience amongst sections of the more educated
Algerian youth (Carlier 1995).
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and "Tunisians". As Bauman (1992: 676) argues pertinently, "to explain the
phenomenon of the nations, one needs to explain the phenomenon of nationalism".40
In the nationalist discourse of the Etoile and the PPA, the Algerian nation and
the state were evoked in different ways. Indeed, it could conjure up the vision of an
independent Algerian state and of the Algerian people based on democracy,
multiculturalism and where different faiths could co-exist, when they demanded "la
suppression du Gouvernement General, de la Delegation Financiere, et leur
remplacement par un Parlement algerien, elu au suffrage universel, par le peuple
algerien, sans distinction de race et de religion" (El Ouma Numero 34, octobre 1935).
And this open and tolerant conception of Algeria was not deemed to be in contradiction
with the nationalist feelings of the ENA, as the following passage shows:
Nous disons, nous nationalistes, qui aimons notre pays, qui desirons pour lui l'instruction, la
liberte, la paix, la justice, le bien-etre pour l'ensemble de ses enfants, sans distinction de race ou
de religion, que la seule solution est dans le peuple algerien lui-meme, dans son union, dans son
organisation, et dans la lutte quotidienne, qu'il doit entreprendre pour la realisation de ses
revendications immediates, et pour sa liberation nationale. (El Ouma Numero 29, fevrier-mars
1935)
In this extract, the ENA's vision of the ideal Algerian nation was rooted in the political
rather than in ethnicity, and its representation of Algerian people included Maghrebis,
Europeans and Jews. It was a nationalism which, the Etoile claimed, was based on
generous values of tolerance and not on racism, which gave the same rights to the
majority as to the minorities. It was a reversal of the colonial order in the sense that in a
free and independent Algeria, the ethnic make-up of the country would be kept as it
was, but it would be a free democratic state where what Messali Hadj's movement
perceived as the true Revolutionary spirit of 1789 and the "Declaration des Droits de
l'Homme et du Citoyen" would find a home. Several examples can be mentioned to
40 Even though this assertion is valid in the context of this study, it is worth noting that there are also
cases, such as the Welsh, where the nation exists outside the sphere of nationalism; that is to say that the
Welsh have not, or not yet, developed patterns normally associated with it.
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illustrate this point. During the debate organised by "the Club du Faubourg" on the
Algerian question 18 March 1936, Dr Ben Sliman's expose of the nationalist view
sparked off a hostile reaction from the French settlers present in the audience who,
according to El °tuna, shouted "Vive la France". Ben Sliman, who was the Etoile's
delegate, then reacted by declaring:
Oui! Vive la France de la Revolution de 89! Vive la France des Droits de l'Homme!
Le peuple algerien, maitre de ses destinees, mettra fin a l'oppression politique, et, dans une
Algerie libre et independante, ii n'y aura ni Juif ni Francais, ni indigenes, mais des Algeriens
reconcilies dans la liberte. Ii y aura aussi, ce jour-la, comme la dit notre vaillant president,
Messali, du pain pour tout le monde et la liberte pour tous. (El Owna Numero 39, mars-avril
1936)
In an article published in El Ouma in January 1938, the Algerian nationalist movement
emphasised the inclusive and conciliatory nature of its political programme and rejected
accusations made by the French press and some political parties (including the Parti
Communiste Francais) that the PPA, successor to the Etoile, was a fascist and racist
party close to Doriot's fascist movement, the PPF:
On nous concedera en toute justice que, rien ne figure dans ce programme qui soit dirige contre
la France ou contre les Francais d'Algerie. Au contraire, tout y est concu pour une plus etroite et
plus reelle collaboration entre les differents elements ethniques du pays ... Collaborer, mais dune
facon reelle et conforme aux principes dont s'inspire le regime actuel de la France, voila ce que
nous visons. Cela ressort avec evidence du chapitre fondamental de notre programme oil nous
demandons la transformation des Delegations financial-es en une assemblee algerienne, mais elue
au suffrage universel, sans aucune distinction, pour les electeurs, de race ni de religion... donner
a tous, musulmans[,] francais ou &rangers ayant acquis droit de cite en Algerie le droit de dire
leur mot dans la direction des affaires du pays, voila le but de notre nationalisme. Un
nationalisme qui n'a, comme on le volt, rien de chauvin ni de xenophobe parce qu'il ne se fonde
sur aucun prejuge de race. (El Ounia Numero 59, janvier 1938)
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It was a nationalism based on equality between citizens belonging to all ethnic groups
within a democratic state, rather than on the nation shaped by a sense of ethnicity. The
Algeria imagined here was not a nation-state giving prominence to the primordial rights
of the majority "ethnic" group, but rather a free, democratic and multi-ethnic state. 41 It
could be argued that this ideal nation was perceived as a pluralist or diverse one, where
all Algerian citizens, regardless of their ethno-national belonging (be it marked by
religion, "race", geographical origin, language, and/or culture) would be part of the
same independent state and have the same rights. This vision of an independent state
reflected the complex ethnic make-up of Algeria at the time, but was marked by a will
to transcend the political and socio-economic divisions and the racialised boundaries
that colonialism had constructed as insurmountable ones.
Establishing the foundations of the nation-state on such a precept was
undoubtedly consistent with Algerian nationalists' understanding of universalism; it also
had the advantage of offering a realistic alternative to the colonial order as it would
enable Algeria to replace the latter with a fairer social system:
II ne s'agit nullement
	 d'amender, d'adoucir, assouplir le systerne colonial, mais le changer par
d'autres rapports plus sains qui, tout en etablissant des droits, sauvegardent certains interets
respectifs des peuples en presence cette voie ... est la seule juste, car elle scellera l'union
fraternelle des peuples, basee sur l'egalite des peuples, basee sur le respect de la nationalite (El
0 ma Numero 58, decembre 1937)
This call for a smoother transition from the colonial to the democratic was, to
nationalists, the best way of helping independent Algeria emerge as an economically
and politically viable and stable state. Expertise from former colonials, who would then
become Algerian citizens, would benefit the country while the Muslim population,
which had previously been marginalised educationally, socially, politically and
41 The discourse of the ENA/PPA also reflected a process of imagining of the ethnic make-up of the
majority North African population (see following section).
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economically, would play a full role in those previously forbidden areas. Also, as a
police report shows, Messali Hadj considered in private conversations that an
independent Algeria would still need France's technical and economic assistance (Note
sur l'activite de l'ENA: 48) (1). That depiction of a free and pluralist Algeria focused on
the construction of an inclusive and egalitarian society where the ethnic divisions on
which the colonial system was based would be removed, in order to establish the
foundations of a modern country whose diversity was represented as being of potential
benefit for all new Algerian citizens. In an independent Algerian state, ethnic difference
was seen as compatible with equality, and equality as the only way forward for the
respect of difference. This political perspective implied that a constructive dialogue
between nationalists and progressive French authorities be established.
The way in which the term "nationality" was used is worth exploring. When they
referred to "l'union fraternelle des peuples basee sur regalite et le respect de la
nationalite [my emphasis]" the latter word was understood as meaning a feeling of
loyalty to the Algerian nation-state within the framework of a diverse society where all
the peoples, in the sense of ethnic groups, would be equal. This feeling of loyalty to
one's nation-state, which they called "nationalite", was a form of patriotism (Connor
1993: 374).42 The Algeria that the ENA and the PPA imagined was rooted in a
universalist/political conception of nation, one where all the citizens living in the state,
whatever their origin, would be bound by this social contract.
However, the ENA/PPA's universalist vision of a multi-ethnic Algeria traversed
by a sense of patriotism was a problematic one, given the particular nature of the
movement's nationalism. Indeed, while, on the one hand, that ideal representation of
social relations between the citizens of an independent Algeria normalised and ironed
out any difference by the establishment of a clear social contract and shared patriotic
42 Walker Connor (1973), who is a proponent of an ethnic interpretation of nation, argues that a
distinction should be made between loyalty to one's national group (which he defines as nationalism) and
loyalty to one's state (to which he refers as patriotism). On the other hand, Breuilly, who sees nations and
nationalism as an inherently modern and political processes, considers that there is "little ananlytical
value in distinguishing 'patriotism and 'nationalism'. The first tends to become a term of praise, the
second a term of abuse" (1996: 148). Whilst I would agree with Breuilly, it has to be said that in the inter-
war period, the ENA and the PPA, like many other political groupings, used the term 'nationalism' as an
empowering and positive concept.
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feelings, the North Africans' anti-colonial nationalism, on the other hand, was sustained
by a process of identity construction marked by an emphasis on ethno-national
differentiation.
Nationalists wanted to be independent because they saw themselves as
"ethnically" different, because they could draw on what they considered to be tangible
historical, cultural, linguistic, religious differences in order to demand the emancipation
of North Africans. In other words, there was a divergence between the underlying
"inspirations" which shaped the ENA/PPA's nationalist feelings of ethnic "uniqueness",
and its aspiration to see, one day, a state based on inclusiveness and equality emerge
from the rubble of colonialism.
Nonetheless, at that particular stage of their anti-colonial struggle, reconciling
the two was extremely difficult, but not impossible, provided that the transition from a
colonial order to the creation of independent Algeria was carried out relatively
peacefully and without alienating the two sides. Muslims' nationalism could serve as a
tool to destroy the colonial order, and the newly independent state could forge a new
patriotic bond amongst ethnically varied Algerian citizens on the basis of the already
existing feelings of Algerian-ness shared by North African Muslims, European settlers
and Jews.43
The nationalist movement's own discourse showed that this vision of an
independent Algeria was sometimes questioned and contradicted as leaders and
militants declared their hope that one day, the French would be expelled from Algeria.
In a meeting of the ENA on 15 September 1934, Imache Amar and Radjef Belkacem
both called for the French to be "jetes a la mer" (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 103-104)
(1). But these evocations, which were occasionally made in the course of heated
political speeches and debates, probably referred to the French as a symbol of
colonialism, and as such were not necessarily contradictory to their other universalist
and inclusive claims. Furthermore, those calls for the French to be expelled did not
43 North African Jews, who became French with the Decret Cremieux in 1870, were culturally and
historically rooted in the Maghreb, and many Europeans had been in Algeria for generations and had
developed a specific Pied-Noir identity. However, history would show that the chasm between the
different parties was to widen as the French authorities showed no sign of reforming their colonial agenda
and anti-Semitism spread.
59
appear in the issues of El Ouma analysed here. Rarely was the future Algeria described
as only composed of indigenous North Africans in the movement's newspaper. On the
contrary, the over-riding position of the ENA/PPA seems to have been that a new leaf
should be turned over once independence had been achieved, and that constructive
relations should be established between France and Algeria:
Cent ans de domination francaise ont cree entre le peuple francais et le peuple alOrien une
affinite spirituelle et une communaute d'interéts certaines. L'Algerie a besoin dune France
sincere et loyale ... Et la France a besoin de l'Algerie aux richesses multiples. (El Ouma Numero
58, decembre 1937)
This conciliatory representation of postcolonial relations between the two countries was
marked by mutual understanding based on shared history, as well as political and
economic interest.
2.5 Ethno-national identity: the tension between inclusive nationality and exclusive
nationalism
Even though the future Algerian nation-state imagined by the ENA and the PPA was of
a multi-cultural nature, Algerians' nationalist feelings, which were rooted in the urgency
of the anti-colonial struggle, were built in a radically different way. In order to
understand the manner in which their nationalism was shaped, it is essential to examine
the process by which the ethnicity of North African Muslims (who were meant to be the
numerically dominant component of that independent state) was constructed in the
nationalist movement's discourse.
It was established in the previous section that one of the key characteristics of
the militants' identity was to define themselves vis-a-vis the other, and to argue that they
could never become that figure of alterity that the French assimilationist discourse
promoted. This marked the outer boundary of their identity. However, one cannot
simply consider oneself as belonging to a specific nation only because one feels
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different from another national group. The nature of that difference had to be defined, or
rather imagined, in such a way that it could mobilise people around a number of clear, if
shifting, referential values. That is why the processes by which they constructed their
own national identity also need to be assessed. To put it differently, the question which
needs to be considered is the following one: if Algerian Muslims were not French, then,
who were they?
Firstly, it is important to note here that both frameworks of reference were
inextricably linked: national identity was formed by the complex and constantly
evolving tension between what constituted "us" and what differentiated "us" from
"them". As Connor puts it, "the essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins
a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all
non-members in a most vital way" (1993: 377). The aim of this section is to examine
how this bond was constructed.
At the core of the process of nation-building is the relationship between nation,
ethnicity and "race". Today, a distinction between race and ethnicity tends to be made.
Wallerstein, for instance, defines race as "[cense] Etre une categorie genetique,
correspondant a une forme physique apparente" and an ethnic group as "une categorie
culturelle, definie par certains comportement persistents, transmis de generation en
generation" (Balibar and Wallerstein 1988: 104-105). Since the notion of "race" lost
much of its credibility after the Second World War, the concept of ethnicity has become
more widely used. In the inter-war years, the term "race" was widely used and loosely
defined: it could describe biological, as well as cultural, religious, historical,
geographical and/or linguistic differences. Banton and Harwood's historical
interpretation of the way in which the notion of "race" was invented and then spread to
the rest of the world highlights the meaning that it conveyed in colonial times:
race was a kind of classification invented by Europeans, first to press the political claims of
groups within European countries; then to represent the relations between these countries; only
later when the potentialities of this way of labelling people had been extended and biological
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theories integrated with social ones, was it imposed upon the rest of the world. (Banton and
Harwood 1975: 8)
However, to follow up on that argument and relate it to our case-study, the fact that this
kind of classification was imposed on the rest of the world does not necessarily mean
that it was adopted, structured and used in the same way by the colonised as it was by
the coloniser.
The meaning of the word "race", as featured in the ENA/PPA's discourse,
seemed to reflect a certain ambivalence. In an article entitled "Le peuple algerien saura
choisir!" which denounced colonialism El Ouma referred to nationalism as the bond
which united all North Africans of the same "race" belonging to the same country:
Nous disons a notre peuple musulman nord-africain et devant le monde entier qu'il ne peut
acquerir ses droits, son honneur et sa prosperite que si le sentiment de la liberte et de la patrie
inspire les grands et les petits et devient le lien puissant entre les enfants dune méme race et dun
meme pays. (El Ounia Num6ro 34, octobre 1935)
In this passage, the term "race" is used in the singular and all North African Muslims
are described as being members of that "race". But which "race" do they invoke? That
article later implies that all North African Muslims belong to the Arab "race" when it
states that "le peuple ... saura choisir entre le courage et la poltronnerie ... entre ceux qui
disent: « nous sommes fiers d'être des Arabes, et nous voulons le rester », et ceux qui se
renient et disent: «nous ne voulons etre que des Francais»"(ibid). However, it also
acknowledges that different "racial" or ethnic groups compose the North African
Muslim people: "a nos appels, les esprits de cof et de division s'effacent, on voit,
fraternellement unis dans un meme esprit nos freres arabes, kabyles" (ibid). One of the
conclusions that can be drawn from the apparent contradiction between the two above-
mentioned passages is that between the two existing ethnic groups, the Arabs and the
Kabyles (or the Berbers), Arabness appears to be the dominant "racial" reference.
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Essentialising the varied ethnic make-up of the North African indigenous
population implied not only determining which "race" was the dominant one, but also
reconciling both ethnic groups by explaining that they were one and the same "race". In
a conference on "[1]a qualite de Francais dans le statut des indigenes" in Algiers on 12
March 1936, Lamoudi, a militant of the ENA, gave the following historical account of
Arab domination in North Africa:
II y a a retenir la conquete arabe. Les Arabes ne sont pas consideres en conquerants, ni
vainqueurs, ni vaincus. Les Berberes beneficierent de la plus large democratie, et c'est pour cela
qu'apres moms de 20 ans, les Berberes etaient conquis corps et ame aux Arabes ... Disons qu'en
Algerie, il n'y a plus, ni Arabes, ni Kabyles, ni Mozabites, ii y a des Arabo-Berberes musulmans
et, tous urns, nous sommes certains du triomphe de notre Cause juste. (El °ulna Numero 39,
mars-avril 1936)
This depiction of the Arab invasion of North Africa was clearly inaccurate as it glossed
over the wars that had opposed the two ethnic groups from the seventh and eighth
centuries onwards and dismissed the differences that continued to mark both
communities."
Nevertheless, the point of this account was not about whether or not it was
historically accurate, but rather about the political purpose that such a portrayal could
serve. Indeed, it could be argued that it played the more important role of creating a
unified identity shared by all North African Muslims, an identity which could mobilise
North Africans and constitute a rallying front against colonialism.
The above-mentioned passage shows another, more particularist, perspective on
the nation. It illustrates Connor's argument that a nation is a self-aware ethnic group
(1978: 388-389). Indeed, however problematic the nationalist movement's
reinterpretation of history was (as time would show) it was part of a process of nation-
building which implied (re)defining Maghrebis' identity in order to create or enhance an
44See, for example, the emblematic figure of the Kahina in Berber consciousness.
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awareness amongst all North African Muslims that they belonged to a common ethnic
group, and therefore to the same nation.
Identity played a crucial role in their fight against colonialism, whose "divide
and rule" strategy was felt across Algeria. 45 Indeed, the nationalist movement
consistently condemned the French colonial authorities, who had introduced
differentialist policies that made a distinction between Arabs and Berbers, as "ceux qui
veulent la division du peuple musulman" (El Ouma Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935).
This point is illustrated in several articles in which nationalists denounced the
continuing exploitation of Muslims by a minority of Europeans, and called for the
Delegation financiere, which was dom i nated by European settlers, to be replaced by an
Algerian Parliament whose members should be elected by universal suffrage:
revenons a notre Delegation financiere et eclaircissons son mecanisme. Comme dans toults les
Assemblees algeriennes, les Musulmans au nombre de 5 millions sont representes par tin tiers et
les neo-francais au nombre de 900.000 sont representes par les deux-tiers. Ainsi. sur 60 delegues
financiers, il y a 40 delegues colons et non-colons et 20 musulmans diisés en deux sections.
l'une arabe et l'autre kabyle. Cette division entre Kabyles et Arabes est ‘oulue et entretenue par
la Delegation pour creer entre les musulmans la lutte de cof qui permettra aux colons de tailler la
part du lion dans le budget algerien. (El Ounia Numero 17, decembre 1933)
Les autochtones, qui soot au nombre de [5] millions, sont representes par un tiers au sein de
la Delegation financiere ... Le tiers qui represente le peuple opprime. est di). ise en deux clans par
l'imperialisme, afin de pouvoir les manceuvrer a sa guise. c'est le clan arabe et le clan kabyle. El
Onma Numero 29, janvier 1935)
Faced with these divisive policies, the nationalist movement saw it as crucial to claim
and reassert that Arabs and Berbers were part of the same ethnic group. This w as all the
more necessary as Kabyles were the subject of a certain fascination amongst French
45 Spurr points out pertinently that the classification of indi genous people according to their relatiNe
complexity of social organization becomes more systematic and articulated as it directly senes the
interests ot colonial administration" (1996: 68).
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intellectuals and politicians in the nineteenth century. The "mythe kabyle", according to
which Berbers were the descendants of Europeans, developed from 1830 onwards, and
had its heyday in the decades between 1870 and 1890. At the time, it led the colonial
authorities to consider the assimilation of Kabylcs and the marginalisation of Arabs."
Even though the myth lost influence at the turn of the century, it survived in colonial
and metropolitan circles; from the early 20th century onwards, France's "politique
berbere" aimed no longer to assimilate Kabyles, but to differentiate between what they
saw as the two "races" of Algeria (Ageron 1968b: 873, see also Domel 1995: 51,
Zeghidour 1995).
This romantic interpretation of the history of the Kabyles as that of a "lost"
European people had its supporters up until 1960 (Ageron 1968a: 267-291). It served
the purpose of furthering the colonial agenda and reinforced racism: it established a link
of distant kinship between Kabyles and European settlers, and divided the two
indigenous communities. It portrayed the Kabyles as the distant European cousins who
were the precursors of the French, and it supported the claim that colonisation was a
rightful enterprise that had come full circle, as the French, in the name of their Gallo-
Roman heritage, were only claiming back what was "truly theirs". This interpretation
also delegitimised any claim on North Africa made by the authochtons: in their view,
Kabyles were descendants of Europeans (many of whom were Christian before the Arab
invasion) and Arabs were just another conquering people. Of course, the French did not
go as far as accepting the Kabyles into the "French family". They were not even, as
Carlier points out "colonise[s] de premier rang, mais citoyen[s] de second plan" (1984:
361), as they did not benefit from French citizenship. Like the Arabs, they were also
considered as North African subjects and had to endure the harsh rule of the Code de
l'Indigenat and racism on both sides of the Mediterranean. But one of the direct
consequences of this representation was that the Kabyles were singled out as the North
African ethnic group on which the proselytising efforts of the Catholic Church should
concentrate.
46 For a study of assimilation in the inter-war period, see, for example, Hily (1981), and Siblot (1989).
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The Algerian nationalist movement saw it as one of its priorities to counter this
historical interpretation of the ethnic make-up of North Africa. In an article which
denounced vehemently this interpretation of the origins of the Berbers and the attempts
made by the Peres Blanes to christianise the Kabyles, the Moroccan student leader El
Kholti, under the pen name of El Ancari, presented the ENA's view of the "racial"
make-up of Algeria:
Depuis quelques annees, s'est installe, a Fort-National, un certain o Pere Blanc »,
denomme Jean Lemoine, missionnaire-espion, soudoye par le Quai d'Orsay et le Service des
Affaires Indigenes, pardon, naturellement aussi par le Pape: dans le dessein manifeste de
detacher les Kabyles de leurs frêres et coreligionnaires arabes et essayer de les christianiser.
Nous voyons que cette politique de division pratiquee sur une plus grande echelle
par l'imperialisme francais, en Afrique du Nord, pour dissocier le bloc musulman arabo-berbere,
se manifeste dune fawn toute speciale en grande Kabylie. C'est ainsi que nous voyons quelle
abjecte litterature M. Jean Lemoine developpe dans son torchon denomme scandaleusement oLe
Berbere», ne ratant aucune occasion de discrediter la civilisation musulmane ... Le Pere Lemoine
veut nous faire croire a nous, Berberes, que nous sommes d'origine romaine et, par consequent,
nous n'avons rien de commun avec les Arabes. Mais dieu merci, nos anc8tres n'ont jamais ete des
Romains, et ce sont les seuls qui ont su juguler leur domination ... Nous, Berberes, nous savons
que nous sommes aussi des Arabes, venus seulement quelques milliers d'annees avant nos freres
venus apres la revelation et la mission de notre glorieux prophete (que le salut soit sur lui), ce qui
explique bien la diffusion rapide de l'Islam en Afrique du Nord a l'arrivee des envoyes des
Kalifes.
Aujourd'hui, pour nous, soit en Algerie, en Tunisie ou au Maroc, il n'y a ni Aiabes, ni
Kabyles, ni Mozabites, ii n'y a qu'une race, la race arabo-berbêre, issue dun seul croisement, et
nous sommes par-dessus tout Musulmans, ce dont nous sommes fiers, et tous les Musulmans
sont freres. (El °ulna Numero 29, janvier 1935)
This article, which dismisses the argument that Berbers are of Roman origin, is worth
quoting extensively as it sheds some useful light on the processes of ethnic identity
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formation in the nationalist movement. What is striking in this expose is that discourse
is structured around similar criteria to the ones developed by Lemoine and his peers.
Firstly, the ENA evoked the links of kinship between the numerically dominant ethnic
group (the Arabs) and the Berbers, whilst the French emphasised the distant connection
between the latter and the colonially dominant Europeans. Secondly, both Lemoine and
El Ancari ignored the possibility that Berbers could be the original indigenous peoples
of North Africa, and asserted that they originated from a specific "homeland" outside
North Africa. Thirdly, the question of religion is seen as central in determining kinship,
and by extension "race" for both Algerian nationalists ("il n'y a qu'une race, la race
arabo-berbere ... et nous sommes par-dessus tout Musulmans ... et tous les Musulmans
sont freres") and the French (who wanted to see the Kabyles "return" to Christianity).
What also appears clearly from this debate is the extent to which the hegemonic
discourse on identity of the nationalists legitimised their own, and countered France's,
claim on the North African territory. In this battle for identity, the interpretation which
would get the upper hand would greatly determine the future of North Africa. For the
ENA, all North Africans were Arabs as the two components of the Arabo-Berber ethnic
group were described as originating from Arabia. This was the way in which the
psychological bond that joined the North African people was justified. To paraphrase
Connor (July 1993: 377), it was a bond that differentiated them from the French in a
most fundamental way, and which constituted the essence of North African nationalists'
claim on the Algerian nation.
Furthermore, it could be argued that this interpretation of Algerian nation-ness
as being inherently Arab was, as they perceived it, all the more justified as the religious
brotherhood that united all North Africans merged Islam with Arabness, and by
extension with the Arabic language. That relationship between race and religious
belonging, where the former could be subsumed by the latter, was implied by the ENA's
occasional reference to Muslims as a race.°
Another parallel needs to be noted. The process by which Algeria was being
imagined as a nation clearly echoed the way in which France developed and portrayed
47 See, for example, El Ounia Numero 15, octobre 1933.
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herself. Indeed, France saw herself as a "Republique une et indivisible" which was the
incarnation of the French nation, in other words of the French people, and by extension
the French ethnie. This meant that the very existence of ethnic minorities such as the
Basques or the Bretons was ignored, and languages and cultures other than the French
forbidden or marginalised because they were seen as a threat to the Republic. Similarly,
Algeria was depicted by the ENA as a republic with, at its core, an Arab nation rooted
in the Arab ethnie, composed of Arabo-Berber people who were described as Arabs.
This essentialist representation of North African identity also meant that differences and
diversity were denied in the name of unity, and it led to a number of crises within the
nationalist movement (and in post-colonial Algeria) as Berbers felt alienated. 48 Calls
made by some Berbers to be recognised as a distinct ethnic group were seen as a threat
to the anti-colonial struggle of the Etoile, which saw itself as a "mouvement de la nation
arabe" (El °tuna Numero 29, janvier 1935), and to the future viability and stability of
an independent Algerian Republic.
2.6 Conclusion
The North African migrant community in France should be considered as a diaspora,
even if it does not correspond to the "ideal" type of the Jewish diaspora. Its experience
of migration, as portrayed by nationalists, was permeated by feelings of dispossession,
oppression and exile, and its hope was to fight colonialism and for the re-establishment
of its lost homeland. It was within this diaspora that Algerian nationalism, in its modern
form, developed.
In its early years, the movement's aim was to mobilise all North Africans in
order to obtain the independence of the whole of North Africa, implying that a single
national state covering the whole Maghreb should be created. However, its position
evolved to present a nationalist programme for the Maghreb based on three distinct
states adopting the existing colonial borders of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. As a
48 It is interesting to note, in the ENA/PPA's discourse, the paradigm of diversity as a concept. It was
constructed positively within the context of a multi-ethnic and independent Algeria enriched by its multi-
ethnic population, and negatively during the process of ethnic self-definition.
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movement numerically dominated by Algerians, the Etoile, and from 1937 the PPA,
focused mainly on Algerian issues.
Algerian nationalists' view of the future of Algeria was inclusive and marked by
universalist principles. They wanted to see the creation of an independent, multi-ethnic
and democratic state keeping strong ties with France, and where all citizens, whatever
their "race" or religion, would be equal and share the same patriotic feelings for Algeria.
By contrast, their own ethnic identity as North Africans was constructed in
exclusivist terms, and informed by a sense of "us" and "them". They argued strongly
that North Africans were not and would never become French, and that France's
colonial domination aimed not only to dispossess North Africans of their land, but also
of their religious identity. "Naturalisation" was seen as a betrayal of their identity as
Muslims and was correlated with a conversion to Christianity, and the "evolues" were
stigmatised for what was seen as their sterile pursuit of assimilation into the French
nation.
Their ethno-national identity was constructed in a way which countered colonial
attempts to divide North Africans on the basis of "race". They denounced French
imperialism for using what they saw as the fallacious argument that Berbers were a
distinct "race" of European origin as the basis for the differentialist policies aimed at
dividing North Africans.
Their own interpretation of Maghrebis' ethnicity also essentialised the varied
ethnic make-up of North Africans. For them, Arabs and Berbers belonged to the same
"Arab race", and both originated from the Middle East. This representation, which
reflected the process by which France had come to essentialise her own national
identity, shows the extent to which Algerian nationalism had been influenced by
France's.
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Chapter 3
The markers of ethnicity in North African nationalist discourse: kinship,
class, culture, pastness and religion
3.1 Introduction
The discourse of the Algerian nationalist movement in the inter-war period in France
highlights the extent to which the boundary of North African ethnic identity was
constructed to coincide with the contour of the imagined Algerian nation. This process
implied not only defining "us" (North Africans) as inherently different from "them" (the
French), but also discursively merging ethnically varied North Africans into a single
ethnic entity (alternatively called "Arab" and "Arabo-Berber") subsumed by a sense of
religious belonging.
That ethnic identity was imagined in such a way that it could build on a number
of socio-cultural, religious and historical references to create a sense of "we-ness", of
self-awareness that they, North Africans, belonged to a specific nation. However, as
Barth argues, cultural features can be used as signals and emblems of differences or can
be ignored, and differences can be played down or denied (Barth 1969a: 14). Far from
being characterised by their consistency, the ENA/PPA's references were selected
strategically and circumstancially in order to justify the image of the Algerian nation
conjured up by the movement's discourse. Some traits were adopted whole-heartedly
whilst others were discarded or modified to support their nationalist agenda.
The mechanisms that allowed the formation of Algerian nation-ness worked in a
binary process of legitimisation: on the one hand, the markers of national identity which
were chosen by the movement legitimised the nationalists' own discourse on the nation
and therefore allowed Messali Hadj and his organisation to present themselves as the
incarnation of the nation; and on the other hand the way(s) in which the nation was
evoked by the ENA/PPA legitimised those traits that had been used as the true source of
their identity and, by extension, delegitimised those which had been dismissed.
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It could be argued that Barth's emphasis on the transactional or negotiated nature
of ethnicity, which subordinates the cultural content and profile of ethnicity to the
process of boundary maintenance, does not tackle an important point, that is to say the
extent to which the ethnic boundary has what could be called a "limited elasticity". In
other words the process by which those cultural traits which are considered relevant and
others ignored cannot be infinitely flexible, as the case of the Algerian nationalist
movement shows. The essentialist nature of the ethnic identity which was constructed
by the ENA/PPA meant that calls for a fairer representation of the nation's varied ethnic
make-up were deemed anti-patriotic because divisive; but this did not mean that the
discarded cultural traits, however clelegitimised they had been, disappeared from the
cultural landscape of its militants' imaginary. The persistence of a distinct Berber
identity, and those supporting a vision of Algeria based on her cultural diversity
recurrently challenged the nationalist movement's official interpretation of ethnicity.
This has continued to be the case up to this day in the independent states in North
Africa. To go further, it could be argued that the boundary of ethnic identity is not only
informed by a process of transaction between "us" and "them", but it is also subject to
inner challenges which can put into question the very legitimacy of that boundary.
3.2 The bond of kinship in Algerian nationalism
The class, religious, cultural and historical references which traversed the Algerian
nationalist discourse were all markers of kinship. Kinship was crucial to the formation
of nationhood as it provided a store of symbolic devices through which the modern
nation-state could construct itself (Helmreich 1992: 244). A number of studies on
ethnicity and nationalism have acknowledged the prominent role played by kinship in
the process of ethnic and ethno-national formation (for example, Geertz 1963a,
Anderson 1983, Jenkins 1997, Connor 1993, Cornell 1996). The bond of kinship which
marks nation-ness is one Anderson illustrates convincingly when he argues that the
nation is an imagined community which "is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible ... for so many
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millions of people, not so much to kill, as willing to die for such limited imaginings"
(Anderson 1983: 16). According to Anderson, the ties of kinship denote something
which is natural and unchosen; and because these ties are unchosen, they have about
them what he calls "a halo of disinterestedness". In other words, the nation can ask for
sacrifices because it is interestless (Anderson 1983: 131).
Using this contention as an analytical tool can enable us to highlight some of the
key processes by which this bond of kinship was constructed in the ENA/PPA's
discourse. Its evocation of the Mother-Nation or Fatherland illustrates the way in which
the Algerian nation was imagined. 49
 After the First World War, the North African
diaspora in France still made a distinction between, on the one hand, French colonial
oppression in the Maghreb and, on the other hand, metropolitan France which
summoned up images of democracy and fairness. At that time, Maghrebis had not fully
developed their nationalist project and their demands focused mainly on socio-political
and economic equality. An article in LIkdain de Paris illustrates the extent to which
many Maghrebis, at that stage of pre-nationalist thought, still perceived France as their
Mother-Nation and were willing to contribute to France's reconstruction after the Great
War :
Tout d'abord, le premier devoir qui s'impose a nous au lendemain de cet indiscible cataclysme
qui a si ferocement atteint la France, consiste a cooperer avec le meilleur de nous-memes A
Fceuvre de reconstitution de la Mere-Patrie, avec cet élan genereux et heroIque, si caracteristique
de notre race, et qui valut a nos freres tomb& par centaines de mule sur les champs de bataille de
Charleroi, de la Marne, de Verdun, pour ne citer que ceux-la, la noire imperissable d'avoir
merite une page historique dans la victoire finale. (L'Ikdaiii de Paris, vendredi 7 mars 1919)50
This passage highlights the fact that, in the years that followed the war, Maghrebi
migrants' sense of kinship was very much anchored within the French nation. By
49 Interestingly, the French equivalents of those terms either encapsulate both genders ("la Mere-Patrie"),
or are marked by patriarchy ("la Patrie").
50 Likdatii de Paris was the voice of the North African community in France until it was forbidden by the
French government on 1 February 1927, and was then replaced by L'Ikdanz Nord-Afi-icaitz until 1930 and
by El Otima thereafter (Note stir l'activite de l'ENA 1934: 135).
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making the supreme sacrifice of their life to the nation, Muslims argued that they had
fulfilled one of the most sacred requirements on which French nation-hood is based ("le
don du sang"). Their identity was perceived within an assimilationist perspective: they
described themselves as a "generous and heroic race" whose contribution to French
victory in the war had earned them a place in the French nation. However, it appears
clearly that that hybrid sense of kinship was not marked by disinterestedness, as on the
one hand Muslims hoped that they would be granted equal rights as a reward for their
role during the Great War, and on the other hand the French had no intention of
introducing reforms that might undermine their colonial rule of Algeria.
From the second half of the 1920s onwards, which coincided with the creation
of the ENA, France's failure to keep her word on the question of rights for Muslims
contributed to her losing much of her credibility amongst them. By then the terminology
used to refer to France and to the war had become far more irreverent. France was
described as a country which had not kept her promise to grant rights to North African
Muslims as a reward for their sacrifice for France during the First World War and as
one of those "pays qcivilises» [ob] le mensonge, l'hypocrisie ... se pratiquent du plus
haut de Fechelle sociale" (El 011177a Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935). Also, the ENA and
the PPA often recalled with bitterness their contribution to the war effort, to which they
referred as "faire trouer sa peau au cours de la grande boucherie mondiale de 1914" (El
alma Numero 17, decembre 1933), and the way in which Muslims had been duped by
France's empty promises into joining their ranks and fight the Germans:
Le peuple nord africain se souvient toujours que pendant quatre ans il s'est battu, parce qu'on lui
avait dit que c'etait une guerre pour le Droit et la Liberte. Ii se souvient encore, et cela est grave
dans sa memoire, que plus de cent mule de ses enfants reposent sur les differents champs de
bataille, et il se souvient egalement que des promesses formelles lui ont ete solennellement
faites. (El Ounia Numero 28, decembre 1934)
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Nous demandons d'abord la realisation de toutes les promesses qu'on nous a faites pendant la
guerre, pour nous endormir et nous envoyer A la boucherie defendre une cause qui n'etait pas la
nOtre. (El Ouma Numero 25, septembre-octobre 1934)
nous avons fait la guerre de 1914 A 1918 ... et du moment que nous avons paye cet impOt du
sang, nous avons le droit de demander, au nom de la justice, la realisation de nos revendications
legitimes. (El Owna Numero 39, mars-avril 1936)
Not only did North Africans realise that they had fought France's war for nothing, but
they, as colonials and unlike the French, had been consistently sent to the front line with
the Senegalese and other "coloniaux" by a racist French army (El Ouma Numero 59,
janvier 1938). They also became aware that the wider implications of that unjust war
had been for European imperialist powers to reinforce their colonial domination in Asia
and Africa:
C'est pendant que les hommes de toutes les races et de toutes les couleurs s'entretuaient pour le
«Droit, la Justice et la Liberte aux peuples a disposer d'eux-mernes», que l'imperialisme anglais,
francais et italien, se reunissait a Londres pour se partager l'Asie et l'Afrique. (El Ouma Numero
29, janvier 1935)
These extracts highlight the extent to which the ENA/PPA's discourse on kinship had
drastically changed from the mid-1920s onwards. What had previously been described
as the "imperishable Glory" of their sacrifice to their French Motherland was now seen
as a "boucherie" during which thousands of Muslims had died for nothing. Their blood
had been wasted on a cause and for a nation which were not theirs. That war had shown
that far from having "a halo of disinterestedness" about it, the bond which had tied
Muslims to the French nation was traversed by interest and prejudice.
In nationalist discourse, a shift had therefore taken place. The Algerian nation
had become the repository of their national feelings, and the bond which united
Algerian nationalists to their nation was marked by disinterestedness. Certainly, the
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concept of disinterestedness is highly ambivalent and should not be equated with
gratuitousness. Social agents act as they do for a particular reason and do not engage in
gratuitous actions (Bourdieu 1998: 76). Furthermore, however valid Anderson's
assessment of the disinterested nature of nation-ness, a dichotomous interpretation of
disinterestedness and interestedness would be misleading in the case of the nationalist
discourse, as the former and the latter constitute both ends of the same tension. In the
case of the Algerian nationalist movement, the disinterested relationship with what it
referred to as the Algerian nation also had a number of corollaries which were arguably
of an interested nature, namely the will to end colonial domination and restore Muslims'
dignity and freedom, improve their socio-economic position and their political rights in
society, and so on. El Ouma's tribute to the Muslims who died or were injured during
the Constantine uprising in August 1934 illustrates that point: "Nous nous inclinons
bien bas devant tous les morts et tous les blesses qui sont tombes en combattant pour
nos libertes, pour nos interets [my emphasis] et pour le respect de notre race" (El Ouma,
aoilt-septembre 1934, in Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 149) (1).
The movement's evocation of family ties to refer to the nation is also revealing.
The nation could ask for sacrifices because the disinterested nature of that bond of
kinship guaranteed that their interests would be looked after. In other words, it was a
question of "national interest" for nationalists to be engaged in building an Algerian
Mother-Nation ("la Mêre-Patrie" or "la Patrie") which would nurture Muslims (her
children in the sense of les "enfants de la nation") as a "true mother" rather than as a
"mardtre" (El Ouma Numero 39, mars-avril 1936).51
As was seen previously, for nationalists, building the Algerian nation implied
first rejecting the French nation as the repository of their nationhood and coming to
terms with the fact that the hybrid relationship that had, for some time, tied North
African Muslims to the French nation was sterile, and that they had been deceived:
51 See El Ounia Numero 39, mars-avril 1936, P. 3: "travailler pour la construction de notre Patric, qui
saura aimer ses enfants en mere et non en 'mardtre-.
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C'est la force qui prime sur le droit! Le peuple a beau gernir, la France a bouche les oreilles
devant nos plaintes, et ferme les yeux devant notre souffrance! Le seul droit qui reste, c'est celui
du plus fort. Ii appartient plus que jamais aux Musulmans de s'unir pour etre forts. Car il n'y a
plus rien a attendre de la France. Notre salut est entre nos mains. (El Ouina Numero 29, fevrier-
mars 1935)
Le peuple nord-africain, dont les yeux naguere etaient encore bandes, s'est affranchi de son
bandeau et s'apercoit que le colonialisme entreprend de l'assassiner par derriere. Soyons
optimistes et esperons qu'il conquerira sa liberte, meme au prix de l'ultime sacrifice. (El Otima
Numero 61, 11 mars 1938)
The concluding part of a letter addressed to the President du Conseil by Algerian
nationalists on 16 January 1925 also shows the extent to which France's rejection of the
Muslims' appeals to be accepted within the French nation and to be treated as equals
informed the birth of their nationalism:
L'indifference de la France a notre egard, son injustice, son ingratitude nous souleve le cceur et
fait naitre en nous, nous vous le disons franchement, un esprit nationaliste Permettez-nous,
Monsieur, de vous dire, avant de nous separer, que nous voulons notre Algerie a nous, puisque
vous nous empechez d'acceder a votre France. ('Propagande communiste aux colonies') (2)
This passage reflects the way in which nationalism developed out of a feeling of
rejection and an awareness that, in colonial Algeria, Muslims would always remain
outside, and never be accepted in the French nation. This polarisation of identities was
the result of the French colonial agenda, and it contributed greatly to the shaping of a
nation-ness marked by a sense of "us" which was irreconcilable with "them". The
movement's discourse shows that because the Muslims' attempt to determine their
nation-ness vis-a-vis the French national project had blatantly failed, it had to be built
on different foundations. Algerian national identity should be defined against France. In
a political meeting of the Etoile on 15 September 1934, Radjef Belkacem, then a key
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member of the Central Committee of the Etoile, declared that France should no longer
count on indigenous troops to protect her and that, if a war happened, she would be
unable to prevent Muslims from rebelling. During that same meeting, Messali Hadj
invited the North African soldiers who were present in the audience to turn their
weapons against imperialist France (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 104-106) (1). In the
same year, an article written in El Otuna by Ali Rouifed, a young militant, explicitly
invited Muslim nationalists to fight against France:
Ne comprenez-vous pas la necessite urgente d'être nationaliste? C'est le moment oil jamais den
profiter, la situation internationale &ant tres tendue. N'y aurait-il pas en Afrique du Nord une
centaine de mule braves qui donneraient leur sang, non pas a Verdun contre une nation qui ne
nous a pas attaques, mais contre contre les aventuriers qui nous oppriment et
nous asservissent? (El Ouma Numero 18, janvier 1934)
This extract illustrates clearly the fact that the concept of "don du sang" had shifted in
the movement's discourse. North Africans' nation-ness, their sense of "we-ness" was
constructed against the Other which incarnated colonialism. The evolution from a
nationhood defined vis-a-vis the other to one constructed against the other displaced the
boundary of national belonging to anchor it within the sphere of nationalism. The
movement developed a discourse on kinship in which calls for sacrifice were rooted in
evocations of peoplehood and symbolised the fight for the Algerian nation:
Ne reste pas indifferent au soil de ceux des tiens qui s'immolent pour ta defense, que ceux-lä
partent au sacrifice la tete haute et degagee en se disant: "Au moms notre sacrifice n'est pas vain,
un peuple entier nous observe, haletant, et n'attend qu'un ordre pour joncher de ses cadavres le
chemin de sa liberation". (El Ouma, juin 1934, in Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 148) (1)
Sacrifice is depicted here as a noble cause that has to be championed in the name of the
Algerian people. The concept of the "don du sang" is one of the key markers of national
belonging. The reference to an Algerian people ready to fight and to give their life for
77
freedom symbolises the birth of a nation. The tension between evocations of death
(through sacrifice) and birth (of a nation) underpins their nationalist discourse. Algerian
nationalists therefore argued that North African identity ("us") could not be reconciled
with French nationality ("them"). Their positing of Algerian identity as being defined by
what it was against was part of a process of mobilisation.
3.3 Markers of ethnic solidarity
Even though identification with the Algerian nation was reinforced by North Africans'
political involvement in anti-colonial struggle, the Algerian nationalist movement could
not mobilise Maghrebis against colonialism unless more positive feelings of solidarity
were established through a shared awareness of who they were: nation-ness had to be
imagined in such a way that Muslims in the Algerian diaspora and in the colony could
identify with it and relate to it.
The references which nationalists drew upon in order to construct a shared sense
of ethno-national belonging were often discussed in contrast with French identity rather
than separately. It shows that identity was not simply the combination of a number of
traits, but also that that combination had to highlight distance and difference. An article
in El Ounta which was highly critical of Ferhat Abbas reflects that point. It denounced
Abbas for going back on the radical political views that he held when he was young (at
a time when he used the name of Abencerage, Chateaubriand's heroic character, as a
pen name) to adopt a more reformist position, and reiterated the PPA's nationalist
conception of Algerian identity:
Comme le jeune Abencerage, nous pensons qu'il est impossible de changer de nationalit6 comme
on change de cravate. Notre nationalite c'est, avant tout, notre passé, notre histoire, nos mceurs,
nos traditions, nos souvenirs de jeunesse, nos habitudes d'esprit, tout ce qui entre dans la
composition de notre moi et on ne peut pas vider la personnalite de son contenu par un acte de
volonte. En d'autres termes, on ne peut pas cesser d'étre arabes ou kabyles pour devenir francais
du jour au lendemain. Nous sommes persuades d'ailleurs qu'une fois transplantes dans la famille
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francaise, Abbas lui-meme, le tricolore flamboyant de l'Entente eprouverait de la gene a dire:
<Nous avons conquis l'Algerie». (El Ounia Numero 59, janvier 1938)
This extract outlines that identity is perceived in binary terms: first by stating what
being Algerian means, and secondly by arguing that those traits make it impossible for
North Africans to become French. To come back to what constitutes an Algerian,
several attributes ("notre passe, notre histoire, nos mceurs, nos traditions, nos souvenirs
de jeunesse, nos habitudes d'esprit") are mentioned which could be encapsulated into
two broad referential and overlapping categories: history and memory on the one hand,
and culture and tradition on the other hand. To those, one could add religion, which is
another key marker of national identity frequently evoked, and class.
3.4 The ethnic dimension of class awareness
The purpose of this section is to assess the interplay between the concepts of class,
ethnicity and nation-ness in Algerian nationalist discourse in the inter-war years. The
development of a class consciousness amongst North African migrants was undoubtedly
marked by their experience as colonial workers in France (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 33).
However, it would be too simplistic to view it only as the result of their socio-political
and economic interaction with other agents during the years that they had spent in the
metropole. Indeed, such an exclusive interpretation ignores the complex diasporic
processes that informed the development of such an awareness. Their experience in the
colony prior to their emigration already played a central role in the formation of a
political consciousness and constituted the very reason why they decided to migrate.
In North Africa, class belonging was very much informed by ethnicity. The
complex social order on which colonial North Africa was based meant that Europeans
occupied the top of the hierarchy, followed by Jews who had gained French citizenship
through the Decret Cremieux in 1870, and by the Muslim elite and "notables", many of
whom had become French citizens by abandoning their "statut personnel" as Muslims.
Most autochtons belonged to the proletariat and the underclass. Even though a European
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proletariat existed, ethnic and racial differences between them and Muslims were
constructed by the colonial order to set them apart from one another through racism.
The harsh realities of the "petit blancs" lower social status was therefore "attenuated"
by racial divisions which still placed them above another group (Muslims). The racist
foundations upon which the colonial system had been built and the discrimination that
they endured in the hands not only of the European bourgeoisie, but also in the hands of
European working class shaped Maghrebis' experience in North Africa. An article
published in La Patrie Humaine on 8 March 1935 and reproduced in El Ouma described
how "[Les Nords-Africains] sont restes les etemels manceuvres-serfs jouets non
seulement des maistres, mais souvent de leurs camarades de travail, specialises eux, mais
inconscients aussi, pleins de prejuges de race... Navrant!" (El Ouma Numero 29, fevrier-
mars 1935). Others also denounced the anti-Maghrebi racism that existed within the
European working class in the colonies. Ferhat Abbas explained that a Serb worker
whom he knew and who greeted him in the street, was told by the workers he was with
that "on ne saluait pas ces gens-la quelque füt leur condition sociale" (Liberte, 7 janvier
1936). Briole, a union leader in Algeria, stated that since his arrival in Algeria in 1904,
he had noted that "les Europeens, meme les bolcheviks, quoi qu'ils en disent,
considerent les Arabes comme des etres inferieurs, malfaisants, paresseux et
malpropres" (Le Peuple, 25 septembre 1926).
The conflict which opposed the Algerian nationalist movement to the evolues or
the reformist North African elite, shows that class could be an important criterion
informing its sense of nation-ness. The Algerian nationalist movement frequently
condemned the latter for ignoring the plight of their people:
Ii y a un clan qui comprend tous les fonctionnaires, les avocats, les medecins, etc... qui se
targuent du nom d'hommes d'elites et d'intellectuels C'est de leur education et de leur milieu
social que decoule leur action. Ce clan est loin du peuple, ii l'ignore, quoique vivant dans son
milieu, il le sous-estime et le prend pour une quantite negligeable, une masse inerte sans aucun
interet pour lui. C'est une grosse erreur, le peuple: c'est la force de l'Algerie, la force sur laquelle
on peut compter; le peuple est plus avance que nos intellectuels, plus combatif, car il est toujours
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pret au combat et a la lutte pour ses revendications et pour sa liberte. (El Ounia Num6ro 15,
octobre 1933)
This passage illustrates how class shaped the nationalist movement's representation of
ethno-national belonging. The Etoile made a distinction between the elite and the
people. This dichotomous representation was not based on "race", but on class. On the
one hand, the North African elite (intellectuals, politicians and "notables") were
stigmatised and described as divided from the rest of the Algerians and indifferent to
their fate. On the other hand, the Algerian people, which referred to the vast majority of
poor and oppressed Algerians, were praised. Peoplehood was depicted as the true
repository of Algerian nation-ness and nationalism. The movement's assertion implied
that because the elite had not developed a sense of kinship with the rest of the Algerian
people, because they did not share feelings of ethnic groupness with them and still
expressed their attachment to the French nation, they had betrayed their people. They
were described as "[des] traitres ... ceux qui dans l'ombre assassinent la nation
algerienne" (ibid). Even though the elite were of the same ethnic origin as the rest of the
Algerian people, they were nonetheless displaced discursively into the sphere of the
Other on the basis of their reluctance to develop a sense of nation-ness based on that
shared etlinie.
Going to France was compared to exile and was in itself a conscious political
decision; it was seen by many North African Muslims as the only way of escaping
colonial oppression. Their years in France, where they were also subjected to racism
and to the colonial rule, were another important stage in a long process of politicisation
which had started in North Africa, and in the development of a class, communitarian
and national conscience. In El Ottma, Imache Amar's vivid recollections of the colonial
realities which had led many North Africans to go into exile highlighted the political
dimension of their migration:52
52 In the same article, Imache denounced the press in France which led a racist campaign, and which
described North African migrants as invaders.
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j'etais la, dans mes meditations, m'efforcant de garder mon calme a l'evocation de ces scenes
tragiques de notre vie brisee oi je voyais tour A tour la silhouette cauteleuse et cynique de
l'usurier, le visage ferme de l'impitoyable cad et la hautaine attitude de l'administrateur,
autoritaire et despotique au milieu de sa sequel de soldats, de gendarmes et de mokhzanis ... Et
pendant que tous les accapareurs se repaissent de nos richesses, pendant que tous les aventuriers
s'enrichissent et s'engraissent du bien de nos aieux, pendant qua cOte d'eux, une autre population
souffre de la faim, pendant que les enfants attendent le retour de leur pere et que la maman
pleure l'absent, pendant ce temps la, ceux qui ont reussi a s'evader de chez eux ironie du sort!
o destinee etrange!- ceux qui ont fui l'enfer se voient qualifies d'aggresseurs et d'assaillants! (El
()tuna Numero 19, decembre 1933)
This discourse clearly reflected an awareness that the political dynamics that led to
North Africans' emigration was rooted in a binary class system which enabled the
colonising minority and the Muslim "notables" to deprive the vast majority of the
Muslim population who constituted the underclass from their land and their rights.
In the 1930s, the Etoile nord-africaine's objective was to unite and mobilise all
Algerian Muslims, whatever their social status, around its nationalist agenda (Note sur
l'activite de l'ENA: 139-140) (1). However, it also celebrated the fact that, as a
movement, it was born within the Maghrebi working class in France. To mention a few
examples, El Ouma saw the successful contribution made by the Etoile's delegation to
the Muslim Congress which took place in Geneva in September 1934 as "un
encouragement pour tous ces ouvriers, pour tous ces fils de fellahs et tous les chOrneurs
qui, du neant, ont fait surgir ce mouvcment qui a fait l'admiration de bus les grands
partis politiques et de tous nos coreligionnaires de tous les pays" (El Ouma Numero 34,
octobre 1935). The December 1937 issue, which condemned Messali Hadj's
emprisonment, recalled the role that he had played in the formation of the movements in
those terms: "patiemment, inlassablement, il organisa les proletaires nord-africains de
France, ces deportes economiques que le colonialisme exploiteur chassa de leur foyer et
de leur patrie" (El 011171a Numero 58, decembre 1937). Class is emphasised here as a
characteristic of the nationalist organisation: it had been created by exiles, those
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workers, farmers and unemployed people who constituted the North African proletariat
of France.
The ENA was well aware that, under colonial rule, both in North Africa and in
metropolitan France, class, ethnicity and "race" were inextricably linked. On the front
page of the 1 April 1938 issue of El Ouma, the PPA reported in those terms on the racist
murder of Acherchour, a North African worker and a union activist, and on the Tribunal
de la Seine's decision not only to acquit Paul Cusinberghe, the Frenchman who had
killed him, but also to order Acherchour's widow to pay costs:
Contre toute attente, Paul Cusinberghe, dont la culpabilite ne faisait pourtant aucun
doute, est acquitte, et pour comble, c'est la veuve de la victime qui est condamnee aux &pens de
l'instance. C'est tout juste si le cadavre d'Acherchour ne fut pas, comme celui du Pape Formose,
exhume et traine sur le banc d'accusation.
Rien pourtant ne pouvait laisser le moindre doute sur la premeditation de ce lache
assassinat et le reseau serre des temoignages a charge excluait toute circonstance attenuante.
Mais ii y en avait une qui, aux yeux du president Saussier, etait suffisante pour justifier le forfait
de Cusinberghe: celui-ci est reactionnaire, fits de reactionnaire, tandis qu'Acherchour etait
ouvrier et indigene de surcroit ... En Algerie, toutes les fois que se produisait une injustice ... les
musulmans tournaient leur regard vers la metropole oti its pensaient qu'il se trouvait encore des
juges integres et une justice oil les considerations de classe et de races n'avaient pas cours; aprês
le proces de Cusinberghe, ii n'y a plus de doute: la justice francaise, sous toute les latitudes, nest
qu'un mythe! (El Ounia Numero 62, ler avril 1938)
The judge's decision was condemned by the movement for being motivated by class and
racial prejudice, and was interpreted as a sign that in the French justice system, and by
extension the French authorities, both in North Africa and in metropolitan France,
Maghrebis were doubly discriminated against on the basis of their "racial" and class
origin.
Nationalists also denounced this implacable double "injustice" when, on 24
January 1935, the leadership of the Etoile nord-africaine (Messali Hadj, Imache Amar
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and Radjef Belkacem) were sentenced to several months in prison and had to pay fines
on charges of "reconstitution d'association illegale", in violation of the 1901 Law. They
argued that "une fois de plus, il nous a ete donne de constater que: selon que vous
serez...». Une fois de plus, nous avons ete victimes de la justice de classe et la justice de
race" (El Ouma Numero 29, janvier 1935).
These examples show that the movement was aware of the fact that the racist
stigma attached to North Africans in colonial times was shaped by class and racial bias.
In other words, North Africans, in court and beyond, were guilty on both counts.
Racism was the locus where class and racial prejudices reinforced each other: their
ethnic origin (North Africans, Arabs, etc...) justified their class positioning (the
underclass).
In order to break that vicious circle, the nationalist movement challenged the
colonial ethno-class system in order to empower the marginalised Muslim majority:
they exploited the fact that class differences broadly reflected ethnic divisions, in other
words that the lower class status occupied by the Algerian population coincided with
their ethnicity in order to mobilise them. Even though class and ethnicity are in general
terms two distinct concepts, the particular colonial context within which the Algerian
nationalists evolved had created a significant overlap between the two, and the
movement turned that overlap into a political tool.
However marginalised North African migrants were, and in spite of the racism
that they endured both in the workplace and outside, the years that they had spent living
and working in metropolitan France affected their political interpretation of their own
experience. Their contact with other workers and the actions in which they were
involved in the workplace enabled them to develop a sense of solidarity with other
workers and identify with the working class of France. When on 24 March 1936, 150
North African workers went on strike at the Sueur factory in Bagneux and demanded a
salary increase and safer working conditions, militants of the Etoile nord-africaine
managed successfully to gain the support of part of the French workforce and produced
tracts calling for solidarity between French and North African workers and for a
continuation of the strike (El Owna Numero 39, mars-avril 1936).
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It is worth noting also that the meaning of the concept of working class in their
discourse encapsulated more than the traditional "blue-collar" workers', it referred to all
workers, including intellectuals (who had been, or had to be, won over to their cause) as
fellow proletarians.53
They considered that North African workers in France were an inherent part of
the working class of France:
[A] l'heure on une inquietude de regression des avantages acquis gagnes dans le
sacrifice de l'ensemble de la classe ouvriere, est declenchee faut-il rappeler que les travailleurs
nord-africains ... exigent, et il est temps encore, que ion s'occupe de leur miserable sort, et que
ion etudie avec plus d'attention et d'egards les revendications les concernant.
Toujours aux cOtes de leurs freres d'exploitation, ayant sincêrement lie, confondu leur
sort avec celui de la classe laborieuse de France, us lutterent d'abord sans restriction aucune a la
conquete dune condition d'existence meilleure et dont les avantages acquis en juin 36, illustrent
eloquemment, aussi ils ne cessêrent de faire ressortir, parallêlement a cc grand mouvement
d'affranchissement de la classe ouvriere les problemes particuliers qui les touchent ... Et ce nest
pas la classe ouvriere francaise aujourd'hui qui va meconnaitre ces justes aspirations de ces
freres d'exploitation, qui dans le sacrifice meme de leur vie (Acherchour est encore dans l'esprit
de tous) ceuvraient courageusement au triomphe de la cause cegetiste. (El 011171a Numero 58,
decembre 1937)
Here, the evocation of the bond of kinship amongst workers in France was marked by a
reference to the sacrifice of the whole of the working class ("le sacrifice de l'ensemble
de la classe ouvriere") for social progress. It was a bond which tied North African
workers to the rest of the working class in France ("[les travailleurs nord-africains]
ayant sincerement lie ... leur sort a celui de la classe laborieuse de France") through the
sacrifice made by Maghrebis for that common cause. However, in spite of the sacrifice
that they had made in the name of class solidarity, the movement argued that their own
53 The January 1935 issue of El Ounia called for the unity of the "proletariat intellectuel et manuel" (El
Ounia Numero 29, janvier 1935), and in the February-March issue of the same year, referred to "[les]
ouvriers intellectuels et manuels".
85
legitimate calls for an improvement in the living and working conditions and rights of
North African workers had been, up to then, largely left out, and still asked the French
working class to make common cause with them and support their specific demands.
El Ouma's nationalist discourse appealed to a sense of kinship based on class (as
their use of terms such as "sacrifice" and "freres d'exploitation" shows) which
transcended ethnic belonging. However, it also hinted at the fact that this bond between
North African and French workers had been weakened by the failure of the union
representing the French working class to express the same level of solidarity towards
them and to support their legitimate demands.
The movement's discourse on class, which focused on the unequal relationship
that characterised the tie of kinship that linked them to the French working class, bears
some similarity to that on the French "Mother-Nation", which denounced the sterile
nature of the sense of kinship that had for so long led North Africans to sacrifice their
lives for France, an oppressive nation which they had come to compare to a "mardtre".
Such attempts to create hybrid ties of kinship which went beyond ethnicity were
jeopardised by the racism that traversed the structures and institutions representing the
other in the relationship (the state in the case of France as a potential "home" for their
nation-ness, and unions in the case of class solidarity). Furthermore, as will be shown
later, this may have been one of the reasons behind the widening gap which appeared
between the nationalist movement and the CGTU.
To conclude, it could be said that class played a role in Algerian nationalist
discourse, and that class consciousness was shaped not only by Maghrebis' experience
as migrant workers in France, but also by colonial oppression in North Africa, which
was at the core of their decision to migrate. In North Africa, class coincided with
ethnicity and nation-ness: the Algerian people represented the under-privileged, and
were described as the repository of national aspirations. The North African elite, which
had generally adopted an assimilationist position, was accused by the movement of
betraying its own people.
Nationalists also celebrated the fact that their movement was born within the
North African working class in France. They viewed the experience of Maghrebi
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immigrant workers as inextricably linked with that of the working class of France, and
called on the whole of the French working class to support their political and social
demands. This shows that class solidarity could transcend ethnicity in the name of
social progress, but only if the sense of kinship between North African and French
workers was shared and was of mutual benefit.
3.5 Cultural practices
The role of culture and its interplay with ethnicity in the discourse of the Algerian
nationalist movement needs to he examined. 54 This section will try to answer the
following question: how was culture defined by the movement and what cultural
features were emphasised or made relevant to the construction of Algerians' ethno-
national identity?
As El Ounia (Numero 59, janvier 1938) pointed out, "ii est impossible de
changer de nationalite comme on change de cravate". Nationality, in its view, was not
about choice or political calculation, it was about substance and destiny; it was
something unchosen and unchangeable. For North African nationalists in France, the
substance of nationality was "avant tout notre passe, notre histoire, nos mceurs, nos
traditions, nos souvenirs de jeunesse ... tout ce qui entre dans la composition de notre
moi" (ibid). In other words, their national identity was very much grounded in culture:
what, apparently, constituted the bond that tied all Maghrebis was a shared sense of
cultural we-ness, an awareness that they were who they were because of some
determinist logic implied by those historically-shaped markers of cultural identity.
However, behind that apparently reified interpretation of culture, lay the fact that
those very markers of identity were actually the result of a transactional and shifting
process which produced or redefined those cultural characteristics. The movement's
naturalised discourse on culture masked its hybrid make-up. Indeed, North African
nationalists depicted a vision of their "true" self shaped by their past, their history,
54 Culture is defined by Fanon as "l'ensemble des comportements moteurs et mentaux ne de la rencontre
de l'homme avec la nature et avec son semblable" (1956: 122).
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customs, traditions and childhood memories which conjured up images of nature and
purity, and therefore of an identity which was intrisically different, unique and not
affected by the Other, when it was in reality a hybrid construct born and developed out
of conflict and resistance to colonial domination. Just as Algerian history and traditions
(even prior to 1830) could not be conjured up outside the colonial context, childhood
memories were traversed by recollections of incidents and injustice that Muslims
experienced or witnessed.
Within the same article, the nationalist movement went further when it added
that "en d'autres termes, on ne peut pas cesser d'être arabes ou kabyles pour devenir
francais du jour au lendemain". This last quote highlights two important facts: firstly,
that nationalists' sense of (Algerian) nationality was defined by culture, and was
inextricably linked with ethnicity (Arabs and Kabyles); secondly, that their ethno-
national identity was not simply defined in terms of the perceived nature of the cultural
substance (or cultural stuff, as Barth (1969) calls it) that made it up, but also by the
creation and maintenance of the boundary between "us" (Algerians) and "them" (the
French) which posited national differences between North Africans and the French as
irreconciliable ones.
To come back to our first point, it is clear that beyond the nationalists'
representation of culture as unique, timeless and transcending spaces and experiences,
cultural practices and perceptions amongst the North African population were in fact,
like most aspects of Muslim society, fundamentally affected by colonisation. The
upheaval brought about by colonisation altered in the most profound manner Muslims'
social, economic, political and cultural frameworks of reference. Expropriation and
dispossession, rural exodus, proletarisation, the introduction of paid labour and of a new
conception of time and space, the prominence given to the individual over the group,
and to private ownership over common use of land and resources, all led to profound
changes in intra and intergenerational relationships, and in the cultural fabric of Muslim
society. As Fanon points out:
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Ii existe ... certaines constellations d'institutions, vecues par des hommes determines, dans le
cadre d'aires geographiques precises qui a un moment donne ont subi l'assaut direct et brutal de
schemes culturels differents. Le developpement technique, generalement eleve, du groupe social
ainsi apparu l'autorise a installer une domination organisee. L'entreprise de deculturation se
trouve étre le negatif dun plus gigantesque travail d'asservissement economique voire
biologique. (Fanon 1956: 122)
Therefore, the cultural practices and "habitus" of North Africans, which fulfilled a
crucial role as the last repository of their identity (with religion), and which constituted
the cultural baggage that migrants brought with them, had already been deeply marked
by French domination. This complex process of "deculturation", as Fanon calls it,
became even more salient for Maghrebi migrants evolving in an environment where
French culture was dominant. 55 Indeed, culture went through a process of further
hybridisation in emigration which was consistent with its politicisation within the
discourse and actions of the nationalist movement.
Within the ENA and the PPA, culture was considered as central to the
development of a sense of common identity and solidarity amongst Maghrebis. This
appeared not only in the movement's discourse, but also in the way in which its political
events were organised. The meetings and rallies that it held were not limited to political
speeches; they often included other cultural and artistic events such as plays and
concerts. Those "fetes arabes" were seen by the police as a way for the association of
attracting more North African migrants to its political rallies (Note sur l'activite de
l'ENA: 56) (1). The aim of meetings such as the ones organised on 18 November 1934
in the "Maison commune" in rue Cadet, Paris, with an audience of 250 people, on 25
November in Puteaux in front of 400 people and on 31 December 1934 in rue Duhesne
was to collect funds for the nationalist movement and its newspaper (Ibid: 66-78). Other
"fetes artistiques", as the association called them, on 7 March in Levallois-Perret, on 4
April 1936 at "La Grange-aux-Belles" (El Ouma Numero 34, mars-avril 1936) and on
55 Fanon has produced a large corpus of work on the impact of colonisation (see, for example, Fanon
1951, 1952, 1975, 1975a and 1991).
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25 December 1937 in "La Mutualite" (El Ouma Numero 59, janvier 1938) were
organised in favour of North African political prisoners (including, at the time, the
leadership of the Etoile nord-africaine). Artistic events regularly featured satirical plays
which denounced colonial rule in North Africa and contained a political message which
was consistent with and reinforced the speeches made by leaders and militants of the
nationalist movement. The fact that political expression was not limited to traditional
rallies and included songs, dances and plays showed that North African migrants had
adopted a holistic approach to political activism. Expressing political views through
artistic means was considered as a tool of propaganda.
These "fetes artistiques" also played a socially cohesive role as North African
migrant workers were culturally and socially marginalised in France. Political
mobilisation was therefore not simply about the evocation of the ethnic bonds that were
meant to unite Maghrebis in their struggle for independence, it was also about
celebrating that bond through the creation of a sense of cultural commonality with other
Algerian Muslims.
The nationalist movement's efforts to establish specific cultural practices and
traditions in emigration which were presented as perenial could not hide the fact their
hybrid contours corresponded to the political boundaries that it had established. The
development of such cultural practices which were (re)created in emigration was
inspired by the ENA/PPA's modern conception of the nation informed by "Fideal
republicain". 56 It aimed to foster a national culture marked by Algerian-ness and
corresponding to specific territorial borders (Gallissot 1984: 49). However, that national
culture could only be constructed and sustained if it was bound to the wider cultural
framework of "civilisation", as the following section shows.
56 This was not incompatible with the movement's claim that its nationalist aspirations were rooted in
Islam.
90
3.6 History and memory: nostalgia for a great past and the anti-colonial struggle
The discourse of the nationalist movement was traversed by evocations of the past
which was one of the most dominant themes upon which its nationalist claims were
based. It informed the present in as much as, to paraphrase Gangulay, reference to the
past provides a crucial discursive terrain for shaping and reconsolidating selfhood and
identity (1992: 21). This section will examine how the past was discursively
reconstructed by the movement and how it was shaped by its political and cultural
vision.
Before looking at the role played by the past in Algerian nationalist discourse, it
is necessary to explain what that term entails. It could be argued that, within the context
of this study, pastness should be defined in binary terms, as it encompasses both history
and memory. The former and the latter constitute the two sides of the same tension that
marks pastness. History marked a sense of "us" which often transcended time and space,
and tended to be constructed positively, while memory was rooted in experience, the
"here" and "now" of the colonial era and was imbued by otherness ("them"). 57 As
Carlier points out, memory belonged to the sphere of the "vecu", and history to that of
the "relu" (1984: 348). Both shaped the Maghrebi diaspora's identity in specific ways
and contributed to shape the shifting boundary of their ethno-national identity.
At the core of the movement's evocation of history lies the concept of
civilisation. Elias (1994: 3-7) considers civilisation to be a concept which can refer to
political, economic, religious, technical, moral or social facts, and which expresses the
self-consciousness, or the national consciousness, of the West. He also argues that by
this term "Western society seeks to describe what constitutes its special character and
what it is proud of: the level of its technology, the nature of its manners, the
development of its scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more" (1994:
4-5). More importantly, Elias points out that the concept of civilisation is shaped by the
articulation of situation and history:
57 The movement's reference to history through its evocation of a great Arabo-Muslim civilisation, which
is discussed later in this section, is a case in point.
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The situation and history of the group are mirrored in [civilization] ... The collective history
crystallized in [it] and resonates in [it] ... the concept[] live[s] as long as this crystallization of
past experiences and situations retains an existential value, a function in the actual being of
society ... at times too, [the concept of civilisation] sleep[s], or sleep[s] in certain respects, and
acquire[s] a new existential value from a new social situation. [It is] recalled because something
in the present state of society finds expression in the crystallization of the past embodied in the
words. (Elias 1994: 6-7)
He also asserts that civilisation was established as a Western concept which gave
expression to the continuously expansionist tendency of colonising groups (1994: 5).
French and British colonial empires were built on and justified by their claim that by
colonising "uncivilised" and therefore inferior people, they fulfilled their civilising
mission.
That concept also became central to the ideology of the colonised fighting for
Algerian independence in the inter-war period. In nationalist discourse, the concept of
civilisation crystallised history and situation. But while at the beginning of the twentieth
century, civilisation expressed the national consciousness of Western countries such as
France whose national integrity was well established, it appears that for North Africans
at the time, the concept was the reflection, as well as the enunciation, of the process of a
national consciousness in formation. It gave structure, meaning and a sense of purpose
to their own social experience at a time when colonial rule was disintegrating the socio-
cultural fabric of Muslim society. Civilisation also constituted the wider framework
within which nationalist aspirations for an Algerian national culture could be
articulated. Indeed, Cesaire argues that civilisation and culture are both aspects of the
same reality, and adds that:
ii n' y a de culture que nationale Mais il saute aux yeux que les cultures nationales, toutes
particulieres qu'elles sont, se groupent par affinites. Et ces grandes parentes de culture, ces
grandes families de cultures portent un nom: ce sont des civilisations ... la civilisation tend a
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l'universalite et ... la culture tend a la particularite; ... la culture c'est la civilisation en tant qu'elle
est propre a un peuple, a une nation, partagee par nulle autre et qu'elle porte, indelebile, la
marque de ce peuple et de cette nation. (Cesaire 1956: 191)
Cesaire also points out pertinently that the spheres of culture and civilisation are shaped
by socio-political processes: "la civilisation est avant tout un phenomene social et la
resultante de faits sociaux et de forces sociales l'idee d'une influence du politique sur
le culturel s'impose comme une evidence" (Cesaire 1956: 193).58
This influence of the political on the cultural was one of the key characteristics
of nationalist discourse. The movement's reference to civilisation was an inherent part
of the process of construction of a national culture and project discursively embedded in
the past. Indeed, the Etoile's nationalist pursuit was metaphorically described as
"chercher sur chaque chemin, chaque sentier, les traces et les pas de nos ancetres et
peut-etre entendrons nous leur langue et leur conseil" (El °tuna Numero 15, octobre
1933).
Far from being rigidly defined, the past was conjured up in fluctuating ways so
that it could both shape and be shaped, as well as inform and be informed by the
present. The function of the concept of civilisation was to provide nationalists with an
empowering cultural framework of reference for their discourse on identity:
Quand les Arabes vivaient dans leur brillante civilisation, quand us construisaient chateaux,
villas, jardins, quand us traduisaient les ceuvres grecques et les perfectionnaient, quand les Papes
allaient sinsli uire a Cordoue, quand pendant plusieurs siecles, les Chretiens apprenaient la
medecine sur les livres arabes traduits en latin, une bonne partie de l'Europe etait vetue de peaux
de bete et vivait a l'etat d'ignorance, parce que les Europeens de cette époque n'etaient pas
organises et vivaient dans l'anarchie. Mais depuis, qu'ont-ils fait? Ils ont imite les Arabes, ils se
sont mis au travail sans perdre un seul instant. Ils se sont organises et ils ne se sont jamais
decourages. Ils ont parcouru un grand chemin et aujourd'hui ils sont nos dirigeants. (El Ouma
Numero 17, decembre 1933)
58 For a detailed discourse analysis of colonialism, see Cesaire (1972).
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The civilisation that they referred to was in itself problematic. Indeed, by
acknowledging only the Arab civilisation, they dismissed the history of North Africa
prior to the Arab conquest and thereby ignored the Berber cultural legacy. That
essentialist interpretation of civilisation and cultural heritage was to mark the discourse
on culture and ethnicity of the nationalist movement, but also of North African
independent states. 59 In a way, it echoed the process by which France came to construct
her own sense of civilisation, as the expression of the French nation and culture which
formed the foundation for the exclusivist construction of a French ethnie (cultural
specificities of minority ethnic groups in France were both dismissed and suppressed).
This passage also shows that nationalists adopted the very concept of civilisation
that the French had developed to justify their colonial domination, but placed it in a
historical context. By displacing historically their discourse on civilisation, they
reversed the dominant/dominated, superior/inferior relationship to the advantage of
North African Muslims. The prestigious Arab civilisation that is evoked here is one
where Arabs were culturally, scientifically, architecturally superior to the French and
Europeans, who were described as backward, uncultivated and dependent on Arab
science and culture. They also implied that Europeans were able to leave that state of
anarchy that characterised their society and develop their own civilisation only by
imitating Arabs. This enabled the movement to claim not only that Arab civilisation
preceded and was superior to European civilisation, but also that the former was a
source of inspiration for the latter. Arab civilisation is therefore given as natural,
authentic, pure and rooted in pastncss, while European civilisation is described as an
imitation, as something artificial, unnatural, corrupt and by extension corrupting:
si, aujourd'hui, ii y a moms de verite en Kabylie, c'est depuis que nous nous sommes un peu
amolis au contact de cette civilisation pourrie quest la civilisation occidentale. Dans ces pays
59 For a historical overview of the Berber question in Algerian politics and in emigration, see Chaker
(1984).
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«civilises», le mensonge, l'hypocrisie, la forberie se pratiquent du plus haut de rechelle sociale.
(El Ounia Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935)
The way in which the movement's discourse on civilisation was developed showed that
the concept had been appropriated by nationalists to construct their own sense of ethno-
national identity, but that it was done in such a manner that the sense of "us" that was
conveyed in those evocations was of dialectical significance to their present (and future)
relationship with the "other" (the coloniser). Indeed, images of a great Arab civilisation
were conjured up to the extent that they could differentiate North Africans from the
French, and position them as culturally superior to the colonial power that dominated
them. This was what El Ouma implied, in an article denouncing the attempts made by
Father Lemoine and the Jesuits to christianise the Kabyles, when they wrote that "la
doctrine et revangile de civilisation qu'il [Lemoine] defend et exalte sont de beaucoup
inferieurs sur tous les points a la civilisation arabe" (El Ouma Numero 29, janvier
1935). Therefore, France's colonial domination of North Africa was not a sign that
France's civilisation was superior, but that the West was now more organised and
motivated than the Arab World:
Celui qui nest pas organise est fatalement voue a l'esclavage, a la domesticite, a travailler pour le
profit de celui qui est organise ... les Europeens, particulierement l'Anglais, le Francais, l'Italien
ou le Hollandais qui dirigent en quelque sorte toute l'activite de la planete ne sont pas dune
naissance superieure a celle des Musulmans tunisiens, marocains ou algeriens; us sont nes
comme tous les enfants des autres pays, us ne sont superieurs en rien. us n'ont pas le monopole
de l'intelligence, ni du savoir, mais la difference est qu'ils naissent dans un milieu organise. (El
Ounia Numero 17, decembre 1933)
Interestingly, this passage shows that nationalist discourse could go beyond the French-
inspired rhetoric and posturing on the superiority of one's civilisation over another, and
explicitly adopt a more egalitarian stance in this debate. It also highlights the fact that
organisation, as a theme, was central to the movement's dialectical interpretation of
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colonialism. It was also seen as indispensable to North Africans if they were one day to
recover their freedom. It was both the reason for their misfortune and the key to their
problem. The Etoile Nord-africaine argued that the experience that they had
accumulated in terms of organisation, and the fact that they were the only North African
political movement to demand rights and independence, made it Maghrebi nationalists'
natural choice for mobilisation. The way in which the movement discursively
positioned itself vis-a-vis the concept of civilisation is illustrated by El Ouma's equation
of the Etoile nord-africaine with "le mouvement de la nation arabe [qui] tend a donner a
une civilisation qui fut brillante la place qui lui convient" (El Ouma Numero 29, janvier
1935). The ENA was therefore not simply depicted as a political association struggling
for North Africans' rights to emancipation, but as the incarnation of the Arab nation
fighting to bring Arab civilisation back to its former glory.
The fact that the nationalists' discourse was based on the representation of a
North African ethnic, nation and civilisation rooted in Arabness shows the extent to
which the past could be re-written, shaped or imagined to suit the ideology and political
needs of the nationalist movement, as well as the situation and context within which it
evolved. It also reveals how those evocations could contribute to a binary process of
legitimisation: one the one hand, the ENA/PPA's recurring reference to the glorious past
of the Arab civilisation and past legitimised the movement as the true voice of the
nation, and on the other hand their very discourse privileged and legitimised that
interpretation of the Algerian nation and civilisation as authentic.
Their use of pastness and of the concept of civilisation, their insistence on the
primacy of thc state and on the integrity of the nation, their reifying definition of a
nation-ness based on one ethnie, one culture and one language further demonstrates how
the Algerian nationalist project was marked by modernity, and how it bore many of the
tropes that characterised French nationalism. The Etoile nord-africaine and the Parti du
peuple algerien were unable to conceive a nation outside the parameters of France's
own nationalist discourse and the binary logic on which France had based her colonial
rule. In the independent Algeria that their discourse conjured up, all things French
would be replaced by all things Arab, but the internal dynamics of cultural and ethnic
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oppression and division would not be questioned. Berber and popular Algerian Arab
cultures and languages would remain marginalised, and an Arab culture (based on
classical Arabic) which was probably as, if not more, alien to Algerian Muslims as the
French culture and language at the time would be imported.
In the nationalists' discourse, their own identity seemed to be only defined
against others (the French) and through others (the Arabs). Arab culture from the
Middle East was seen as suitably prestigious, authentic and untouched by the corrupting
influence of French civilisation, and therefore ideal to supplant French culture in North
Africa. But for such a projet to function as a framework of reference for their identity,
that Arab culture had to be presented as the true cultural self of North African
civilisation. 60 This implied that the varied ethnic make-up and cultures of Algeria would
remain as stigmatised under the new cultural order as they were under French rule. But
when Algerian nationalist leaders decided to favour the "Algerie arabo-islamique"
alternative rather than the "Algerie algerienne" one, they may not have fully realised
what the implications of such a cultural option were; it was a choice which was fraught
with problems, and the economic, social and political price to pay for the imposition of
an imported Arab culture and language on Algeria would turn out to be heavy,
particularly if one considers that it took the French several centuries (probably up until
the early twentieth century) to establish a culturally and linguistically homogeneous
state.61
To return to the question of civilisation, it is worth noting that such a concept
was used by the nationalist movement as a device to construct Algerian national identity
as marked by pastness, and therefore by timelessness. The ENA/PPA discursively
reduced French domination to a temporary episode of colonial domination, which like
other such periods in the history of North Africa, would one day fade away and leave
North African civilisation unadulterated. El °lima compared metaphorically France
with ancient Rome when it wrote that under French colonial domination "ii ne saurait
60 The "courant berberiste" which existed within the nationalist movement, and which was in favour of
"l'Algerie alg6rienne", a pluralist Algeria did not manage to impose its views.
61 See Benrabah (1999) for an account of the disastrous social, cultural and political consequences of
Algeria's arabisation policy after independence.
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etre question pour nous d'affranchissement. Rome a besoin d'esclaves" (El Ouma
Numero 61, 11 mars 1938). Nationalists argued that just like the Roman domination of
North Africa, France's colonial adventure was destined to fail:
le recours a la force est une erreur grossiere sur cette term d'Afrique ... Le Romain a la poigne
brutale nest plus depuis longtemps. Ses grandes ruines dorment sous le linceul des sables. Et ses
armes de bronze ont fondu au soleil. Mais notre peuple est toujours la, solide comme le roc. Seul
l'Islam la conquis pour toujours, parce qu'il a su s'adresser aux cceurs et leur parler le seul
language qu'il comprenne: celui de l'honneur et de la foi. (El Ouma Numero 59, janvier 1938)
Nationalists considered that history was on their side. The Roman example, which had
proved that domination by force could not succeed, was used by the movement as a
metaphor for the fate that awaited the French colonial empire. Colonialism was defined
as ruthless, uncivilised ("le Romain a la poigne brutale") and ephemeral, while the
Algerian people (and therefore, within the political context of the time, the Algerian
nation) was described as timeless and powerful, as something which was part of nature
("solide comme le roc") and civilised ("le seul language qu'il comprenne: celui de
l'honneur et de la foi"). Therefore, history enabled the ENA/PPA to reverse discursively
the power relations of their time. Their evocation of the past glories of the "sarrazin"
recalled "l'epoque pas si eloignee oi l'Arabe savait se faire respecter" (El Ouma Numero
59, janvier 1938).
It can therefore be seen that the concept of civilisation developed by the
nationalist movement fulfilled two functions: the first one was to emphasise difference
and mark the boundary between "us" and "them", the second one was to empower the
nationalists' sense of ethno-national identity through their identification with a great
civilisation. This does not mean that their conception of civilisation was inherently
different from that of the French. In fact, distinguishing one's own civilisation from the
other's and present it as intrinsically superior is one of the characteristics of civilisation
as a concept. Even if the content of that civilisation was (and needed to be) different, the
basic processes that shaped its conception were the same.
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One of the key features which could be highlighted here to illustrate the extent
to which the nationalists' reference to the greatness of their own civilisation bore
similarities with that of the French is the question of colonialism and domination. If, as
was discussed previously, domination of North Africa was denounced as brutal,
uncivilised and ultimately futile, the Etoile's own discourse on the Arab civilisation also
conjured images of supremacy and subjection. In a political rally which took place on
26 May 1934 in the "Salle des Societes Savantes" in Paris, Fodil Arab, a militant of the
Etoile, contrasted North Africans' subjugation by France with their past glories and
recalled that "autrefois les musulmans, unis, avaient pu conquerir une partie de l'Europe
et de l'Asie, alors qu'ils devaient a leur division leur actuel esclavage" (Note sur
l'activite de l'ENA: 83) (1). The linking of the past greatness of Arab civilisation with
the concept of empire was also mentioned in El Ouma:
Nos ancetres ont ete les artisans dune civilisation qui a brine dun vif éclat en Asie, dans tout le
bassin mediterraneen et partout oü l'Islam a penetre. us en semerent les premieres graines; elle
prit un grand essor et repandit sur le monde barbare les lumieres de la science. Pendant que les
Arabes construisaient des palais dune grandeur jamais egalee, et des universites pour diffuser la
civilisation florissante, l'Europeen logeait dans des cavernes naturelles et s'habillait de peaux de
betes.
Nous avons Cu nos savants illustres, nos philosophes, nos litterateurs, nos historiens,
nos geographes, nos mathernaticiens, nos architectes. De nos jours, nous voyons encore partout
les vestiges de l'art arabe, qui ont defie la force du temps et ont garde intacte toute leur beaute
c'est parce que nous formions une nation unie et prospel e que nous pilmes organiser un domaine
colonial. (El Ounia Numero 64, vendredi 27 mai 1938)
This passage shows the striking similarity that existed between the way in which both
North African nationalists and the French invoked their own civilisation. Were terms
like "Arab" and "Islam" to be replaced respectively with "European" and "Christianity",
this extract would have easily been taken for a celebration of "European civilisation".
Condemning the domination that Europe had imposed on the rest of the world in the
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name of civilisation, while praising the fact that they, too, as Arabs, had once organised
a colonial empire was not so much a contradiction as an illustration of the ideological
power struggle in which North African Muslims and French colonialism were engaged.
It was, to a large extent, a discursive confrontation with the French about the greatness
of their respective civilisations whose outcome would determine who would rightfully
claim ownership of North Africa.
North African nationalists, just like the French, illustrated the timelessness and
greatness of their civilisation at a cultural, scientific and political level. The reference to
aesthetics and past architectural achievements was also aimed at conveying a sense of
superiority: while Roman constructions were seen as ephemeral ("Ses grandes ruines
dorment sous le linceul des sables" (El Ouma Numero 59, janvier 1938), an emphasis
was put on the timeless beauty of Arab art and architecture ("De nos jours, nous voyons
encore partout les vestiges de Fart arabe, qui ont defie la force du temps et ont garde
intacte toute leur beaute").
Nationalists also dismissed French accusations that North Africans were
"barbarians" and considered that their own civilisation was superior to that of Europe
because it spread not through oppression and exploitation, but through fraternity. In the
October 1935 issue of El alma, an article quoted an unnamed English historian who
observed, in his book entitled "Histoire de Charles Quint", that Muslim civilisation was
unique in that it combined armed conquest and proselytism with tolerance. Remel El
Hok, the author of this article, also argued that:
Si les Musulmans etaient des Barbares, us n'auraient pas conquis de Gibt altar aux glacieis de
l'Himalaya, de la Mediterranee aux confins de la Chine. Les Musulmans ont cree un empire qui
reunis toute la population arabe divisee pendant des siecles, dans une fraternite raciale, dans une
fraternite de paix d'oii est exclue toute distinction entre riches et pauvres; entre becloins et
sedentaires.
Ils gouvernent non seulement politiquement la moitie du monde, mais nos savants de Cordoue,
de Salamanque, de Bagdad, de Damas influencent profondement les sciences, la vie
intellectuelle du monde entier. (El Ounza Numero 31, octobre 1935)
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In this passage, the switch from the past (paragraph one) to the present tense (paragraph
two) reflects the contiguity of both past and present in Algerian nationalist discourse.
What is also implied here is that, for the Etoile, the greatness of Muslim civilisation was
inextricably linked to the possession of an empire. This article dismissed French claims
that North Africans were barbarians on the basis of the conquests that had been made by
Muslims. What this extract also shows is that, for nationalists, Arab civilisation was
also imagined as unique because it was marked by tolerance, generosity, fraternity and
egalitarianism, thereby ignoring the reality of imperial domination when it came to
remembering their own. This rhetoric further emphasises the parallel which was made
earlier: the more North Africans strived to make their imagined Arab civilisation as
different and unique, the more alike it appeared to that of the French in the way it was
constructed.
A further consideration of the above extract also reveals the problematic manner
in which territory was equated with ethnicity and religion. The fact that nationalists
amalgamated Islam and Arabness and argued that the empire which they had built
unified the previously divided Arab population, brushed aside the existence of other
peoples, ethnic groups (Iberians, Berbers, Persians, Kurds, Indians, Chinese, and so on)
and religions (Christianity, Buddhism, etc.) that may have been numerically dominant
in parts of the empire.
The movement's argument conveyed the idea that the concept of civilisation, and
the empire which was built in the name of civilisation was not about domination, but
about fulfilling a destiny. It conveyed the idea of a return, of a reunification of one's
people. It was, in a way, about claiming what was rightfully one's. In that sense, the
ENA and the PPA's interpretation of civilisation was not different from that of the
French who presented France's imperial ambitions in North Africa not only as its
destiny and as its duty to spread civilisation and faith to inferior and "barbaric" people,
but also as a return to their Roman/European roots. 62 The Arab empire which
62 This was the context within which the Kabyle myth and the "politique berbere" were particularly
pertinent.
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nationalists described was essentialised to accommodate their nationalist project which
aimed to establish an egalitarian and classless society based on one religion and one
ethnie.
It is therefore apparent that pastness as a theme was particularly salient in the
discourse on national identity. However, did it play a similar/comparable role for
Maghrebis on both sides of the Mediterranean, or did the particular diasporic experience
of North Africans in France shape the way in which the past was "mobilised" to imagine
the Algerian nation? In order to examine this question, let us compare and contrast the
discourse on the nation as invoked by the Algerian nationalist movement in France with
that of a prominent North African politician in Algeria. The ENA/PPA's nationalist
programme was based on claims that the Algerian nation pre-existed the arrival of the
French:
Les colonialistes ont voulu nous faire croire qu'avant leur arrivee sur la terre d'Afrique, nous ne
formions pas une vraie nation, que nous &ions plonges dans une grossiere barbarie. Ceci est
denue de tout fondement. Nous &ions une vraie nation avant l'arrivee des Francais en Algerie.
Le meme sentiment de solidarite et d'unite nationale nous animait. Nous avions un genre de vie
particulier. (El Ounia Numero 64, 27 mai 1938)
The nationalists' assertion that their nation existed before the French arrived may first
appear questionable. After all, the very name and borders of Algeria were creations of
the French colonial authorities. But their argument, however problematic it is, should be
interpreted as more than mere posturing. Firstly, the nation is referred to in vague term,
and the article does not explicitly mention Algeria. Secondly, nation as a concept is
understood in this extract as rooted in ethnicity.63
The ENA/PPA refers here not so much to a "nation-state" which they want to
restore, as to the broadly-defined nation that forms the foundation upon which that
63 This problematic interpretation of nation as ethnie is supported by Anthony D. Smith who argues that
the origins of nation "can be traced back to pre-modern ethnic communities"(1989: 340). In the same
tradition, Connor (1978) also asserts that a distinction should be made here between "nation" on the one
hand and "state" on the other.
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nation-state would, one day, be built. The nation is presented as well established on the
basis that a sense of nation-ness existed prior to the invasion of the French. When
nationalists stated that "le meme sentiment de solidarite et d'unite nationale nous
animait", they implied that they were a nation in the sense of a self-conscious ethnie and
that shared socio-cultural traditions and practices marked that sense of belonging ("nous
avions un genre de vie particulier").
The fact that this argument may not have reflected the ethno-national reality of
the North African territory before 1830 is not really important; the accuracy of France's
representation of Algeria's ethnic, historical and social characteristics prior to, as well as
after, colonisation was no less questionable. Indeed, as Anderson (1983) points out,
what characterises all nations is not their falsity/genuineness but the way in which they
are imagined. In this instance, the discourse of Messali Hadj's movement merely
reflected the way in which the Algerian nation was conjured up in nationalist discourse.
It was an interpretation of the nation which was negotiated within, and informed by, the
colonial context, by the Other. Firstly, nationalist discourse on nation-ness, which
essentialised ethnicity around what was seen as a prestigious and powerful identity
based on Arabness (when the ethnic make-up of Algeria was actually varied and
complex) echoed the way in which the French nation had been constructed. Secondly,
as the above-mentioned passage shows, the movement's representation of nation-ness
served a clear political purpose: it was designed to counter the colonialists' argument
that the Algerian nation did not exist prior to 1830.
Let us now turn to Muslim politicians in North Africa and to their discourse on
the nation. In contrast to the nationalist stance adopted by the ENA and the PPA, both
shaped by the diasporic experience of the North African proletariat in France, the
political voices of Muslims in North Africa, which were grouped together within the
Federation des elus musulmans, were marked by reformism. That Federation
considered that the future of Algeria lay with France. It included a number of
movements led by the intellectual elite and the notables, by religious leaders (the
Otdemas) and, from its creation in 1936 onwards, the Algerian Communist Party. Ferhat
Abbas, vice-president of the Federation des elus mustdmans, expressed those
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assimilationist views very clearly in L'Entente (28 f6vrier 1936) and in La Liberte (7
janvier 1938) when he argued not only that he was in favour of assimilation, but that he
identified with France:
Je suis partisan de l'assimilation. La France, c'est moi, parce que je suis le nombre,
l'ouvrier, l'artisan je ne puis concevoir l'Algerie sans la France ...
Mon opinion est connue. Le nationalisme est ce sentiment qui pousse un peuple a vivre
a finterieur des frontieres territoriales, sentiment qui a cree ce reseau de nations. Si j'avais
decouvert la «nation algerienne», je serais nationaliste et je n'en rougirais pas comme dun crime.
Les hommes morts pour fideal patriotique sont journellement honores et respectes. Ma vie ne
vaut pas plus que la leur. Et cependant, je ne mourrai pas pour «la patrie algerienne» parce que
cette patrie n'existe pas. Je ne l'ai pas decouverte. J'ai interroge l'histoire. Jai visite les
cimetieres: personne ne men a pane. Sans doute, ai-je trouve «l'empire arabe», «l'empire
musulman», qui honorent l'Islam et notre race. Mais ces empires se sont eteints. us
correspondraient a l'empire romain et au Saint Empire romain de l'epoque medievale. us sont nes
pour une epoque et une humanite qui ne sont plus les nOtres.
Un Algerien musulman songerait-il serieusement a batir l'avenir avec ces poussieres du
passé? Les Don Quichotte ne sont plus de notre siècle ... On ne batit pas sur du vent. Nous avons
ecarte une fois pour toute les nuees et les chimeres pour her definitivement notre avenir a celui
de l'ceuvre francaise dans ce pays. (La Liberte, 7 janvier 1938)
Ferhat Abbas' interpretation of the nation differed significantly from that of Messali
IIadj. While his statement includes many of those tropes which made up the nation
evoked by the ENA/PPA (ethnicity, religion, kinship/sacrifice, history and memory),
these were considered in a distinct and disarticulated manner. By contrast, nationalist
discourse imagined an Algerian nation which crystallised and mobilised all those
markers for political ends.
While, on the other side of the Mediterranean, the uneducated workers who
belonged to the nationalist movement were more able to imagine the Algerian nation in
its own right, Ferhat's position echoed that of many French-educated Muslims in North
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Africa who failed to do so. 64 Indeed, he was convinced that a nation had to be built on
some tangible foundations and failed to realise that all nations - including France - were
imagined. His views on the French nation as being somehow concrete and marked by
timelessness was very much influenced by the French education system which he, like
many North African evolues, went through, and whose function was not only to
articulate convincingly those tropes of the nation in order to inculcate a sense of French
nationhood based on the manifest and unquestionable existence of the French nation,
but also to present Algeria as an uncivilised territory where no nation existed.
Abbas' contention that no Algerian nation could be found in the past was based
on problematic premises; firstly, that nation-ness was rooted in and legitimised by
history, when it is clear that nation-ness could actually shape and legitimise history;
secondly, that a nation could only exist per se, and not be shaped through conflict and
negotiation at the boundary between "us" (the colonised) and "them" (the coloniser);
thirdly, that memory, in other words recollections of past experiences, including
colonial ones, did not play a part in the building of Algerian nationhood; and fourthly
that nation and state had to coincide in the past and present to be legitimately considered
as a basis for nation-ness, when they could be two discrete, but by no means
incompatible, loci of belonging; and finally that giving one's life for the Motherland was
justified only if that nation "existed", when in fact that longing for sacrifice could foster
the birth of a nation.
Soon after their publication, Ferhat Abbas' arguments were denounced in the
March-April 1936 issue of El Ottnia, which accused him of betraying Arabs and
Muslims. The way in which each of the points that he had made were countered not
only exposed the chasm that existed between the two political groups at the time, but
more importantly, revealed the modern character of the Etoile's nationalism. On the
question of the link between the past and nation-ness, whilst the Etoile nord-africaine
recognised that the "Arab Empire" had declined, it asserted that "l'Empire arabe n'est
pas une poussiere du passe, ii existe, pour celui qui veut le voir". Its statement conveyed
64 It is important to note, however, that the leadership of the nationalist movement (including Messali
Hadj and Imache Amar) were more educated than the large majority of the migrant workers who
supported it.
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the idea that the past is not fixed and dead, but can be subject to choice and
interpretation, or, to use Carlier's argument, that history can be "re-read" (1984: 348).
The Arab empire, and by extension the Algerian nation, exist for those who want to see
them. What is implied here is that the Arab Empire, epitomising Arab civilisation, is not
rigidly rooted in the past, but is crystallised at the boundary between past and present; it
is shaped by, and interpreted through, present circumstances and situations. The Etoile's
evocation of the Arab empire was one in which ethnicity was subsumed by religion and
the past linked to the present. It encapsulated both Arab and non-Arab Muslim
countries: the examples given by the nationalist movement to support its argument
included countries such as Yemen, Irak and Egypt, but also, more problematically,
Afghanistan and Turkey (El Ouma, Num6ro 39, mars-avril 1936).
In the same article, the examples of Algerians, but also of Syrian and Egyptian
nationalists who had sacrificed their life for the emancipation of their nation, were also
cited by the ENA to counter the argument of the vice-president of the Federation des
elus musulmans that he would not die for the "Algerian motherland, because it does not
exist":
Pour ce qui est de la Patrie algerienne, si M. Abbas ne la voit pas personnellement,
n'y a rien d'extraordinaire a cela, mais qu'il condamne les six millions d'Algeriens a penser
comme lui, cela &passe les limites de la raison ... Ii y a dans chaque cceur d'Algerien musulman,
l'idee de patrie fortement bien ancree.
Sans remonter dans l'histoire de l'Algerie jusqu'aux dynasties arabes et berberes,
prenons seulement la grande figure de l'Emir Abd-el-Kader, qui a, pendant 16 ans, tenu tete aux
armees etrangeres, et qui a oblige la France a reconnaitre sa souverainete par le traite de la
Tafna. Cette reconnaissance, nest-ce pas une reconnaissance de la Patrie algerienne?
Depuis 1830 jusqu'a nos jours, est-ce que l'Algerie s'est soumise corps et Arne A
l'imperialisme francais? Jamais! Elle a toujours lutte avec acharnement pour recouvrir son
independance. M. Abbas pane de cimetieres; eh! bien, qu'il aille visiter les cimetieres de la
Kabylie, oil des milliers de combattants sont morts pendant l'insurrection de 1871. Et bien
d'autres soulevements pour la liberation de l'Algerie. (El Ounza Numero 39, mars-avril 1936)
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For Algerian nationalists, the Fatherland was rooted in history and memory. What
differentiated them from reformist and assimilationist politicians such as Ferhat Abbas
was that it was their national feelings which fostered the idea of the nation. By contrast,
Abbas was wrong to consider that the "existence" of the nation was an indispensable
condition for the emergence of nationalism. The Etoile argued that it could indeed build
"l'avenir avec ces poussieres du passe". In the age of nationalism, the fact that shreds of
the past could be summoned up and construed by nationalists to further their agenda
belied Abbas' argument that "les Don Quichotte ne sont plus de notre siècle".
Revealingly, the historical references which were selected in that article were all
illustrations of past resistance to France's domination, and placed Algerian nationalism
within the French colonial context. The mythical figure of Abd el-Kader, who fought
against the French until his surrender on 23 December 1847 (Droz and Lever 1982) and
the Kabyle rebellion led by Mokrani in 1871 were evoked to sustain the nationalist
movement's argument that the "Patrie algerienne" did exist; but the existence of such a
nation was not so much perceived in the form of an established nation-state, as through
the nationalist feelings and struggle of historical figures. The fact that the above-
mentioned examples were all from the colonial era was no coincidence. Nationalism
was, after all, a gift of the West to the rest of the world (Chatterjee 1996: 215) and
triggered the construction of nations in many colonial countries, including Algeria.
However, as Hobsbawm points out, "nations without a past are a contradiction in terms
[w]hat makes a nation is the past" (1996: 255). Nationalist discourse wraps the nation
with the mantel of timelessness. Like all other nations, Algeria was constructed as
rooted in the immemorial past.
Nevertheless, the same article provided a useful insight into how the nation was
constructed in nationalist discourse, and showed that it could not be exclusively
grounded in historical recollection of past resistance to oppression. A powerful rallying
force, Islam, had to be invoked to create strong enough feelings of solidarity and
identification with the nation to mobilise Muslims around the movement's nationalist
project:
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Merne en admettant l'inadmissible, a savoir n'a jamais existe de Patrie algerienne, est-ce que
six millions d'hommes ne sont pas capables de travailler pour creer cette patrie? Ii est plus facile,
plus logique de stimuler l'idee de Patrie parmi la population musulmane déjà prete a cette
conception par son amour indefectible a l'Islam, par ses luttes acharnees et sa resistance a la
penetration de l'imperialisme, que d'entreprendre un travail de francisation, et de
francequillonnerie, et de trahir ainsi Dieu et le peuple, comme le font Abbas, Ben Jelloul et
douzaine de leurs pareils. (El Otuna Numero 39, mars-avril 1936)
This was the closest that the Etoile ever came to consider explicitly that the nation could
be imagined, and shaped by nationalism. It argued that even if, as Abbas pointed out,
such a nation did not exist, it could be created by stimulating the idea of an Algerian
fatherland amongst Muslims based not only on resistance to imperialism, but also, and
more importantly, on Islam. The nationalists' discourse conveyed the idea that the
construction of their national identity was very much informed by the colonial context
from which it had emerged. The choice was between assimilation and nationalism; both
were, to some extent, defined vis-à-vis or against the other (French colonial rule). The
former implied a Frenchification which was equated with the betrayal of one's religion
and people, and presented as contrived, artificial ("entreprendre un travail [my
emphasis] de francisation") and somewhat ridiculous ("francequillonnerie"); while the
latter was described as a more logical and easier choice, and as something which was
consistent with the true nature and religious beliefs of North African Muslims. The
argument made by Ferhat Abbas about the impossibility of a nationalism based on "ces
poussieres du passé" was therefore discursively challenged by the movement which,
conversely, depicted the Muslim elite's assimilationist agenda as an empty pursuit, as
nothing more than an impossible attempt to build a French Muslim identity on, so to
speak, ces poussieres du present.
The nationalists' argument that past examples of nationalist struggles
demonstrated that the Algerian nation did "exist" seems to be supported by the work of
historians such as Droz and Lever, who emphasise the nationalist character of Abd-el-
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Kader's reign when they point out that during his war against the French, "ii amorca la
constitution dun etat arabe, sinon algerien, dote de moyens etonnamment modernes"
(1982: 14).
In that context, Gellner's argument on the development of Algerian nationalism,
which concurs with that of Abbas, is problematic. He states that:
There had previously been no Algerian nation prior to the nationalist awakening in this century,
as Ferhat Abbas, one of the principal early nationalist leaders in the country, observed. There
had been the much wider community of Islam, and a whole set of narrower communities, but
nothing corresponding even remotely to the inhabitants of the present national territory. (Gellner
1983: 73)
This assertion needs to be challenged because it judges the nineteenth century, and the
centuries preceding it, through criteria which were established in the twentieth century.
Gellner problematically assumes here that a nation can only exist if national aspirations
manifest themselves within the limited confines of the territorial state inherited from the
colonial era. Indeed, the nation can emerge as the result of complex political processes
which may not, initially, necessarily be correlated with a specific territory.
Furthermore, he ignores past events such as Abd-el-Kader's struggle against the
French and his establishment of a kingdom because they did not coincide with the
borders of the present national territory, even though, at the time of his rebellion, those
colonial borders on which the present Algerian national territory was based were not
even created.
Finally, Ferhat Abbas could not be considered as one of the principal early
nationalist leaders in Algeria. The Jeunes Algeriens to which he belonged in the inter-
war period was a secularist and assimilationist movement inspired by the French
republican tradition (Ageron 1968b: 1053). The assimilationist stance that he had
adopted until 1939 led him to become a volunteer in the French army and fight for
France during the Second World War. It was only during that conflict that his political
views evolved towards moderate nationalism. Even if he was to play a prominent role in
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the post-war struggle for independence, his political career stood in sharp contrast to
that of the leaders of the EtoileIPP A whose militant nationalism had led them to face
police repression as early as the mid 1920s and several jail sentences from the 1930s
onwards.
3.7 Religion: a nationalist project shaped by Islam
While Gellner's assessment of early manifestations of national formation in Algeria and
of Ferhat Abbas' political profile may be problematical, his appraisal of the central role
played by Islam in the development of Algerian nationalism is convincingly presented.
He points out that before, and as it were during, the emergence of nationalism, "the
religion defined fairly closely all the under-privileged as against the privileged, even if
the under-privileged had no other positive shared characteristic (such as language and
common history)" (Gellner 1983: 73). Gellner's assertion implies that, in the case of
colonial Algeria, there was a strong correlation, or an overlap, between religion, which
he describes as a high culture, and class. This is where religion became salient to the
development of Algerian nationalism. Indeed, if Islam was what characterised a
dominated, oppressed and, to a significant extent divided, North African population, it
could play a significant role not only in shaping a new Algerian identity, but also in
mobilising North Africans against colonialism.
The purpose of this section is to examine the ways in which Islam, and religion
as a concept, came to play a central role in nationalist discourse and ideology. In other
words, our aim here is to assess the process by which the experience of the sacred was
appropriated by nationalists to give it territorial shape (Chatterjee 1996), and by doing
so, entered the sphere of modernity.
It is also important to note that the close relationship between religion and
politics which characterised the nationalist discourse was also a feature of colonialism.
Indeed, for Muslim nationalists, France's colonial policy in North Africa went further
than socio-economic dispossession and political oppression. It set out to marginalise
Islam and christianise the autochtonous population. Imperialism and Christianity went
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hand in hand. In an article which conjured up painful images rooted in history,
colonialism was described by the PPA as "[1]a croisade acharnee de l'imperialisme
francais contre les musulmans nord-africains" (El Ouma Numero 70, mars 1939). The
nationalist movement considered that, in North Africa, politics and religion were
inextricably linked to further the interest of imperialism:
La politique et la religion vont de pair. [L'imperialisme] utilise, pour le meme but, l'officier et
reveque, comme le soldat et le mouchard, et les inoffensifs Peres Blancs s'y pretent avec la
meme grace et la meme aisance que la gent au grand Guenour II est temps d'ouvrir les yeux au
danger de christianisation et de naturalisation ... Ii faut defendre votre droit et votre vie. (El
°ma Numero 34, octobre 1935)
Tout ce que peut affirmer l'imperialisme ne nous emeut plus. Que n'a-t-il pas essaye, d'abord,
[de] nous assimiler par la christianisation (les missions africaines, peres blancs missionnaires,
etc.). oLa Croix est trop fragile pour briser le Croissant», la naturalisation pour que nous ne
puissions plus reclamer, d'abord, puis, un jour que nous souhaitons prochain, EXIGER la
liberation nationale de notre pays. (El Ouina Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935)
Christianity was compromised by its association with colonialism to such an extent that
they became indistinguishable from one another. In the ENA/PPA's discourse, the
political and religious dimensions of colonialism overlapped. In 1938, the imprisonment
of nationalists such as Messali Hadj and six other leading activists by France was
compared to the "époque obscure de l'Inquisition" (El Ouma Numero 61, 11 mars
1938). The nationalist movement referred to the Eucharistic Congress which was held in
Algiers in May 1939, as "cette manifestation colonialo-catholique" and saw it as a
provocation to Islam. It recalled how, throughout the history of colonisation, "nous
trouvons a l'avant-garde des troupes expeditionnaires, le missionnaire pour preparer
Farm& de soldats apportant avec eux ce que l'on appelle sous un euphemisme
hypocrite, la civilisation" (El Ouma Numero 71, avril 1939). When nationalists
denounced the dispossession and exploitation of Muslims by colonialism, and stated
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that "ce qui compte pour lui, c'est le Dieu-argent, c'est la son culte et son adoration" (El
Ounia Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935) the Christian faith was, in their eyes, further
(albeit indirectly) discredited by its association with imperialism.
So it appears from the above-mentioned examples that the nationalist
movement's discourse was indeed characterised by its dialectical interpretation of
colonialism as being shaped by a process of politicisation of religion. In fact, its
accusation that it was France which had inextricably linked the issue of religion with
politics was not unfounded. The decision by France not to apply the law on the
separation of State and religion to Islam was clearly politically motivated. The Muslim
faith was directly controlled and administered by the government, and the colonial
authorities had established a social order which excluded the majority autochtonous
population socially, economically and politically on the basis of their religious faith.
The fact that North Africans had to give up their "statut personnel" as Muslims to
become French citizens implied that they had to renounce a central part of their identity.
This indicated that France considered Islam as the last bastion of "resistance" to colonial
domination which had to be mastered. The Etoile nord-africaine was aware of this
when it declared that "P]a France, qui a proclame la separation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat, a
fait de l'Islam, en Algerie, un clerge soumis et devoue a la colonisation" (El Ouma
Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935). As part of their political programme, nationalists
demanded "[la] liberte de culte et separation de la Mosquee et de l'Etat, Mautonomie
complete des organisations religieuses et [F]election au suffrage universel de la cultuelle
musulmane" (El Ounia Numero 28, janvier 1935) and the extension of the 1905 Law on
the separation of the Church and the State to Islam (El °tuna Numero 68, 11 decembre
1938). The construction of the Paris Mosque in the 1920s, which was opposed by the
ENA as a further act of propaganda (Stora 1996, MacMaster 1997), was an earlier
illustration of France's will to use religion as a political means to assert her imperial
power. In such circumstances, the struggle for independence was discursively equated,
in nationalist discourse, with a war of religions, as its use of the "Croix contre le
Croissant" metaphor shows.65
65 See, for example, the September-October 1934 and the February-March 1935 issues of El °ulna.
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As Kedourie points out, the transformation of religion into nationalist ideology
enables nationalists to use the "powerful and tenacious loyalties which a faith held in
common for centuries creates" (1985: 76-77). However, one should not see the role
played by Islam in the development of Algerian nationalism simply in utilitarian terms
and thereby conclude that it was given prominence only because it had that capacity to
mobilise. Certainly, the movement was conscious of the potential for effective
mobilisation contained in religious loyalties. But because of the very nature of the
colonial context within which its ideology developed, and given the particular social
background of most North African migrants in France, Islam also constituted the main
socio-cultural framework of reference through which they could interpret their own
experience.
However, the kind of Islam which was to play such a central role in the
definition of an Algerian national identity and in the movement's struggle for
independence was of a particular nature. It was different from the traditional faith of
most North Africans. It was constructed as a high and universal culture in order to
challenge politically colonial rule effectively. This grounding of religion within
nationalist ideology was made possible through a three-way process.
Firstly, Islam was shaped as a high-culture per se. Indeed, as was seen in the
previous section, religion was posited at the core of a prestigious Arabo-Islamic
civilisation rooted both in history and in the present.66
Secondly, in order for the Muslim faith to constitute the foundation of national
identity and mobilise North Africans, it had to be defined as inherently incompatible
with French culture and rule. France's control of Islam was perceived as heresy, and
North Africans who sought to obtain French citizenship were condemned as traitors. For
instance, in a meeting of the Etoile which took place on 9 September 1934 in rue des
Pyrenees in Paris, Imache Amar called for "la mise a l'index de tous les naturalises,
tratres a l'Islam" and Muslim leaders and scholars who were seen to collaborate with
the French were denounced (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 101) (1). The Etoile nord-
66 Examples of independent Muslim countries such as Turkey, or those fighting for their independence,
such as Egypt, were often evoked by Algerian nationalists to sustain their argument that their Muslim
civilisation was not dead.
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africaine's sustained attacks on Si Kaddour Ben Gabrit, the French-appointed Imam of
the Paris Mosque is a case in hand. In May 1934, the central committee of the ENA
addressed an open letter to him which ended with "[a]ujourd'hui plus que jamais, la
jeunesse musulmane nord-africaine ... travaille d'arrache-pied pour son avenir, et cela,
malgre et contre vous et vos maitres de la colonisation" (Ibid: 142). During a political
meeting which took place in rue Daguerre on 13 January 1934, Imache Amar
stigmatised the imam and invited the members of the association to seize the
opportunity of the Aki Seghir on 17 January to go to the Paris Mosque "pour manifester
contre ce renegat"; and in the banquet organised by the ENA on the day of that religious
festival, Si Kaddour was condemned by Messali Hadj, while Radjef Belkacem
described how he and several other militants were arrested by the police before they
could reach the Mosque where they wanted to protest (Ibid: 71-73).
Thirdly, if Islam was to embody national identity and aspirations for freedom
and modernity, then it had to be distinguished from the vernacular forms of religious
practices which were well established amongst North Africans. Interestingly, this type
of Islam as high culture and as universal religion which nationalists referred to was also
the one that was well established in the urban bourgeoisie of North Africa, and was in
many respects opposed to the traditional faith of most rural Maghrebis. This dichotomy
between those two forms of religious belief is highlighted by Bourdieu when he asserts
that in North Africa:
la religiosite des bourgeois citadins («traditionalistes» ou «occidentalises»), conscients
d'appartenir a une religion universelle, s'oppose en tous points aux ritualismes des paysans,
ignorants des subtilites du dogme et de la theologie et l'Islam se presente comme un ensemble
hierarchise oil l'analyse peut isoler differents «niveaux», devotion animiste et rites agraires, culte
des saints et maraboutiques, pratique reglee par la religion, droit, dogme et esoterisme mystique.
(Bourdieu 1971: 326)
Nationalists viewed those "backward" practices, epitomised by the marabouts, as a form
of low culture which corrupted Islamic faith and maintained Muslims in a state of
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colonial subjection and exploitation. In the 9 September 1934 meeting, Si Djilani, who
was then editor of El Ouma and a member of the central committee of the Etoile,
blamed the practices of marabouts, whom he accused of collusion with imperialism. He
called for Muslims to rediscover the purity of their faith and reject the beliefs associated
with the worship of false saints (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 101) (1). The contrast
between the "true" nature of Islam and the "subverted and venal" character of
maraboutism was also emphasised in the nationalist newspaper:
L'Islam est pur, ii n'accepte pas ces microbes [les marabouts] dans ses rangs, ni de
maquignons se servant de lui pour tromper et leurrer le peuple. Notre religion, l'Islam, est claire
et nette, point de sorcelleries, ni de prestidigitateurs, point aussi de jongleurs. La science, la
morale, l'honnetete, la paix, la bravoure et le respect de son prochain. Voila l'Islam. Demandez la
science meme en Chine[,] demandez la science du berceau jusqu'a la tombe, a dit notre grand
prophete que le salut et la benediction soit sur lui.
Tous ces chefs de Confreries qui espionnent, qui se dressent contre noire inter&
national, l'ensemble du peuple algerien doit les combattre, les demasquer et eclairer nos
coreligionnaires sur leur nefaste action. Lutte a outrance contre eux, lutte sans pitie, par la
parole, par la plume et les conferences. Ces suceurs de sang du peupte doivent disparditre de
notre societe. (El ()ulna Numero 15, octobre 1933)
The way in which religion was defined in Algerian nationalist discourse reflected, and •
was intricately linked to, that of the process of ethnic identity construction. The
movement's evocation of Islam was shaped and negotiated at the boundary between "us"
and "them". It was a high culture per se with which all North African Muslims should
identify. Islam could not escape the logic of being historically defined in comparison
and contrast with the Other: it was the core of a great civilisation which was perceived
as intrinsically superior to that of France or Europe. The condemnation by the Etoile
and the PPA of reformist Muslim leaders and people willing to abandon their "personal
status" as Muslims to become French showed that religion was seen to be a marker of
difference: it was what distinguished North Africans from Europeans (one could not be
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both Muslim and French). And when nationalists denounced traditional religious
practices amongst North African Muslims as backward and almost "barbaric", they
perpetuated the stigmas that the French had attached to vernacular forms of cultural and
religious expression. For nationalists, religious identity, which was at the basis of
national identity, was very much informed by processes of interaction and conflict with,
as well as emulation of, the spirit of Western modernity.
That process of politicisation of religion served several purposes: it legitimised
not only Algerian Muslims' claim for independence on the basis of their distinct national
identity rooted in Islam as a high culture, but also legitimised the movement itself by
draping it with the mantle of Islam. The Etoile and the PPA presented themselves as the
true voice of religion. Joining the nationalist movement was depicted as a duty for all
Muslims:
Chaque bon Musulman nationaliste peut et doit contribuer a l'effort commun en faisant la
propagande autour de lui par la parole et par le journal. Faites des abonnes, faites des
souscriptions Debout tous pour notre droit a la vie, pour notre dignite et pour l'Islam! (El
Quota Numero 17, decembre 1933)
A tract announcing a political meeting on 16 June 1933 ended with "[a]bonnez-vous
au journal "El Ouma" qui vous defend. Faites-le connaitre, ainsi vous aurez fait votre
devoir de bon musulman" (Note stir l'activite de l'ENA: 61) (1).
Religious metaphors were also used to describe the particular atmosphere of
political rallies. Reporting on a political rally which took place in Lyon on 26 August
1934, El Ouma wrote how the speeches made by Bedek, president of the Lyon section
of the Etoile, and by Messali Hadj both imposed "un silence religieux" in the audience
(El Ouma Numero 25, septembre-octobre 1934). Also, Imache Amar described his tour
of the Lyon region in January 1935 in the following terms:
Partout, des freres! des freres dune meme famille partout le meme accueil, partout les memes
sentiments etaient mis a l'epreuve, et partout la merne volonte de lutte et de sacrifice se lisait
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dans les yeux ... Et Ion pane de voyage? Je l'appe[l]lerais plutOt un pêlerinage puisque ce
&placement ma permis de constater notre union et notre fraternite. Ma mission etait pourtant
d'aller annoncer ce miracle a mes freres, et jai eu la joie de le trouver partout realise. (El Ounta
Numero 29, janvier 1935)
Let us now turn to the relationship between ethnicity and religion. The way in which the
ethnic, and by extension the ethno-national, identity of Algerians was constructed by the
nationalist movement implied that differences, distinctions and variety in Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia had to be reconciled into a unified interpretation of the ethnic
make-up of North Africans. It was a process which essentialised identity in order to
create a sense of ethnic commonality and solidarity amongst Maghrebis, and which
could, in turn, constitute the basis for efficient political mobilisation. The movement's
assertion (which countered French colonial attempts to divide and rule the two ethnic
groups) that Arabs and Berbers belonged to the same Arabo-Berber people, that Berbers
were somehow of the same ethnic origin as Arabs, explicitly constructed Algerian
identity as being marked by Arabness.
This reification of Algerian-ness was very much facilitated by the incorporation
of Islam as the core marker of national identity. Ethnic differences were effaced by
religious commonalities. In a political rally which took place on 7 July 1934 in the salle
de l'Union intersyndicale in Paris, Fodil Arab announced that "le riven de l'Islam se
realiserait bientOt" and that "il n'y aurait plus de Kabyles, ni Arabes, mais seulement des
Musulmans unis pour la guerre sainte" (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 61) (1); and the
Etoile nord-africaine stated that:
aujourd'hui, pour nous, soit en Algerie, en Tunisie ou au Maroc, il n'y a ni Arabes, ni Kabyles, ni
Mozabites, il n'y a qu'une race, la race arabo-berbere, issue dun seul croisement et nous sommes
par-dessus tout Musulmans, ce dont nous sommes fiers, et tous les Musulmans sont freres". (El
Ounia Numero 29, janvier 1935)
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This passage illustrates the extent to which religion was crucial to the movement's
construction of North African ethnic identity. In the colonial context, the prominence
given to Arabness was not simply justified by history, it was, more importantly,
consistent with the nationalists' argument that all North Africans were, first and
foremost, Muslims. Islam, Arabness and the Arab language were inextricably linked,
and constituted the high culture and powerful identity on which the nation could be
shaped, imagined, and fought for. The movement further emphasised the bond between
religion and "Arabite" when it asserted that "[p]our arriver a nos &sirs, il faut l'union de
notre race. Nous demandons a Dieu et a notre Prophete, qui, jadis, a donne la force a
l'Islam, de nous redonner cette force afin de reconquerir nos libertes et nos droits" (El
Ouma Numero 17, decembre 1933). When, in January 1934, the movement decided to
organise Arabic classes and Messali Hadj took the initiative to read and comment on
Arab texts to militants every Wednesday, the aim of the Etoile was to "enseigner a ses
auditeurs la force de l'Islam" (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 75) (1). Islam was therefore
not limited to the religious sphere; it symbolised "race" and language as well as culture.
On 26 May 1934, in front of 600 mainly Algerian Muslims, Messali Hadj condemned
France's attempt to regulate Koranic teaching as a threat to Algeria's Muslim traditions
and culture (Ibid: 81-82). Religion also gave meaning to Muslims' experience as a
colonised people and substance to their struggle for independence:
A la barque desemparee, Dieu fait trouver le port. Le seul bien qu'il nous reste au monde, c'est la
lutte, naitre, esperer et souffrir, tel a ete notre sort ... Que nos frêres musulmans, partout oi us se
trouvent, se rememorent les belles pensees de l'Islam: oInvoque la toute puissance, elle viendra
ton secours, dans la lutte». (El OuIna Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935)
The fact that the movement emphasised Islam's compatibility with modernity (El Ouma
Numero 64, 27 mai 1938) implied that, for its militants, religion could play a central
role in the development of nationalism. What also emerges from an analysis of the
movement's discourse is that religion did not so much justify the existence of the
Algerian nation as embody it. Indeed, every political act and event had a religious
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resonance to it. Islam epitomised all aspects of the nation as the movement perceived it
(religion, but also culture, tradition, language, history, civilisation, "race", etc.), as well
as its national aspirations (nationalism). For the Etoile, being faithful to one's culture,
tradition and history was to be faithful to one's religion. In the meeting of the Etoile of
the 6th of June 1933, the nationalists' fight for independence was referred to as
"travailler a la liberation totale de l'Islam" (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 57) (1). Imache
Amar's lyrical evocation of Algeria's emancipation also underlined the correlation that
was made between the renaissance of Islam and the birth of the nation:
C'est l'aube naissante, c'est la lumiere, c'est le soleil qui va paraitre. Et la-bas, sur la montagne
rose, un grand drap [est] plante par une poigne vigoureuse, sa couleur est vert-esperance avec
l'Etoile et le Croissant. [S]ur sa hampe une feuille imprimee en lettres lumineuses oii chacun peut
lire: Union, fraternite! Independance, liberter (El Ounza Numero 15, octobre 1933)
For Algerian nationalists, the sacred dimension of the nation, defined by Balakrishnan
as "the longing for immortality becoming a will to membership of an unperishable
collective" (1996: 205) was therefore incarnated by Islam. It conferred on this
collective, that is to say on the community of North African Muslims, that "halo of
disinterestedness", as Anderson (1983) puts it, which could ask for sacrifices:
"Notre Prophete ne nous ordonne-t-il pas de lutter pour notre liberte, de tomber sur le champ de
bataille et de defendre l'Islam? Ne sommes-nous donc pas musulmans, reveillons-nous Nords-
Africains, mettons-nous dans les rangs. (El Ounta, janvier 1934, in Note sur l'activite de l'ENA:
144)
The nationalist discourse illustrates how religious attachments were used to develop a
sense of national identity and solidarity and mobilise North Africans against French
imperialism. However, it could be argued that Algerian nationalism and French
republican nationalism shared the same framework of reference. Loyalty to the nation
was marked by the bond of kinship and its corollaries: sacrifice and the "don du sang".
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But unlike France, whose long-standing republican nationalist discourse focused
essentially on the nation decoupled from Christianity, Algerians constructed their
nationalism on the concept of a nation rooted in religious belonging. The timeless,
boundless and modern nature of Islam as a high and universal culture enabled
nationalists to challenge France's claim that there had been no nation in Algeria before
1830 on the grounds that their great Islamic religion and civilisation had been
suppressed by French imperialism. It also allowed them to represent discursively the
ethnically diverse North African population as all sharing the same Arab identity which
was seen as indissociable from religion.
3.8 Conclusion
The nationalist discourse on the nation was characterised by its modernity and by a
dichotomous process of "opening" (evocation of a future independent state) and
"closure" (essentially in their discourse on anti-colonial struggle). Indeed, while
nationalists considered that Algeria would, one day, be an independent multi-ethnic
state where Muslims, Europeans and Jews would live side by side, and maintain some
relationship with France, the colonial context within which they developed their
ideology led them to construct an exclusive sense of national identity which was based
on ethnicity, and which was defined as inherently incompatible with Frenchness. The
nation to which North Africans were to identify was one marked by a sense of kinship
which was deemed strong enough to command feelings of disinterestedness and
sacrifice for Algeria. It was also based on a reified and problematical interpretation of
ethnicity (whereby all Arab and Berber North Africans belonged to the "Arab race"), on
class (the North African "people" seen as the underclass in Algeria), culture, as well as
history and memory.
More importantly, Islam was placed at the core of nationalist discourse. It
transcended differences and divisions and embodied the nation and its corollary,
nationalism. Religious loyalties could command those feelings of sacrifice and
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disinterestedness. The ENA/PPA's interpretation of nation, as based on ethnicity/"race",
class, culture and history and memory were all traversed by religious attachments.
The inextricable link between Islam, Arabness and the Arab language provided
nationalists with a blueprint for an empowering national identity which could
effectively challenge colonial rule. For them, Algerians were Muslims and therefore
Arabs. Conversely, Arabness was seen as incompatible with Frenchness, because such a
bond betrayed Islam. Also, the language of the nation was Arabic, the language of
religion.
However, those markers of the inner boundary of ethno-national identity were
problematical: they included, as much as they excluded. Nationalists' will to mobilise
Muslims around a unified and modern vision of the nation, which placed Islam (in its
modern form) at the core of Algerian-ness, implied imposing a new identity, language
(classical Arabic) and religious practices on North Africans, and alienating people
because of their vernacular religious beliefs, cultural practices, language (Berber and
colloquial Arabic), in other words their "ethnic habitus".
In so doing, the Etoile and the PPA's discourse showed that, in nationalism,
difference was very much rooted in sameness. The more they wanted to build Algerian
national identity as different, the more the way in which that difference was constructed
appeared similar to that of the French. Indeed, it could be argued that their nationalism
shared many of its characteristics with French nationalism (the bond of kinship based on
disinterestedness, sacrifice, and the "don du sang" theme, a unified high culture based
on a reified vision of ethnicity, the rejection of difference seen as a threat to the
"Republique une et indivisible", etc.). Furthermore, nationalists implicitly adopted the
legacy of French colonialism when they simply replaced one "imported" high culture
(that of the French) by another (Islamo-Arab culture from the Middle East), and
dismissed North Africa's varied cultural, linguistic, ethnic and vernacular Islamic
heritage as "backward" and unfit to form the basis of a modern nation.
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Chapter 4
The outer boundary of ethno-national identity:
racism, colonialism and universalism
4.1 Introduction
In Algerian nationalist discourse in the inter-war period in France, ethnic identity and
nation-ness were defined and negotiated at the boundary, at the point of contact between
"us" and "them". Indeed, the way in which nationalists represented themselves (the "in")
was very much informed by a process of transaction, interaction and conflict with
"them" (the "out"). In that sense, ethnicity was constructed to fit in the straight-jacket of
modern nationalist necessities. Their ethno-national identity had to appear as unique,
while the processes by which that identity was shaped were, in many respects, similar to
those of Western nationalism.
For the ENA and the PPA, a number of (mainly French or Western) institutions,
symbols, values, political processes and groupings were viewed as markers of alienation
and racism. In other instances, events and symbols, but also political groups and
personalities both in France and beyond whose actions were seen as consistent with the
nationalist movement's anti-colonial project were constructed more positively. Those
factors, which could be called alternatively the "out" or the outer formative elements of
identity, need to be examined. The fact that they were recurrently evoked by the Etoile
and the PPA illustrates the extent to which they contributed to shape Algerian
nationalist ideology and the movement's conception of Algerian ethno-national identity.
Chapters four and five will discuss both aspects of the "out". Chapter four will focus on
the movement's discourse on racism, colonialism and on France. It will look at the
complex role played by the concept of universalism in the ENAJPPA's ideology.
Chapter five will assess the movement's complex relationship, or rather the way in
which that relationship was invoked, with other groups (such as the French Communist
Party and the CGTU, French intellectuals and workers, colonial migrants, etc.) whose
values were traditionally viewed as closer to those of the Etoile and the PPA, and with
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movements and events both within and outside the French colonial empire (such as the
Middle East and other colonies) which were considered to be pertinent to their own
struggle for emancipation.
4.2 Racism in North Africa and in France
Racism, as a concept, was central to colonialism, and more importantly, constituted a
fundamental theme in a North African nationalism inspired by universalist values.
Indeed, the complex interplay between racism, colonialism and universalism shaped the
way in which Algerian nationalist ideology and discourse developed in the inter-war
period. This chapter aims to examine that interplay, rather than carry out a detailed
study of those three concepts (racism, colonialism and universalism), which would be
beyond the remit of this work.
Let us start with the first concept, which featured as one of the main issues in
nationalist discourse. The meaning and connotations of terms such as "race" and
"racism" have evolved and changed historically (see Banton and Harwood 1975), but
for the purpose of this study, which consists of a comparative analysis of two
movements set in different historical, socio-economic and political contexts, racism will
be referred to in its current meaning.
A significant corpus of work on racism exists (see, for example, Banton 1967,
1988 & 1994, Banton & Harwood 1975, Miles 1989, Rex 1986, Taguieff 1989, 1989a,
1991a & 1991b, Wieviorka 1991, 1992 & 1994, Silverman 1992). Our aim, however, is
to select a working definition of racism which can be used as an interpretative tool to
deconstruct the discourse of the nationalist movement. Banton's definition could be
adopted as a good starting point. He defines racism in the following terms:
By racism is meant the doctrine that a man's behaviour is determined by stable inherited
characters deriving from separate racial stocks having distinctive attributes and usually
considered to stand to one another in relations of superiority and inferiority. (Banton 1967: 8)
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What he pertinently implies here is that racism is a determinist doctrine in which group
difference and inequality are ascribed in "racial" traits. However, given the elusive
nature of "race" as a concept, his reference to the "racial stocks" to which people are
supposed to belong requires further clarification.
The difficulty of defining "race" resides partly in the fact that, as a concept, it
can draw on perceived genealogical, genetic and/or cultural characteristics, as well as on
processes of "cross-fertilisation" between those three domains - whereby, for instance,
cultural traits are represented as inherently linked to, and explained by the "genetic" and
"genealogic" make-up of a group to justify the place occupied by members of that group
in the social/world order, and vice-versa.
Jenkins, synthesising some of the variant interpretations of the concept, offers a
broader defining framework whose options may apply to specific or general contexts
where racism is noted:
• either (1) racism is a set of organized beliefs about 'racial' categories and their inferiority or
superiority, which people consciously hold and can, to some degree, articulate; or (2) racism
exists in institutional arrangements and practices which have systematically detrimental
outcomes or consequences for 'racial categories, rather than in consciously held beliefs, attitudes
or values;
• and either (3) racism involves categorization on the basis of purported biological differences; or
(4) racism involves categorization on the basis of any set of criteria which will allow difference
to be asserted. (Jenkins 1997: 82-83)
Racism, which is both belief and practice of categorisation and differentiation, places
and fixes the "other" in a state of inferiority. The question of the forms that racism can
take in society is discussed by Wieviorka (1991: 83-86), who notes that there are four
levels of "intensity" of racism, from "infraracisme", a rather minor and disarticulated
social phenomenon, to racism permeating the inner workings of the state and its
policies. This perspective is of particular relevance to our case study as it explores the
role which racism plays in articulating social practices and the polity.
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Memmi's work on racism and antiracism (1957) in a colonial context broke new
ground in this field. It emphasised the specificity of the experience of the colonised and
offered a dualistic interpretation of the relationship between the former and the
coloniser which went against the grain of "traditional" theories of antiracism which
were imbued in universalism (Lloyd 1998). Gallissot (1985a) adopts this dualistic
approach to explain colonial racism, but provides a better understanding of the complex
social processes which led to the inherent antagonism between colonised and coloniser.
He describes how, in Algeria, racism was an inherent part of colonial relations affecting
not only the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised, but also that between
Jews and Europeans, as well as that between the varied European populations. From the
end of the nineteenth century onwards, the Algerian colony was traversed by virulent
anti-Semitism which had repercussions in France in the Dreyfus affair. Anti-Jewish
racism developed within a tense racial context which, in the colony, was referred to as
"la guerre des races". The populations from Italy, Spain and Malta (and so on) which
composed the multi-ethnic, stratified and racialised European proletariat that the
colonial economy needed to expand, expressed hatred and envy towards the Jews who
had acquired French citizenship with the Decret Cremieux in 1870. It was only with the
Law of 1889 which made second generation European migrants into French citizens
that the idea of the "Francais d'Algerie" emerged, and that the myth that two
communities existed in North Africa, that of the French of Algeria and that of Muslims,
became established (Gallissot 1985a: 44-46).
To return to our case study, it could be argued that the Etoile nord-africaine and
the PPA were very much conscious of the fact that racism pervaded all levels of
colonial society from the individual to the higher echelons of the French imperial
project.° The movement's denunciation of the colonialist press, which referred to North
Africans as "des «bicots», des propres a rien ... dans le but evident de tromper et
d'ameuter l'opinion publique ... pour enrayer le mouvement national de revendications"
(El Ounia Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935) shows that it saw racism as creating a chasm
between Muslims and the French people and as an obstacle to emancipation.
67 See Sivan (1979) for a detailed analysis of Pied-Noir racism against Muslims.
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The legacy of the century-old colonisation of Algeria was described by
nationalists as one of suffering, humiliation, oppression and exploitation of Muslims,
and they accused imperialism of using force "pour ... nous abaisser au rang d'inferieurs,
au rang d'esclaves" (El Ouma Numero 25, septembre-octobre 1934). In an article
reporting on a court case where a young French settler had been sentenced to pay a
sixteen franc fine for murdering a Muslim woman in Algeria, El Ouma depicted the
relationship between the dominant and the dominated as one of extreme psychological
and physical violence:
[en] Afrique du Nord, un colon peut tuer, voler, frapper, insulter, humilier, verbaliser de son
propre chef ... il est maitre et l'Arabe est, purement et simplement sa chose, il en dispose a sa
guise, en tout moment et en toute circonstance ... Nous sommes la chair, vous etes le couteau,
decoupez-nous comme vous l'entendrez, emprisonnez-nous, comme vous voudrez, assassinez
nos femmes, suivant votre desir, deportez-nous aux cinq cent diables, prenez-nos terres,
exploitez nos enfants, mais nous savons tres bien que tout a une fin. Rira bien qui rira le
dernier". (El Ounia Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935)
For North African nationalists, this violence which marked the relationship between
coloniser and colonised was informed by racism. Racism dehumanised and reified the
"indigenes". In response to an article written by Jules Rouanet in the pro-colonialist
newspaper La Depeche Algerierme on 21 February 1939 claiming that colonials were
treated as equals and brothers by France, El Ouma put colonialism in the dock and
explicitly linked it with racism:
Du racisme? A entendre oLa Depeche» on croirait qu'il n'y en a pas en Algerie et dans les
colonies francaises. Pourriez-vous nier que le code de rindigenat nest pas un code de racisme?
Que le Decret Regnier et toute la liste des decrets speciaux aux indigenes, ce nest pas du
racisme? Que le fait [que les] fonctionnaires et ... ouvriers indigene[s] gagne[nt] un salaire
moindre que celui des [E]uropeens, ce nest pas du racisme? Que le fait des expropriations et le
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refoulement des indigenes vers des terres pauvres, ce nest pas du racisme[?] Que les massacres
du Maroc et de la Tunisie, ce n'est pas du racisme? (El Ounia Numero 70, mars 1939)
This passage shows that racism was not perceived as a corollary of colonialism, but as
constituting the very nature of it. Each measure introduced and action taken by the
French empire was seen as racist. Indeed, colonialism was discursively and
ideologically conflated into racism. The movement's interpretation of the realities of
colonialism, which was in sharp contrast to France's claim that it was her duty to fulfil
her generous "mission civilisatrice" in the colonies, had direct implications for the
development of Algerian nationalism, as racism was also posited as a justification for
emancipation:
C'est incroyable, mais cependant vrai. Le colonialisme n'engendre pas seulement ... la
misere et l'exploitation des peuples opprimes, mais ii cree des prejuges de race et de xenophobie
quand on a besoin des Nord-Africains pour se faire trouer la poitrine us sont [f]rancais,
mais pour jouir de leurs droits politiques et civiques, us sont «indigenes», ce qui veut dire de
race inferieure, taillables et corveables h merci. Devant cette atteinte a la liberte et devant ces
prejuges de race, Musulmans nord-africains, unissez-vous et exigez partout la liberte.
A bas le code de l'indigenat! A bas la haine de race. (El Ounia Numero 29, fevrier-mars
1935)
The surprise expressed by the author of the article was purely rhetorical. He asserted
that the exploitation and oppression of Muslims by colonialism went hand in hand with
racism (referred to as "prejuges de race") and xenophobia, and highlighted the cynicism
displayed by French imperialism, which imposed on Muslims the duty to defend the
French nation and sacrifice their life for her, but did not grant them any of the civic and
political rights that such an act deserved. The movement considered that the colonial
order, which differentiated between Europeans (who were French) and Muslims
("indigenes") was one based on "race", and that racism was at the core of colonial
policy making.
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For nationalists, colonialism was a system which was not inspired by the
principles of the French Revolution, but was akin to feudalism (for example evocations
of slavery, of North Africans being "taillables et corveables a merci"). In such a context,
their fight against colonialism was presented as a struggle against racism. Their
nationalism was informed externally by racism. Indeed, the racism that they were
subjected to justified their struggle for freedom and reinforced their resolve: "de chaque
repression, de chaque injustice, nous sortirons plus forts et plus aguerris" (El Ouma
Numero 63, 22 avril 1938). The very process of alienation, exploitation and violence
that it engendered also precipitated the formation of movements of national liberation.
4.3 Colonialism, universalism and the state
If colonialism was denounced as inherently racist, the nationalists' discourse on, and
relationship with, metropolitan France was more complex. At an ideological level,
Algerian nationalists were very much influenced by universalism and presented
themselves as a movement ruled by democratic principles (El Ouma Numero 59, janvier
1939). Their political programme, which demanded equality between the French and
Muslims, was greatly inspired by those principles. That programme included, amongst
other things, equal political and union rights between Muslims and the French, equal
pay, access to jobs and social legislation, the separation of the Mosque and the State,
freedom of expression for Muslims and their press, the abolition of the Code de
l'indigenat and of the communes mixtes, compulsory education in French and Arabic, a
military service of the same duration for both Muslims and the French, the same
freedom to travel as European settlers and an Algerian parliament elected by universal
suffrage "sans distinction de race, ni de religion" (El Ouma Numero 25, septembre-
octobre 1934, El Ouma Numero 28, janvier 1935). At a more abstract level, they argued
that their nationalism reflected Muslims' aspirations to freedom and rights, to become
full citizens:
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[les musulmans] veulent la liberte, le respect absolu de leur personne, de leur conscience et de
leurs droits, une part equitable dans les avantages e[t] les biens de la vie collective ... le droit aux
bienfaits de l'instruction et de leur education, a la jouissance de tout ce qui peut contribuer A
elargir la vie et a l'embellir, celui de participer egalement a la direction des affaires publiques et
des interets generaux; en un mot, tout ce [qui] leur donne droit d'aspirer [a] leur caractere de
personnes raisonnables et libres faut avoir la conscience dune solidarite superieure qui,
associant les Musulmans dans la poursuite dun ideal commun substituera l'ordre et la paix,
l'autorite respectee des lois a la violence et a la tyrannie brutale des plus forts et des plus hardis.
(El 0 tuna Numero 61, 11 mars 1938)
The themes contained in this passage and the way in which they are stylistically
presented were consistent with those developed in French universalist discourse. The
movement called for the Declaration of the Rights of Man to be enforced and for
tyranny to be brought to an end when, after the arrest and imprisonment of the leaders
of the Etoile in 1934, they declared: "[q]uand prendra fin cette mise a l'ombre indecente
et brutale? Quand? Le jour oi nous serons groupes, disciplines, exiger que nos droits
d'hommes, nos droits de citoyens soient respectes" (El Ouma Numero 28, decembre
1934).
To return to the question of the movement's discourse on France, our analysis of
the newspaper El lkdam and of its successor El °Ulna would tend to suggest that it
evolved over the two decades of the inter-war period. Up until the early 1920s,
politically active North African migrants in France were still ideologically close to the
Jeunes Algeriens, and viewed Metropolitan France as the true home of Revolutionary
principles. They considered at the time that there was a dichotomy between the
"Hexagone" and the values it stood for, and the colonial system which oppressed North
Africans. They also argued that Muslims were fortunate to depend on a central
government and parliament whose concern for justice would garantee a fairer system in
North Africa, if only the terrible conditions in which Muslims lived were better known
in Paris (El lkdam Numero 22, vendredi 11 mars 1921).
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The birth of the Etoile nord-africaine in 1926 coincided with North Africans'
comdemnation of France as an imperialist power whose ideology, marked by racism
and oppression, suppressed the legitimate rights of the colonised. At the end of 1934, an
El Otuna article denouncing the arrest and imprisonment of nationalist leaders and
militants on both sides of the Mediterranean developed the movement's interpretation of
the relationship between France and colonialism:
Les lois republicaines ont cede la place aux lois feodales. La dernocratie s'incline et s'efface
devant le code de l'Indigenat qui s'installe en maitre souverain dans la capitale de la France
«liberale». Queue derision! Quel recul C'est le retour vers la Barbarie! D'ailleurs les lois qu'on
nous impose «chez-nous» sont-elles autre chose que des lois barbares? Et maintenant, c'est dans
la capitale de la revolution, c'est dans la ville des droits de l'homme, ô ironie, que les lois
abjectes nous sont appliquees! C'est dans la ville des grands juristes et des grands penseurs qu'on
nous empeche de nous reunir, de fonder une association pour reclamer nos droits a la vie et a la
liberte. C'est dans la ville de Victor Hugo et de Jaures que l'on fait la chasse a l'homme, que ion
fouille, que l'on bouscule, que Ion arrete et Ion condamne les Musulmans. (El Ounia Numero
28, decembre 1934)
In this passage, the movement presented universalism and colonialism in dualistic
terms: a dichotomy was made between France and her colonies, between Revolutionary
principles and feudalism, between civilisation and barbarity, between freedom and
oppression, and between tolerance and racism. Paris was seen as the home of the
Declaration of Human Rights, of a great civilisation and of the rule of Law, while the
colonies («chez-nous») were steeped in barbarity, not because of the supposed "savage"
nature of the autochtons, as colonialists argued, but because of colonial domination.
However, the persecution which North African migrants were subjected to in the
"metropole" revealed that France no longer was the land of rights and freedom it used to
be. Through the imposition of the Code de l'indigenat in Paris, barbarity/feudalism was
in the process of imposing its tyrannical rule on France. Liberal France had turned into a
parody of herself ("la France «liberale»"), as colonialism was corrupting and
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contaminating the revolutionary principles that had inspired her for so long. In a way,
colonialism and racism had turned back the clock of history, and feudalism was, once
again, imposing its barbaric rule on France. Within that context, the fight for rights and
freedom of the Etoile nord-africaine was not only depicted as consistent with France's
true values, but also as crucial for the survival of those values in the "capital of the
Revolution" and in the "city of Human Rights".
This diasporic perspective on the colonial problematic posited universalism and
imperialism as two distinct and conflicting ideological and spatial loci. In order to
understand the way in which that dichotomy was constructed, the nationalist
movement's recurrent evocations of France as the repository of revolutionary principles
need to be further examined. Which France did nationalists refer to when they
emphatically proclaimed "Oui, vive la France de la Revolution de 89! Vive la France
des Droits de l'Homme!" (El Ouma Numero 39, mars-avril 1936)? To put it differently,
who did incarnate that country which they still admired and whose values they adhered
to?
Let us start by looking at the representation of the central government in
nationalist discourse. The French authorities were no longer perceived as the "protector"
of the colonised, unaware of what was really going on in North Africa. The movement
argued that if the government had really wanted to help North African Muslims, then
they would, long ago, have abolished the Code de l'Indigenat on both sides of the
Mediterranean (El Ouma Numero 15, octobre 1933). Furthermore, the universalist
discourse developed by Paris was also interpreted as hypocrisy: the nationalist
movement pointed out that it had been aware for some time that "dans cette France qui
se dit une democratie, les fameux slogans «Liberte», «Egalite», «Fraternite» ne sont que
de vains mots, du moms en ce qui nous concerne" (El Ouma Numero 59, janvier 1938).
The government was also stigmatised for being at the core of the imperialist
project. Paris and Algiers were described as "deux poles oi des mains rouges de sang
frappent inlassablement" (El Ouma Numero 28, decembre 1934). The authorities were
denounced for betraying France's Declaration of Human Rights and the legacy of 1789,
and letting their representatives in the colonies behave as "potentates" (El Ouma
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Numero 39, mars-avril 1936). Colonialism was depicted as an anachronistic system
rooted in feudalism which was encouraged by the Third Republic:
voulais dédier cet article a tous mes freres. A ceux qui souffrent la-bas, en Afrique du Nord,
de l'oppression imperialiste, obliges de courber la tete sous l'autorité feodale au XXe siècle, sous
La Republique democratique qui fait couler a flot la «justice et la paix». (El 0 Ulna Numero 17,
decembre 1933)
The Etoile nord-ufricuine's struggle for independence was also discursively placed
within a universalist framework of reference in which nationalists were the true bearers
of revolutionary principles fighting against a feudal government. In a tract announcing a
meeting in Lyon on 9 September 1934 in support of the victims of colonial repression in
Tunisia and in Constantine, where Muslims had protested against the desecration of a
mosque, the movement called for mobilisation "contre l'occupation armee, contre le
plan de servage que poursuit le gouvemement" (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 99) (1).
Another tract explaining how the meeting of the Etoile planned for 13 October 1934 had
been banned by the government, and which invited North Africans to attend another
political meeting on 28 October 1934 in rue Grange-aux-Belles in Paris, developed the
same themes. Nationalists asserted that the fundamental values of rights and justice
which France claimed to champion were being denied to Muslims, and that the
oppression which they were condemned to endure under the tyrannical rule of
colonialism would only reinforce their resolve to be free: "[Le gouvernement] espère-t-
ii continuer a nous maintenir en état d'esclavage perpdtuel? ... Le peuple est decide a
briser ses chalnes et a anacher ses droits, cane que cane" (Ibid: 111-112). A further
parallel was made between the Etoile's fight against colonialism and France's
revolutionary past when the PPA denounced the imprisonment of some of their
militants in the Barberousse prison in Algiers in 1938: "Trente-tmis musulmans
algeriens sont actuellement dans la Bastille modeme de Barberousse. Deux d'entre eux,
arretes depuis plus de six mois, n'ont meme pas subi un premier interrogatoire. Comme
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au temps des lettres de cachet et des oubliettes, la justice dite «republicaine» ne
s'embarrasse d'aucun scrupule" (El Ouma Numero 65, 24 juillet 1938).
France's evocation of colonisation as a "mission civilisatrice" was also
denounced. It was derided as "Fceuvre de «syphilisation», entreprise par la genereuse et
humaine France republicaine" (El Ouma Numero 25, septembre-octobre 1934). For the
movement, its only purpose was to further France's imperialist project of oppression and
dispossession:
La pretendue civilisation dont la France se montre si fiere en Algerie, nest pas bien differente de
la barbarie dont elle est issue, puisqu'elle repose sur le droit du plus fort". (El Ouma Numero 17,
decembre 1933)
Nest-ce pas manifester le cher desir de chloroformer [le peuple algerien] pour empecher tout
mouvement reactif en criant hautement que la France remplit une mission civilisatrice alors
qu'en fait elle remplit ses coffres-forts des multiples ressources tirees de l'exploitation de notre
sol, sous-sol et de nous-memes. (El Otima Numero 25, septembre-octobre 1934)
The French Republic and imperialism were therefore seen as one and the same thing.
The government was accused of hypocrisy, as its policies and actions were at odds with
the values it claimed to stand for. It was discredited for the feudal system which it had
introduced in the colonies. Algerian nationalists also viewed its attempt to prevent
Muslims from having access to education as another illustration that colonialism was
not about enlightening the colonised, but about oppression and racism. In 1938, they
argued that millions of Muslims were maintained in a state of complete ignorance by
France "dans un but racial ... pour des fins d'exploitation ehontee et indigne d'une
grande nation se pretendant civilisee et se reclamant des glorieux principes de 1793" (El
Ouma Numero 61, 11 mars 1938). Racism was not simply seen as something which
affected education (or rather the lack of it) in the colonies, it traversed every aspect of
government policy:
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Ni l'inferiorite de certaine[s] race[s], ni la protection assuree aux esclaves en echange de leurs
services ... ne sauraient justifier, ni meme attenuer une iniquite aussi criante. L'etroite
dependance oil se trouve recluit le serf vis-à-vis de son maitre est manifestement contraire a sa
dignite, au developpement de sa personnalite et au droit de jouir librement de la vie. L'esclavage
et le servage ont disparu de nos mceurs Cela n'autorise cependant pas le gouvernement d'aller
nier et violer les grands principes politiques et moraux comme par exemple ceux du «Droit de
l'Homme» pour lesquels une grande revolution s'est faite et des torrents de sang ont coule. (El
Ouma Numero 61, 11 mars 1938)
The fact that the nationalist movement considered the racism which informed the
government's colonial policy as incompatible with the universalist values that France
represented proved that, to them, the source of revolutionary legitimacy lay somewhere
else than in the structures of the state. In an open letter addressed to the Interior Minister
in December 1934, the Etoile nord-africaine condemned the police oppression against
North Africans in Paris orchestrated by the "services de la rue Lecomte" as barbaric,
unjust, and unworthy of a civilised nation, and called for the Minister to intervene on
the basis of those principles: "Nous vous demandons d'y mettre un terme, si vraiment
vous repr6sentez encore cette France, laquelle nous voulons encore le croire est la
derniere tranchee de liberte" (El °tuna Numero 28, decembre 1934). This passage
suggests that there was a dichtomy between the French government on the one hand,
and France as a "civilised nation" on the other. Indeed, when the Etoile called on the
Minister to bring an end to police injustice, they appealed to "cette France ... derniere
tranch6e de liberte, to that civilised nation which the government was supposed (but so
blatantly failed) to represent. It could be argued that herein lies the key to the Algerian
nationalists' evocation of France's universalist values: the true bearer of those principles
was the nation and by extension, the people of France.
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4.4 The French people and the legacy of 1789
The struggle of Algerians for rights and freedom, and against "feudalism" was identified
by nationalists with that of the French people in 1789. Their own longing for
independence was conjured up in terms which were reminiscent of their discourse on
the French revolution: "nous voulons dechirer le baillon et briser nos chaines. Nous
voulons notre part de la vie, de la lumiere et de la liberte" (El Ouina Numero 28,
decembre 1934 ). Algerian Muslims and the French people were presented as sharing
the same values, and both were depicted as inherently hostile to the colonial project
supported by the French authorities. In a speech made at La Mutualite after the arrest of
her husband, Madame Hadj (who was French) asserted that the French people would
never tolerate the injustice of colonialism:
Le role de l'indigenat, les mesures d'exceptions font du peuple algerien, une proie pieds et mains
lies au colonialisme. Cela, le peuple francais ne le permettra pas, lui qui a fait la revolution de
1789 pour briser les chaines monarchiques qui l'etouffaient et pour donner la liberte a tous les
peuples. (El Ounia Numero 28, decembre 1934)
The French people were described as the repository of revolutionary legitimacy and the
interests of the Algerian people were presented as inalienable from those of the French.
A tract which announced a meeting of the Etoile on 26 May 1934 ended with a call for
the French to support North Africans' struggle for emancipation: "Peuple francais, epris
de la liberte, viens parmi nous, peuple opprime, ta presence sera un puissant concours
pour obtenir nos revendications" (Note stir l'activite de l'ENA: 80) (1). In Algerian
nationalist discourse, the French people appeared as a privileged interlocutor, whom the
Algerian people could address as an equal. The oppression to which both people were
subjected had also created a sense of mutual understanding and shared interests. Their
common enemy was the imperialist state which not only subjugated the colonised but
also trampled on the revolutionary legacy of 1789, and by extension on the integrity and
fundamental rights of the French people:
135
Au veritable peuple de France, nous nous adressons pour que son prestige, pour que sa
gloire d'avoir fait 89 ne s'eteigne pas ici. En nous defendant ... le peuple de France se defendra
lui-merne et defendra la cause de la democratic. Que ces veritables Francais de France, au cceur
si franc et si accueillant, ne restent pas indifferent a notre asservissement
Tous h Faction pour ... l'application de l'article premier de la Declaration des Droits de
l'Homme et du citoyen:
«Tous les hommes naissent libres et egaux en droits». (El Ouma Numero 63, 22 avril
1938)
The emphasis put on the authenticity of the French people ("[a]u veritable peuple de
France", "ces veritables Francais de France") aimed not only to differentiate the latter
from the oppressive state structure which claimed to represent it, but also, more
importantly, to distinguish them from the European settlers in North Africa, whose
Frenchness was questioned. Indeed, the Pieds-Noirs were discredited in the eyes of
Algerian nationalists for their racism, their disdain for human rights and their
unflinching support for the colonial project. The Etoile and the PPA denounced the bias
and inconsistency of the imperialist system which marginalised Muslims and treated
them as subjects on the basis of their constructed difference (their religion, ethnicity,
language and so on), while ignoring the cultural and linguistic differences of European
settlers (many of whom had come from countries such as Spain, Italy and Malta and
whose knowledge of French language and culture was often limited) and granting them
"feudal" privileges and French citizenship.68
In the ideological framework of reference of Algerian nationalists in the inter-
war period, the boundary between "us" (the Algerian people) and "them" (the "true"
French people) was negotiated positively. Independence from France was not posited as
a rupture, but as a rapprochement of two equal peoples who shared the same values, as
the logical outcome of the spread of those universalist values granted by the French to
68 At the turn of the twentieth century, settlers from southern Europe accounted for the majority of the
European population in Algeria. Second generation Italians, Spaniards and Maltese became French
citizens thanks to the law of 26 June 1889 (Talha 1981: 19-21).
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the rest of the world. Algerian emancipation was therefore presented as crucial to the
survival of those ideals and as reinforcing the rights of the French themselves by
challenging the rule of imperialism which threatened the very foundations of
universalism.
What was implied by this interpretation was that there was a dichotomy between
the French people on the one hand, and the state - which was supposed to emanate from
it - and its colonial policies on the other:
Ii faut protester par de frequentes reunions dans la region parisienne, comme dans les
departements limitrophes afin d'attirer l'attention du peuple francais trompe par ses gouvernants
et lui exposer la situation miserable et les abus dont est victime le peuple nord-africain. (El
Ounza Numero 15, octobre 1933)
This representation was, to some extent, informed by the concept of class, as a
distinction was made between the French people who, just like the Algerian people, was
depicted as the "classe laborieuse" oppressed and misled by the French government, and
the ruthless imperialist state controlled by the privileged.
However, this representation was problematic as it was based on the premise
that there was a chasm between the "real" French people and the state which emanated
from it. Nationalist discourse idealised the French people as the true heir of the
Revolution, and failed to ackowledge the fact that a significant proportion of French
public opinion could be far from hostile to the colonial project, as the success of the
"exposition coloniale" in 1931 showed. 69
 More crucially, it did not mention the fact that
in a democratic system such as the one which was in place in metropolitan France,
government policy and actions were not necessarily at odds with popular will. Even
French workers and workers movements, which the Algerian nationalist movement
viewed as natural allies, were too often favorable to colonialism and frequently and
explicitly referred to the colonised as inferior people, as Bedarida shows:
69 The Exposition coloniale which took place in Marseille in 1906 was also very popular (Bedarida 1974:
38). The Exposition coloniale of 1931 was castigated in a tract of the Etoile as France's celebration of the
oppression and exploitation of the Algerian people ('Freres musulmans, alerte!', janvier 1929) (1).
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Au soutien ou A l'acceptation de la colonisation contribue aussi un autre sentiment, assez repandu
dans la classe ouvriere et gull ne faut pas sous-estimer: un complexe de superiorite A regard des
populations indigenes jugees primitives et inferieures. (Bedarida 1974: 38)
The second premise upon which nationalist discourse was based was to posit
universalism and colonialism (and by extension racism) as irreconciliable opposites. It
has been shown previously that colonisation was justified by Western states on the basis
of those universalist principles. Civilising the colonised was presented as their duty, as
the "white man's burden". To become truly universal, those values had to be spread to
the rest of the world. Inherent in this ideology was the belief that European civilisation
was intrinsically superior to others and that the uncivilised had to be put under its
"protection". Algerian nationalists also wrongly assumed that the French Revolution
was carried out by the French to grant freedom to other people (see El Ouma Numero
28, decembre 1934). Indeed, it is worth noting that none of the colonised who lived in
territories which were under French control during and after the Revolution of 1789
were granted any more rights and freedom.
At a conceptual level, there is also a link between universalism and racism
which goes beyond their apparent contrariness. Balibar (1994: 191-204) points out
convincingly that universalism developed in the Enlightenment, at a time when race
acquired its modern meaning and when the natural bases of slavery were spelt out, and
that the idea of Man so central to universalism implies a latent hierarchy. He goes on to
suggest that:
you cannot find a clear-cut line of demarcation between universalism and racism or, if you
prefer, you cannot designate two sets of ideas with no intersection, one in which you would put
all the (potentially) universalistic ideas, and the other in which you would put all the
(potentially) racist ideas ... universalism and racism are indeed (determinate) contraries, and this
is why each of them has the other one inside itself - or is bound to affect the other from the
inside. (Balibar 1994: 198)
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Wallerstein (1988: 42-54) considers that gender ("the Rights of Man") and racial biases
inflect the "egalitarian message" of universalism, and that, as a concept, universalism
fails to include non-whites and women. He views the relationship between universalism
and racism/sexism as one of tension constructed and sustained by the capitalist system,
in which racism "ethnicises" the workforce in order to maintain low costs of production
(in other words low wages for the "ethnicised") and sexism ensures that women's non-
paid work remains so.
One of the feats of universalism as a concept was therefore to appear, and be
exported, to the rest of the world as truly "universalistic" whilst being so marked by
those underlying tensions.
The idea that universalism could not be reconciled with the limited framework
of the nation because it was, by nature, limitless, also needs to be challenged.
Universalism was one of the most efficient ideological tools used by French nationalism
in its conquest of an Empire. The boundless character of it as an ideology suited
France's expansionist ambitions. Yet, at the same time, the central place which it
occupied within nationalism marked it as limited. Universalist principles were evoked
by the French not so much to emancipate and free other peoples as to posit their own
civilisation as inherently superior, and justify the colonial order as a generous mission
which had to be carried out for the greater good of humanity. 7° Cesaire explained that
when, during a conference about the concept of civilisation which gathered historians
and philosophers in 1930,
un homme politique comme M. Doumer interrompait l'historien Berr ou l'ethnographe Mauss
c'etait pour leur signaler les dangers politiques de leur relativisme culturel et qu'il fallait laisser
intacte cette idee que la France avait pour mission d'apporter a ses colonies ola civilisation»,
entendez la civilisation francaise. (Cesaire 1956: 197)
70 From Doriot's extreme right-wing La Liberte (20 janvier 1938) which praised the progress brought
about by imperial France in the colonies, to the "laxist" attitude adopted by many workers movements
which favoured moderate and peaceful colonialism (Bedarida 1974: 29), a large consensus seemed to
exist across the political spectrum on the benefits that colonialisation could bring to the colonised.
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In that context, universalism as an ideology was closely tied to French civilisation and
exclusively tolerated within the sphere of the dominant party, the coloniser. It was also
used to rally the autochton elites educated in French schools to its national project and
make the assimilation myth appear as credible to them. 71 It was clearly not intended to
be taken literally and seized by "uncivilised" indigenous people to claim independence
and threaten France's colonial empire. When it was, autochtons' nationalist aspirations
were interpreted by the French as fuelled by religious, tribal "fanaticism" and as
political extremism which was inconsistent with universalism, or as a "fanatisme
moyen-ageux, voire prehistorique" (Fanon 1956: 126).
When faced with the realities of a racist colonial system whose discourse was
traversed with references to universalist principles, Algerian nationalists failed to
recognise that universalism could indeed contain those inherent tensions, and argued
instead that the French authorities had betrayed their own people by paying lip-service
to those revolutionary values whilst oppressing Muslims. The complex intrinsic nature
of universalism and its relationship with colonialism, racism, and nationalism could
explain why the Etoile and the PPA could develop a nationalist agenda marked by anti-
colonialism and inspired by the values of 1789, and at the same time, justify their claim
for independence on the basis of the past greatness of an "Arab nation" which had had,
in its time, its own colonial empire.72
4.5 Antiracism and racism within Algerian nationalism
The tension between racism and antiracism in Algerian nationalist discourse needs to be
further investigated. It was argued earlier that the racism to which North African
71 On 15 April 1930, the congress of the Association des instituteurs indigenes ended with a declaration
by S. Faci which stated that "la politique indigene de la France ne peut etre qu'une politique
d'assimilation". During the nineteenth congress of the Union des associations generales des etudiants de
France, Ferhat Abbas who, at the time, was president of the Arnicale des etudiants nzusultnans, asserted
that Algerian Muslim students' ideals were to "s'incorporer dans la grande famille francaise" (Ayache
1972: 97).
72 See for instance the movement's evocation of the past Arab nation: "c'est parce que nous formions une
nation unie et prospere, que nous pflmes organiser un domaine colonial" (El Ounza Numero 64, 27 mai
1938).
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Muslims were subjected was evoked as a justification for emancipation. Their fight was
therefore equated with a struggle against racism. In a number of articles and political
speeches, they called for the instigation of "un parlement algerien elu au sufrage
universel ... sans distinction de race ou de religion", and invited Muslims to join their
movement "contre les injustices et la haine des races" (El Ouma Numero 34, octobre
1935). They asserted that they were "ni antifrancais, ni anti aucune race, ni fanatiques,
ni anarchistes, mais ... nous sommes anti-imperialistes" (El Ouma Numero 28,
decembre 1934), and that their nationalism "n'a rien de xenophobe car il ne se fonde
sur aucun prejuge ni complexe de race" (El Ouma Numero 58, janvier 1938). Dr Ben
Sliman, representing the ENA at a debate on Algeria organised by the Club du
Faubourg on 18 March 1936, reiterated the nationalists' antiracist agenda when he
declared that "on a dit que l'Etoile Nord-Africaine est une organisation antifrancaise et
antijuive M elle nest ni l'une ni l'autre, elle est anti-colonialiste et anti-imperialiste ... et
dans une Algerie libre et independante, il n'y aura ni Juif, ni Francais, ni indigêne, mais
des Algeriens reconcilies dans la liberte" (El Ouma Numero 39, mars-avril 1936).
Nationalists argued that their antiracism was based on what they saw as the inherently
tolerant nature of Islam: "les Juifs n'ont jamais ete molestes ni dans leurs biens ni dans
leur religion, en pays islamique, car ce qui honore l'Islam, c'est sa tolerance" (El Ouma
Numero 29, fevrier-mars 1935).
However, those antiracist claims could not hide the fact that their nationalism,
just like other nationalisms, was also marked internally by racism. In the context of the
1930s when anti-Semitism was rife, the Algerian nationalist movement also played the
race card for political purposes. The events of Constantine in the summer of 1934 were
a case in point. The riots which took place in Constantine between 4 and 6 August 1934
were triggered by the desecration of a Mosque by a drunk French Jewish soldier. A
number of political rallies were organised by the Etoile to debate the issue. El Ouma
denounced the fact that the soldier had been condemned to spend only two days in
prison when Muslims who had taken part in the demonstrations had received sentences
of two to five years imprisonment, and accused the French justice system of racism (El
Ouma Numero 25, septembre-octobre 1934). This was the principal framework within
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which anti-Jewish discourse was developed by the movement. Jews in North Africa
were accused of betraying Arabs who had welcomed them, by becoming French
through the Cremieux Decree of 1870 and siding with French imperialism:
Les Juifs, amis et serviteurs de l'imperialisme francais, ont trahi le peuple arabe en se faisant
naturaliser en masse en 1870, faisant ainsi le jeu du colonialisme, en se mettant du cOte du plus
fort ... Presque tous les Juifs sont de devoues serviteurs du colonialisme au detriment du peuple
arabe. (El Ouma Numero 25, septembre-octobre 1934)
In the same issue, Imache Amar's article was traversed by more virulent racist rhetoric
and conveyed many of the common stigmas that racism has historically attached to
Jewishness:
Les Juifs ingrats, les Juifs felons, trahissant ceux qui leur ont ouvert les bras, alors qu'ils etaient
pourchasses des pays chretiens; les Juifs, obeissant a leurs instincts sordides et cauteleux sont
passes armes et bagages au service du plus fort dans le camp de l'imperialisme qui, en echange, a
favorise leurs desseins cupides, leur amour de l'usure et leur soif de richesse A notre detriment ...
Ceux qui ont crucifie Jesus, le divin martyr, ne reculeront devant aucun sacrilege A l'egard de
Mohamed. (El °tuna Numero 25, septembre-octobre 1934)
How can those occurences of racism within a discourse otherwise marked by
universalist references be accounted for? How could North Africans, who denounced
and fought against all forms of colonial racism and developed a vision of an
independent Algeria where Muslims, Europeans and Jews could live together as equals,
also use anti-Jewish rhetoric? 73 Part of the answer may possibly lie in the very nature of
nationalism as a political ideology and its relationship with racism. As Anthias and
Yuval-Davies argue, race and racism act as a structuring principle for national processes
(1992: ix), and "[w]herever a delineation of boundaries takes place, as is the case with
73 For examples of the ENA/PPA's inclusive discourse presenting Muslims, Jews and Europeans as
equals, see section 2.4.
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every ethnic and national collectivity, processes of exclusion and inclusion are in
operation (Ibid: 39). What is remarkable in the way in which the racism directed against
Jews by Algerian nationalists was constructed and the racist terminology and themes
that it uses, is the resemblance that it bears to anti-Jewish discourse in European
nationalism.
As Balibar (1990: 65-66) points out, even if the nationalism of the dominant ("le
nationalisme de conquete") should not be equated with that of the dominated ("le
nationalisme de liberation"), they both share some common ground. The discourse of
the Algerian nationalist movement shows that, however antinomic the relationship
between universalism and racism may appear, it could be argued that nationalism is the
ideological terrain on which universalist and racist discourses do not so much coexist as
form two sides of the same tension. Within the field of nationalism, inherent to the
processes by which the former (universalism) "idealises" and the latter (racism)
categorises individuals and societes, is the idea of a hierarchy which leads to a
reification of the "Other".
This tension could justify domination and exclusion in the case of a dominant
and expansionist nationalism such as France's. It could, for different reasons, also affect
a nationalism of liberation such as Algeria's. Universalist values were embraced and
were presented as vindicating their independentist agenda. However, the events of
Constantine show that European anti-Semitism, which stigmatised the "Other"
(incarnated by the Jew) as "privileged", "treacherous" and exploiting the people (etc.),
could be taken on and reinterpreted by Algerian nationalists within the colonial context.
This upsurge of anti-Jewish feelings during those incidents was in sharp contrast
with the movement's main nationalist discourse which, essentially, put an emphasis on
tolerance and equality. 74
 It is indeed worth noting that once the agitation surrounding
the events had abated, it became far more moderate in its evocation of conflicts which
had opposed Muslims and Jews, such as in Constantine and in Orleansville, and put the
blame mostly on imperialism for the violence which had occured. In an article
74 In a way, this apparent dichotomy between both spheres of discourse echoes French republicanism,
whose discourse of freedom and equality coexisted with universalist rhetoric justifying colonialism and
its corollary, racism.
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published a few months later, the Etoile nord-africaine expressed regret for those
clashes during which there had been as many victims in both communities, and called
for a general amnesty. The movement referred to all those who had been condemned as
"[les] victimes dune provocation qui a desservi aussi bien les Juifs que les Musulmans".
It argued that it was colonialism which had made Jews "arrogant", that Muslims had
been manipulated by French anti-Jewish groups, and that the violence of the North
Africans' reaction had been exacerbated by 105 years of misery and colonial domination
(El °ulna Numero 39, mars-avril 1936).
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the Algerian nationalist movement was acutely aware that
at the core of colonialism was racism. It affected the North Africans' whole experience
as subjects of the French colonial empire. As a consequence, racism informed externally
their nationalism, as it was evoked as a key motive for their desire to gain freedom and
independence. The only possible way of bringing to an end the racism to which they
were subjected, was not to reform but to end the colonial rule of Algeria.
Universalism was explicitly acknowledged as a key inspiration for nationalists'
own struggle for emancipation. They still regarded France as the true repository of
those values inherited from the Enlightenment and the Revolution. However, a shift
took place in the way they perceived the role played by metropolitan France in the
colonial project. Until the early 1920s, a dichotomy was still made between on the one
hand, a tolerant and generous "metropule" and French government which were seen as
the protector of those values, and on the other hand, the feudal rule of imperialism in the
colony. From the mid 1920s onwards, a period which coincided with the development
of police oppression against North African migrants within France, the French state was
denounced as being the real instigator of imperialist domination in North Africa.
The true heirs of the Revolution were no longer seen to be the Government and
Parliament in Paris but the people of France. The movement often called on the latter to
support the struggle and demands of the Algerian people on the basis of the universalist
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values that both people shared. This vision was problematic as it failed to recognise that
the government which carried out those colonial policies emanated, to a large extent,
from the will of people of France, that colonisation was very popular amongst the
French population, and that the relationship between universalism and colonialism was
not necessarily an antinomic one in French nationalist ideology. Furthermore, even
though the Etoile and the PPA declared themselves to be antiracist and tolerant, the
events of Constantine in the summer of 1934 showed that, like all nationalisms, their
nationalism of liberation could also be informed by racism.
..
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Chapter 5
Algerian nationalists in the French political arena and beyond
5.1 Introduction
At least until 1938, when the PPA moved its headquarters from Paris to Algiers, the
nationalist movement's ideology and actions were not simply rooted within the North
African political context, but also shaped by their experience in the French social,
economic and political arena. 75
 It was an organisation which was created and developed
within the North African diaspora in France and which acknowledged, when addressing
fellow Algerian Muslims in North Africa, that "nous avons commence notre lutte loin
de notre pays, loin de vous!" (El Ouma Numero 28, janvier 1935). Beyond metropolitan
France, international issues, such as Palestine and the Middle East, as well as Ethiopia,
were also considered as important to their own political fight and were discussed
extensively both in political meetings and in the nationalist newspapers, L'Ikdam and El
Ouma. The aim of this section is to assess some aspects of the ENA/PPA's discourse
pertaining to the nationalists' relationship with political groups of the left and other
immigrants in France, and to examine the attention given in their discourse to
international events in the Middle East and in Africa.
5.2 Links and conflicts with the French Left
Until 1914, the French Socialist Party had paid little attention to the colonial question
and to the fate of Muslims in North Africa. However, on 5 March 1919, the first
Manifesto of the International pressed French socialists to side with the colonised and
bring "colonial slavery" to an end (Ageron 1972b: 8). The "Eurocentric" strategy that
had been adopted, which viewed any changes in the colonies as the result of a
proletarian revolution in Europe, enabled many socialists both in France and in North
75 In spite of strong opposition within the comite directeur, Messali Hadj decided to transfer the
headquarters of the PPA to Algeria on 18 June 1937. This transfer came into effect in November 1938
(Stora 1992b: 49-52).
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Africa to sit on the fence and support the status quo on French colonialism. This
strategy was challenged by the Third Congress of the Communist International and by
Lenin's writings in June 1920. The colonies were now considered to be a key focus of
the revolution. This forced the French communists to adopt a clearer position vis-a-vis
the colonies and led to rifts and tensions within the party (Ibid: 9).
Therefore, it was under the influence of the Komintern that the French
Communist Party and the communist trade union (the CGTU) came to play a
significant, but nonetheless ambiguous, role in the fight against French imperialism in
the 1920s and in the creation of the Etoile nord-africaine in 1926 (see Stora 1982,
1992a).76
By the end of November 1927, the Etoile had become an important political
organisation. They had thirteen sections in France, including eight in Paris, and had
correspondants in many French towns and cities. The movement had 3500 members,
who were all members or sympathisers of the Communist Party and its publication,
L'Ikdam, had a circulation of 3,000 copies (Note de police, 16 novembre 1927) (3).
Many North Africans in France, including Messali Hadj, started out as political activists
within that party. Some had been trained at the Communist School of Bobigny or at the
School of Propaganda at the Marxist University in Moscow (Note sur l'activite de
l'ENA: 23-24) (1).
However, the close relationship which existed between North African
nationalists and the French Communist Party was marked by tensions (see Hadj 1982).
The attempts made by North Africans to develop a more independent organisation,
whose agenda did not necessarily conform to that of the Communist Party, led to a
number of crises which culminated at the end of the 1920s. At the beginning of the
1930s, after the dissolution of the movement by the French government in 1929,
attempts made by the PC to revive it as a movement close to its views failed.
On 28 May 1933, Messali Hadj managed to reorganise the Etoile nord-africaine.
During the 1930s, he gave the nationalist movement a truly independent voice which
76 For a study of union activity in North Africa during the colonial period, see, for example, Ayache
(1969 & 1972), Bedarida (1974), Bessis (1974), Gallissot (1969 & 1969a).
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put Islam at the core of its political ideology. Even though contacts were maintained
with the communists, hostility between the two parties grew and turned into an open
conflict during the second half of the decade, by which time the French Communist
Party and the newly created Algerian Communist Party had abandoned their
commitment to an independent Algeria and adopted a more assimilationist stance.77
The movement's relationship with the SFIO was more problematic. The
socialists' discourse on the colonies was indeed far more moderate than that of the
Communists. In the 1920s, some socialist MPs such as Nouelle and Blum expressed in
Parliament their support for a progressive and cautious move towards autonomy in
some of the French colonies (Note du Ministêre des Colonies No 17, 15 janvier 1929)
(4), but in the 1930s the party moved away from that position and favoured policies
which would gradually improve the socio-economic and political rights of North
Africans within the French Empire.
In 1934, during the trial of Messali Hadj, the nationalist movement
acknowledged the support provided to them by left-wing parties and intellectuals (such
as Daniel Guerin) and stated that "[n]ous nous rejouissons ... de la sympathie agissante
des [p]artis de la classe ouvriere, qui, au moment oil le Gouvernement s'acharne contre
nous sont venus tous a notre secours" (El Otuna Numero 28, decembre 1934). This
support was expressed by key figures such as Francis Jourdain, president of the Ligue
Anti-imperialiste, Paul Hirtz, of the Jeunesses Laiques et Republicaines, Ferrat of the
Communist Party, Cudenet of the Parti Radical-Socialiste, as well as Jean Longuet and
Andre Berthon, both lawyers supporting the ENA, who spoke during the meeting
organised by the Etoile in Paris to protest against the condemnation of Messali IIadj and
the leadership of the movement. Representatives of the PC, the CGTU, the SFIO and
the Secours Rouge International (SRI) also took part in a meeting organised in Lyon on
8 September 1934 (El Ouma Numero 28, decembre 1934).
However, tensions with the communist and socialist left were always present.
The polemic which surrounded the meeting organised by the ENA at La Grange-aux-
77 The Parti conununiste algerien was created on 17 October 1937. During the first congress marking its
foundation, the party voted for a manifest "pour une Alg6rie libre et heureuse fraternellement unie au
peuple francais comme a tous les autres peuples" (Stora 1992b: 48).
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Belles in September 1934 after the Constantine events, illustrates the growing tension
between the nationalist movement and the PC. El Ounia (Numero 29, septembre-
octobre 1934) published a "mise au point" denouncing the report on this meeting which
had appeared in L'Humanite. That report had failed to mention the role played by the
Etoile and the speeches made by Algerian nationalists, and had presented the event as a
communist initiative.
Socialist politicians, members of Parliament and left-wing governments and
ministers (particularly those in charge of the colonies) were frequently criticised for
their reluctance to challenge the colonial status quo established by the Right:
[C]ombien avons-nous eu de gouverneurs de droite et de gauche, sans oublier ceux membres du
Comite Central de la Ligue des Droits de l'Homme[?] La situation a-t-elle change lorsque ces
messieurs de la gauche nous gouvernaient? Ont-ils supprime le code infame de l'indigenat? Non,
non et non. (El (Mina Numero 39, mars-avril 1936)
In spite of those conflicts and arguments, the movement often acknowleged that its
political affinities lay with the French left. When the Etoile decided to join the Front
Populaire in 1936, it had high hopes that the left-wing coalition would introduce
sweeping reforms in the colonial system. During the debate on the Algerian question
organised by the Club du Faubourg on 18 March 1936, Dr Ben Sliman, representing the
ENA, praised the Front Populaire and recalled that the movement had presented its
programme of demands to the Comite National du Rassemblement Populaire (which
later became the Front Populaire) and that 7,000 of its militants had taken part in the
procession of 14 July 1935 with the French Left (El Ounza Numero 39, mars-avril
1936).
However, the colonial policy led by the Front Populaire, after it had won the
general election on 3 May 1936, was a great disappointment to the Etoile, which felt
betrayed by the Left. Nationalists opposed the timid reforms of the "projet Blum-
Viollette" which planned to extend the right to vote to a mere 20,000 Muslims in
Algeria and failed to address the fundamental question of democracy and rights in North
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Africa (El Ouma Numero 59, janvier 1938, El Ouma Numero 62, ler avril 1938). The
conflicts and recriminations which developed between the two sides after 1936 led the
government to dissolve the ENA on 27 January 1937 and to arrest the leadership of the
nationalist movement.
Even though contacts were maintained between some French politicians of the
mainstream Left, such as Gu&in of the Commission Coloniale of the SFIO, and
Algerian nationalists, the Front Populaire's accession to power marked the end of an era
of difficult coexistence between the movement and the French Left. The PPA, created
on 11 March 1937 by the ex-leadership of the Etoile to continue with their nationalist
struggle, was consistently attacked by both the Left and the Right. The nationalist party,
which still hoped to win over the Left to its cause, regretted the fact that "dans les
journaux de droite, le PPA n'est ni plus ni moms qu'une cellule de Moscou ... par contre
dans les journaux de gauche, on se plait a nous representer comme le prolongement du
fascisme international" (El Ouma Numêro 63, 22 avril 1938). The movement also
condemned the Communist Party's hostility towards them, and criticised it for aligning
its colonial policy with that of the SFIO:
Le fait que le PPA revendique son independence politique et l'oriente resolument dans la voie de
la defense des interets des masses laborieuses algeriennes, suffit pour que le P.C. trouve plus
dun motif de haine contre lui. Car le PPA s'avere un dangereux rival, qui tend de plus en plus a
etendre son influence sur des couches de plus en plus larges de travailleurs algeriens, et cela au
detriment de l'influence du P.C. (El Ouma Numero 58, decembre 1937)
The Algerian nationalists' co-operation with French parties of the left in the 1930s,
which was considered crucial to the success of their struggle, was all the more difficult
as the effects of the economic recession, which were felt throughout the French working
class, exacerbated xenophobia. The crisis and unemployment that affected France
during that decade were imputed to foreigners within the ranks of the French Left.
Radicals such as Edouard HenTiot and Pierre Mendes-France, socialists such as Roger
Salengro and George Monnet (who was also a leading member of the Ligue des Droits
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de l'Homme) called for a reduction in the number of immigrants, while the CGT
declared that they were in favour of giving preference to the French on the job market.
The Parti communiste francais and the CGTU also denounced the xenophobia which
was rife amongst their members and militants (Milza 1985a: 128-129, Schor 1996: 120-
127).
If the relationship between the nationalist movement, the communists and the
socialists was often problematic and conflictual, it was essentially within parties of the
French extreme-left such as the Parti Ouvrier Intern ationaliste that Algerian
nationalists found consistent support for their cause:
chaque fois que nous avons ete victimes de la repression, nous n'avons trouve pour la denoncer
que les partis et les organisation d'extreme-gauche, et certains groupements de gauche, les gens
et la presse reactionnaires nous ont toujours accables d'injures. (El Ouma Numero 39, mars-avril
1936)
While the Etoile and the PPA's political strategy was to work with all the democratic
(and in particular proletarian) organisations in France, they defended their independence
from other parties (El Ouma Numero 58, decembre 1937). They also considered that the
unity of North Africans within nationalist organisations was paramount if their fight for
independence was to succeed:
[Lies Nord-Africains n'ont aucun inter& a adherer aux partis politiques francais, qu'ils soient de
droite ou de gauche. Leur place se trouve dans les groupement nationalistes anti-imperialistes. Ils
doivent d'abord arracher regalite avec les autres hommes par la liberation de leur pays, soumis
l'oppression coloniale. Apres cette liberation, ils peuvent, chacun suivant son ideologie, adherer
a des conceptions politiques et sociales. Avant cela, ii n'ont pas le droit de se disperser devant les
forces immenses de rimperialisme colonial. (El Ouma Numero 39, mars-avril 1936)
For the Etoile, anti-colonialism was a cause which was above ideologies. It was an
organisation which was posited as a mouvement d'union nationale which transcended
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socio-political differences. The nationalists' call for political mobilisation against
imperialism along ethnic lines showed that, for them, ethnicity took precedence over
political allegiance and beliefs. They considered it to be the only way to counter the
imperialist agenda, which, in the 1930s, had managed to gain support from all sides of
the political spectrum. Only in an independent state could North Africans express their
democratic right to belong to different political groupings.
5.3 Solidarity with other colonial workers in France
The Etoile nord-africaine and the PPA made consistent attempts to establish links with
other North African groups and with Arab organisations based in Europe and the
Middle East, as well as with other colonial migrant organisations in order to create a
united front against colonialism. Some of them were more successful than others, and it
showed that the Algerian nationalist movement wanted to develop beyond the limited
boundaries of the social class from which it had emerged in order to develop into a truly
"national" organisation, which would gather manual workers, intellectuals and traders
belonging to the oppressed colonial population, and promote Arab nationalism from the
Maghreb to the Middle East.
Even though Algerian nationalists maintained close relations with North
African-based parties such as the Destour in Tunisia and the Jeunes Marocains during
the inter-war period, they did not manage to create any real alliance with Muslim
intellectuals, politicians and religious groups in Algeria (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA:
119) (1). Algerian organisations which failed to respond to the movement's call for
unity were systematically stigmatised during political meetings.
The movement's efforts to win over North African organisations in France
focused mainly on student associations and traders' organisations. They were far more
successful with the former than with the latter. Students from the Association des
etudiants marocains and from the Association des etudiants tunisiens were politically
far more radical than Algerian students, who were often criticised for their reformist
stance. Moroccan and Tunisian students, including the leaders of the Association des
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Etudiants Musulmatis Nord-Africains de Paris, Ben Milad and Belafredj, respectively
Tunisian and Moroccan, often took part in, and made addresses during, meetings
organised by the ENA and the PPA (Lettre du Prefet de Police au Ministre de
l'Interieur, juillet 1933) (3). They also played an active part in the running of the
organisation and provided assistance with the writing and editing of the nationalist
newspaper. For instance, El Kholti, who was president of the Association des Etudiants
Marocains in the early 1930s, was a regular contributor to El Ouma, while Messali Hadj
was invited to make a speech at the Congres des etudiants musulmans which took place
in December 1933 (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 70-71) (1).
The presence of North African intellectuals and traders during meetings of the
Etoile organised after specific events, such as the clashes of Constantine or the arrest of
nationalist activists, was interpreted by nationalists as the start of a process of
mobilisation of all Maghrebis against colonialism:
Les brimades et les vexations de la police ont reussi a rallier a notre cause ceux de nos
compatriotes, intellectuels et commercants, moms malheureux que la masse et qui conservaient
encore quelques illusions ... C'est ainsi que nous avons eu la satisfaction de voir a notre meeting,
outre la masse de nos compatriotes, des intellectuels musulmans, notamment ceux que naguere
encore notre mouvement laissait indifferents ... Les intellectuels viendront tous nous aider a
denouer les crimes et les mefaits de l'imperialisme francais. (El Ouma Numero 28, decembre
1934)
However, as far as North African traders' associations were concerned, this judgement
was more incantatory than based on the realities on the ground. The Arnicale des
commercants, created in the early 1930s, remained staunchly faithful to France. In June
1934, a number of meetings were organised between Messali Hadj, the leader of the
Etoile nord-africaine, and Mansouri Ahmed, president of the Ligue de defense des
Musulmans, which was the main North African traders association in Paris, in order to
establish closer ties between the two organisations. But those attempts failed and
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constituted a serious setback in the Etoile's aim to unite and mobilise all North Africans
against imperialism (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 86-104) (1).
Algerian nationalists also had connections with movements from the Arab world
in Europe. During the "Congres Islamo-Europeen" which took place between 12 and 15
September 1935 in Geneva, contacts were also established by the leadership of the
Etoile with the organiser of the event, Chekib Arslan (of the Academie Arabe in
Lausanne and editor of La Nation Arabe) and with the representatives of Muslim groups
based in Europe attending the Congress (El Ouma Numero 34, octobre 1935). The
presence of Arabs belonging to the Association syrienne de Paris in some of the
movement's political meetings would also suggest that links with Middle-Eastern
organisations also existed within France.
The movement was also keen to create a front uniting all the colonised
subjugated by the French colonial empire. The involvement of many North African
nationalists in the Communist Party's Union Intercoloniale in the 1920s had enabled
them to build strong relationships with the Annamese and Black organisations.78
Chabila Djilani, for instance, who was described by the police as "one of the best
propagandists" of the ENA, had worked very closely with the Martiniquais community.
Leaders of the Annamese movement and Ligue de defense de la race negre were also
invited to speak during meetings of the Etoile (Notes du Ministre des Colonies, 31
decembre 1928 & 31 mars 1929) (2).
In the 1930s, those links were maintained and reinforced as the "coloniaux"
became more radical. Emile Faure, president of the Ligue, made a speech during a
meeting of the PPA organised at the Salle Wagram in Paris in December 1937
denouncing the sentencing of the leadership of the Algerian nationalist movement by
the French government as a "deni de justice" (El Ouma Numero 58, decembre 1937).
And Nguyen The Truyen, the Indochinese delegate and president of the Rassemblement
Colonial, made a key address at the PPA's meeting of 18 February 1938
78 For an account of Vietnamese immigration and political activism in France in the inter-war period, see
Hemery (1975).
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commemorating the death of Emir Khaled, Abd-el-Kader's grandson and leading figure
of the Jeunes Algeriens movement (El Ouma Numero 61, 11 mars 1938).79
Through those links, the Algerian nationalist movement aimed to establish a
united front with all the colonised. In an article which condemned the Conference
Imperialiste which had taken place in Paris on 3 December 1934, the ENA called for the
unity of all the colonised:
II est indispensable que tous les opprimes des colonies, Algeriens, Marocains, Tunisiens,
Annamites, Malgaches, Senegalais etc., se reunissent, s'entendent, forment leur comite d'action
pour arracher leurs revendication immediates, et travailler ensemble, coude a coude, pres du
proletariat intellectuel et manuel francais pour leur independance economique, politique et
sociale. Opprimes des colonies, unissez vous pour defendre vos interets". (El Ouma Numero 29,
janvier 1935).
Solidarity between all the colonised and the French people was therefore considered
necessary in order to challenge French colonial rule. However, the vision of the
"coloniaux nationalistes" was problematical. It was, to a certain extent, structured
around the idea of class (the oppressed colonial and French proletariat united against an
oppressive imperialist system) and universalist principles, and did not take into
consideration the fact that racism did create divisions between the French population (it
even affected the French Left) and the colonised.80
79 Ngue The Truyen was a leading Vietnamese nationalist. He arrived in France in 1919 and was a
science student in Toulouse between 1919 and 1921, and in Paris between 1922 and 1923. He became an
engineer in chemistry and succeeded Ngyuen Ai Quoc at the "section coloniale" of the Parti communiste
francais (Hernery 1975:6).
80 For example, Ageron (1972b) and Bedarida (1974) highlight the racism wich existed within the French
Left and workers' movements in the inter-war period.
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5.4 Anti-imperialism in the colonies and in the Arab World
5.4.1 The Ethiopian crisis
Events which took place in the rest of the world influenced North African nationalists'
ideology and actions. As a letter addressed on 16 January 1925 by Algerian nationalists
to the President du Conseil shows, the Russian revolution, the rebellion against the
French led by Abdellcrim in Morocco, Egyptian nationalism and Gandhi's struggle for
Indian independence were all acknowledged as sources of inspiration for their own fight
(Letter addressed by Algerian nationalists to the President of the Conseil des ministres,
Mr Herriot, 16 January 1925) (2). To those could be added Mustapha Kemal's accession
to power in Turkey, which was often evoked by Messali Hadj as an example that an
independent Algeria should follow (Stora 1982: 38-39).
In the 1930s, other developments both in African colonies and the Middle East
came to occupy a more prominent place in the discourse of the Etoile and the PPA,
enabling them to reinforce their relationship with other anti-colonialist groups. During
the war waged in Ethiopia by Italy in 1935 and 1936, the links between the Algerian
nationalist movement and the Ligue de defense de la race negre became stronger. Both
movements held joint meetings to protest against Italy's aggression and letters of
protestation against Italy's invasion were addressed to the French President du Conseil,
to the British and Ethiopian embassies and to the Society of Nations (El Ouma Numero
34, octobre 1935). In the Algerian nationalist publication, leading figures of the Ligue
such as Emile Faure and Tiemoko G. Kouate denounced the invasion of Ethiopia as the
latest illustration of a European imperialist expansion facilitated by France, which had
complacently allowed Italy to carve out its own colonial domain in Africa. In October
1936, the Etoile and the Ligue called for the mobilisation of all the colonised against
the invasion of Ethiopia, and for the creation of a committee bringing together Black,
North African and Indochinese anti-colonial organisations (El Ouma Numero 34,
octobre 1935, El Ounta Numero 39, mars-avril 1936).
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A Comite de Coordination des Associations noires et arabes, whose aim was to
further the cause of Black and Arab emancipation, was created in Paris at the end of
1935 by the Comite intercolonial pour la defense du peuple ethiopien. It was led by the
left-wing d6putes Paul Perrin and Jean Longuet. Mme Leo Vanner, an anti-colonialist
militant of the extreme-left, became its first secretary. A number of organisations joined
the newly created Committee. It included movements representing the colonised (the
Etoile nord-africaine, the Ligue de defense de la race negre, the Union des travailleurs
negres, the Ligue de defense des musulmans nord-africains and the Association
syrienne de Paris) and anti-colonial groups led by French politicians and intellectuals
(Paul Penin and Professor Marcel Cohen's Comite intercolonial pour la defense du
peuple ethiopien, Madeleine Braun's Comite d'assistance aux victimes de la guerre en
Ethiopie, Francis Jourdain's Ligue contre l'imperialisme et l'oppression colon iale,
Professor Cenac Thaly's Comite d'etude et d'action coloniale, and Hanna Charley's
CO/77W permanent Victor Schoelcher (Note de police, 21 mai 1936) (3).
5.4.2 The Middle East and the Palestinian question
The origins of Arab nationalism can be traced to Nanda, a movement which developed
in the late nineteenth century and which had a long term influence on nationalist
organisations in that region (Said 1995: xiii). The consistent support of Algerian
nationalists for Arab liberation movements illustrates the extent to which the dominant
faction within the Etoile and the PPA considered that North Africa was ethnically,
culturally, politically, religiously, historically and linguistically anchored within the
Arab World. The call made by Messali Hadj, during a political meeting on 13 January
1934 at the Maison du Peuple in Boulogne, for North Africans to unite with Syrians and
Egyptians in order to form one Muslim people highlights the ideological tension which
existed at the time within the nationalist movement between, on the one hand, their long
term vision of an "Arab nation" which would cover the Middle East and North Africa
and, on the other hand, their fight for the establishment of independent "Arab states" as
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separate national entities, building on their shared culture in order to establish closer
links (Note sur l'activite de l'ENA: 71-72) (1).
The struggle of Arab nationalists in Irak and Syria was followed with great
interest by North African militants, who considered it as an inspiration for all Muslims
in the Middle East and North Africa (El Ouma Numero 15, octobre 1935). During the
negotiations which took place in Paris between Syrian nationalists and the French High
Commissioner in Syria in March 1936, the Etoile organised at La Mutualite in Paris a
political rally with the Ligue anti-imperialiste and the Ligue syrienne des Droits de
l'Homme in support of Syrian independence, and published an article stating that
"l'Afrique du Nord musulmane suit avec un vif inter& et une grande joie la marche vers
l'independance du peuple frere syrien, et avec l'aide de Dieu et la lutte quotidienne, elle
saura suivre la meme voie pour aboutir egalement a son independance" (El Ouma
Numero 39, mars-avril 1936).
Even though those events were of great significance to North African
nationalists, it was the Palestinian question which came to occupy centre stage in their
discourse on imperialism beyond North Africa. The conflict which opposed Palestinians
to British imperialism and Zionism was regularly evoked and discussed during political
meetings and reported in El Ouma as affecting the whole Muslim World: "des bords du
Gange aux rivages de l'Atlantique, aucun Arabe ou Musulman ne reste insensible aux
sacrifices et aux souffrances de ses freres de Jerusalem et de Jaffa" (El Ouma Numero
58, decembre 1937).
The Algerian nationalist movement considered Zionism to be the "stalking
horse" of British - and by extension European - imperialism, which was also referred to
as "l'imperialisme anglo-sioniste". It denounced the Jewish colonisation of Palestine as a
further act of dispossession and oppression of Muslims whose aim was to ensure the
future presence of imperialist powers in the region and to prevent the unity and
independence of the Arab nation (El Ouma Numero 17, septembre 1933).
North African nationalists argued that the claim of Arabs on Palestine was all
the more justified as it was a land which had been theirs for fourteen centuries and for
which they had made so much sacrifice: "[les Arabes] n'accepteront jamais que les
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[J]uifs deviennent maitres dans ce pays ... qu'ils ont arrose de leur sang pour le defendre
et qui n'est par surcroit qu'une province de la nation arabe, au meme titre que l'Auvergne
en France, ou l'Ecosse en Angleterre" (El Otuna Numero 66, 27 aoilt 1938).
By contrast, the PPA considered that the Zionist claim on Palestine, which was
also very much based on history, was unfounded, and stated that Arab hostility to the
creation of a Jewish homeland was not motivated by anti-Jewish xenophobia, but by
anti-Zionism:
[L]es Arabes ne luttent pas en Palestine contre les Juifs en tant que Juifs, mais contre le
Sionisme et l'Imperialisme anglais.
Non et non, ce nest ni un conflit a caractere racial, in confessionnel, ce nest que la reaction
juste et leg Wine d'un peuple qui ne veut point signer son arret de mort en acceptant d'être
depouille y a des braves gens dans tous les pays qui s'imaginent que les Arabes sont
sectaires ou xenophobes en voulant empecher l'emigration juive en Palestine, et que le [J]uif a
bien le droit A un «chez-lui». D'accord, mais ii ne faut pas que ce soit en s'accaparant le foyer
d'autrui ... Et si les sionistes revendiquent la Palestine comme «terre irredente», autant dire que
les Grecs vont revendiquer bientOt Marseille? Pourquoi pas du moment qu'elle fut creee par leurs
geux ii y a quatre mule ans? (El Ouma Numero 58, decembre 1937)
For Algerian nationalists, the parallel which may have been made between the
Palestinians and their own colonial experience probably contributed to a reinforcement
of their conviction that Jewish expansion in Palestine was part of a plot to further
European imperial domination. Indeed, their discourse implies that Jewish nationalists'
claim on Palestine bore some similarities with France's historical justification for
imperial expansion in a North Africa once dominated by Romans. It was based on a
historical interpretation which presented their "colonisation" as a return to their past, to
their roots, resurrecting and rebuilding the once great nation, and carrying on with the
achievements of their forebears.
At another level, their discourse was not without contradictions as it could,
within the same article, assert that their opposition to Zionist expansion in Palestine had
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nothing to do with racism, yet refer to Jewish violence against Palestinian Arabs as
characterised by their inherent nature, their "lachete et ... perfidie legendaire" (El Ouma
Numero 66, 27 aoCit 1939). In other words, they claimed that Arabs were opposed to
Zionism, not to Jews, but could also refer to the latter in racist terms. Those apparent
contradictions in their discourse raise a number of questions about the nature of, and the
relationship between, racism and nationalism, both phenomena which developed in and
were "exported" from Europe (Banton and Harwood 1975: 8, Kedourie 1985: 9), and
illustrate the impossibility of their nationalism Oust like all nationalisms of liberation) to
be articulated outside of the tension that exists between universalism and racism, as
previously argued.
The Palestinian question was a symbol which was crucial to the articulation of
Arab and North African nationalist discourse based on Arabness, just like, for different
historical and political reasons, it was central to Jewish nationalist ideology. Indeed,
Palestine was the land where both Arab and Jewish nationalisms contested the validity
of each other's historicised imagining of the nation. This process, which implied a
negation of the other's history and existence, and therefore of the other's legitimate
claim to a homeland, was too often marked by racism.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the relationship which existed between the Algerian
nationalist movement and the French Left was a difficult one. Tensions with the
Communist Party grew from the end of the 1920s onwards as the Etoile asserted its
independence and its nationalist agenda, and as the position of the Communist Party on
the colonial question shifted to become closer to that of the SFIO. Those tensions
became more pronounced with the economic recession of the 1930s and with the
difficulty left-wing politicians had in countering the spread of anti-immigrant racism
within the French working class.
The great hopes which the ENA had in supporting the Front Populaire were
dashed when Leon Blum's coalition government failed to introduce bold reforms in the
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colonies. The "Projet Blum-Viollette" was condemned by the Etoile as timid and as a
betrayal of the commitments which they had made. The left-wing French government
ordered the ban of the Algerian nationalist movement and arrested its leaders in 1937.
In spite of those rifts, close links with left-wing intellectuals such as Daniel
Guerin and Jean Longuet remained. But it was mainly within the extreme-Left, in
organisations such as the Parti ouvrier internationaliste, that Algerian nationalists
found consistent support.
The movement also attempted to spread its base of support - which consisted
mainly of North African workers in France - by establishing a close relationship with
North African groups on both sides of the Mediterranean. In North Africa, they had
regular contacts with Tunisian and Moroccan parties which had a clearly nationalist
agenda such as the Destour and the Jeunes Marocains, but failed to rally the
traditionally reformist Algerian-based political movements. In France, while they
managed to work closely with Moroccan and Tunisian student leaders of the
Association des etudiants musulmans nord-africains de Paris, they failed to mobilise
the assimilationist Algerian students organisation, and their attempts to build links with
North African traders in France were unsuccessful.
The Algerian nationalist movement also had contacts with other Arab
organisations such as the Association syrienne de Paris and Chekib Arslan's Lausanne-
based Academie arabe. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, it also reinforced its links with
the Indochinese and the Ligue de defense de la race negre in France.
International events in the Muslim World and in the colonies were often evoked
by the movement and followed with great interest. The events in Ethiopia, during which
the Etoile called for the establishment of a front uniting all the colonised and the French
against imperialism, led to the creation of the Comite de Coordination des Associations
noires et arabes at the end of 1935. In the Middle East, colonial struggles in Syria and
Egypt were also mentioned as a source of inspiration. However, the Palestinian problem
was the international issue which was raised most frequently in Algerian nationalist
discourse. The fight of Palestinian Arabs against Jewish expansion was described as a
cause which epitomised the fight of all Arabs against domination, and Zionism was
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depicted as an ideology whose aim was to further the imperialist project of
dispossession and oppression of Muslims in the Arab World.
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Part 2
North African nationalism during the 1970s in France:
the case of the Mouventent des travailleurs arabes
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Chapter 6
Ethnicity and nation-ness in the discourse of the MTA
6.1 Introduction
In the wake of the colonial era, North Africans in France had established a tradition of
anti-colonial political struggle. Their political discourse was structured around a
common denominator: their identity as Arabs and Muslims fighting against French
colonial oppression. The Algerian anti-colonial movement, born within the structures of
the French Communist Party in the mid-1920s was to distance itself slowly from the
direct influence of this party. The Etoile nord-africaine developed a discourse that
initially encapsulated all North Africans, but soon evolved to focus mainly on Algerian
issues, the construction of a "modern" Algerian identity and the struggle for
independence. Maghrebis in France had played a central role in Algeria's anti-colonial
struggle.
But how did the political action of Maghrebis in France develop, and how did
their discourse on and reference to identity and nation evolve in the aftermath of the
fight for independence? And what socio-economic and political factors both within
French society and abroad affected their discourse, their identity and their struggle for
rights and recognition? These questions will be assessed through the detailed analysis of
a second case study: the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes (the MTA), a movement
created by Maghrebi students in the early 1970s, and which developed during that
decade to become one of the most powerful alternative voices of Maghrebis in France.
The MTA was born and developed during the 1970s in a particularly difficult
socio-political context. Immigration was changing nature, and was no longer seen by
analysts as being temporary, but rather becoming structural (see, for example, Weil
1991, Schor 1996, Ageron 1985, Abou Sada et al. 1990, Allouane 1979, Khellil 1979,
1991 & 1994). That decade also marked the end of the often idealised and prosperous
three decades that followed the Second World War, and that Jean Fourastie later
popularised as the Trente Glorieuses (1979). With all the tensions created by the
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changing profile and economic role of immigration within the wider context of French
societal changes and international events affecting North Africa and the Middle East,
the Maghrebi community in France developed socio-political strategies which aimed at
addressing issues which were seen as affecting them both in France and in a wider
international context.
In September 1970, solidarity with Palestinians' struggle in the Middle East
acted as a catalyst for the formation of French-based committees called Comites
Palestine which were composed of North African students and workers, and whose
purpose was to explain the "Palestinian Revolution" through debates, discussions and
films. They collected money and sent medication in order to help the Palestinian Red
Cross. Maghrebi militants who took part in those Comites later compared their
involvement in the Palestinian cause with their earlier support for the Algerian
revolution (La voix des travailleurs arabes, Numero 1, janvier 1973) (3).
However, in the light of the discrimination and racism they experienced in
France, they realised that unless they extended their action to address issues closer to
the concerns of Maghrebis in France, their movement might run out of steam (Akhbar
El Haraka, 1976, Frontiere 1973) (3). Two years later, in June 1972, these committees
evolved to become one organisation: the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes (MTA). In
France, they fought for improved working and living conditions for Maghrebis, for the
sans-papiers and against deportations and racism. This movement was also concerned
with international issues related to Palestine and Lebanon, as well as to the Maghreb,
and saw support for the Palestinian revolution as a catalyst and example for immigrants'
fight for freedom. Through a detailed analysis of archival documents, this chapter will
assess how the discourse on ethnic identity and nation-ness was constructed by the
MTA in the 1970s.
6.2 Ethno-national identity and the Arab nation
During the Conseil national du Mouvement des travailleurs en lutte on 8 October 1972,
a number of militants from Paris, Grenoble, Marseilles, Aix, Lyon, Amiens, Toulouse,
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Dunkerque and Paris discussed, amongst other things, the necessity to unite all "Arabs"
within France. In reaction to the call made by the Grenoble representative to all North
African workers to organise within Arab organisations, the Dunkerque delegate
expressed his concern that in regions - and factories - like his where there were fewer
Arab workers, it was difficult to mobilise workers effectively along ethnic lines. Unity
with French and other immigrant workers within multi-ethnic coniites de lutte was
necessary in order to get results. The delegate from the fourteenth arrondissement of
Paris replied that even though solidarity of action with the French and other immigrants
was encouraged in struggles within the workplace and beyond, North Africans had to
belong to an Arab organisation:
II faut mener la lutte au sein des Comites de lutte, en fonction des besoins dans l'usine. En merne
temps, on peut appartenir A l'organisation arabe. Les travailleurs arabes ont tous A un moment
donne le besoin d'appartenir a quelque chose de central qui les unisse, A une organisation arabe.
(Proces verbal du Conseil national des travailleurs en lutte', 8 octobre 1972) (3)
The delegate from Gennevilliers supported this view and insisted on the fact that
Maghrebi workers should not make common cause with other workers in the factory
individually but as a group representing the Arab organisation.
This debate about strategy and action reflected the entire discourse of the MTA
in that it posited Arabness as a given and unchallenged marker of identity for all
Maghrebi workers in France. The Mouvement's discourse systematically referred to
North Africans in France as "les Arabes", "freres arabes", "les ouvriers arabes", "les
travailleurs arabes" or as "les masses arabes". 8I Its perception of ethnicity was, to some
extent, consistent with that of the North African nationalist movement in the inter-war
period. Indeed, as with the ENA and the PPA, North Africans' identity was defined
through a process which essentialised the varied ethnic make up of the North African
81 This terminology appeared consistently in MTA documents. The report produced on the campaign of
mobilisation after Djellali Ben Ali's death in October 1971 is a good illustration of this: "ouvriers arabes",
"travailleurs arabes" and "masses arabes" are all used on page 6 of the report to refer to North Africans in
France ('B ilan de la campagne Djellali') (7).
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population. However, whereas the Etoile did acknowledge the existence of a Berber
people, if only to describe them as Arabs, nowhere in the MTA's discourse did this
happen. This may partly be explained by two factors: firstly, unlike the Etoile and the
PPA, and even though many members of the MTA may have been Berbers (a large
proportion of Maghrebis in France are Berbers), the leading militants within the MTA
were often from Morocco and Tunisia, countries where the Berber movement has,
perhaps, not been as politically active as in Algeria. Secondly, the 1960s and 1970s
were two decades when the Arab nationalist movement was very popular, not only
amongst Maghrebi governments, but also within the population in North Africa and in
the diaspora.82
Nonetheless, ethnic identity is not simply the result of essentialisation, it is
mainly shaped and negotiated at the boundary between "us" and "them" (Wallman
1979: 3). Indeed, it was through a process of interaction, conflict and negotiation that
ethnic identity was constructed within the MTA's discourse. During the above-
mentioned Conseil national, the Gennevilliers delegate's evocation of his identity
illustrates the extent to which the militants' Arabness was informed by confrontation
with "them" when he stated that "[n]ous sommes arabes, nous faisons partie de la nation
arabe qui lutte contre les sionistes et les r6actionnaires" (Traces verbal du Conseil
national des travailleurs en lutte', 8 octobre 1972) (3). The aim of the MTA was to
create a mass movement which could confront and address the problems experienced by
North Africans:
C'est un courant de lutte pour la dignite, contre le racisme, pour le soutien a la revolution
palestinienne et au peuple arabe en lutte contre le sionisme et la reaction arabe ... pour des
conditions de vie clecentes et la defense de nos droits, contre la misere materielle et morale. A
travers ces luttes s'est form& une conscience nationale arabe (qui est aussi une conscience
ouvriêre). (MTA document, untitled, undated) (3)
82 The re-emergence of Berber identity and movements on the political scene can be traced to the 1980s
when the "Printemps Berbere" in 1980 challenged the government's repression of Kabyle culture and
language and the imposition of an Arab identity in Algeria.
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As with the Etoile and the PPA, the movement's perception of North African national
identity was very much informed by the Other, by what it was against. Maghrebi
immigrants' Arab identity was therefore shaped by their struggle for rights and dignity
and against oppression in all its forms. The movement's discourse and action were
targeted towards a number of socio-political problems affecting Maghrebi workers in
France (racism, hostile authorities and employers, housing and working conditions, the
struggle of the sans-papiers for their regularisation and against deportation) as well as
questions related to Arabs in the Maghreb, the Middle East and in other European
countries.83
Conflicts at a local, national and international level which were perceived to be
relevant to the Arab people were all conflated into one ideological locus which
informed their sense of identity and their actions. Within the discourse of the MTA,
each issue was considered to be of significance to another. For instance, racism in
France, events in North Africa and in Palestine were all discussed during strikes in
factories or in the foyers:
En tant qu'ouvriers arabes, dans l'usine, le foyer et dans la rue, nous nous unissons et nous
luttons en France contre le sionisme et tous les reactionnaires pour soutenir la lutte du peuple
palestinien et des autres peuples arabes. Les travailleurs arabes qui prennent en main ces luttes
sont conscients d'appartenir a un peuple arabe en France. us sont conscients de participer au
mouvement qui souleve tout le peuple arabe contre ses oppresseurs. (MTA document, untitled)
(3)
This extract also shows that MTA militants' ethnicity was marked by a binary process
reflecting that of the ENA/PPA, in which identity was closely linked to action. On the
83 On 25 September 1973, the main French unions (the CGT, the CFDT and the PEN) and the Arnicale
des Algeriens called for a general strike against racism which was very much inspired by the success of
the general strikes organised by the MTA on 3 September 1973 in the south of France and on 14
September 1973 in the Paris region. They also organised a meeting at the Bourse du Travail on that day
during which MTA militants were prevented from addressing the audience. In their publication, the MTA
denounced these organisations for attempting to marginalise its militants during that meeting and declared
that "les Arabes ne sont pas contre les Francais, mais contre les racistes" (La Voix des travailleurs arabes,
octobre 1973) (3).
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one hand, their sense of ethnic belonging informed their mode of political mobilisation
and action against these various forms of oppression nein tant qu'ouvriers arabes
nous nous unissons et nous luttons..."), and on the other hand it was through these
struggles that the consciousness that they belong to the Arab people was shaped.
Solidarity and mobilisation against all those issues (which were interpreted as
constituting tropes of imperialist oppression against Arab workers) were what gave
form to their sense of ethnic identity. To some extent, their discourse echoed that of the
ENAJPPA which linked its sense of ethnic identity with its struggle against imperialism
affecting not only Arabs in North Africa, but also in France (racism, economic
exploitation and police oppression), in the Middle East and in other colonies in Africa.
In the context of the 1970s, the MTA viewed the ethnic identity of Maghrebis in
France as inherently Arab, and considered that ethnicity was at the core of their sense of
nation-ness. It asserted that all Arabs belonged to the Arab nation. Unlike the Etoile
and the PPA, its sense of nation-ness was not tied to the limited borders of a specific
state. 84 During the inter-war period, the nationalist movement endeavoured to create a
nation within the narrow constraints of the colonial territory and prove that an Algerian
nation rooted in Arabness existed before French colonisation. In contrast to the
ENA/PPA, the MTA's evocation of nation transcended the boundaries of established
nation-states. It was a nation which encapsulated all Arabs in the Arab World and in the
diaspora, and events taking place in the Arab World were viewed as affecting them as
Arabs, whatever nation-state they belonged to. 85 The Palestinian struggle and the
repression of Palestinians in Jordan in September 1970 which led to the creation of the
Conine Palestine and later to the MTA, as well as the Algerian Revolution were seen as
inspiring the MTA's Arab national feelings and giving a national character to its anti-
racist action in France ('Bilan de la campagne Djellali') (7).
84 Even though the struggle of Muslims in the Arab World was often evoked in the discourse of the Etoile
and the PPA, the inter-war nationalist movement never really considered the establishment of an Arab
nation embracing all the Arab World. Its nationalist ideology was very much rooted within the colonial
borders established by imperialist powers.
85 However, it is worth noting that in the discourse of the MTA, North Africans were sometimes
described as Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians in specific contexts where their nationality was
pertinent (for instance, the deportation of Moroccans and Tunisians to their home country, or the
oppression of North African political activists by the oppressive regimes in the Maghreb).
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The Arab nation evoked here was the expression of a self-aware ethnic group, a
group aware of its uniqueness (Connor 1978: 388-389). The fact that the movement's
reference to North Africans as Arabs did not necessarily reflect their ethnic make-up is
not crucial to our understanding of the movement's discourse on nation-ness. What is
more revealing is the movement's belief in its ethnicity and the way that ethnicity was
imagined (Connor 1978: 380, Anderson 1983: 15). The MTA's realisation of the
uniqueness of Arabs as an ethnic and national group was shaped by the socio-political
context of its time, and was rooted in the diasporic experience of Maghrebi immigrant
workers.
Like nationalists in the inter-war period, most first-generation Maghrebi
immigrants did not see France as a potential repository of nation-ness. Their very
experience as immigrants, their socially marginal status had turned them into almost
"invisible" workers who were seen as instrumental in meeting the needs of French
industry and agriculture in the eyes of many French people. Furthermore, the legacy of
colonial conflicts had equipped Maghrebis with a strong sense of national pride in their
home country. Ties with France as a nation would have been all the more difficult and
problematic as they would have been perceived as a kind of betrayal in favour of 'their
host country' which they used to see as their colonial oppressor.
In its discourse which was reminiscent of that of inter-war nationalists, the MTA
put the emphasis on the temporary nature of Maghrebis' presence in France and the
return to their home country was described as their main objective. This was highlighted
in a letter written by an MTA activist in 1974:
Nous ne pouvons oublier que notre pays cc nest pas la France ... notre horizon ne doit pas
s'arreter au racisme en France, mais pousser jusqu'au retour au pays et pour mieux comprendre
notre pays ... l'ideologie occidentale essaie de nous enfermer dans un etau; pour nous separer
entierement de notre peuple. L'ideologie europeenne est une ideologie d'intoxication, elle vise a
reduire notre jeunesse au style de vie occidental, alors que notre peuple est bien loin. ('Chers
camarades') (3)
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Here, France was perceived as a space of racism, of social, economic and cultural
oppression, and French culture as an instrument of Western domination. This discourse
echoed that of the North African nationalist movement in the inter-war period. French
culture was seen as close, all pervading and oppressive. It was characterised by its
limited horizon, its ability to divide and separate Maghrebi immigrants from their home
country, to "reduce" and "intoxicate" rather than develop and enrich them culturally. In
that context, strengthening their ties with their country of origin enabled them to break
the "stranglehold" of Western/French ideology and escape cultural entrapment.
On the other hand, in spite of its evocation of an eventual return to the home
country and of the importance of keeping North African traditions alive in emigration,
and despite the fact that it consistently invoked its faithfulness to the Arab nation, the
movement acknowledged that France was also the social space within which the life and
socio-political experience of Maghrebis were being shaped (see El Yazami 1997: 119-
120). Indeed, France was not only viewed as a space of social, political and economic
alienation for immigrants, it was also seen as the framework within which the
socialisation, political action and self-definition of Arabs as an ethno-national group
were constructed and expressed. In that sense, the movement differed from the ENA
and the PPA in that it acknowledged the embedding of the social experience of
Maghrebi immigrants in a French context. This was emphasised by an MTA document
which stated the aims of its theatre company, Al Assifa:
Barbes est la capitale [a]rabe de la France, c'est aussi un ghetto et il fallait le faire &later ... Les
immigres essentiellement les Arabes sont rejetes des autres quartiers. Aussi peut on voir
Barbes la repression sexuelle et tout ce qui tourne autour: les cafés pour se saouler et la
delinquence en particulier chez les mOmes. Notre but est de montrer quil existe autre chose et
faire venir les Francais dans les quartiers[,] ceux-ci ne venant jamais a Barbes. ('Al Assifa', avril
1976) (3)
In its discourse and actions, the movement recognised the realities of North Africans'
diasporic experience and aimed to improve their socio-economic situation in France.
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Maghrebis were fighting for the right to stay, live and work in the hexa gone and argued
that they were "[des] travailleurs arabes de France [qui] aspirent a s'unir et a unir leur
lutte dans un cadre national en France" (MTA document, untitled, undated) (3).
Beyond the ideological discourse of the MTA, which presented Arabness as the
main locus of national sentiment amongst North Africans, the political actions of MTA
militants in France were often structured around solidarity between Maghrebis from the
same country and the same region. This phenomenon was not inconsistent with the
inter-war nationalists' political action. During hunger strikes by 'illegal' immigrants
which followed the adoption of the Circulaire Marcellin-Fontanet in 1972, a decree
which brought the process of regularisation of immigrants after their arrival in France to
an end, the movement's actions gained impetus through mobilisation based on shared
neighbourhood in France, and on their country and region of origin in the Maghreb. The
case of the hunger strike of rue St Maur in Belleville in 1973 illustrates this:
Le travail de popularisation des greves de la faim, l'impact ideologique des greves de la faim
sont tels que se regroupent des centaines de sans-papiers autour de la rue St Maur, qui seront la
force motrice de la lutte pendant plusieurs mois, et qui, un mois apres le debut de la greve de St
Maur, descendront dans les rues A Belleville dans une manifestation au nombre de 7000.
Comment cela s'est-il passé? Les reseaux naturels des masses ont joue: sur la base du quartier, de
la nationalite, de la region d'origine, des centaines de personnes viennent rendre visite aux
grevistes de la faim. ('Lettre a un camarade en prison') (1) (3)
Those bonds of solidarity which united Maghrebis in France in the 1970s, and which
were used by the MTA as the basis for political mobilisation, mirrored those of North
African workers in the 1920s and 1930s whose working and living patterns also tended
to be informed by their country and region of origin (MacMaster 1997: 94-102).
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6.3 Kinship and class: within and beyond ethnicity
As was seen previously, the MTA not only saw "Arabness" as a marker of Maghrebis'
ethnic identity, it also considered that it constituted the basis of their national belonging
("la nation arabe"). But the movement viewed North Africans' national consciousness as
Arabs very much from a class persepective. Its documentation highlights the extent to
which its militants' class consciousness had developed through political struggle:
A travers ces luttes s'est form& une conscience nationale arabe (qui est aussi une conscience
ouvriere), chez les travailleurs arabes de France. Le Mouvement des travailleurs arabes a servi
un tel courant de masse. De fait, il s'est lui-meme forme a travers les luttes menees par les
travailleurs arabes. Les greves des travailleurs arabes contre le racisme (septembre 1973) lancees
par le MTA, tout comme les initiatives de soutien a la Revolution [p]alestinienne et au peuple
arabe (octobre 1973) au cours de la guerre demontrent la realitell la vitalite et la force du
courant de lutte dans la communaute arabe en France. (MTA document, untitled, undated) (3)
This sense of belonging to the working class which informed national awareness was
more marked in the MTA's discourse than it had been in that of the ENA/PPA. The
latter considered that Muslims were the main victims of colonial domination, but that
did not mean that its discourse was devoid of references to class. As Muslims
constituted the vast majority of the under-class in the North African colonies (Gellner
1983), class belonging was subsumed by religious belonging in the ENA/PPA's
discourse.
For the MTA, there was a direct correlation between identity and class. But
before we can assess how that correlation was established, it is necessary to define what
we mean by working class. Jenkins defines the working class within the Marxist
interpretation of the development of class consciousness as:
a social category that was initially defined with reference to their immiseration and alienation of
the means of production, and to their threat to the established order, by others such as capitalists,
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agencies of the state, or socialist activists [which] becomes a social group, the members of which
identify with each other in their collective misfortune, thus creating the possibilitity of organized
collective action on the basis of that identification. (Jenkins 1997: 55)
The socio-economic position of Maghrebis in France reflected that of colonial workers
before them. It was anchored at the lower end of the working class hierarchy, and many
amongst them belonged to what Marx defined as the Lumpenproletariat.
Furthermore, in the 1960s and 1970s, as Pinot (1973) argues, immigration
remained the reserved domain of the state and of the police, and immigration policies
were adopted by the government through decrees. This enabled the government to avoid
parliamentary and public scrutiny in that area of policy-making, and to apply these
"circulaires" in an arbitrary way:
Si «clandestinite» ii y a eu, c'est d'abord celle de l'administration et du pouvoir qui contournaient
tout a fait officiellement les textes de lois dans les faits, sans contrOle parlementaire, par le jeu de
circulaires. Le pouvoir s'est, ce faisant, plie aux demandes des entreprises ... l'arbitraire est de
regle. Les textes ne sont pas publies ou inutilement compliques, ils sont diversement interpretes
par les fonctionnaires dun meme service, frequemment modifies, variant dun departement a
l'autre ... Les decisions de rejet arrivent souvent sans la moindre explication. (Pinot 1973: 32-33)
The experience of Maghrebi immigrants in the hands of the authorities in 1970s France
was marked by arbitrariness and was very much reminiscent of that of their colonial
forebears. The adoption of the Circulaire Fontanet-Marcellin in 1972, in particular,
aimed to further weaken immigrants' position in France and contributed to their
alienation from the rest of society. It did so by privileging the national workforce and
putting the police in charge of all the administration of immigrants, by making it
impossible for illegal migrants to regularise their situation (Labracherie 1973: 1169), by
making the renewal date of residence and work permits' coincide and by forcing foreign
workers to remain in one specific region and job with one employer for one year. A year
was not long enough to become a "delegue du personnel", but sufficient for employers
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to dismiss employees who were deemed undesirable for a number of reasons. Those
who, at the end of a contract, became unemployed or who were unable to work because
of a disability resulting from an industrial accident could see their residence and work
documents "not renewed". 86 This in turn enabled the authorities to expel immigrants
without resorting to the lengthy and complex legal process that the deportation
procedure entailed (Pinot 1973: 46-47, 57, Jordan 1972: 733). To some extent, this
decree weakened immigrants' rights in the 1970s, and their experience was not unlike
that of the coloniaux under the Code de l'Indigenat.
Within such a context marked by social, economic, political and cultural
alienation within French society, immigrants' ethnic and national identity had to be
constructed in such a way as to provide an empowering sense of belonging to a
particular group. Like inter-war nationalists in France, empowerment through the
imagining of a strong ethnic and cultural realm ('Arabness') amongst Maghrebis could
constitute a strategy allowing them to question and challenge the implacable forces of
economic and social marginalisation that they were subjected to in 1970s France.
Using Roosens' argument about ethnic identity, it could be said that in the 1970s
as well as in the inter-war period, ethnic groupness provided Maghrebis with a tool
which made it possible to challenge the social, political and economic inequalities they
experienced:
Those who identify with an ethnic category, network, or group can find psychological security in
this identification, a feeling of belonging, a certainty that one knows one's origin ... One can
commit oneself to "a cause", fulfill oneself, realize oneself to be unique, original, irreplaceable as a
member of an ethnic group and irreducible from the outside to something else ... One can feel ...
different from the others, and in this being different define and experience oneself as incomparable
or as primordially equal. (Roosens 1989:16)
86 Most immigrants who were recruited and allowed to work in France had been rigorously "selected" and
their health condition had to be excellent. Disabilities amongst migrants were often the result of poor and
dangerous working conditions in France.
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Roosens' statement illustrates the empowering processes by which ethnic identification
constituted a strategy which made it possible for socially marginalised Maghrebis to
bypass some of the stigmas and prejudice attached to their conditions as workers, as
immigrants and as North Africans. 87 Belonging to the imagined "Arab nation" could
also be interpreted as a claim for the right to difference, "uniqueness" and beyond this to
equality.
While the primordial focus of the ENA and the PPA's discourse on kinship was
on ethnicity and the modern nation rooted in religion, it appears that for the MTA,
greater emphasis was put on ethnicity as informed by class. The latter movement's
discourse on class and identity, which was marked by a will amongst Maghrebis to have
their rights recognised and be accepted as equals within France, could not be better
illustrated than by the declaration of candidature to the 1974 French presidential
elections of Djellali Kamal, a Maghrebi sans-papiers and key militant of the MTA
(Interview with Driss el Yazami, 22 January 2001). He was a hunger striker fighting
against the Circulaire Fontanet-Marcellin who had been chosen by other immigrants to
represent them (Declaration du candidat immigre aux elections presidentielles', 1974)
(3). His candidature highlights the extent to which Maghrebis militants' experience in
France was far more rooted in a French socio-political context than that of the
"coloniaux". Indeed, the ENA/PPA's political action focused more on emancipation
from France and on political representation in elected bodies in North Africa in order to
defeat colonialism.
Even though Djellali acknowledged that, contrary to other candidates, he did not
want to become president, he nonetheless wanted to show French people that "meme si
nous ne votons pas, nous existons comme tous les autres travailleurs de France" (Ibid.).
His agenda was to condemn the way immigrants were exploited by France and Europe,
treated as slaves and subjected to racism and racist attacks. Djellali argued that
immigrants' culture and identity were rejected and despised by France and that the only
87 It is worth noting that Roosens reference to identification poses a problem as it makes a parallel
between "ethnic category" and "group". Indeed, it could be argued that a distinction should be made
between a group and a category as the former, to quote Jenkins , is "a self-conscious collectivity, rooted
in processes of self-definition" while the latter is "externally defined" (1997: 54).
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right that they had was the "right to silence". His plea was very much consistent with
that of North Africans in the 1920s and 1930s who denounced their lack of political
rights and freedom of expression. He saw this election as an opportunity to speak in the
name of immigrants and express their hopes and demands: "contre cet etouffement et ce
ghetto dans lequel on nous maintient, nous nous emparons de cette occasion pour
prendre la parole et nous adresser a tous les travailleurs de France" (Ibid.).
According to Djellali, immigrants in France rejected the discourse of French
politicians and candidates who tried to introduce restrictive measures such as the much-
hated Circulaire Marcellin-Fontanet and who talked of "un probleme de l'immigration".
Indeed, they questioned the implacable political rhetoric which endeavoured to present
immigration as a problem. This echoed the ENA/PPA's criticism of the Code de
l'Indigenat and of French politicians. Similarly, Djellali's discourse was very much
addressed to the French population, and aimed to build solidarity between immigrant
and French workers, just as the inter-war nationalist discourse aimed to bypass
oppressive political structures in France to call for solidarity with the French people.
However, it was an attempt to create a new type of kinship which put more emphasis on
class.
Let us now look at the interplay between ethnicity and class. By using
Anderson's concepts of "kinship" and "sacrifice" as markers of community belonging
(1983), this analysis will suggest that Djellali's discourse illustrates the extent to which
MTA militants' identity and nation-ness as "Arabs" were anchored within a French class
context and imbued in universalist values. In so doing, it will highlight the contrast that
existed between the MTA and thc inter-war nationalist movement. Indeed the latter's
evocation of kinship through sacrifice was rooted in difference and ethnic belonging,
and it aimed to construct a national state distinct from France. In his declaration,
Djellali Kamal criticised left-wing candidates who wanted to consolidate the "unity of
the working classes" because their answer to the Right's representation of immigration
as a problem was to propose a "statute governing immigration". He argued that:
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Ce que nous voulons, ce nest pas un statut de l'immigration qui nous diviserait de la classe
ouvriere francaise, mais nous voulons beneficier des droits acquis par les annees de lutte que la
classe ouvriere de France paya de son sang. (Declaration du candidat immigre aux elections
presidentielles', 1974) (3)
Djellali clearly wanted to establish a relationship of solidarity and disinterestedness
between immigrant and French workers. That feeling of kinship was based on shared
experience and struggle ("mes freres"), and it is revealing to notice that he referred to
the broader "classe ouvriere de France" which could unite all workers of different
origins and from all national groups. The rights of workers had been won through
sacrifice, through the "don du sang", which no longer related to sacrifice for a nation, as
it did in the Etoile and the PPA's discourse, but rather to workers' rights within France.
Indeed, the divide was no longer between national groups but between classes. MTA
militants such as Djellali inscribed their own sense of sacrifice within the tradition of
the working class in France:
nous voyons les sacrifices auxquels [la circulaire Marcellin-Fontanet] contraint aujourd'hui 37
grevistes amen[es a] la greve de la faim, je suis de ces grevistes, amene par cette circulaire a dire a
mes freres: NOUS MOLTRRONS POUR VIVRE. (Ibid.)
He justified his sacrifice and that of his fellow immigrants who were on hunger strike as
a price worth paying to gain rights and recognition in France. This declaration was
characterised by its inclusivcss and was infused with a particular sense of belonging in
which sacrifice for a greater cause could be seen as a marker of class identity.
Therefore, it constrasted with the ENA/PPA's exclusive discourse which did not aim to
gain recognition within France, but rather to mark difference and distinctiveness.
According to Djellali, Maghrebi and other immigrant workers saw their culture,
history and traditions as different from the French, but they dismissed the exclusive
discourse and differentialist policies on immigration which were adopted by French
politicians on the basis of their cultural specificities. This reflected the ENA/PPA's
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discourse which emphasised North Africans' cultural specificity, but denounced the
French authorities whose discriminatory policies towards the "coloniaux" were based on
cultural, ethnic and religious difference. But the MTA went further and sought
Maghrebi and other immigrants' inclusion into French society. As Djellali's declaration
illustrates, migrants' identity was very much marked by their sense of belonging to a
particular class and they saw their experience as immigrant workers in France as tied to
that of French workers:
On ne nous reconnait que notre force de travail, avec en prime le droit de SE TAIRE, LE DROIT
AU SILENCE ... Si chaque homme a ses traditions, sa culture, son histoire, son pays a exprimer
[,] en tant que travailleur, ii ne connait pas de frontieres. Pour parler de nos problemes de
travailleurs immigres, ii n'y a que nous qui puissions le faire et nous saurons les poser dans l'unite
avec nos freres francais ceux qui nous calomnient et cherchent A briser nos luttes sont les
ennemis de la classe ouvriere. (Ibid.)
There was a will here to break the vicious circle of silence that immigrants were
subjected to, seize the discourse on immigration from the hands of French politicians
and appropriate it. It was a declaration stating that immigrants wanted to be considered
as human beings. Differences in tradition, culture and history were certainly
acknowledged, but migrants' identity was also marked by their sense of belonging to the
working class in France and beyond. In that sense, it differed from the perspective of
the inter-war nationalist movement as the latter developed an empowering and
universalist discourse on cultural identity that informed its demand for emancipation
from France.
Djellali's declaration was also universalist in its approach to rights. However,
differences were not described as national ones; they were seen as a constitutive part of
each human being and did not openly connote any allegiance to a particular nation-state.
His discourse constructed the fight of immigrants in France as a class struggle, and he
warned that "nous sommes conscients que la situation de terreur et de surexploitation
qui est la nOtre ... risque de s'etendre a l'ensemble des travailleurs de France; ceux qui
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nous calomnient et cherchent a briser nos luttes sont les ennemis de la classe ouvriêre"
(Ibid). The rhetorical process used here echoes that of the ENA/PPA which presented
the repression to which the colonised were subjected ultimately as a threat to the hard-
won rights of the French. It aimed to win the support of the French people by warning
them that any oppression against immigrants would one day also undermine the rights
of the French.
Markers of kinship and sacrifice here show that, at the time, Maghrebi militants
in France saw their own identity as somehow rooted in the French social and economic
space and marked by their belonging to the "classe ouvriere de France". This discourse
on solidarity and belonging to a particular class was structured around its inclusiveness.
Characteristic of the French universalist tradition and echoing the discourse of
the nationalist movement in the interwar period, Djellali's declaration was informed by a
dialectic interpretation of the immigrants' experience. 88 It framed the fight for
immigrants' rights within the wider context of class struggle in France and Europe, and
dismissed the way cultural and ethnic differences were (re-)constructed by French
authorities to segregate against them. Immigrants' struggle for rights and against racism
and exploitation was also seen as a fight between French revolutionary and universalist
principles on the one hand, and pre-revolutionary "feudal" oppression on the other.
Similarly, the ENA/PPA presented its own fight against colonialism as consistent with
the French revolutionary fight against feudalism. Djellali argued that the central
contribution that immigrant workers made to the wealth of France and Europe was not
recognised, and that immigrants were dehumanised. His discourse referred to the
Common Market, not as a space of opportunity, but as one of "slavery", "serfdom" and
continuing exploitation in the post-colonial era:
Les travailleurs immigres sont plus de 3 millions en France. A travers l'Europe, nous sommes un
peuple de 14 millions d'ouvriers. Nous sommes exploites de notre premiere goutte de sueur A notre
derniere goutte de sang. Nous participons a la production des richesses et sommes A la base du
88 See section 4.3 on colonialism, universalism and the state.
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developpement de feconomie des pays d'Europe: depuis des siecles les pays d'Europe pillent nos
richesses naturelles, us continuent de le faire et nous traitent comme une marchandise.
[Des] millions d'hommes sont aujourd'hui enchaines dans le marche commun de l'esclavage ... Ma
candidature nest pas une plaisanterie, ce nest pas une operation publicitaire, elle est le cri de
millions d'hommes reduits au servage en plein 20eme siècle. (ibid)
This extract, as well as the ones mentioned above, highlights the similarity between the
discourse of Maghrebi militants in the inter-war period and in the 1970s. Oppression
and exploitation by imperialism (here Capital, France and by extension Europe) are
viewed as echoing both feudal times when people were subjected to serfdom, and
colonial times with their legacy of exploitation, slavery and denial of human rights
("depuis des siecles les pays d'Europe pillent nos richesses naturelles, us continuent de
le faire et nous traitent comme une marchandise"). Here, the terminology anchors
imperialism within a framework transcending history (feudalism, colonialism and
modern European capitalism) to construct it as a continuous reactionary machine of
oppression. It is, therefore, consistent with the inter-war nationalist discourse on
imperialism. This discursive representation was not only relevant to immigrants (a large
proportion of whom came from ex-colonies of France) but also to French workers who
were the heirs of the revolutionaries who freed themselves from serfdom.
This discourse constructed exclusion in such a way that it allowed immigrants to
pose their own demands and concerns as well as those of other workers in France as
inalienable and intrinsically just. Thus, they could position their requests and struggle in
a progressive and universalist framework consistent with the values that France and
Europe had always considered their own since the Enlightenment but visibly failed to
implement as far as immigrants' rights were concerned. This reflected the inter-war
nationalist discourse which presented North Africans' anti-colonial struggle as
consistent with the values of the French people, viewed as the repository of the
revolutionary legacy.
For the ENA/PPA, this process of demarcation of the sphere of imperialism
aimed to gain the support of the French people for its fight aginst colonialism and the
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establishment of independence in North Africa. By contrast, in the 1970s, the
denunciation of imperialism enabled MTA militants such as Djellali to gain rights and
recognition within France, and to reinforce their inclusive sense of kinship and
solidarity with the "classes ouvrieres de France". The "serfdom" that they were
subjected to was based on their ethnic and national origin. This discourse showed how
the authorities' legislation insisted that immigrants should be excluded from the national
political process, thereby preventing them from having their demands and grievances
heard. By contrast to the authorities' exclusive policies, Djellali appealed to intrinsically
universalist values of equality, fairness and rights for immigrants. He endeavoured to
have their human rights recognised and their right of expression granted:
J'irai interpeller les candidats là oü les appareils d'information d'Etat sont a leur service et leur
poserai des questions. Nous couvrirons la France d'affiches, nous serons partout pour qu'on nous
entende, comme nous sommes déjà dans les mines, les usines et sur les chantiers, mais reduits au
silence. NOUS N'IRONS PAS AU BUREAU DE VOTE MATS NOUS VOTERONS A NOTRE
MANIERE. (Ibid.)
Djellali Kamal's political declaration of candidature constituted in itself a symbolic act
of citizenship. It marked immigrants' will to be fully included in the nation's social and
political life. To some extent, it was a lesson in citizenship given to the French political
establishment and showed how much immigration policies were at odds with migrants'
concerns and hopes and with France's universalist values. By contrast, the ENA/PPA's
emphasis on the compatibility of its anti-colonial agenda with the revolutionary values
of the French aimed to isolate discursively the French state and gain French support for
the establishment of a nation-state.
Numerous other examples can be found within the discourse of the MTA which
show that forces of oppression against Maghrebi and other immigrants were always
interpreted within a class perspective. To name but a few, the internal report assessing
the campaign of mobilisation of the Comite Palestine after the murder of Djellali Ben
Ali, a young Algerian killed in the Goutte d'Or district of Paris in 1971, emphasised the
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"caractere d'unite populaire" between French and immigrant workers and viewed its
action as part of the wider class struggle against repression of all workers ('Bilan de la
campagne Djellali') (7). 89
 In the October 1973 issue of La voix des travailleurs arabes
which was published after the wave of racist murders which had taken place in
Marseilles and other parts of France in the summer of that year, the MTA denounced
racism as an attempt to divide the working class and declared that "nous sommes des
ouvriers et non des esclaves ... notre lutte continue avec tous les immigres et les
travailleurs francais" (3). In a tract, the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes and the
Comite de defense de la vie et des droits des travailleurs immigres stigmatised the
government's immigration and deportation policy for forcing migrants into "un[]
nouvel[] esclavage" and argued that "[n]ous faisons partie de la classe ouvriêre en
France, sans en avoir pour autant les moindres droits" ('Halte aux expulsions des
immigres!!! Halte a la politique d'esclavage et de refoulement du gouvernement!!!') (4).
More generally, the particular dominant-dominated relationship that Maghrebi
immigrants experienced (which, in Kamal's declaration and in other MTA documents,
had a colonial resonance to it) influenced the way in which they defined their own
identity. On the one hand, it was informed by a process of inclusion whereby being part
of the 'Arab nation' was compatible with their belonging to the 'working classes of
France'. In that sense, it contrasted with the inter-war nationalist view that North
Africans' belonging to the 'Arab nation' would lead them to emancipation from the
French, and that only when North Africans were independent could equality with the
French be reached.
On the other hand, in the 1970s, Maghrebi militants' identity was shaped by
processes of exclusion and of vilification of imperialism (racism, Capital, the Common
Market, the French authorities and political class, illegitimate governments in the
Maghreb, Zionism, etc.). To some extent, this mirrored the anti-imperialist discourse of
the Etoile and the PPA. Those different markers of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, of
identification and rejection were not fixed in time or in a particular order of importance.
89 The Coniite Palestine became the MTA in June 1972.
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They were shifting components of a constantly changing "construction identitaire" in
the discourse of the movement.
How much does the discourse of the MTA tell us about Maghrebis' identity in
France in the 1970s? Part of the answer could lie in Stuart Hall's discursive definition of
identification. He states that it is a "construction never completed - always in progress"
and that "identities can function as points of identification and attachment only because
of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render 'outside', abjected". Every identity
has its 'margin', an excess, something more" (Hall 1996a: 2-5). The shifting markers of
belonging amongst Maghrebi members of the MTA that were discussed earlier reveal
the extent to which identities as points of identitification are constructed. It was through
that shifting process of identification that Maghrebi militants of the MTA were able to
negotiate their own identity at the boundary between "us" and "them". In this context,
their identity dealt with differences from within (cultural differences between them and
other workers) in an inclusive manner, through kinship and solidarity ("nos freres
travailleurs francais"), as well as sacrifice ("nous sommes exploites de la premiere
goutte de sueur a notre demiere goutte de sang", "nous voulons beneficier des droits
acquis par les annees de lutte que la classe ouvriêre classe ouvriere paya de son sang",
"[n]ous mourrons pour vivre"). More so than with the Etoile and the PPA in the inter-
war period, ethnic boundaries were thus subsumed by class solidarity in the discourse of
the MTA. It was - in an exclusive manner - also informed by the Other (imperialism),
by what it was not, what it was against.
6.4 Islam as a cultural marker and the role of the Catholic Church
What role did religion play in the construction of nation-ness amongst Maghrebi
members of the MTA in a context of constant negotiation of identity? 90 Hastings views
every ethnicity as being "shaped significantly by religion just as it is by language"
which was undoubtedly the case for the shaping of ethnic and national identity in the
90 Bruno Etienne defines religion as "un systeme de croyances et de pratiques relatives au sacre qui
produit des conduites sociales et qui unit dans une meme communaute l'ensemble des individus qui y
adherent" (1989: 68).
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Etoile nord-africaine and the PPA during the interwar period in France (Hastings 1997:
185). However, his acknowledgement that "Christianity has of its nature been a shaper
of nations, even of nationalisms; Islam has not, being on the contrary quite profoundly
anti-national" (1997: 185-187) is more problematic. It may be well founded in the
broader context of Islam and the Umma, but it is more problematic in the North African,
and more specifically Algerian, case. As was seen in Part One, the ENA and the PPA
reconstructed Islam as a unifying, modern political force underpinning Algerian ethnic
and national identity. But was it also the case with the MTA?
A thematic study of the latter would tend to draw a different picture. The first
striking element coming out of a detailed analysis of the MTA's documentation is that
Islam and religion were rarely part of its discourse. Clearly, this did not mean that
Maghrebi immigrants in France were not seen or did not consider themselves as
Muslims. On the contrary, in the context of France in the 1970s, they were often
marginalised not only on the basis of their origin, but also on religious grounds. The
often negative and sometimes derogatory images that were attributed to them in French
society (particularly in the media) was that of Muslims. 91 It was a religion which was
seen as intertwined with their ethnic identity and which, as Clement points out, was
deemed to be incompatible with Western society (1991: 89). This shows the extent to
which North Africans' marginalisation on the basis of their religion in colonial times
continued in the post-colonial era.
Even though Islam was the second religion in France, it was often portrayed as
the religion of the poor immigrant from the Maghreb, as an inherent part of the identity
of the Maghrebi underclass in France at the time, and was constructed as a marker of
difference. What better example could be given to highlight this point than the official
terminology used by the French state ("les Francais musulmans") to refer to the
Harkis?92 In the context of a secular France proud of its universalist values and whose
foundations were marked by separation of the state and religion, it would seem that
those French citizens were designated according to their religious faith or origin. It
91 See, for example, Flames (1989).
92 Harkis were Algerian Muslims who had opted for, and fought on, the French side during the Algerian
war of independence.
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would, for example, be hard to imagine some other sections of the French population
being officially labelled as "Francais catholiques", "Francais protestants" or "Francais
juifs". Beyond the official discourse of "integration des Francais musulmans", it could
be argued that this term was used to differentiate and marginalise rather than "integrate"
those populations (see Fabre 1990: 355, Fysh and Wolfreys 1997: 30, Silverman 1992:
102). This phenomenon is not inconsistent with France's earlier infringement of its
political credo when, in colonial times, a distinction had been established between
French citizens and Muslims in North Africa.
Islam did play an important role in Maghrebis' life in France in the 1970s. In
1976, there were two million Muslims in France, including 400,000 French nationals. It
was the most important religion amongst immigrants, yet was "une religion qui n'a pas
droit de cite dans ce pays" (Bissekri 1976: 19). Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties
that Muslims met, the number of places of worship in France - most of which were no
more than a room in foyers and sometimes in flats - grew from thirty three in 1970 to
274 in 1980 whilst that of islamic associations increased over that decade from seven to
192 (Kepel 1991: 229-231). 93 A Pakistani movement called the "jama'at el tabligh" (the
"Society for the Propagation of Islam"), founded in British-ruled India in 1927 played a
key role in the creation of mosques and prayer rooms in France in the late 1960s and
mainly in the 1970s (Kepel 1991:178-179). Together with some Algerians and
Mahmoud Medjahed, an Egyptian imam who had graduated from the prestigious Al-
Hazar University, they founded the "Association cultuelle islamique" in 1968 and after
a split, created the "Association musulmane Foi et Pratique" in 1972. Both were to
become highly successful, as Muslim organisations and places of worship in France
were scarce in the early 1970s:
Le mouvement ["Association musulmane Foi et Pratiquel fonde a. Paris en 1973 ... la mosquee
Abou Bakr, dans un petit immeuble vauste 	 Puis d'autres mosquees se creent, en banlieue -
Creteil, Goussainville, Mantes, Corbeil-Essonne, Creil - et dans les villes de province dont le tissu
93 A number of other studies of Islam in France have been carried out (see, for example, Andezian 1981,
Etienne 1988, 1989 & 1991, Kepel 1994, Leveau 1988, Schor 1985a, Bariki 1984).
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industriel attire une concentration de main-d'ceuvre banale immigree: Le Mans, Lyon, Marseille,
Roubaix, Sochaux, Montbeliard, Mulhouse, Rouen notamment. (Kepel, 1991: 97,191-192)
Supporters and activists in the MTA were certainly representative of the rest of the
Maghrebi population as far as religion was concerned. Indeed, similarly to the Etoile
and the PPA, the movement recognised that religious festivals were important to
Maghrebi immigrants and sometimes organised social events to celebrate them. For
instance, a tract written in 1974 called for a preparatory meeting aimed at organising a
National Conference, and also a "Nuit de l'Immigration" on the eve of the "Aid El fitr"
on 12 October of that year (MTA tract, untitled, 1974) (3). As in the discourse of inter-
war nationalists, celebrating Muslim festivals was described as a form of political
struggle against oppression and for rights. It was also seen as a way of maintaining
traditional cultural values amongst Maghrebi immigrants and their children:
Les ouvriers et les families a Barbes qui en plein[e] occupation policiere fetent 1['] Aid el Kebir,
les ouvriers de Mantes-la-Wolie qui imposent par une Assemblee Generale dans leur foyer le droit
d'apprendre c'est tous les jours que notre peuple lutte pour garder en France ses traditions et sa
culture, apprendre sa langue et son histoire a ses enfants en emigration. (MTA document, untitled,
undated) (3)
The January 1977 issue of El Assifa, an MTA publication in Marseilles, celebrated the
fact that Maghrebi immigrants on strike in a SONACOTRA foyer in December 1976 in
Aix had won the right to hold meetings, to watch films on Palestine and use some of the
foyer's cultural budget to buy some sheep to celebrate the "A'id el Kebir" on 2 December
of that year (El Assifa, Numero 12, janvier 1977) (3).
However, while the few examples given above show that religious festivals and
references to Islam were acknowledged, they nonetheless appeared very rarely in the
documentation of the Comitê Palestine and the MTA. When they did, they were only
mentioned to support a particular political point. Islam as such was almost completely
absent from their discourse and was neither viewed as a main rallying force nor as an
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end in itself. Religion, or rather the visible signs of religious celebration, were seen as
markers of cultural identity and tradition. Their symbolic value was also acknowledged
in as much as they could be (re-)interpreted and used to reinforce their justification for
socio-political struggle and demands. This differed markedly from the inter-war
nationalist discourse which posited religion at the heart of its political ideology.
However, just like for the Etoile and the PPA's militants in the 1930s, the
Mosque represented a political symbol and rallying point for the Mouvement. After the
murder of Djellali Ben Ali on 27 October 1971, the Comite Palestine, with Secours
Rouge, organised a march towards the Paris Mosque ('Halte au terrorisme anti-arabe!')
(7). 94 Similarly, when, on 14 September 1973, the MTA launched its "journ6e de
protestation contre le racisme", it asked all Arab workers in the Paris region to stop
work, and held a public meeting which gathered about 1000 workers outside the same
symbolic place: the Paris Mosque (La voix des travailleurs arabes, octobre 1973,
Frontiere, octobre 1973) (3). The ENA and the PPA had already chosen the Mosque as
a rallying point and a political symbol, but they also denounced the construction of the
Mosque by France as a further sign of colonial oppression. For the MTA, the Mosque
was simply viewed as a religious symbol.
At a more grassroots level, a pamphlet written by Maghrebi strikers supported
by the Mouvement at the Clichy plant of Cables de Lyon, and calling for solidarity and
support amongst "Arab and immigrant brothers", showed that religion could nonetheless
constitute a point of reference for political action:
Ce que nous comprenons, c'est que nous n'avons pas de valcur dans ce pays ... nous devons nous
battre pour garder notre sante. Nous sommes en chair et en os et non en fer un proverbe arabe
dit: "a celui qui perd sa sante ii ne lui reste que la folie" Aujourd'hui, nous vous lancons, frêres
arabes et immigres, un appel pour vous unir car comme dit un proverbe de l'Islam: "l'unite c'est la
force. ('Appel des travailleurs des Cables de Lyon en greve a tous nos freres arabes et immigres',
undated) (3)
94 Tract signed by the Comite Palestine, Secours Rouge 'Seine and "[dies habitants du quartier
antiracistes".
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The parallel between Arabness and Islam which is made here aims to make sense of
Maghrebis' experience as immigrants, and to justify their action. Whilst the "Arab"
proverb refers to the domain of the personal and is used to make sense of their plight
and warn them against the implications that their state of alienation and dehumanisation
("nous sommes en chair et en os pas en fer") in French society might have, the Muslim
proverb provides strategies of empowerment and ways of fighting against oppression.
For the Etoile and the PPA in the 1920s and 1930s, Islam constituted the very
core of their ethno-national identity and the basis upon which their nationalist demands
were based. How can the relative absence of religious references in the MTA's political
discourse be accounted for? It would be erronous to see it as a sign of secularisation of
forms of political expression amongst Maghrebis in 1970s' France. After all, the MTA
also fought for the introduction of prayer rooms in foyers and factories. However, the
emphasis of the movement's political discourse was not really based on a modern
reconstruction of Islam as a core political weapon, as it had been for nationalists in the
inter-war period, but on other shifting and 'flexible' markers of identity (Arab-ness, class
belonging, solidarity with Palestine, etc.) as 'points of identification' (Hall 1996a).
Religion, or rather religious belonging was certainly one of them, but by no means the
most important one. Indeed, religious celebrations were seen as one of the strategies
available to Maghrebis to maintain their traditions and culture in France. Islam was
integrated as one trope of cultural identity, but their sense of belonging to, and solidarity
with the working class of France was over-riding, as was seen in the previous section.
This may reflect a greater anchoring of Maghrebi immigrants' experience within a
French class structure in the 1970s than in the 1920s and 1930s.
The movement's response to the "differentialist" and exclusive discourse of the
French government, politicians and the media (who stigmatised immigration and
considered Islam as incompatible with French democratic values) was to develop a
universalist and open political discourse of inclusion and solidarity where religious and
cultural differences, even though they were described as important, did not constitute an
obstacle to unity between Arab, immigrant and French workers. By contrast, in the
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ENA/PPA's discourse, religion was viewed as an irreconciliable marker of difference,
and as the driving force for the establishment of an independent national state.
Let us now turn to the MTA's relationship with the Catholic Church. In the
Algerian nationalist discourse in France in the 1920s and 1930s, the Catholic Church
was consistently stigmatised for being an intrinsic part of France's project of colonial
domination, and for attempting to convert Muslims to Christianity. In contrast, in the
1970s, even though most of France's institutions were seen as prejudiced against
immigrants, the key role that the Catholic Church played with regard to the sans-
papiers meant that it was perceived differently within the MTA. Indeed, many Catholic
leaders actively supported illegal immigrants who fought against the Circulaire
Marcellin-Fontanet, and who demanded a work and resident permit. On 15 February
1972, three Tunisians and two Moroccans started a hunger strike in St-Hyppolite
Church in Paris, as did thirteen Tunisians at 154, rue St Maur, in the annex of a church
('Lettre a un camarade en prison') (1) (3). This was a form of action that the inter-war
nationalist movement had not adopted. Similar action took place at the Notre Dame de
Menilmontant Church in Paris where fifty six immigrants managed to get a work permit
after six months of struggle ('Victoire. La carte de travail pour les 56 grevistes de la
faim') (3).
By 1973, hunger strikes had spread to about twenty French towns and cities
which led to the regularisation of 50,000 immigrants. The most revealing case,
however, took place in Valence in December 1972, where nineteen Tunisians who were
threatened with expulsion under the new Circulaire Marcellin-Fontanet went on hunger
strike. Four Catholic priests in the city did not celebrate the Midnight Mass to show
their solidarity with the sans-papiers' action (Le Nouvel Observateur, 8 aoiat 1996). The
help and support of Catholic priests was fully acknowledged by members of the MTA.
This shift in North Africans' perception of the Catholic Church from the colonial to the
post-colonial era was a reflection of the major change in its approach towards Muslim
migrants. In a hand-written document, an MTA activist reported the events in Valence
in a rather lyrical way:
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La richesse de l'experience de Valence est que la greve de la faim rassemble immigres et Francais.
Les Chretiens, les cures, la jeunesse soutiendront les [T]unisiens en lutte. Dans toute la ville de
Valence, Noel sera un Noel en Deuil: [u]ne grande manifestation de jeunes et d'immigres
traversera la ville de Valence a Minuit; ce sera une marche au flambeau rythmee par le
martellement des tambours. Toutes les eglises sonneront le tocsin, et les pretres celebreront leur
messe sur le theme de la grande misere materielle et morale des immigres en France: ils refuseront
de celebrer la joie alors que des immigres sont menaces dans leur vie et leur liberte en France.
('Lettre a un camarade en prison')
La voix des travailleurs arabes (Numero 1, ler janvier 1973), the MTA's publication,
stated that two demonstrations in which immigrants and French people participated had
taken place in Valence, and described how "apres quelques semaines de lutte, et apres
cette marche silencieuse et le soutien de toute la population de Valence nos freres ont
obtenu[] leurs droits: la carte de sejour et la carte de travail" (3). While the inter-war
nationalist discourse argued that an insurmountable dichotomy existed between the
French people and a Catholic Church which sided with imperialism, the MTA
interpreted the Church's role as central to the welfare of immigrants and as embodying
the generosity of the French people.
Actions such as the hunger strike in Valence were not presented solely as a way
of securing rights for immigrants; they were seen as socio-political frameworks within
which solidarity between immigrants and the French could be developed, by appealing
to France's Christian values of compassion and tolerance. This contrasted with the view
of inter-war nationalists who viewed Christianity as a danger, a threat to the last sphere
that the coloniser had not conquered, that of the spiritual. Furthermore, their nationalist
struggle was presented as a fight between the Cross and the Crescent.
What characterised the discourse of the MTA was the representation of the
Catholic Church as close to the values of the French people, and therefore as anti-
imperialist. Echoing a theme which had also been developed by the Etoile and the PPA,
the MTA's discourse rhetorically showed the extent to which the status and treatment of
immigrants in the hands of the French authorities were at odds with France's religious
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and political values, as well as with public opinion. Here, religion was described in its
most symbolic form: immigrants' "material and moral misery" in France became the
main concern of Catholics. By contrast with what had happened during the colonial era,
the French state no longer had the support of the country's moral guardian (the Catholic
Church) to further its imperialist agenda. French legislation and policies on immigration
and the officials and politicians behind them were seen as discriminatory and exclusive
whilst immigrants, the French people and the Catholic Church were described as
sharing the same values and concern.
Those signs of solidarity were used to define the boundaries of inclusiveness and
shared values within French society Indeed, a shift in representation took place: those
who were officially marginalised became included and accepted by France's population
and by the Catholic Church, whilst the authorities which introduced alienating and
differentialist measures towards them were shown as inherently isolated and removed
from the concerns of people whom they were meant to represent. The political class
and the legal system were thus rhetorically marginalised.
To conclude, it is interesting to note that the MTA, through the relative de-
coupling of Islam from the political sphere in its discourse, only acknowledged visible
forms of Muslim religious expression in as much as they conveyed markers of tradition
and culture that could sustain social cohesion within a Maghrebi community fighting for
recognition and rights. The lack of emphasis on religious belonging in the MTA's
discourse may have facilitated the establishment of links of solidarity with the Catholic
Church. Islam was mostly described as a facet of cultural identity and ethnic belonging
which could sometimes be used as a rallying point of reference, as the antiracist
demonstrations of November 1971 and September 1973 showed, but which never
played as central a role as it did in the nationalist discourse and actions of the ENA and
the PPA.
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6.5 Culture as politics
The relationship between ethnicity and culture is as central to the understanding of the
construction of the MTA's discourse on nation-ness as it is with that of the ENA/PPA.
Jenkins argues that ethnicity is generally understood - in anthropology - as being about
cultural differentiation and as being centrally concerned with culture. It evolves within
and as a component of a particular cultural framework, and as a "social identity [it] is
collective and individual, externalized in social action and internalized in personal
identification" (1997: 12-13). In the MTA, like in the ENA/PPA, the shifting nature of
ethnic boundaries was constantly defined through transactional cultural processes.
Amongst Maghrebi supporters of the MTA, ethnic and cultural identity was often
modulated and negotiated through the shifting boundaries of inclusion ("us") and
exclusion ("them"). Both were by no means discrete spaces. Defining and constructing
the Other often informed self-definition. Hall echoes this view when he argues that:
Identities are constructed through, not outside difference. This entails the radically disturbing
recognition that this is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to
what precisely it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside, that the 'positive' meaning
of any term - and thus its 'identity - can be constructed ... Throughout their careers, identities can
function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to
leave out, to render 'outside', abjected. (1996: 4-5)
The MTA's references to cultural identity were perhaps more informed by the
experience of Maghrebi immigrants in France than had been the case in the ENA/PPA.
The movement's aim was twofold: firstly, like the inter-war nationalist movement,
culture was about maintaining North African traditions in France. Secondly, it was
about developing and negotiating cultural strategies aimed at addressing North Africans'
concerns, experience and socio-political action in the Hexa gone, rather than in North
Africa as had been the case of the ENA/PPA.
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Those objectives were not dichotomous. They reinforced each other through a
process of inclusion and exclusion. The extract of the letter written by the MTA
supporter mentioned previously showed how French racism and ideological domination
informed his argument that France was not the country of Maghrebi immigrants ('Chers
camarades') (3). It argued that "nous ne pouvons oublier que notre pays ce n'est pas la
France" and that it was only through a better understanding of their home country, and
by extension its culture, that Maghrebis could develop a viable identity within France.95
Thus, culture and national identity were defined through difference and the conviction
that North African immigrants were made to feel different in France (e.g. through
racism). Echoing the discourse of the Etoile and the PPA, the MTA argued that
Maghrebis did not see themselves as French as it was perceived that France rejected
them and their culture only to impose triumphantly on them her own Western ideology.
Therefore, developing its own cultural response to French rejection and
oppression was seen by the MTA as a viable way of constructing Maghrebis' diasporic
identity and strengthening communitarian solidarity through cultural practice. This
strategy reflected that of the Etoile and the PPA. It was an empowering and humanising
process aimed at countering their alienation and challenging the reductive economic
role in which they had been confined within French society, that of the "eternel Homo
Oeconomicus", to use Talha's phrase (1981b), and to which the MTA often referred as
slavery.% As Marie points out, the workplace was the only sphere where immigrants'
existence was acknowledged:
ce nest pas sur [le] terrain de l'urbain que le travailleur immigre trouve sa legitimite: cue est sur
le terrain de la production. La, la discrimination se fait sur le mode du corps machine, bete, pure
force de travail. (Marie 1981: 339)
95 See section Chapter six, section three.
96 The MTA frequently referred to Maghrebis experience in France as "slavery". See, for example, MTA
documents such as the lettre a un camarade en prison' (1) (3), as well as their newspaper La voix des
travail/curs arabes (3).
195
Within such a context, cultural activity was considered by the MTA as an efficient way
of countering Maghrebi immigrants' alienation and exploitation in French society.
Culture was a polysemic concept which was constructed as an inherent part of the
MTA's political struggle. Indeed, as in the ENA/PPA's discourse, the celebration of a
religious festival, immigrants' will to learn their language, and cultural activities
organised by Maghrebis in the foyers and occupied factories were all seen by the MTA
as markers of cultural expression.
El Assifa, the theatre company founded by some members of the MTA, played a
key role in the movement's cultural strategy. Its role went beyond that of artists and
theatre companies performing for the ENA and the PPA. For the latter, cultural action
and political mobilisation were essentially taking place within an intra-ethnic
framework. Even though these cultural performances were seen as important for the
nationalist movement in the inter-war period (political meetings and rallies often
featured plays and music to reinforce the political message of the organisation), it put
more emphasis on the discursive evocation of a high culture within the context of a
higher Arabo-Islamic civilisation rooted in history and in the sacred than in the
importance of cultural practice.
By contrast, El Assifa described itself as "un collectif compose de travailleurs
immigres et de travailleurs francais, participant directement aux mouvements et luttes
des travailleurs immigres en France" which expressed itself through theatre, cinema,
songs, dance, street events, and so on. Its objectives were quite different from those
developed by inter-war nationalists. Firstly, it aimed to "desacraliser la culture" and
make it accessible to all (Collectif Al Assifa'). 97 Secondly, its purpose was to fight what
it saw as "le racisme culturel" ('Quest-ce que Assifa?') (3). Thirdly, it endeavoured to
ensure that immigrants' experience and struggles were better known in France, as well
as develop and foster cultural expression amongst migrants in order to fight against
racism, exploitation and oppression. El Assifa argued that "[c]ontre la situation
d'accultures qui nous est imposee, contre le racisme culturel, nous cherchons a faire
97 El Assifa started to perform in August 1973 during the strike action at the Lip factory, after a meeting
between immigrant and French workers. Their first paly was entitled "ca travaille, ca travaille et ca ferme
sa gueule" ('Collectif Al Assifa' and 'Quest-ce que Assifa?') (3).
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reconnaitre notre culture d'origine dans le respect des differences" ('Qu'est-ce que
Assifa?') (3).
Therefore, within the MTA, culture was perhaps more open and rooted in
practice and action than it had been in the ENA/PPA. It was not only about cultural
preservation but also about opening a front of solidarity with the French. Occupied
factories and foyers, demonstrations, parties, celebrations and theatre performances
were considered as privileged frameworks for cultural manifestation. El Assifa ("the
Storm") also produced "Radio Assifa", a monthly series of programmes on tape (made
by the El Assifa theatre company, music groups, as well as other MTA militants) about
the life and struggles of immigrants which had similar social and political aims as the
theatre company:
«La Tempete» - symbole de la volonte de l'immigration arabe de prendre la parole; de combattre,
au-dela des problemes de chaque jour et du racisme, Fecrasement culturel auquel elle est soumise
Cela fait des annees que !es immigres arabes demontrent [gulls] ne sont pas seulement des
ouvriers de chantier qui travaillent, travaillent, travaillent; «ils savent aussi ouvrir leur gueule»...
pour imposer leurs droits, l'existence de leur culture ... «Radio Assifa» rendra compte de la vie
et des luttes qui ecrivent peu a peu l'histoire de l'immigration arabe en France; elle se fera l'echo
de toutes les tentatives qui jettent les bases dune nouvelle culture. ('Ici Radio Assifa') (3)
How can this relationship between culture and politics be interpreted? It could be
argued that they were mutually shaped within the MTA by a binary process: that of
politicisation of culture and culturalisation of politics. On the one hand, and to a far
greater extent than the nationalist movement in the inter-war period, the MTA
endeavoured to construct and use culture and cultural practice as political tools, a
strategy which could be defined as politicisation of culture.
The editorial of the MTA's publication Akhbar El Haraka (1 May 1976) (3)
evoked the problem that the movement was faced with when defining the strategic role
that the MTA's theatre company, El Assifa, could play as part of the cultural life and
political struggle of Maghrebi immigrants in France. The author wondered whether
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"l'animation culturelle se reduit ... a des representations theatrales? L'animation
culturelle peut-elle transformer la vie culturelle d'un quartier ou d'une usine et
contribuer a sa lutte de maniere reelle et durable?". This question was answered in the
same editorial as it recalled how, since 1975, strikes in the Sonacotra foyer of St Denis
and the refusal of residents of the Nanterre foyer to pay their rent had led to a spread of
the strike action to many other foyers throughout the country in 1975 and 1976, and
how the immigrants involved in those actions had developed their own political and
cultural life (Ibid.). In an interview given in April 1976, El Assifa stated that it put on
performances in a number of foyers SONACOTRA such as Romain Rolland, Pierrefitte,
St Denis where strikes were taking place and that in each foyer, they also organised
political and cultural debates (El Assifa') (3).
The MTA differed from the ENA/PPA in that it questioned and assessed far
more explicitly and extensively the role that cultural practice could play within its wider
political aims. Both the political and the cultural were seen as inseparable. The
fundamental relationship between the two and their complementarity were spelt out
even more clearly when the editorial referred to the action of El Assifa in St-Bruno and
that of the MTA in Barbes
L'intervention culturelle de Assifa a St Bruno, l'intervention militante du MTA a Barbes
(Palestine-Maroc-campagne Sonacotra) et surtout la jonction de ces deux mouvements filrent des
p8les de resistance a l'encerclement du mouvement comme a la liquidation interne (quoique cet
acquis reste encore tres fragile). (Aklibar El Haraka, 1 May 1976) (3)
The movement's theatre company also emphasised the political importance of its action
when it declared that apart from the shows that it organised in Barbes, members of the
company also focused on their work as militants of the MTA:
Theoriquement, on est cense faire un travail militant a Barbes, ceci faisant partie du travail du
MTA dans son ensemble. Animer le quartier c'est etre present: connaitre les gens, les problemes
du quartier ... Et aussi theoriquement les membres de la troupe doivent faire partie dun noyau
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militant ... sachant Barbes occupe par la police, le fait de jouer dans la rue avec les instruments
de musique attire la sympathie de la population ce qui empeche une intervention repressive,
montre l'aspect autoritaire de la police et en meme temps sape son autorite. Notre but est que
l'animation creee avec la participation effective des gens continue apres notre depart de Barbes
notre activite culturelle ne s'arretant pas seulement au theatre. ('El Assifa') (3)
As these extracts illustrate, culture was posited as an inherent part of the movement's
political and antiracist struggle, and as an effective way of mobilising and maintaining
cohesion amongst Maghrebi migrants, reinforcing solidarity between immigrants and
the French, and countering oppression in all its forms. Therefore, the role of cultural
practice in the MTA's political project was far more important than in the ENA/PPA.
For the latter, plays and musical events involved North Africans. They focused mainly
on their experience in the colonies rather than in France, and only aimed to fulfill the
first of the above-mentioned objectives of the MTA (socio-cultural cohesion and
political mobilisation).
In the 1970s, the Mouvement's ambitious multi-ethnic framework for cultural
action was emphasised by El Assifa, which defined itself as more than a theatre
company:
Assifa n'a jamais ete une "troupe de theatre", mais un collectif d'action culturelle compose de
[F]rancais et d'immigres et dont la vocation demeure de favoriser un courant d'expression et
d'action aupres des immigres et [F]rancais, contre l'esclavage, contre le racisme. ('Collectif Al
Assifa') (3)
For the MTA, the cultural action of El Assifa was important. It enabled the movement to
develop a cultural strategy which countered the cultural marginalisation of Maghrebis,
and to fight racism and imperialist oppression by involving French people.
Within the movement, the politicisation of culture was also accompanied by a
process of culturalisation of politics. The MTA embodied the idea that the political
rights of a particular ethnic group in France were better served by an organisation
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representing and gathering immigrants who shared a common 'ethnicity' and 'culture'. It
viewed Maghrebis as the main victims of racism and social, political and economic
marginalisation in France. In a context in which they saw 'Arabs' as being stigmatised in
France and abroad, it elaborated Arabness and Arab culture as an empowering tool
capable of unifying Maghrebis around common values and projects in order to counter
alienation and victimisation.
This process of establishing Maghrebi identity and culture as the foundation of
MTA militants' political identity, in other words of structuring the latter along ethnic
lines (culturalisation of politics) had several roots. On the one hand, Arab nationalism
was certainly an ideology shared by a number of post-colonial Maghrebis on both sides
of the Mediterranean and by Arabs in the Middle East. And on the other hand, the
underlying or open racism towards Maghrebis which was noticeable in both mainstream
and extreme political discourses in France also informed, to a large extent, the
movement's ideology and discourse. Indeed, it considered that the best way of
countering the politicisation of Maghrebi culture (described as 'too different',
'inassimilable', 'intertwined with religion' and inherently incapable of accommodating
'Western democratic values') by French politicians and the media was to (re-)define and
sustain their culture as a means of resistance against stigmatisation. This was a process
which, in turn, also strengthened the movement's political struggle (politicisation of
culture).
Therefore, culture as practice played a far more central role in the action and
discourse of the MTA than it did in that of the EtoileIPPA. By contrast with the
nationalist movement in the inter-war period, culture, for the MTA, was no longer
rooted in history and in evocations of the greatness of Arab culture and civilisation, but
rather, closely linked with the immediacy of political struggle on the ground. In the
dehumanising context of immigration in France, it allowed Maghrebis to convey and
maintain their cultural heritage in 'exile' and 'humanise' their experience. It was a
quintessentially empowering political process.
However, this analysis of culture within the discourse of the MTA would be
incomplete if it focused only on the tension between politics and culture. The interplay
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between ethnicity, culture, nation and nationalism needs to be examined. Bauer defines
the nation as a cultural community whose "national character is determined by the
common cultural values transmitted from earlier generations" (1996: 43), and Gutierrez
(1997: 163) argues that "culture ... as the medium of communication and cohesion of
peoples of industrial nations ... claims ethnicity". But can those cultural values
underpinning ethnicity and the nation be taken at face value? It could be said that
Gutierrez inaccurately asserts that "the nation's display of prestigious ethnic past which
recollects solid experience and tradition, not artifice, invention or fabrication, is the
source that provides authenticity and a collective desire for renovation and posterity"
(Ibid). Indeed, he does not acknowledge the extent to which "dead languages can be
revived, traditions invented, quite pristine purities restored" (Gellner 1983: 56).
Most nations are founded on a number of precepts, ethnic and cultural values
which were invented, re-constructed or modified, as Hobsbawm has shown (1984).
Therefore, as Gellner puts it, "nationalism is not what it seems, and above all what it
seems to itself. The cultures it claims to defend and revive are often its own inventions,
or are modified out of all recognition" (1983: 56). But for what purpose? As was seen in
the above analysis of the MTA's discourse, cultural practice on the one hand, and
political activism on the other, were seen and used as synergic forces to enhance the
social and political projects of Maghrebis in that movement. Indeed, as an internal
document of the MTA highlighted, "le travail d'explication s'accompagne d'un
epanouissement culturel" ('Introduction: Bilan sur la lutte pour la carte de travail, sur la
base de Menilmontant par rapport a St Maur (le passé), pour en tirer des enseignements
et des regles de travail', 1973) (3).
Not only was culture seen as the natural repository of political legitimacy
(Gellner 1983: 55) but political action, in turn, sustained, developed and legitimised
Maghrebi/"Arab" culture, or a certain vision of it promoted by the movement. It was
therefore a binary process of legitimation, giving Maghrebis the autonom) of action that
was required by the nature of the movement's socio-political action. It NN as an
empowering tension aimed at turning isolation and marginalisation into autonomy of
thought and action.
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Even though culture played a different role in the colonial and post-colonial
movements, this binary process of legitimation within the MTA also characterised the
discourse of the Etoile and the PPA. But a major difference was that for the latter,
culture was also constructed in exclusive terms (as inherently irreconciliable with, and
superior to, French culture), and structured on modalities similar to those used by the
French to refer to their own culture and civilisation at the apogee of their colonial
power. The aim of nationalists at the time was to build a national culture strong enough
to underpin the modern nation-state that they wanted to establish. By contrast, the MTA
posited culture along inclusive lines in order to build a multi-ethnic front of solidarity.
Cultural expression, which was rooted in practice, aimed to present Maghrebi/"Arab"
and French cultures as different, yet compatible with each other.
To conclude, it could be said that the cultural dimension of Maghrebi immigrant
workers' identity in France was central to the MTA's political struggle. In the inter-war
period, the ENA/PPA's discourse emphasised the fact that culture was a marker of
ethno-national difference and never really acknowledged the specificity of North
African migrant workers' cultural experience in France. On the other hand, the Arab
nationalist stance developed by the MTA placed culture in its diasporic context, as
rooted both in emigration (the "Arab" culture and traditions that immigrants had brought
with them), and immigration (a shared experience anchored in France and underpinned
by class kinship). The MTA saw Maghrebis as Arab workers of France who shared
common values with French workers, but who were distinct as far as culture and
traditions were concerned.
Furthermore, culture itself was defined within a politically strategic framework
and was rarely sustained by markers of religion. However, by contrast with the Etoile
and the Parti du peuple algerien, religion was limited, to a large extent, to visible signs
of cultural belonging. 98 Culture was perceived amongst immigrant political activists of
the Mouvement as an empowering means of challenging racism, exploitation and
marginalisation, of mobilising and establishing solidarity with the French population.
98 This trend also marked the relationship of many so-called "Second Generation" Maghrebis with
religion in the 1980s (see, for example, Bariki 1984: 427-445).
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Moreover, it could be argued that the movement's discourse on culture and traditions,
which aimed to reinforce socio-cultural cohesion amongst Maghrebi immigrants,
implicitly evoked a connection and some continuity with the past, with history. But how
was this link constructed in the movement's discourse?
6.6 Memory and history: anti-colonialism and the Algerian War
The study of the MTA's discourse carried out in the previous sections highlights the
salience of cultural practice in the socio-political action of the movement. However, it
should not hide the fact that many tropes of Maghrebis' identity, including their
perception of tradition, were "embedded", reconstructed and redefined within a
historical framework through a process of memory. In the inter-war period, this had
enabled the ENA/PPA to give a sense of timelessness to a culture and traditions that it
had re-constructed to form the basis of a national culture indispensible to a modern
nation-state. In the 1970s, Maghrebis' traditions and culture were posited as
transcending nation-states, and as markers of Arabness.
This process of celebrating certain traditions, as well as cultural and religious
practices aimed to give them a character of continuity and, as a corollary, legitimised
the MTA's own political role, discourse and action, as it had done with the Dade and
the PPA during the inter-war period.
This political perception of culture, however, contained a number of dilemmas
and ambiguities. Indeed, the sense of timelessness attached to one's culture and
traditions, and the identification to cultural values and characteristics seen as
quintessentially different from the Other's, both conjure up the idea that culture is a
'vehicle' of identity par excellence. This discourse also implies that culture is ancient,
unchanged and unaffected by processes of cultural and socio-political interaction, in
other words that it conveys a form of stable truth and "purity", as well as constitute a
rigid framework of reference. How can this tension be accounted for? In the light of our
interpretation of cultural and ethnic identity being transactional and shifting, this
historical view of Maghrebi culture and traditions deserves to be assessed, if not
203
challenged. The very process of nation-building among North African countries both in
the colonial and post-colonial eras underlines the evolutionary, circumstantial,
negotiated and imagined (Anderson 1983) nature of ethnic and cultural identity.99
However, this perception of culture may also have something to do with another
historically defined dimension of ethnic identity which, as Jenkins notes in a study of
Barth's work, is to some extent stable:
While Barth's more recent discussions of ethnic diversity and pluralism (1984, 1989) still focuses
on interaction and negotiability, something else emerges: ongoing 'streams of tradition' or
'universes of discourse' in which individual actors differentially participate, and which - despite the
use of imagery which suggests movement and practice - possess a degree of stability over time.
History combines with the give-and-take of the moment in the social construction of ethnic
boundaries and identities. (Jenkins 1997: 142)
This analysis opens up a space where both sources of ethnic identity formation and
boundaries not only coexist, but also interact and complement each other (i.e. the
transactional present and the somewhat 'stable' past). But even this interpretation does
not provide all the answers to the problem posed. Indeed, the argument put forward here
would probably prove salient in a number of studies of ethnicity and nationalism, but it
does not address issues pertaining to cultural and ethnic hybridity, particularly in the
post-colonial era.
For Papastergiadis, "the clash of cultures that colonialism invariably provoked,
rather than producing a neat bifurcation between coloniser and colonised, encouraged
the formation of new cultural hybrids" (1997: 264). This statement is even more
relevant within the context of post-colonial Maghrebi immigration in France whose
identity was shaped through transactional cultural processes within a dominant cultural
framework (see Sayad 1984: 387). To understand better the question of hybridity, one
needs to assess the extent to which it relates to the tension informing the boundaries of
ethnic identity and nation-ness. Papastergiadis states convincingly that:
99 See the study of nation-ness in the discourse of the Etoile and the PPA, chapter two, section four.
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Hybridity evokes narratives of origin and encounter. Whenever the process of identity formation is
premissed on an exclusive boundary between 'us' and 'them', the hybrid, born out of the
trangression of this boundary, figures as a form of danger, loss and degeneration. If, however, the
boundary is marked positively - to sollicit exchange and inclusion - then the hybrid may yield
strength and vitality. Hence the conventional value of the hybrid is always positioned in relation to
the value of purity, along axes of inclusion and exclusion. In some cases, the 'curse' of hybridity is
seen as a mixed blessing. (Papastergiadis 1997: 259)
It seems clear from this quote that there is a direct correlation between the way in which
the boundary of identity is constructed and perceived and the very nature of the hybrid.
The positive and transactional shaping of the former will contribute to the creation of a
positive hybrid identity. It could be argued that both post-colonial societies in North
Africa and Maghrebi immigrant workers in France developed hybrid identities which
were somewhat problematic. The socio-political and cultural specificities of North
African countries informed, to a large extent, the identity of migrants arriving in France
and, therefore, should be assessed in their own right.
In the colonial era, the Algerian nationalist movement was characterised by its
hybrid nature. The Etoile grew in France in the mid-1920s before developing in Algeria,
which was itself a country whose people had been very much marked by French
colonial domination and cultural influences. It could be argued that Algeria herself was
a nation whose nature was hybrid. French culture had left a legacy that the new
government could not ignore. Algerians were also traditionally rooted by their Arab and
Berber cultures.loo
Before 1962, the questions of identity and language had been closely linked to
each other and had been clearly problematic for the French colonial authorities. Indeed,
the French coloniser viewed hybridity as a dangerous "transgression" of the boundary of
identity, a threat to the stability of colonial rule and made every possible attempt to
100 To a lesser extent, the presence of a Jewish community in North Africa left lasting cultural influences
which the Algerian nationalist movement did not recognise as part of a national culture marked by what
Gallissot refers to as "Falgerianite" (1984: 49).
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impose French - a marker of colonial cultural domination - as the official language of
Algeria. Classical Arabic, the only written language in pre-colonial North Africa, was
seen as the only serious challenger to French and was declared a foreign language in
1938. Vernacular languages (colloquial Arabic and Berber) were denigrated as inferior
languages (Benrabah 1995, Granguillaume 1990 &1997).101
In the wake of Algerian independence, the opportunity to recognise the full
cultural and linguistic diversity and the inclusive hybrid nature of the new nation-state
was there. Intellectuals such as Kateb Yacine suggested that French should be used as a
"butin de guerre" (Provost 1996: 44) and both vernacular dimensions of identity
("arabite" and "amazighite") could have been recognised as inherently part of Algeria's
persona.
However, the Algerian authorities rejected all the opportunities that such a
choice would have offered and opted to (re-)create or, many authors would argue,
reinvent (a term whose pleonastic nature reflects the ambiguities of the Algerian
regime's cultural project) a single and exclusive Arab identity closely tied to liturgic
Arabic and Islam, an identity which did not reflect that of many Algerians, but which
would legitimise their grip on power, as the FLN government hoped.
In so doing, they indirectly espoused and carried on with the destructive cultural
and linguistic policies of the French by denying any space for Algerian ethno-cultural
specificity. They merely replaced French with another language that most Algerians
could not understand (Benrabah 1999). Colloquial languages were again denigrated and
Francophones and intellectuals were seen as a "fifth column" by the ruling party. 102 As
Provost argues, "toute l'histoire de l'Algárie depuis son independance a ête marquee par
cette proclamation anti-francaise du regime algerien, comme si celui-ci ne pouvait
exister hors de cette geste de liberation contre l'ex-puissance coloniale" (Provost 1996:
26). This exclusive cultural policy, which saw any form of hybridisation as a "danger"
and a "loss", greatly contributed to the destructuring and alienation of Algerian society
101 Further studies of the role of language in the Maghreb include Santucci (1984) and Schliesendinger
(1973).
102 It is interesting to note that even though the ruling classes aimed to "arabise" the country through
education, French continued to play an important role amongst the Algerian middle class (see Santucci
1984) and politicians in the ruling party often sent their own children to bi-lingual schools.
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and is one of the underlying factors behind the civil war which simmered throughout the
1980s and started with the cancellation of the legislative elections in 1992 (see Stone
1997: 58-80).
The shaping of a cultural identity and memory in the Maghreb is relevant to this
analysis as "first generation" Maghrebi migrants had been influenced by the cultural and
historical environment of their home-country. However, beyond this "cultural bagage"
that they carried with them, it could be argued that immigration in France created a
favourable terrain for the emergence of a hybrid cultural identity which appears to be
even more complex. The diasporic nature of the experience of post-colonial workers
living within the dominant cultural framework of France (the ex-colonial power) created
a whole new set of variables, each intervening to some extent in the interplay of identity
formation. But how can those "layers" of identity be defined and how did they interact?
In his case-study on multi-ethnic alliances, Baumann (1997: 209) pertinently
stresses the distinction that exists between two complementary discourses amongst
ethnic minorities: the "dominant discourse", where differences of culture are seen as
consistent with differences of ethnic identity, and the "demotic discourse" which is an
alternative discourse opening up possibilities of alliances between ethnic groups:
Where the dominant discourse views 'culture' as the reified possession of 'ethnic' groups or
'communities', the demotic discourse questions and dissolves this equation between 'culture',
ethnos, and 'community'. On the basis of this dual discursive competence, 'culture' and
'community' are rendered into terms of active negotiation and debate, the social processes that
underlie the forging of multi-ethnic 'communities of action' out of reified 'communities and
'cultures'. (Baumann 1997: 209-210)
This description reflects the ideologial tension which existed within the MTA's
discourse even more so than in that of the ENA/PPA. The negotiation of identity is
characterised by its shifting nature and informed by a binary process. On the one hand,
references to cultural, ethnic and religious differences are sometimes put to the fore in
an exclusive and affirmative strategy of empowerment and socio-political counteraction
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(dominant discourse). On the other hand, calls for multi-ethnic support and solidarity
become prominent, and differences are either played down or acknowledged selectively
when they are seen as a unifying factor with multi-ethnic forces in order to create or
participate in 'communities of action' (demotic discourse).
Even though these two forms of discourse on the past could also be noted in the
documents of the EtoileIPP A, they were rooted in frameworks which were different
from those of the MTA. For the former movement, the dominant discourse on the past
referred mainly to what it saw as a great Arabo-Islamic civilisation, and the demotic
discourse to French revolution and its legacy. The dominant discourse on the past
informed the movement's nationalist agenda of building intra-ethnic solidarity and
mobilisation in an exclusive manner, whilst its demotic discourse shaped its demands
for equality, highlighted the legitimacy of North Africans to self-determination, and
characterised its evocation of a multi-ethnic independent Algeria.
The interplay between dominant and demotic discourses was structured
differently within the MTA, and it transcended the constraints that the EtoileIPP A's
struggle for a national state had imposed on its discourse. It was very much rooted in the
movement's action for rights and against racism within France. The dominant part of the
MTA's discourse related to more recent history, that of colonial oppression and post-
colonial racism, in order to construct and sustain markers of identity, and justify
strategic political choices and actions. The events related to the Diab case clearly
illustrated this. On 29 November 1972, Mohamed Diab, a mentally ill Algerian
immigrant was killed at Versailles police station. Le Monde (1 decembre 1972) reported
the tragic incident as being the result of Diab's violent attack, injuring several
policemen. The article, which reflected the conclusions reached by the police enquiry,
stated that after he was arrested for indecent behaviour in a hospital where he was a
patient, he was taken to the Versailles police station where he hit several policemen
with a chair and tried to escape:
Toujours arme de sa chaise, M. Diab aurait alors tente de gagner la sortie du commissariat.
Trouvant sur son passage le sous-brigadier Robert Marquet
	
le menaca a son tour. M. Marquet
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declare avoir alors ouvert le placard dans lequel se trouvaient les armes et s'est empare dun fusil
mitrailleur. M. Diab se serait alors jete sur lui, et au cours de la lutte, une rafale serait partie,
atteignant l'ouvrier au thorax et le tuant sur le coup. ( Le Monde, 1 decembre 1972)
The judge in charge of the case heard the testimonies of key-witnesses such as Diab's
wife and his neighbour, both present at the station at the time of his death. Their version
of the incident drew a completely different picture of the circumstances of his death
from the one produced in the police report. Indeed, their account suggested that, far
from being "armed with a chair", he had been killed by the policeman whilst he was
standing unarmed (Le Monde, 7 decembre 1972). 103 The case, however, looked bound
to be closed and the policeman involved would avoid prosecution.
However, the reaction of the MTA was immediate and played a central role in
the fight for justice for the Diab family. The movement's support for the victims of
racism was more pro-active than that of the ENA/PPA in the inter-war period whose
role was often limited to denouncing these racist acts in its documentation. 1 °4 The
MTA's action was two-pronged: it was based on solidarity between "Arabs" on the one
hand (dominant discourse), and on a strategy of multi-ethnic alliance and mobilisation
on the other (demotic discourse).105
The case was presented by the MTA within a clear historical context. The fact
that the murder had taken place in a commissariat was symbolically important for the
movement which described it as "[un] assassinat de sang[-]froid a la mitraillette, sous le
drapeau francais, par un policier" ('Lettre a un camarade en prison') (1) (3). The
policeman was seen as a representative of the state and the location of the incident came
metaphorically to embody France and her flag. This description of the killing illustrates
the fact that the MTA's assessment of the case was within a historical and dialectical
103 The use of the expression "arme dune chaise" in this Le Monde article is far from innocent. It
somehow reinforces the threatening nature of Diab's behaviour and prepares the reader to the reaction of
the policeman, which is discursively condoned as an act of "legitime defense".
104 See section 4.2.
105 December 1972 marked the creation of the Comite de defense de la vie et des droits des travailleurs
inunigres (CDDVTI) which the MTA saw as "the start of a mass organisation in which unity between the
French and immigrants would be achieved". This Comite played a key role in the Diab campaign ('Lettre
a un camarade en prison') (1) (3).
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interpretative framework where Maghrebi immigrants were the victims of oppression
from the French state: "La reponse est rapide et vive. C'est la reponse du cceur. Les
ouvriers comprennent tout de suite la verite sur ce crime car us en ont l'experience
historique et sociale" (Ibid). This very much echoed the ENA/PPA's interpretation of
racist violence as involving the French state and as a characteristic of the relationship
between the coloniser and the colonised. The Diab case was put into a historical
framework of oppression of North Africans consistent with that of the inter-war
nationalists. Diab's murder became a further demonstration of racism and violence on
the part of the French state against Maghrebis.
The movement developed a binary discourse on this case. On the one hand, this
discourse was of a dominant nature. It drew upon North African immigrants' experience
of French colonial and post-colonial repression in order to mobilise them on this issue
in the "foyers", in local markets, as well as in the workplace (in large factories such as
Renault and Chausson). This reflected the inter-war nationalist discourse which drew
upon the memory of colonial oppression to mobilise Maghrebis on specific issues. On
the other hand, the MTA's dialectical interpretation of the case was set within a class
perspective which presented the murder as affecting all workers and as a further
illustration of oppression against workers (demotic discourse). This account highlights
the attempts made by the MTA to build solidarity and consensus against racism and
oppression on the basis of class. This is an illustration of MTA militants' self-definition
as workers caught in a class struggle and marks one of the aspects of their demotic
discourse. This contrasted with the ENA/PPA's demotic discourse, which attempted to
establish solidarity with the French not on the basis of class, but rather on the basis of
shared universalist values inherited from the French Revolution.
The dominant nature of the MTA's discourse was undeniably strong and was
closely tied to history and memory. History gave them an interpretative framework of
reference on issues affecting Maghrebis in France, and inversely, current events
reinforced the pedagogical nature of those historical events. In that sense, this process
which characterised the MTA's use of history evoked that of the ENA/PPA. Indeed, far
from being only a one way process where the MTA extracted elements of history to
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apply to its current discourse and action, past and present mutually informed each other
and shaped the movement's interpretation of past and present events and trends.
Memory encapsulated past struggles and experience and its content could be recalled
and unleashed by the present, as the MTA's incantatory discourse and reaction to the
death of Mohamed Diab showed:
La reponse exigee par les arabes [sic] doit etre a la hauteur du cri de desespoir et de haine qui
s'echappe de leur poitrine: l'assassinat par la police a touché les arabes, il a touché la memoire et
fait remonter les souvenirs: toute la rancceur du passe, la rancceur accumulee fait surface. Ce crime
a chogue ... et tout cela va chercher tres loin dans les trefonds de la memoire collective, donc par
definition, toute reponse doit chercher tres haut. La reponse sera de taille, de la taille du crime, ou
ne sera pas. Telle est la reflexion des arabes. (Ibid.)
In this passage, a direct dialectical correlation is made between the present (the incident)
and the past ("l'assassinat ... a touché la mernoire"). It is a tension in which memory
informs action ("donc par definition, toute reponse doit chercher três haut"). The use of
this particular kind of discourse is revealing of the way in which those concepts and
spheres of interpretation interact at different levels, both literally and figuratively.
Feelings of "rancceur", buried in the depth of memory, are evoked. They "resurface"
from the distant past to inform their current experience and interpretation. There is a
metaphorical use of language where the past belongs to, and shifts upward from, the
lower sphere of memory of suffering ("les trefonds", "remonter", etc.) and the future of
their reaction is seen as belonging to the higher sphere of action ("reponse [...] a la
hauteur du cri de desespoir ... La reponse sera de taille"). This form of metaphorical
representation of the relationship between past and present did not appear in the
discourse of the inter-war nationalist movement in the colonial era. This could be
explained by the fact that, for the ENA/PPA, evocations of colonial oppression were
still rooted in the present or the recent past.
Let us now examine the interaction beween dominant and demotic discourses on
memory and suffering, and the way in which these discourses informed present action.
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The temptation was high amongst Maghrebi militants of the MTA to let the dominant
discourse on memory lead to the adoption of a dominant strategy. In that case, the
reaction to the racist murders would be initiated and carried out along ethnic lines. After
all, Maghrebis were well aware that they were the main focus of prejudice and that
many racist attacks targeted them as "Arabs". This reflected the ENA/PPA's awareness
that racism and discrimination affected Muslims on both sides of the Mediterranean.
MTA militants' sense of being the victims of persecution, racism and exploitation was
directly correlated to the recent past of colonial oppression and struggle in North Africa.
Indeed, the "ghosts" of the past, and more specifically of the Algerian war, were
omnipresent in the way they structured their action and discourse. In La voix des
travailleurs arabes (1 janvier 1973), the MTA publication, Fatna Diab made a direct
link between her brother's death and the killing of Algerian pro-independence protesters
by the French police on 17 October 1961 when she declared:
Jai vu mon frere mourir assassine par la police fasciste. Des dizaines d'autres arabes ont ete
assassines. On les jette dans la Seine et on entend dire les racistes que les arabes s'entretuent. En
realite tous ces freres sont victimes des racistes. Si nous, les arabes, on ne fait rien, comment
voulez-vous que les francais se rendent compte de quelque chose? Si on s'unit, alors les francais
viendront avec nous, parce que ce qu'on demande, c'est la justice. On veut que chaque fois la
Write se fasse. Les racistes mentent, et nous, nous luttons pour la Write. (La voix des
travadleurs arabes, 1 janvier 1973) (3)
This dominant discourse was mainly addressed to North African immigrants and was, as
in the case of the ENA/PPA, rooted and interpreted within a colonial context. However,
while the inter-war nationalist movement focused mostly on historical figures (such as
Abd-el-Kader) and events (such as racist crimes committed by colonists) which had
happened in North Africa, the MTA referred to examples of colonial oppression and to
figures who had fought colonialism on both sides of the Mediterranean. Several
examples of this connection between past and present in the MTA's documentation
illustrate this. An internal document shows that the movement sent one of its activists,
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who had just taken part in the demonstration organised after Mohamed Diab's death, to
Valence where Maghrebi sans-papiers were on hunger strike, in order to explain, as a
representative of the Paris Committee, the similar fight of hunger-striker Said Bouziri in
Paris and create unity of action. The nick-name of the MTA activist (Ali la pointe) was
reminiscent of the Battle of Algiers and of one of the leading figures of this episode of
the war of independence. An internal report assessing the impact of the Comite
Palestine's action after the murder of Djellali Ben Ali on 27 October 1971 stated that
tracts were distributed outside a cinema which showed La Bataille dAlger ('Bilan de la
campagne Djellali). 106 This report also argued that by mobilising and protesting against
this racist murder, "les ouvriers arabes renouent avec leurs traditions nationales, les
traditions nationales revolutionnaires. Ils entonnent l'hymne du FLN. us renouent avec
la tradition qui leur est propre"('Bilan de la campagne Djellali') (7).
At the end of 1973, after the wave of racist murders which took place in
Marseilles following the killing of Desire Guerlache, a bus driver, by a mentally ill
Algerian, the MTA declared that:
Nos pays furent colonises et tout fut mis en place pour qu'ils demeurent sous-developpes ... Le
colonialisme de papa est peut-etre mort, mais il y a en France et en Europe des colonises: les
travailleurs immigres Depuis Hitler, les fascistes emploient partout les memes methodes: hier
le juif, le meteque, aujourd'hui l'arabe. Mais les travailleurs arabes ont reagi. us ont reagi
justement en utilisant l'arme commune des ouvriers: la greve. (La voix des travail/curs arabes,
octobre 1973) (3)
Those few examples of mostly dominant discourse on the past illustrate the extent to
which concepts, events and people could shift in time, find a new role and be
internalised to create trans-historical commonalities and new interpretative frameworks
for identity and action. Evocations of the past undoubtedly affected, if not informed the
perspective, discourse and action of the movement. The above-mentioned extract also
106 Daniel Pigot was judged in 1977, some six years after he had killed Djellali. The court declared that
his act was not motivated by racism, and he received a prison sentence of five years, three of them
suspended (see, for example, Le Matin, 22 juin 1977, Liberation and Le Monde, 23 juin 1977).
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shows that the ENA/PPA's nationalist project of bringing racism to an end by defeating
colonialism failed. In the eyes of MTA militants, colonialism had left deep wounds in
North Africa and still oppressed immigrants.
The strategy that the MTA decided to adopt after the death of Mohamed Diab
was more open to alliances and consensus. After all, it had learnt the lesson from past
actions and saw the limits of such an exclusive strategy. Indeed, after the death of
Djellali Ben Ali on 27 October 1971, the Comite Palestine organised a large protest in
which about 4,000 people took part. In spite of a real will on the Comite's part to
involve more French people in their antiracist activities, most of the protesters were
Maghrebi ('Lettre a un camarade en prison') (1) (3). The scale of their protest action did
not lead to a reduction in the number of racist murders and it proved to have little
impact on racism. This reflected the ENA/PPA's awareness that its anti-colonial and
therefore anti-racist fight was less effective without the support of the French people.
The MTA's strategy needed to be of a demotic and inclusive nature. "Bridges" between
immigrants and French public opinion had to be built.
After Diab's death, MTA supporters were aware that solidarity based on
Algerian nationality could be taken for granted, and that it would constitute the starting
point for a broadening of support ("Diab etait algerien, et l'emigration algerienne est des
lors partie prenante. Elle entraine le reste avec elle") (Ibid.). But this wider basis for
solidarity had to be fought for. Similarly, the inter-war nationalist movement viewed its
support by Algerian Muslisms as a basis upon which wider mobilisation had to be built.
The MTA considered that its efforts should focus on initiatives aimed at educating and
encouraging the creation of alliances with the French population. The "low" dominant
nature of memory of past suffering should inform a "higher" demotic purpose which
would touch a wider audience, interpellate both the French and the state, and lead to
concrete political action such as a protest march to the Justice Ministry:
Ii faut toucher l'ensemble de l'opinion, ii faut ebranler les consciences tranquilles, faire savoir,
atteindre retat tel est le raisonnement que font les travailleurs immiL(res ... de la naitra l'idee:
Marche sur le Ministere de la Justice - marche de protestation. (Ibid)
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This was a strategy which was characterised by its hybrid nature where the boundary
between "us" and "them" was "marked positively to sollicit exchange and vitality"
(Papastergiadis 1997). It conveyed tropes of political action which are, as in the case of
the ENA/PPA, inherently universalist and empowering.
However, the interaction between a dominant discourse on the past and a more
open and inclusive strategy for the present might not have been the only link between
memory on the one hand, and current action and discourse on the other. It is indeed
essential to assess whether there were other relationships between them. As was seen
above, the MTA had occasionally been attracted by a more dominant strategy which
reflected their discourse on memory of the past with points of reference such as past
racist attacks, colonialism and other types of struggle. But the demotic dimension of
memory also needs to be analysed. That sphere of reminiscence conjured up past events,
concepts and ideas which were inclusive and open in their nature. A case in point was
the anti-racist demonstration organised in Paris on 16 December 1972 after Diab's death
(Le Monde 19 decembre 1972). This included references such as common struggles of
the working class, but unlike the EtoileIPPA, never explicitly referred to the French
Revolution.
Beyond the reference to cross-ethnic class unity, the MTA, by contrast with the
ENA/PPA, also drew upon past examples of solidarity between French and North
Africans against colonialism and racism. In December 1972, the Diab demonstration
involved key French intellectuals such as Jean Genet, Michel Foucault, Alain Geismar
and Claude Mauriac and was directly inspired by the "Appel des 121" made by
intellectuals such as Sartre during the Algerian war ('Lettre a un camarade en prison')
(1) (3).
Even though the modalities of cross-ethnic mobilisation of the colonial and post-
colonial movements differed, both invoked another kind of past which could inform the
building of a universalist discourse and a multi-ethnic solidarity front in the present.
Bouziri l s declaration against his expulsion in 1972 illustrates this universalist stance
within the MTA:
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[A]ujourd'hui, les fascistes, les flics, les racistes essaient de semer la terreur chez les arabes,
comme au temps de l'OAS ... Pour la premiere fois depuis la guerre d'Algerie, des centaines de
travailleurs sont descendus dans la rue aux cOtes des francais ... pour la Palestine, contre le
racisme [T]ous, francais, arabes, antillais, espagnols, portugais, nous avons les mernes
ennemis et nous menons le meme combat: pour la justice et pour notre dignite. (Declaration
d'Hamza Bouziri') (4)
However, the movement's universalist discourse was different, but no less problematic
than that of inter-war nationalists. Indeed, French universalism was built on a sense of
French essentialist superiority and domination of other cultures. It never allowed
expressions or tolerance of political, cultural or even linguistic difference, and even saw
them as threats. It could be argued that in both the colonial and post-colonial
movements, Maghrebis' construction of universalism was based on different premises.
It was a hybrid discourse which decoupled universalism from the rigid and culturally
dominant characteristics that the French had given to it, in order to endow it with a more
hybrid, demotic and "truly" universal nature, where equality can be compatible with
difference, and alterity with solidarity. However, by contrast with the nationalist
movement in the inter-war period, the MTA never presented the universalist ideas that it
defended with reference to France and her revolutionary legacy. It was, in a way, a
strategy allowing Maghrebi immigrants to reappropriate and reinterpret the concept of
universalism to rid it of its narrow French revolutionary framework. In that sense, the
tension between dominant and demotic discourses within the MTA was more than a
tension between particularist and universalist perspectives as it was also marked by
hybridity.
We can therefore see that, as with the Etoile and the PPA in the inter-war
period, memory played a central, if differing role in the formation of the discourse of
the MTA. And it did so at different levels. Dominant historical interpretative strategies
were adopted to reinforce ethnic cohesion and action through a direct link with anti-
colonial and antiracist struggles. However, while inter-war nationalists often referred to
216
the past and to French Revolutionary principles to construct a national culture, the MTA
essentially focused on North Africa's opposition to colonialism, and also on the struggle
of the whole of the working class as a tool for mobilising Maghrebi immigrants and the
French against racism.
6.7 Conclusion
The MTA was a movement whose discourse and strategy were structured around a
number of internal markers of identity. Reflecting the predominant discourse within the
ENA/PPA, MTA militants saw themselves, first and foremost, as Arab nationalists.
However, their sense of belonging to the Arab nation transcended narrower affiliation to
a particular nation-state and never acknowledged the ethnic specifities of North
Africans. More so than in the discourse of the ENA/PPA, class and culture were
probably the most important frameworks of reference which allowed militants of the
Mouvement to both interpret their diasporic experience in France and negotiate their
identity, action and strategy at a social and political level.
Faced with the demeaning representations of immigrants often made by French
politicians and the media, the MTA reacted by creating a strong political voice for
North Africans in France. This discourse expressed a will amongst North African
militants not to be treated as a passive entity and workforce, but as human beings. The
movement reappropriated the debate by developing its own empowering process of
politicisation of culture, and its use of culture went further than in the case of the
ENA/PPA. It was based on the premise that culture not only had to be nurtured and used
as a tool allowing North Africans to reinforce social communal cohesion, but it also had
to be rooted in practice, shaped to serve the political purposes of the movement, and
opened up to establish a multi-ethnic front of solidarity with the French.
This process extended to religion, which was mostly referred to as a cultural
trope of identity. By contrast with the inter-war nationalist movement, Islam did not
play a central role in the MTA's political discourse. Furthermore, the support provided
by Catholics to the cause of the sans-papiers meant that the Catholic Church was no
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longer represented as an arm of imperialist domination, but as an ally against racism and
oppression.
In the MTA's discourse, far more emphasis was put on class and on immigrants'
action within France than in that of the ENA/PPA. Maghrebi workers' identity was
described by the MTA as being based on class kinship and solidarity, and their
experience as "Arab workers" was perceived as being anchored within France's working
class. References to memory and history rooted in the struggle of North Africans for
independence, but also in the fight of the French against colonialism, informed a binary
discourse which could mobilise Maghrebis and establish a multi-ethnic front of
solidarity against racism.
All these inner constitutive markers of identity were constantly shifting and to
some extent unstable. They allowed militants within the MTA to develop a flexible
discourse which could maximise political opportunities, unite around dominant identity
points of reference, and widen support through demotic discourses and strategies. This
gave Maghrebis a strong and independent voice which was at odds with the general
perception that the French had of immigrants, that of a "silent", "invisible",
"dehumanised" and "passive" workforce.
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Chapter 7
The outer boundary of ethno-national identity:
antiracism, universalism and difference
7.1 Introduction: the context of racism and antiracism in the 1970s
What perhaps differentiated the nationalism of the colonised in the metropole and in the
colonies from that which inspired and shaped the French nation-state was its roots. The
discourse of North African migrants engaged in nationalist politics was a reflection not
only of their will to establish a national state of their own along modem lines, and
therefore be accepted as citizens of a nation equal to others, but also of their desire to
defeat a system of domination, that of the French colonial order steeped in nationalism
and rooted in racism. For Algerian nationalists in the colonial era, vanquishing
colonialism also meant defeating racism. Therefore, as was shown in part one, fighting
for independence was very much a humanising process which was equated with
antiracism. This implied, for many, the end of all forms of economic, social and
political oppression on the basis of "race".
But what form did racism take in the 1970s? If the independence of Algeria and
of other ex-colonies marked the end of an era of overt colonial domination, it failed to
address the other dimensions of imperialism, racism and domination which persisted
and evolved in the post-colonial era, and which continued to affect a North African
diaspora still part of the 'internal colony' in France during the 1970s. 107
 By that decade,
the nature of racism had changed. Indeed, the 1950s and the 1960s marked the challenge
to, and loss of influence of racism as a "doctrine biologique de l'inegalite des races"
(Taguieff 1992: 21) which had characterised the years during which the ENA/PPA
developed. These two decades also saw the emergence of a neo-racism positing cultural
differences as irreconcilable ones that Taguieff refers to as "racisme differentialiste"
(1992: 21-35). Taguieff points out that:
107 For a discussion of the concept of the 'internal colony', see Lloyd (1998: 131-148).
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ces nouvelles theorisations racistokles, qu'on trouve dans la litterature politico-philosophique des
nouvelles-droites, sont fondees sur le postulat de l'irreductibilite, de rincomparabilite, de
l'incommunicabilite, de l'absolue separation des cultures ... des structures mentales, des mceurs,
des traditions communautaires, brefs des manieres collectives differentielles d'etre, de penser, de
faire, de desirer. La «biologisation» s'est effacee au profit de la «culturisation» (les cultures etant
transformees en natures secondes), en meme temps que l'axiome d'inegalite inter-raciale faisait
place a la nouvelle evidence absolue de la difference inter-culturelle [...]. (Taguieff 1989: 77)
This shift in racist ideology and discourse was partly the result of the loss of credibility
of biological racism in the aftermath of the Second World War and of the collapse of
colonial empires. Even though the term "race" as a valid scientific concept began to be
rejected after World War Two by the United Nations (Levi-Strauss 1987), it was only in
the 1960s and 1970s that it was fully challenged. This was as a consequence of the
growing consensus amongst scientists on the absence of scientific foundations for
"race" as a biological marker and the emergence of an anthropological discourse based
on cultural characteristics (Guillaumin 1972 and 1992: 64, Bonniol 1992: 187-195,
Piazza 1992: 159, see also Darlu 1992). Not without tensions, this latter interpretation
influenced the discourse of many antiracists who argued that equality and the
universalist principles that informed their ideology and discourse could be consistent
with the respect of difference (Lloyd 1998, Taguieff 1992, Memmi 1973). 108 This leads
Taguieff to argue that racist and antiracist discourses are rooted in the same pluralist
logic (Taguieff 1988). Gallissot goes further when he points out that:
L'antiracisme est en retard dune guerre parce qu'il reste prisonnier de l'antifascisme et de
rantisemistisme; il se trouve pris au piege du jeu de la difference et de l'identite, de la seule
consideration de l'autre comme si il s'agissait encore de la particularite juive quand la chasse
est aux basanes. Le defi est maintenant celui de l'immigration, et les conflits sont donc
108 Of course, this did not mean that biological references had disappeared from racist discourse and
accusation, as racism could rely on the shifting interplay of biological, cultural and character differences
as justification for discrimination (Memmi, A., September-December1964, 'Essai de definition', La Nef,
Numero 19-20, p. 42, cited in Taguieff 1992: 40).
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immediatement sociaux, a l'entreprise, dans les immeubles et dans la rue, comme les relations
directement interethniques. (Gallissot 1985a: 8)
In her study of antiracist discourse in France, Lloyd partly acknowledges the sometimes
cautious and delayed response of antiracist organisations such as the MRAP to anti-
immigrant racism and to the autonomous mobilisation of immigrants for rights and
against discrimination (1998: 200-227). However, she criticises Taguieff's presentation
of anti-racism as a defensive discourse and as the logical opposite of racism, and points
out that, far from being purely the antithesis of racism, anti-racism is a hegemonic force
playing a central role in society. Lloyd's analysis of antiracism is essentially based on
the Mouvement contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et pour la paix (MRAP), a well-
established and institutionally recognised antiracist organisation in France, and as such
does not focus on the specificity of autonomous immigrants' movements. By contrast,
this chapter will focus on the latter through an analysis of the MTA's antiracist
discourse and practices. I will first examine the process by which the movement
interpreted racism as systemic in French society and as a characteristic of imperialism, a
discourse which echoed that of the ENA/PPA. I will then assess the way in which its
antiracist discourse could be, on the one hand, informed by a differentialist perspective
and, on the other, by universalist values and class belonging.
7.2 The MTA's systemic interpretation of racism
The 1970s was a decade marked by racism, and particularly by racist violence. In that
sense, and even though the nature of racist discourse had evolved, the racism that North
Africans suffered from during that decade reflected that endured by North African
Muslims in the 1920s and 1930s. 1 °9
 As Gallissot points out, Tie racisme vise
aujourd'hui l'immigration, et directement les immigres de couleur et meme de
109 Racist violence during the 1970s was frequently echoed in a number of periodicals (see, for example,
Badday (1972), Meury (1975a & 1975b), Africasia, Contact, Droit et Liberte, France-Pays Arabes,
L'Algerien en Europe, Le Droit de vivre, Jeune Afrique, Reforme, Revolution africaine, Vivre en France)
as well as in French daily newspapers and weekly news magazines.
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preference de type nord-africain" (1985a: 7). Between September 1973 and January
1974, the MRAP stated that twenty-two racist attacks, mainly against Maghrebi
immigrants, took place, many of them fatal (Frontie. re, octobre 1973: 30-33, see also
Bitterlin 1973 and Toumi 1973a). In 1973 alone, forty crimes were committed against
North Africans by people who were never detained by the police (Croissance des jeunes
nations, mars 1973: 14). These occurrences of anti-Maghrebi racism in the post-colonial
era showed the limits of the ENA/PPA's anti-racist project, which was to bring racism to
an end through the destruction of colonial imperialism. Indeed, French racist violence
which had affected Maghrebis in the colonial period had not abated after independence.
On a different level, the life of Maghrebi migrants during the 1970s was not
necessarily better than that of their colonial forebears. Politique Aujourd'hui (mars-aviil
1974: 42) described the experience of immigrants at work and in hostels as
"surexploitation" and traversed by racism. It also stated that French legislation against
migrants was particularly repressive: they were denied basic rights, such as freedom of
expression and association, and were left at the mercy of their employers and of
frequent police controls. In 1974, Albert Levy, then National Secretary of the MRAP,
echoed this point when he declared that racism was expressed not only through
individuals, but also through organised groups. And when he stated that "le racisme fait
partie de la politique francaise d'immigration", he implied that racism was also present
at a higher level, within policy making (1974: 23-27).
Wieviorka views these levels of racism in contemporary France as "fragmented"
because even though racism can traverse institutions, lead to violence, inform people's
behaviour in public services and in the workplace, and form part of the relationship
between the dominant and the dominated, it cannot become a real mobilising force as
long as it does not reach the level of active institutionalisation in the political sphere
(1991: 86-87). 110 However, analysis of the MTA's discourse would seem to suggest that
110 Wieviorka defines four levels in what he refers to as the empirical space of racism. The first level is
infraracism, a minor and disarticulated phenomenon marked by the presence of xenophobic doctrin and
the spread of xenophobic rather than racist opinions. At the second level, racism is less fragmented, and
expressed in a more visible way in polls and in numerous xenophobic publications. The third level is
characterised by the fact that racism becomes the central characteristic of a political or para-political force
mobilising large sections of the population and creating a favourable context for racist violence. The four
and last level is reached when the state is organised on the basis of racist orientations (1991: 83-86).
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its interpretation of racism differed markedly from that of Wieviorka, and was more
consistent with the systemic interpretation proposed by Guillaumin. Guillaumin argues
that racism is a system whose meaning is shaped by concrete acts, and that racist
ideology is closely tied to its material dimension (1972: 8, 47, 61, cited in Wieviorka
1991: 89, see also Balibar and Wallerstein 1988: 18).
The MTA was well aware that Maghrebi immigrants were the prime target of
racism, and that it affected all aspects of their life (Sans Frontiere (10), octobre 1973:
31). This can be illustrated by the movement's discourse on anti-Arab racism in France
in 1973, a period of hightened racist violence against Maghrebis which echoed previous
incidents that had affected North African migrants in France. H1
 In the aftermath of the
wave of racist murders which had taken place during the summer of 1973 after Desire
Guerlache, a French bus driver, was killed in Marseilles by a mentally ill Algerian, La
voix des travailleurs arabes (octobre 1973), the MTA's mouthpiece, stated: "le racisme?
Nous travailleurs arabes, le vivons chaque jour dans notre 'dine et notre chair! A
l'embauche, dans la rue, dans le metro, nous sommes chaque fois humilies et offenses.
Aujourd'hui, on nous tue" (3). To some extent, the MTA's evocation of racism varied
from that of the ENAJPPA. The former put greater emphasis on racism in its discourse
and focused on racist incidents in France, while the latter viewed racism as a
characteristic of the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised in French
colonial society and was mostly denounced in North Africa.
Let us now look at the way in which the MTA considered that racism affected
the life of immigrants. In the movement's discourse, racism was seen as a characteristic
of their experience in, and contact with French society. It affected them in the world of
work ("a l'embauche"), in the street and in the underground (which could refer here to
French people's perception of immigrants, but also to violence towards them from
racists and constant harrassment and checks by the police), and had reached a new level
of violence with the murder of many Maghrebis. The MTA further denounced racism in
the world of work when it declared in its bulletin Akhbar el Haraka (undated) that
"nous occupons les postes les plus durs et nous subissons les injures des chefs" (3). This
See, for example, MacMaster's study of the murders of rue Fondary in 1923 (1995).
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reflected the ENA/PPA's denunciation of racism towards, and exploitation of North
African workers which was equated with slavery.
The 1970s Maghrebi movement put more emphasis on denouncing the difficult
living conditions of North African immigrants than the Etoile and the PPA. It argued
that racism was at the core of housing arrangements for immigrants, and supported
residents who fought for better living conditions: "Nous ne voulons plus accepter la loi
raciste des proprietaires et des gerants, des patrons et des mairies qui nous meprisent et
imposent des logements là oi un homme ne peut vivre dignement" (Declaration de
Hamza Bouziri') (3). The use of "loi raciste" to refer to the discrimination that
immigrants were subjected to in hostels ("proprietaires"), at work ("patrons") and in
local councils ("mairie") implied not only that there was a link between all those forms
of oppression, but also that racism was legitimised by the law.
At another level, acts of violence against Maghrebi and other immigrants were
also stigmatised. To some extent, this aspect of the MTA's discourse reflected the
ENA/PPA's denunciation of racist acts against North Africans. For instance, in a report
published in the mid-1970s, the movement described how Mohamed Laid Moussa, an
Algerian teacher, had been murdered on 18 March 1975 by "[Lin] tueur [qui] appartient a
une organisation chargee de pourchasser les Arabes" ('Mohamed Laid Moussa, jeune
travailleur algerien, a ete lachement assassine a Marseille') (3). While inter-war
nationalists systematically castigated colonialists for being responsible for racist
violence, the MTA saw this crime as part of a series of racist attacks and murders
committed by "de veritables organisations racistes" whose aim was to murder Arab
workers systematically.
However, the MTA's analysis did not stop there. This racist violence was
interpreted as being made possible because it was tolerated by the authorities and the
judiciary. The letter addressed by Larbi Boudjenana, a militant of the MTA and of the
Connte de defense, to the Minister of the Interior, on 10 May 1973 illustrates this. In
this document, he protested against the Minister's decision to expel him after political
books were found in his home. He also stigmatised the authorities and the judiciary for
failing to arrest and condemn racist killers such as Pigot who had killed Djellali Ben Ali
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in 1971, and sous-brigadier Marquet, the policeman who had murdered Mohamed Diab
in November 1972. This was redolent of the ENA/PPA's accusation that racist violence
against Muslims was condoned by the French authorities. Another extract of
Boudjenana's letter illustrates the movement's interpretation of racism:
Ce que vous n'avez pas vu, ce sont les assassins ... que la justice n'a toujours pas puni; ce sont les
centaines de crimes commis par des groupes racistes encourages par une ignoble propagande
autoris6e, par leur impunite et aussi par l'indulgence de certains de vos services. Mais celui qui
reclame avec ses freres immigres et ses amis francais que la justice soit rendue, parce que je suis,
comme tous les immigres, victime du racisme, vous voulez l'expulser. (Monsieur le Ministre de
l'Interieue, 10 mai 1973) (3)
Indeed, the MTA criticised the authorities for failing to investigate and arrest any of the
perpetrators of such attacks, and denounced "un ordre fasciste qui commence a regner
dans ce pays" ('Mohamed Laid Moussa, jeune travailleur algerien, a ete lachement
assassine a Marseille') (3). Referring to Laid Moussa's death (which they attributed to an
extreme right wing organisation called France Libre), to the wave of racist murders
which took place in the south of France after the death of Guerlach in August 1973, and
to the bombing of the Algerian Consulate in Marseilles in December 1973 (which Le
club Charles Martel claimed to have carried out), the MTA stated that:
Si des organisations racistes (tel le groupe Charles Martel) ont pu sevir pendant des annees pour
en arriver aujourd'hui a assassiner Laid Moussa (par 1'interm6diaire de l'organisation fasciste de
la France libre), c'est parce qu'elles ont pu jouir dune impunite totale de la part de la justice et du
gouvernement ... Si tant de crimes sont aujourd'hui possibles, c'est parce qu'ils s'inscrivent dans
un climat general d'incitation au meurtre [et Coppression raciste dont les autorites portent la
responsabilite: occupation par la police de nos quartiers, rafles dans le metro, ratonnades et
expulsions de travailleurs immigr6s. Ces assassinats spectaculaires et couverts par les autorites
ont donne a chaque fois le signal a des vagues d'exactions racistes. ('Mohamed Laid Moussa,
jeune travailleur algerien, a ete lachement assassine a Marseille') (3)
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In the discourse of the MTA, which to some extent evoked that of the inter-war
nationalist movement, racism was clearly posited as a system which traversed all
aspects of French society from individual acts to the highest echelons of the state. The
authorities were directly incriminated for failing to arrest, and for protecting those
responsible, who could therefore act with impunity. This discourse reflected that of the
Etoile and the PPA which consistently stigmatised the judiciary for failing to prosecute
French murderers of North Africans, and which the inter-war nationalist movement
referred to as "justice de race". In the MTA's discourse, the authorities were also
portrayed as the accomplices of such violence ("ces assassinats couverts par les
autorites"). More importantly, the state was stigmatised for fostering an environment
within which murdering North Africans was not only tolerated, but also encouraged.
The declaration of the MTA made during a press conference on 21 March 1975 made
this point explicitly. It stated that:
L'apparition aujourd'hui de milices privees qui pretendent "faire justice" contre les Arabes nest
que la suite logique du developpement des organisations racistes depuis 1971, de l'impunite
totale dont elles ont toujours joui de la Police et de la Justice, donc de la "couverture" que leur
ont assure aussi bien l'Etat que la plupart des differents moyens d'information ... La
responsabilite de la Police (et donc de l'Etat) est d'autant plus engagee que des policiers eux-
rneme participent a l'action des groupes racistes organises ... Et ce sont des policiers qui tous les
jours, organisent tous les jours des "ratonnades" anti-arabes confirmant ainsi la responsabilite
de l'Etat-Policier dans le racisme anti-arabe. (Declaration du Mouvement des travaillcurs arabes
(MTA) a la conference de presse du vendredi 21 mars 1975) (9)
This extract illustrates the extent to which the government was seen as responsible for
the climate of racism and violence within which immigrants lived. It also reflects the
contiguity of discourses of the MTA and the ENA/PPA on racism. Firstly, the violence
perpetrated by racist organisations was described as benefiting from total impunity on
the part of the police and the judiciary, and therefore the state. Secondly, the complicity
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and direct involvement of the state in racist crimes, which was highlighted by the
numerous "ratonnades" involving policemen, led the MTA to refer to the French state as
"I'Etat-Policier".
In the movement's discourse, all forms of racism to which Maghrebis were
subjected, whether they originated from the state and its representatives, from the
economic system or from clandestine and violent racist organisations, were posited as
consistent with each other. To the MTA, they formed a systemic chain of racist
oppression against North African migrants (racist murders, violence and terrorist attacks
by individuals and organisations of the extreme right, the government's immigration
policy, the expulsion of immigrants, the judiciary, police harassment in the
underground, and so on). 112
 This interpretation echoed that of inter-war nationalists who
viewed racism as traversing all aspects of French society on both sides of the
Mediterranean, and as a corollary of colonialism.
The MTA's discourse also reflected that of nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s in
that its interpretation of racism transcended and blurred the normally distinct boundary
between, on the one hand, the lawfulness that the state, the government and the
judiciary were meant to incarnate, and on the other hand, the unlawfulness of racist
crime, violence and repression. In the MTA's discourse, binary oppositions in French
society were therefore ideologically collapsed into one sphere of systemic racism. The
established dichotomies which marked out the terrain of what the French describe as
l'Etat de droit were challenged as smokescreens. The policies and acts of the
government and its representatives (such as the "administration", the police and the
justice system dealing with immigrants) which were supposed to be the garantors of
justice, order and social peace were not only seen as racist, and thereby as contributing
to the spread of racist practices in French society, but were also accused of covering up
for the murders and violence committed against Maghrebis by racist organisations such
as le Club Charles Martel. The MTA's argument that "[e]n France, nous nous trouvons
112 It is worth noting that the MTA's emphasis on the illegal character of France's immigration policies
was not necessarily inconsistent with the facts, as they were not subjected to normal legislative scrutiny.
As Bonnechere points out, "la reglementation de l'immigration est encore souvent le fruit de circulaires
confidentielles ou illegales" (1976: 128).
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face a une nouvelle politique de repression de l'immigration (arra de l'immigration,
operation "coup de point", attentats racistes a Toulon, Marseille et Paris)" is reminiscent
of the ENA/PPA's denunciation of racism in the colonial era. It illustrates the extent to
which these multiple aspects of racism were viewed as forming part of a coherent whole
and as constituting a well-defined policy (MTA document, untitled, undated) (3).
This interpretation of racism in French society by the MTA can be traced to a
report produced by the Comite Palestine (which became the MTA in June 1972) after
the murder, on 25 October 1971 in La Goutte d'Or, of a young Algerian called Djellali
Ben Ali. This report, which assessed the impact of the organisation's antiracist
campaign organised in the aftermath of Djellali's death, denounced the "tendances
fascistes qui se developpent dans l'Etat" and viewed all forms of racism and violence
against North Africans as the "expression systematique du racisme" ('Bilan de la lutte
Djellali') (5).
However, as was the case with the inter-war nationalist movement, the MTA's
analysis of racism went further. Racism was not simply perceived as a trait which
traversed all aspects of French society, but also viewed as serving a purpose: that of
furthering economic exploitation of the dominated through imperialism. The wave of
racist murders which took place in Marseilles in the summer of 1973 was interpreted by
the MTA as a reaction by capitalism against the campaign of mobilisation of
immigrants in the workplace, in the foyers and against the Circulaire Marcellin-
Fontanet.
The MTA's discourse on racism put more emphasis on class belonging in France
than that of the Etoile and the PPA, which saw racism as an expression of the colonial
paradigm. Indeed, racism was also viewed by the 1970s movement as a means of
castigating Maghrebi workers and dividing the working class in France. La voix des
travailleurs arabes (octobre 1973) emphasised the movement's interpretation of racism
based on ethnicity and class when it stated that "c'est parce que nous sommes apparus
comme une force ouvriere autonome et combative que le patronat a senti le danger.
C'est done pour intimider et reprimer la lutte des travailleurs arabes que cette vague de
racisme a 6te orchestróe" (3).
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Nonetheless, the discourse of the MTA evoked that of the ENA/PPA in the
inter-war period, as both movements portrayed racism and racist violence as being
encouraged by the authorities and as a central trope of imperialist oppression. However,
whereas the inter-war nationalist movement saw racism as informing the relationship
between coloniser and colonised, the MTA viewed anti-Maghrebi racism in the 1970s
as being both the legacy of the colonial era and the continuation of anti-semitic racism
which traversed French society.
This binary interpretation of racism in the 1970s can be illustrated by an article
entitled "Le racisme fait diversion, le racisme tue!" written in La voix des travailleurs
arabes (octobre 1973) (3), and which denounced the wave of racist murders which had
taken place in September 1973. On the one hand, it described the exploitation and
racism that marked Maghrebi immigrants' experience as consistent with that of the
colonised when it stated that Tie colonialisme de papa est peut-etre mort, mais il y a
toujours en France et en Europe des colonises: les travailleurs immigres". On the other
hand, this racism was also viewed as the continuation of anti-semitism ("hier le juif, le
meteque, aujourd'hui l'arabe"). In this respect, the movement's discourse differed from
that of the ENA/PPA, as the latter did not make any direct correlation between the
racism that the colonised experienced and anti-semitism.
7.3 Antiracist discourse and actions of the MTA
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Etoile nord-africaine and the PPA frequently denounced
racism as one of the most important characteristics of the colonial oppression to which
North Africans were subjected on both sides of the Mediterranean. Racism was also
presented as a key motive behind their demands for an end to colonialism, for
emancipation and independence, and greatly contributed to the creation and
development of the nationalist movement structured around a sense of ethnic and
religious belonging. Similarly in the 1970s, the fight against racism informed, to a large
extent, the process of political mobilisation of North African migrants in the COlniteS
Palestine and in the MTA. However, what differentiated its discourse was its focus on
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ethnicity and class. In Akhbar el Haraka (1976), an article which emphasised the
antiracist nature, and universalist aims of a strike against racism and working conditions
at the Peugeot-Cycles factory in 1976 highlighted this process of using antiracism as a
force for mobilisation. It stated that "[crest dans la lutte qu'on efface le racisme pour
mettre en place une fraternite durable, c'est dans la lutte qu'on retrouve notre dignite et
notre liberte d'homme" (3).
It has been shown previously that the discourse of the MTA against racism and
exploitation was, like that of the ENA/PPA, marked by universalist references, but that
it was also grounded in class belonging.' 13 This section will go further and demonstrate
how the nationalist movement developed a binary antiracist discourse marked by
universalism, but also by differentialist references. Indeed, what can also be noted in the
MTA's antiracist discourse is that it can be characterised by its focus on an exclusive
reference to ethnicity (which was essentialised), and that it used a terminology which
was very much evocative of universalist discourse.
Let us now examine this process of construction of a differentialist antiracist
stance within the nationalist movement. When looking at the MTA's documents, what is
striking is the recurrent reference to the Palestinian cause as a catalyst for mobilisation
against racism and oppression in France. The role that the Palestinian question played in
the MTA's discourse was therefore far more central than it had been for the ENA/PPA.
The latter referred to it in broader nationalist terms and as an inspiration for its fight
against imperialism in North Africa and for Algeria's search for independence. On the
other hand, the MTA also posited the Palestinian Revolution as being inextricably
linked to Maghrebi's fight against racism within a French metropolitan context. To
mention one example, Hamza Bouziri's declaration against his expulsion in 1972
illustrates the role that the Palestinian Revolution played in such a process of antiracist
mobilisation:
[N]ous avons compris que les travailleurs arabes unis, organis6s pour soutenir la Palestine,
constituent une force que les racistes ne pourraient pas briser. Dans les Comites de soutien a la
113 See section 6.4.
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Revolution palestinienne nous avons retrouve notre dignite, nous avons repris le droit a la parole
qu'on nous refuse. Nous avons cesse d'être "des bicots", des esclaves, nous sommes devenus des
combattants, des fedayins. (Declaration de Hamza Bouziri') (4)
In this extract, Bouziri focuses on support for the struggle of Palestinians as a force
enabling North Africans to fight against racism. The link between the two is justified at
a political and ethnic level. On the one hand, Palestine epitomises the struggle of an
oppressed people against Zionism which was seen by the movement as a racist ideology
serving the interests of imperialism, a view reflecting that of the ENA/PPA. I14 On the
other hand, the claim that all North Africans were Arabs allowed MTA militants to
identify with the Palestinians' cause and justify even further their support for it. This
process had also informed the ENA/PPA's support for the Palestinian struggle, but the
1970s movement took it further. For the MTA, it was a cause which transcended
geographical boundaries and was deemed exemplary not only for "Arabs" in France, but
also for all Arabs who were the victims of racism and oppression. Supporting it was
perceived as a humanising process. Bouziri's declaration was very much imbued in
universalist terminology, and portrayed Maghrebis' mobilisation as a revolutionary
process whose aim was to restore Arabs' dignity and end racism and "slavery" in
France.
By contrast with the inter-war nationalist movement, the MTA viewed North
Africans' experience in France and the events in Palestine as inalienable. This can also
be noted in an article in La voix des travadleurs arabes (octobre 1973) (3). It focuses on
antiracist and political actions carried out exclusively by Maghrebi immigrants and uses
a similar stylistic approach. It describes the movement's general strike against racism on
3 September 1973 (which brought many companies and building sites in the south of
France to a stand-still) and demonstrations held by North Africans during the October
War as consistent with their aim of fighting capitalist and imperialist oppression: "La
derniere grêve genërale contre le racisme et de grande manifestations pendant la guerre
114 See section 8.7 for a detailed analysis of the MTA's discourse on the Palestinian Revolution.
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d'octobre ont montre l'unite de la communaute arabe et sa determination a vaincre
contre [sic] tous les oppresseurs capitalistes et imperialistes".
The second antiracist approach adopted by the movement was very much rooted
in universalist values and in class belonging. What differentiated the MTA's strategy
from that of the Etoile and the PPA was that the latter had tried to create a front of
solidarity between the French and North Africans which focused more on anti-
colonialism than on anti-racism per se. Indeed, the fight of the inter-war nationalist was
subsumed by its struggle for independence. Through its antiracist discourse and
strategy, the MTA sought to establish multi-ethnic solidarity around common values.
This approach led to the creation of the Comite de defense des droits et de la vie des
travailleurs immigres (CDDVTI), a multi-ethnic antiracist organisation founded after
the hunger strike of Sad and Faouzia Bouziri in Paris in October 1972, and led by a
leading militant of the MTA, Mohamed Selim Najeh (Sans Frontiere, mardi 11 janvier
1980). 115
 Here, the discourse of the MTA goes further than that of the ENA/PPA, as
Maghrebis are not only described as Arabs, but are viewed as a community which
transcends national boundaries.
By contrast with the movement's differentialist discourse on antiracism which
was rooted in the Palestinian struggle, this universalist approach sought its inspiration in
the past, thereby transcending historical boundaries. The antiracist mobilisation which
followed the murder of Mohamed Diab, an Algerian worker, by Robert Marquet, a
French policeman in a Versailles police station on 29 November 1972 is a case in point.
The MTA supported Diab's family and organised a demonstration with the CDDVTI on
16 December 1972 to demand Marquet's arrest. This "marche silencieuse", which
involved 137 intellectuals (including Jean Genet, Michel Foucault and Claude Mauriac),
had been banned by the Prefecture de Police, and was met with extreme violence by
policemen and led to many arrests (Le Monde, 19 decembre 1972). La voix des
travailleurs arabes (ler janvier 1973) (3) emphasised the universalist character of this
demonstration when it stated that "[1]e 16 decembre, nous &ions des milliers, Francais,
115 Mohamed Selim Najeh was expelled by the French government after the antiracist strikes successfully
organised by Maghrebi workers in September 1973 to protest against the wave of racist murders targeting
North African immigrants (see Le Monde, 5 septembre 1973).
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immigres et Arabes, unis comme des freres". By contrast, and even though the
ENA/PPA had won the support of some leading French intellectuals (who were mostly
politicians), it did not develop the same form of common protest action with the French
as the MTA. Indeed, expressions of cross-ethnic solidarity were mostly limited to
speeches during political rallies.
In the MTA, the inspiration for this multi-ethnic, universalist action against
racism came from past initiatives developed during the Algerian war. On the one hand,
the MTA tried to re-establish a front of solidarity with French intellectuals consistent
with that which was created by intellectuals such as Sartre against the Algerian war
("l'appel des 121"), and on the other hand, the route chosen for the demonstration was
very much inspired by the March of the 17th of October 1961 in Paris, when a peaceful
pro-FLN demonstration by Algerian immigrants was met with a violent reponse from
the police, who proceeded to mass arrests and killed an estimated 300 marchers:116
De la est venue l'idee des 121. Ceux-la qui pendant la guerre d'Algerie avaient &nonce les
crimes et la torture des coloniaux, lancaient un appel au soutien des Arabes contre les crimes
racistes et la nouvelle colonisation. Its faisaient appel a la memoire historique des Francais et
choisissaient comme point de depart la marche sur le ministere: Bonne-Nouvelle-le cinema Rex
oil les Algeriens avaient ensanglante les paves de leur sang en octobre 1961. Second appel a la
memoire et a la conscience des Occidentaux. Cet appel a la memoire permettait de faire plein
feux [sic] sur les horreurs que connaissent aujourd'hui les immigres. ('Lettre a un camarade en
prison') (1) (3)
Both past events aimed to draw upon the French people's memory of the racism
inflicted on Maghrebis and highlight the fact that in the 1970s, their experience was still
marked by racism and required a wide consensus encompassing immigrants and the
French against what was referred to as "la nouvelle colonisation". So the link between
the MTA's antiracist struggle and the ENAJPPA's fight for independence is stronger
116 For a study of the events of 17 October 1961, see for example, Einaudi (1991, 1994). For an
exposition of French opposition to the Algerian War, see Vidal-Naquet (1986), and Evans (1997).
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than it seems. Both were interpreted as fights against imperialism. Furthermore, the
1970s movement wanted to resurrect this prominent front of multi-ethnic solidarity and
action ("l'appel des 121") which, it could be argued had been constructed on foundations
laid by the ENA/PPA.
By ensuring that a parallel was made between North Africans' fight against
colonialism and their own antiracist struggle, and by attracting the support of leading
intellectuals, some of whom had already taken part in the "Appel des 121", the MTA
sought to set their own experience and demands within a dialectical framework which
could win the support of the French population. Clearly, this attempt to establish a
united multi-ethnic front of solldarity against racism was also informed by the
realisation that purely ethnically-based responses had less impact, were met with more
violent police response, and did not reduce the number of racist attacks (ibid). It could
be argued that the movement's antiracist discourse was more prominent, complex and
rooted within a French metropolitan context than that of the ENA/PPA. By contrast
with the latter organisation, and even though the MTA's discourse was universalist
through the terminology and themes that it used, it never referred to the French
Revolution or the Declaration des droits de l'Homme as sources of inspiration for its
own struggle, and never described the French people as the repository of these values.
This highlights the considerable shift which had taken place in Maghrebi immigrants'
perception of France from the colonial to the post-colonial era.
As was seen in the previous section, the MTA's focus on differentialist and
universalist forms of mobilisation against racism marked much of its discourse,
ideology and action. To some extent, it reflected the binary discourse of the ENA/PPA.
These two antiracist approaches were not necessarily seen as dichotomous frames of
reference for the movement as it sometimes combined, in different ways and with
different emphases, both forms of antiracist discourse. For example, the MTA's reaction
to the wave of racist murders which took place in the south of France in the summer of
1973 was not exclusively based on a differentialist, intra-ethnic approach. Echoing the
discourse of the ENA/PPA which stigmatised France's representation of the colonised, it
sought to address wider antiracist considerations by challenging discursively the way in
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which immigration was referred to in public, media and political discourse. This
strategy was consistent with the movement's perspective on racism in society as
systemic.
Within the context of the 1970s, numerous posters which featured the slogan
"Halte a l'immigration sauvage" appeared in Paris (Guillaumin 1984: 43). However,
contrary to what Guillaumin (1984) argues, the use of the expression "immigration
sauvage" was not limited to racist groups and to popular discourse. Examples show that
it was also integrated into mainstream media and political discourses. For instance, an
article in Le Monde (7-8 janvier 1973) about the hunger strike of four Tunisians and one
Algerian sans-papiers in churches in La Ciotat and Marseilles was entitled
"L'administration ne parvient pas a maitriser l'«immigration sauvage»". It talked of a
"phenomene de saturation de la main-Sceuvre etrangere" and of a "population
difficilement contrOlable" before ending with the assertion that "Happlication de la
circulaire Fontanet connait de nombreuses vicissitudes et consacre une impuissance
chronique a maitriser l'immigration sauvage qu'on entendait combattre".117
This term was also very much present in mainstream political discourse. In a Le
Monde article (9-10 septembre 1973), ex-Minister Eugene Claudius-Petit described the
violent reaction against North Africans which followed Guerlache's death as "la colere,
dont les exces sont excusables". He saw the protest of French workers against what he
called "l'immigration sauvage" as being justified, and shifted the blame for immigrants'
bad housing conditions from the state to the migrants themselves when he stigmatised
"cette immigration sauvage [qui] a provoque la proliferation et le gonflement des
bidonvilles et des ilots defectueux".
The MTA denounced this expression which was widely used at the time. In a
declaration about the media and political outcry and the appearance of posters calling
for an end to "l'immigration sauvage" which followed the murder of Desire Guerlache,
Mohamed Selim Najeh, a leading member of the MTA, declared:
117 The reference to immigration sauvage without quotation marks in the latter assertion is quite revealing
of way in which it was adopted as a valid notion by the mainstream media.
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En quoi le crime est-il plus horrible s'il est commis par un Algerien que par un Francais? ... A
Marseille, un travailleur immigre a tue un travailleur francais, voila le drame: c'est quand un
travailleur tue un autre travailleur ... la terreur raciste existe en France ... II n'y a pas
d'immigration sauvage. Ii y a des travailleurs dont le souci est de travailler et une exploitation
sauvage des hommes ... A quoi ca sert de faire la une sur le crime commis par un Algerien:
permettre les aggressions racistes contre les immigres, a les faire accepter par les Francais, le
crime de Marseille autorise les crimes racistes et les crimes racistes les affrontements contre les
communautes. (Declaration de Mohamed Najah Selim [sic], Secretaire general du Comite de
defense des droits et de la vie des travailleurs immigres, Paris, 29 aoilt 1973) (5)
This passage shows that the antiracist discourse of the MTA on these events was also
inherently universalist and based on class. It called for Algerians to be treated in the
same way as the French. It denounced not only racists, but also mainstream journalists
and politicians who, by focusing on the fact that the murderer was Algerian, only
contributed to dividing the working class and encouraging further racist acts. The
pertinence of the expression "immigration sauvage" was challenged. Mohamed Selim
Najeh emphasised the fact that immigrants were first and foremost "workers" whose
aim was to work, and the adjective "sauvage" was discursively displaced to describe
what he considered to be the true nature of the capitalist system ("une exploitation
sauvage des hommes"). 118
 The use of the adjective "sauvage" by the MTA aimed not
only to counter French popular, political and media discourses, but also to denounce the
French state, whose action sustained the systemic racism that traversed French society,
as inconsistent with the progressive and universalist values it claimed to stand for.
To some extent, this form of counter-discourse mirrors that of the ENA/PPA. In
1933, Imache Amar also castigated the mainstream press for referring to Maghrebis'
immigration in France as "l'invasion des Kabyles", "les Arabes ont envahi la France"
and so on, when in his view, their presence in France was a consequence of France's
118 The adjective "sauvage" had also been applied by the Comite Palestine in 1971 to police repression,
which was referred to as "l'intervention sauvage de la police" ('Bilan de la campagne Djellali', Dossier
France - racisme - lutte contre les crimes racistes, 1971-1974 - Affaire Djellali (octobre-novembre 1971),
Mfc 218/7, BDIC.
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invasion of North Africa and of her colonial project of dispossession of Muslims (El
Ouma Numero 17, decembre 1933).
In the 1970s, another, more wide-spread expression used in French media,
political and academic discourse to refer to the presence of immigration in French
society was the dubious and a-scientific concept of "seuil de tolerance", which was
closely linked to that of "immigration sauvage" (De Rudder-Paurd 1980: 3, 9). It was
constructed by the French as a scientifically sound sociological tool which could help
national and local politicians, as well as the "administration", the judiciary and the
police to define with "scientific precision" the proportion of immigrants that the nation,
cities, towns and neighbourhoods could "tolerate" without ethnic tensions.
Reflecting the discourse of the Etoile and the PPA, the MTA interpreted the
wave of anti-Maghrebi racist violence which had followed the death of Guerlache in the
summer of 1973 as a further illustration of racism in society and as a tool of imperialist
oppression against the dominated. It rejected the "causes sociologiques: le fameux seuil
de tolerance" which had been frequently evoked by the French media, as an explanation
for the racist murders which had taken place (La voix des travailleurs arabes, octobre
1973) (3).
In fact, this sociological notion of "seuil de tolerance", which did not exist in the
inter-war period, had no valid scientific basis and was systematically defined arbitrarily.
But its influence on the way in which immigrants were viewed, on the manner in which
policy and discourse on immigration was structured, and on racism in French society
was significant. In her study of this concept, de Rudder-Paurd (1980), states pertinently
that:
l'idee de seuil ... evoque celle dune limite, dune frontiare entre le dedans et le dehors, le soi et le
non-soi que ion ne franchit pas sans consequence. Par le "seuil" (de tolerance) on affirme
implicitement les contours dune societe francaise une et indivisible et ion designe plus
clairement retranger comme intrus. L'immigration est, par ce biais, presentee a la fois comme un
phenomene anormal, voire pathologique, et comme une invasion". (1980: 9)
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The idea that a "seuil de tolerance" existed also implied that French society was
inherently tolerant, but that her hospitality towards immigrants was not to be abused.
This enabled the French media and politicians to interpret any act of violence
committed against immigrants as sociologically understandable (the proportion of
immigrants in the neighbourhood, or their behaviour had undoubtedly transgressed that
threashold). 119
 It also allowed them to remove all sense of responsibility for racist
behaviour and violence from French society, and ultimately to put the blame of such
tragic incidents on migrants themselves (racist murders were the regrettable, but logical
consequence of their behaviour and presence in France).
Within this framework, any act of delinquency or crime committed by
immigrants was not interpreted within the normal sphere of law enforcement in popular,
political, media and legal discourse, as any crime committed by a French person would
be, but as a further sign that migrants were abusing the trust, tolerance and hospitality of
the French people.
It contributed to an atmosphere of victimisation whereby immigrants bore
common responsibility for any unlawful act committed by individuals who were
immigrants, or seen as such. It confirmed the prejudices that the French attached to
immigrants, and further denigrated the vast majority of law-abiding immigrants. For
instance, a murder committed by a French person may have been seen as a terrible
crime, but in no sense would it have been interpreted as revealing anything about the
nature and character of the French people. By contrast, had this act been committed by a
migrant, it would have been put within a wider interpretative framework whereby all
isolated cases of unlawful behaviour (ranging from minor offences to violent acts) by
immigrants would reinforce prejudice and confirm the general pattern of stigmas that
the dominant population attributed to immigrants, and more particularly to North
African and other post-colonial migrants.
The consequences of this type of discourse, in which the concept of "seuil de
tolerance" plays a central part, are serious and multiple. It creates a culture of guilt and
119 Eugene Claudius-Petit's article in Le Monde (9-10 septembre 1973), which is quoted above, illustrates
this point.
238
common responsibility amongst immigrants. If an unlawful act is committed by an
immigrant or his children, the origin of the perpetrator or suspect is systematically
highlighted in the French media. Any such act might be "internalised" by immigrants
worried that it will further worsen their image in French society. This process of
"devalorisation de soi", to use Noiriel's term (1988: 167), is very much consistent with
the phenomenon of marginalisation of the dominated (migrants) by the dominant in
French society. The vilification of immigrants has also constituted a crucial tool in the
integration of earlier immigrants, who have attempted to conform to the norms of
French society.120
Beyond the climate of "deresponsabilisation" vis-a-vis racism that it fosters
amongst the French, this notion of a "tolerance threshold" also has an impact on the
widely used, yet no less problematic concept of "integration". Too often, this concept
puts the onus on immigrants to integrate. "Integration" is generally portrayed by the
French as a commendable aim of the state which is consistent with France's universalist
values. But this integration is perceived as all the more arduous, if not impossible to
achieve as the behaviour, culture, acts and presence of immigrants in France are
systematically constructed as markers of irreconcilable difference, and as a dangerous
transgression of the "seuil de tolerance", that "frontiere entre le dedans et le dehors,
entre le soi et le non-soi" (de Rudder-Paurd 1980: 9). In that sense, the notion of
integration is as problematic in the post-colonial era as the concept of assimilation was
during the colonial period. As Silverman - who views both notions
(assimilation/integration) as linked - points out, "[t]he concept of assimilation (or
integration) is ... a smokescreen for complex ordering of social relations, in which a
process of racialisation and racism has played a fundamental role" (1992: 102).
Finally, another aspect of the MTA's discourse on racism is worth noting. As
early as 1971, the Comite Palestine had already evoked the use of self-defence and
violence as useful weapons against racists. This aspect of immigrants' discourse in the
1970s differed markedly from that of inter-war nationalists who did not call for
120 Noiriel also gives an early example of this phenomenon affecting Italian immigrants when he points
out that "... a Lyon en 1894, a la suite de l'assassinat du president Carnot par un anarchiste italien, de
nombreux immigres de cette nationalite enleverent le i ou le o final de leur nom" (1988: 170).
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immigrants to establish self-defence groups against racists. The report produced to
assess the impact of the movement's campaign which followed the death of Djellali
called for the Comite to adopt "des formes d'organisation politico-militaire large et
multinationale" and create autonomous groups called "des groupes de vigilance", whose
aim was to oppose police repression, carry out surveillance operations on racists, and
counter any racist aggression committed by individuals and organisations ('Bilan de la
campagne Djellali') (7). Another MTA document shows that violence, a less often
acknowledged reponse to racist attacks, had sometimes been adopted by the movement.
It argued that:
Nous avons pour tache de resoudre le probleme de cette nouvelle etape de repression des masses
arabes en transformant le rapport du MTA avec la question de la violence ... En effet, Si nous
voulons casser l'encerclement et la repression qui s'abat sur nous en France [,] il est fondamental
d'examiner comment exercer la violence contre ceux qui nous opprime[nt]; ainsi, apres les
derniers attentats racistes ii n'y a pas eu de reponse spontanee des travailleurs arabes comme par
le passé. (MTA document, untitled, June 1972) (3)
Given the fact that references to violence rarely appeared in the MTA's discourse, it is
difficult to assess the extent to which the movement relied on such an approach to fight
racist violence. But what appears clearly in this quote is that ethnically-based forms of
violent action were also used to counter racist attacks. This form of action adopted by
the MTA differed from that developed by the Etoile and the PPA in the inter-war
period. Indeed, even though the latter often called for armed rebellion against French
colonial rule, it could be argued that its discourse served the purpose of mobilisation
and was evoked within the context of national liberation. 121
 Nowhere in its
documentation did the inter-war nationalist movement explicitly admit to, or consider
using violence to fight the daily racism that the colonised endured.
121 It was only after the Second World War that the PPA favoured explicitly an armed uprising against
French colonialism (Droz and Lever 1982: 49).
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7.4 Conclusion
What emerges clearly from the study of the MTA's discourse is that it viewed racism
not only as one of the key markers of Maghrebi immigrants' experience in France but
also as one of the most important mobilising forces for its militants. In that context, the
movement's antiracist action and discourse mirrored, to some extent, that of Algerian
nationalists in the inter-war period. The movement interpreted racism as a systemic
force which traversed all aspects of French society from the individual to the state, and
which served the interests of capitalism and imperialism.
The MTA's antiracist discourse and strategy were three-fold: firstly, it developed
a differentialist approach which positioned Arabness as a key reference and a mobilising
force against racism and oppression. The Palestinian Revolution constituted a central
reference and a catalyst for the MTA's ethnically-based antiracist mobilisation. Zionism
was viewed as a racist ideology serving the interest of imperialism and oppressing
Arabs, and the Palestinians' struggle epitomised Maghrebi/"Arab" immigrants' own
fight against racism and exploitation in France. Secondly, the MTA's antiracist approach
was also marked by universalist values which, to some extent, reflected the discourse of
the ENA/PPA, although in this case, through class belonging, as highlighted by the
movement's response to Mohamed Diab's death. By evoking the Algerian war in its
action and discourse, by gaining the support of leading intellectuals (which echoed the
influential "appel des 121"), and by developing a counter-discourse challenging French
politicians and media representation of migrants, the movement sought to establish a
multi-ethnic front of solidarity against racism capable of attracting the sympathy of
French public opinion. Finally, this movement's discourse differed from that of the
ENA/PPA in that it explicitly acknowledged its reliance on violence to counter racist
aggression. The differentialist and universalist antiracist perspectives adopted by the
movement were not necessarily discrete and dichotomous forms of antiracism, but
could sometimes be combined, in different ways, to increase support for the MTA's
cause.
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Chapter 8
North African nationalists in the French socio-political arena and abroad
8.1 Introduction
As was seen in the previous chapter, racism permeated all aspects of French society
from the individual to the State, and constituted the main focus of attention for the
MTA. However, like the ENA/PPA, its discourse and ideology were also informed by
conflicts and alliances with, and evocations of, external determinants in the social,
economic and political arena both in France and beyond.
This chapter aims to discuss the movement's relationship with, and discourse on
various groups, organisations and political parties, as well states and governments.
Some of these relationships and discourses were constructed in conflictual terms, whilst
others were posited as close to the movement's aims and ideology, and as crucial in its
endeavour to create wider commonalities and solidarity. It also aims to highlight some
noteworthy similarities between the MTA and the ENA/PPA, regarding the way in
which these various spheres were evoked.
I will do so firstly by looking at the way in which the MTA's actions in, and
discourse on the workplace, in the foyers and on illegal immigrants' rights was
constructed. Secondly, I will examine the cross-ethnic links of solidarity that this
movement established with other immigrants in France. In section three, the often
antagonistic, but sometimes close relationship between the Mouvement and French trade
unions will be analysed. I will then focus on the conflict that opposed the MTA and the
Amicales. 122 Section five will look at the movement's discourse on North African states
and their governments. Finally, I will consider the movement's discourse on the
Palestinian revolution and the extent to which the Palestinian question became the
central point of reference which shaped the MTA's identity and ideology structured
around antiracism, universalism, ethnicity and class-consciousness.
122 The Arnicales were organisations set up by North African governments to represent and "control" their
nationals who had emigrated to France.
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8.2 The MTA's struggle in the workplace, in the foyers and for the sans-papiers
In the 1970s, the MTA was faced with accusations, often voiced by opponents of the
movement, such as the COT, that it was a sectarian group exploiting the cultural and
religious specificity of Maghrebi immigrants for its own political ends. 123
 The
movement strongly rejected these allegations and argued that on the contrary "nos mots
d'ordres s'adressent avant tout aux Arabes parce que ce sont eux qui, plus que tout autre
ethnie, sont les victimes du racisme" (Frontie. re, octobre 1973: 33). As chapter seven
has shown, this racism informed the discourse and process of mobilisation of the MTA,
as it had done with the ENA/PPA during the inter-war period. For the 1970s movement,
"Arabness" was viewed as an empowering reference and as a mobilising force against
racism which targeted Maghrebis. In that context, it placed ethnicity at the core of its
antiracist ideology and strategy, and presented it as consistent with its wider universalist
aims.
In this section, I will examine the MTA's discourse on Maghrebis' experience as
illegal immigrants, workers and hostel residents and argue that it was more rooted in
migrants' life in France than that of the ENA/PPA. I will assess the processes by which
the movement managed to use these spheres of immigrants' life as frameworks for
action, and will see how it then attempted to mobilise militants beyond those narrow
spheres in an attempt to broaden, nationalise and politicise immigrants' actions. I will
argue that the overall aim of the MTA's strategy was to posit immigrants' demands for
rights as inherently universalist, to oppose the state's segregationist policy and force it to
recognise migrants' presence and role in French society as legitimate.
The role that had been ascribed to immigrants in 1970s France was that of
workers (see, for example, Talha 1981a & 1981b). 124 Their presence was seen by the
state as purely functional and instrumental in sustaining and furthering the French
123 To some extent, this echoed the way in which, in the late 1930s, the PCF and the CGTU accused the
PPA of being a fascist, fanatic religious organisation close to the PPF.
124 This functional and dehumanised view of immigrants was derided and challenged by El Assifa, the
theatre group close to the MTA, in its play entitled "Ca travail le, ca travaille et ca ferme sa gueule".
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economic interest. 125
 Their experience in France, which was described by Mauco as one
of "[e]xploitation tous azimuts" (1973a, see also 1973b & 1973c), was therefore not
dissimilar from that of colonial workers in the 1920s and 1930s.
In the workplace, migrant workers were systematically paid less than their
French counterparts and occupied the most difficult and dangerous jobs. One in six
suffered from tuberculosis, and in the metal industry where immigrants represented less
than 11% of the workforce, they accounted for 20% of accidents (Politique aujourd'htti,
mars-avril 1974: 41-42). 126 These difficult working conditions reflected those endured
by Maghrebis during the colonial period. 127
 The difficult conditions within which
immigrants worked led the MTA to organise and/or support a number of strike actions
in factories (such as Perranoya, Cables de Lyon, Peugeot-Cycles, Renault and
Margoline) for improved working and pay conditions, and for the granting of work and
residence permits to illegal immigrants working in the French industry ('Le bilan de la
greve de Peugeot-Cycles a Beaulieu-Mandeur') (3).
Immigrants were also subjected to spatial/residential segregation which was very
much reminiscent of that experienced by their inter-war forebears. A large proportion of
them lived secluded from French society in hostels and bidonvilles where their living
conditions where so appalling that they often led to health problems and accidents, such
as in Valenciennes in 1973 (Williame 1976a: 36-37, see also Bada-Pache 1972, Aries
1973, Granges 1981, Viet 1999). Conditions in SONACOTRA hostels were not
necessarily better, as residents were subjected to stringent rules and could be expelled at
any time by hostel managers (who were often ex-soldiers who had served in Indochina
and Algeria). They could not receive visitors, hold meetings or express their views.
Their difficult living conditions, together with the fact that rents almost doubled
125 In 1973, there were 3,775,000 immigrants in France (7% of the population). The proportion of
workers amongst them (48%) was higher than that of the French (41%). In 1971, 72% of immigrants were
unskilled workers, and by 1981, Maghrebis represented 42% of immigrants in France (Pohtique
aujourd'hui, mars-avril 1974: 41-42, Granges 1981: 143).
126 For an analysis of Maghrebi immigrants experience in the workplace see, for example, Bouhouche
(1973), Cornu (1982), Gharbaoui (1969), Lahalle (1972), Le Bras (1985), Manangy (1976), Migrinter
(1986), Ouhadj and Trebous (1972).
127 A number of studies of the experience of colonial migrants have been carried out - see, for example,
MacMaster (1997: 76-83), Bouguessa (1981), Gallissot (1985b), Ghazi (1952), Home (1985), Mauco
(1932), Ray (1938), Stovall (1993).
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between 1971 and 1976 without any improvement in their environment led to large
scale rent strikes in the foyers (Williame 1976b: 34).
The absence of legal rights for migrants who were too often the victims of
administrative and police arbitrariness further contributed to their marginalisation, as
the adoption of the Circulaire Marcellin-Fontanet on 18 September 1972 illustrated
(Castells 1975: 22-23). In that sense, their experience was reminiscent of that of North
African colonial migrants during the inter-war period. The fact that immigration was
controlled by the administration and the police, echoed the way in which inter-war
colonial migrants had been subjected to the Code de l'Indigenat in France and to the
arbitrary rule of police departmenis such as the Services de surveillance, protection et
assistance des indigenes nord-africains (SAINA).
It was within these three spheres of administrative, spatial/residential and
economic segregation of immigrants by the state that the MTA's action was articulated.
The anchoring of the MTA's political discourse and protest action within these spheres
of Maghrebi immigrants' life illustrates the extent to which its approach differed from
the more discourse-based strategy of the Etoile and the PPA. The latter movements
discussed immigrants' strike actions in the workplace only occasionally, and did not see
North African immigrants' difficult living conditions and the expulsions that they were
subjected to as central frameworks for political action. They interpreted them as further
expressions of colonial domination which would be brought to an end by independence,
and their political project focused almost exclusively on a discourse of national
liberation.
In contrast, the MTA's political discourse was more rooted in action. The wave
of hunger strikes by illegal immigrants which followed the introduction of the
Circulaire in the early 1970s marked the start of a two-way process which aimed to
develop a united front of solidarity between immigrants and the French, and to broaden
the movement nationally by establishing links between similar actions taking place in
France. 128 In October 1972, the hunger strike of MTA activists Said and Faouzia
Bouziri in the Saint-Bernard chapel in the eighteenth arrondissement, led to their
128 For an account of immigrants' action against the Circular, see, for example, Verbunt (1973).
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regularisation, to the development of other hunger strikes, and to the creation of the
Comite de defense de la vie et des droits des travailleurs immigres (Sans Frontiêre,
mardi 1 janvier 1980, 'Lettre a un camarade en prison') (1) (3).
The MTA's documentation provides crucial details about the way in which the
hunger strikes spread to other parts of the country and how they were structured. It also
highlights the greater importance that the MTA gave to the spread of protest action
within France, as compared with the inter-war nationalist movement. Rabah Saidani, a
Tunisian worker from Valence, played an important role in this process. He had met
Said Bouziri at the MTA's first "Congres des comites de lutte d'atelier" and had started a
one week hunger strike of solidarity with Bouziri. In mid-December, 18 Tunisian sans-
papiers, including Saklani, were arrested in Valence and faced expulsion. The MTA saw
Saldani's role in the hunger strike that some of them started in an annex of Notre-Dame
church in Valence as central:
Le trait d'union entre la greve de Valence et celle de la Chapelle Saint-Bernard a Paris 18eme
(celle de Said) sera ce Tunisien de Valence ... confronte a l'expulsion de 19 [sic] Tunisiens,
aura recours a la rnethode vue en pratique a Paris: la greve de la faim defensive. ('Lettre a un
camarade en prison') (1) (3)
The broad base of support that it attracted from the Church to the CPDT, and from the
PSU to the Communist Party, and the popular demonstration which took place on 23
December were described by Al Assifa (Numero 7, janvier 1973), a bulletin linked to
the MTA, as the most extraordinary event since 1968 (3).
The second dimension of the movement's strategy, which distinguishes it from
the inter-war nationalist movement, was to establish bridges between the various
spheres of action in which it was involved. The arrival in Valence of two militants of
the Comite Mohamed Diab (formed after Diab's death in a Versailles police station at
the end of November 1972) during the Tunisians' hunger strike illustrates how the MTA
attempted to relate the hunger strike of the Tunisian sans-papiers with its action against
racist violence (see Le Monde, 19 decembre 1972).
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This approach can also be noted in the way in which the May 1973 strike at
Margoline, a recycling plant in Nanterre which employed mostly illegal immigrants (Le
Monde, 25 mai 1973), was structured. Even though the MTA often denounced the
reductionist role that the French had cast for immigrants (that of a labour force), it was
within that narrow definition of their role in French society that Maghrebis tried to
reconstruct an empowering identity. This very much echoed the way in which the
ENA/PPA endeavoured to build a strong national identity as Muslims and Arabs, two
terms used by the French to discriminate against North Africans. On the other hand, in
the 1920s and 1930s, the Etoile/PPA's discourse did not perceive the important role that
immigrants played in the French economy as a potentially powerful political tool to
further its nationalist agenda.
It is worth noting that other differences existed between the two movements.
The MTA's mobilisation process was helped by the particular political context of the
1970s. What distinguishes it from the inter-war movement was that the events of May
1968 had weakened the credibility of established organisations, official institutions and
of nation-states as repositories of political legitimacy and authority, and reinforced the
marxist ideological premise that political legitimacy rested first and foremost within the
working class. In such a context, the workplace constituted the framework par
excellence within which immigrants' action had to be developed. As Bonnechere argues,
"l'immigre est en France parce qu'on attend quelque chose de son travail ... et c'est
d'abord dans sa condition de travailleur que peuvent etre defendus ou nies ses droits"
(1976: 127). In a society where immigrants were marginalised, immigrants' action in
factories constituted a potentially powerful weapon which could affect sensitive areas of
the French economy.129
Furthermore, unlike the ENA/PPA, the MTA acknowledged the importance of
the workplace as a terrain for political action when it stated that it had to work towards
"l'elargissement necessaire de la lutte pour la carte de travail au front principal, l'usine"
('La greve chez Margoline (Nanterre-Gennevilliers du 21 au 23/5/73), douze regles
129 For example, the general strikes against racism organised by the MTA on 3 and 14 September 1973
crippled large sections of industry in the South of France and in the Paris region.
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tirees de l'experience') (3). It was on these most sensitive grounds for the French
authorities that the MTA considered that it could challenge the state effectively. Indeed,
as Verbunt argues, "Hadministration francaise confond facilement la contestation
dun pouvoir (economique) avec la contestation contre la nation" (1972: 1220). In that
context, protest actions within the workplace were consistent with the movement's aim
to challenge the state. This approach differed from that of the ENA/PPA which
presented its anti-colonial project in broad terms as one of national liberation, without
specifying the concrete characteristics of its struggle for independence. The discourse of
the 1970s movement was more specific and rooted in action. The Margoline strike,
which started on 21 May and ended on 25 May 1973 marked this shift in emphasis in
the MTA's strategy, and was to influence other strike actions in the workplace. The
movement successfully mobilised illegal immigrants who worked in this plant and
linked their strike to other actions such as the sans-papiers' hunger strikes by organising
meetings involving both Margoline workers and hunger strikers from Menilmontant.
However, MTA militants did not want to limit their demands to better working and
living conditions, and work and residence permits for workers:
La seule revendication de la carte de travail ... sous pretexte qu'elle etait principale, aurait ete
trop abstraite, suspendue entre ciel et terre, limitant d'emblee la lutte A son caractere administratif
et juridique. Donc aider les gars A traduire ce qu'ils disent EN FAIT: On veut VIVRE, on veut
nos DROITS". (La greve chez Margoline (Nanterre-Gennevilliers du 21 au 23/5/73), douze
regles tirees de l'experience') (3)
This passage shows that the movement aimed to place this action within a universalist
framework which was consistent with the wider aims and ideology of the movement,
and with its attempt to win over French public opinion.
It is also worth noting that the year when the Margoline strike took place (1973)
coincided with the MTA's adoption of a far more pro-active approach to protest action
which distinguishes it from the inter-war nationalist movement. Whereas in the early
1970s, illegal immigrants went on hunger strike once they had been arrested and were
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faced with expulsion (for example in actions such as the Valence hunger strike, which
the movement called a "greve de la faim defensive"), the movement now supported a
more assertive stance whereby illegal immigrants came out and started hunger strikes
voluntarily ("greves de la faim offensives") ('Lettre a un camarade en prison') (1) (3).
This was the case for the hunger strike started on 15 February 1973, by Tunisians and
two Moroccans in the St-Hyppolite Church in Avenue de Choisy, and the one which
began on 22 February of the same year in a church annex in St Maur, when thirteen
Tunisians stopped feeding themselves and demanded basic human rights and legal
documents (Ibid.).
This was also accompanied by a bolder strategy when dealing with the
authorities. The MTA's approach highlights the greater importance that the movement
gave to challenging the authorities directly as compared with the ENA/PPA. The
creation of delegations of sans-papiers or workers on strike, whose representatives then
met French officials to present their demands (such as on 28 February 1973 when a
delegation of hunger strikers went to the Ministry of the Interior) proved largely
ineffective. This reformist approach, which was referred to as a "politique syndicaliste",
was then replaced by a more offensive and empowering strategy ("politique maoIste")
which aimed to attract publicity and ensure that immigrants' case was heard in the
media. This "politique maoIste" was put into practice on 16 March 1973 when a group
of 200 sans-papiers occupied the Bureau de la Main-d'ceuvre in Paris and presented its
regional director, Mr Bois, with 1500 applications for work and residence permits
which had been collected at rue St-Maur (ibid).
The MTA's involvement in actions in the workplace was far greater than that of
the ENA/PPA during the inter-war period. Indeed, the former also adopted a similar
strategy in factories. Margoline strikers went to the Prefecture and to the Bureau de la
Main-d'ceuvre to tell secretaries and other staff, as well as the media (Le Monde, 25 mai
1973) about their experience at Margoline, and force the authorities, which, according
to them, were aware of the employment of illegal immigrants by this factory, to act. In
so doing the movement hoped to discredit racist authorities and the state:
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L'interet politique en est evident, non seulement du point de vue des grevistes mais aussi de toute
la population: on soutient les premiers en informant les seconds, en "mouillant" tous les
responsables administratifs et policiers, en aiguisant toutes les contradictions au sein de l'appareil
d'etat. ('La greve chez Margoline (Nanterre-Gennevilliers du 21 au 23/5/73), douze regles tirees
de l'experienee') (3)
Therefore, by developing a national base for its actions, by adopting a bolder strategy
and linking all forms of protest actions with each other, and by placing immigrants'
experience and demands within a universalist framework, the MTA aimed to renegotiate
the boundary of political action in immigrants' favour. It also endeavoured to challenge
the French state's discriminatory rule against immigrants, a strategy which the MTA
also referred to as "des affrontements successifs mais mesures avec l'ennemi" ('Lettre a
un camarade en prison') (1) (3). Thus, unlike the ENA/PPA in the 1920s and 1930s, the
movement's political agenda challenging the state went beyond discourse to embrace a
more pro-active strategy of protest action in all spheres of immigrants' life.130
8.3 Solidarity between the MTA and other immigrants in France
Echoing the Etoile and the PPA's call for solidarity with all the colonised in the inter-
war period, the discourse of the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes positioned France's
inherently "repressive" and "racist" state as part of a larger systemic order aimed at
exploiting all immigrants throughout Europe and beyond. The movement reacted by
expressing the need to create a newspaper (La Voix des travailleurs arabes) which
would allow it to unite Maghrebi, immigrant and French workers "de Toulouse a Paris
... partout en France et pourquoi pas en Europe" (Les travailleurs arabes luttent, les
travailleurs arabes veulent s'exprimer. Un journal est indispensable') (3).
130 This does not mean that Messali Hadj's movement remained purely "legaliste". In February 1947,
Messali's MTLD created the Organisation speciale (OS), a secret paramilitary organisation whose aim
was to prepare the uprising. Several OS members were at the origin of the development of the FLN (Droz
and Lever 1982: 48-51).
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In meetings, demonstrations and other types of protest actions, its reference to
issues affecting immigrants, in particular North Africans in Germany, and the contacts
that it had established with other Maghrebi militants of the Arab Left in Brussels may
have been signs that the MTA tried to develop a European strategy based on solidarity
amongst Maghrebis. This was reminiscent of the ENA/PPA's attempt to develop
European links with other Muslim and anti-colonialist organisations to further its
nationalist agenda. By contrast, the MTA's struggle aimed mainly to ensure that the
rights of Maghrebi and other immigrants within France and Europe be respected.
Because racism, marginalisation and exploitation affected all immigrant workers, MTA
militants viewed it as essential that these ethnically-based links should not be an end in
themselves but should constitute the foundation for wider inter-ethnic mobilisation
amongst all immigrants in France and beyond in order to fight what Djellali Kamal
coined "le Marche Commun de l'esclavage" (Declaration du candidat immigre aux
elections presidentielles') (3).
The future success of this embryonic supra-national strategy and network was
very much dependent on the effective mobilisation of all immigrants within France.
Indeed, like the ENA/PPA which had established close links with Black and Annamese
colonial workers and political activists, the MTA tried to establish a front of solidarity
with other immigrant workers and organisations by presenting the experience and fight
of Maghrebis as inextricably tied to those of other immigrants. This was illustrated by
the movement's complex hybrid discourse which was rooted both in ethnicity and class
belonging. In its framework of reference, the terms "Arabs" and "immigrants" were
often used as interchangeable signifiers. 131 This could be interpreted as being the result
of a binary process which reflected, within different parameters, that of the ENA/PPA
(Arabs/Muslims). On the one hand, the MTA's interchangeable use of "Arabs" and
"immigrants" ethnicised a socio-economic phenomenon (immigration), and on the other
hand, it reduced one's ethnicity to a specific socio-economic dimension.
131 This made the interpretation of the movement's discourse all the more complex to clarify, as
"immigres" could sometimes refer to immigrants who were specifically Maghrebi, and sometimes to all
immigrants.
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Within a French socio-political context where, in popular discourse at least, the
qualifier "immigrant" was progressively becoming a euphemism for "Arab", this
process showed that the MTA, like the ENA/PPA, was able to adopt this reductive
framework of reference imposed on it by French society as a basis for identification,
and as a starting point for mobilisation in order to better challenge it. 132 If the struggle
of Arabs was seen as epitomising that of all immigrants, then it enabled the movement
to emphasise commonalities with other migrants and facilitated multi-ethnic
mobilisation. Furthermore, by combining ethnically-based actions with alliances
between Maghrebi and other immigrants in France, the movement was able to break that
reductive mould, and fight more effectively against what it saw as segregation and
economic exploitation.133
Various actions in the workplace (Peugeot-Cycles, Perranoya, Cables de Lyon,
etc.), in the foyers and on the streets were considered to be ideal loci for such alliances
to be formed. This further illustrates that even though both the ENA/PPA and the MTA
sought to establish solidarity with other immigrants, the latter built a front of solidarity
which went beyond political rallies, and was involved in common protest action within
French society. The struggle of Mauritian and other immigrants for regularisation,
rights and better living and working conditions was often evoked in the MTA's internal
documents and in its newspaper, La voix des travailleurs arabes. 134 For instance, links
of solidarity were established with the Pakistanis in France who went on hunger strike
in Paris in March 1974 with the support of Pere Louis Gallimardet, a French priest. Led
by Abdul Razak, they demanded that residence permits be granted for the 400 or so
Pakistanis who lived in Paris, that an agency be set up by the French government in
Pakistan to recruit workers, and that better accommodation be provided for those
already living in France ('Situation des travailleurs pakistanais sous contrat' and tract
written in English by Pakistani activists entitled 'We demand') (3). The fact that the
MTA also consistently supported the Mouvement des travailleurs mauriciens and their
132 This was consistent with the MTA's adoption of the workplace, to which Maghrebi immigrants role
was limited, as a basis for mobilisation (see previous section).
133 In La voix des travailleurs arabes (octobre 1973), the MTA emphasised this when it stated that "notre
lutte continue avec tous les immigres et les travailleurs francais" (3).
134 See, for example, La voix des travadleurs arabes, 1975 (3).
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actions against the proposed expulsion of 2000 illegal immigrants to Mauritius suggests
that it was more involved in the daily struggle of other migrants than the ENA/PPA. It
was particularly active during the Silveri° case when Mauritian illegal immigrants
successfully sued their employer (Silverio) in Troyes in February 1974. They had been
recruited in Mauritius, brought to France illegally through Belgium and had to work as
builders without pay for months (supposedly to pay back their air fare) or face
expulsion (Akhbar el Haraka, bulletin N°4, 15 decembre 1975) (3). The MTA
welcomed the verdict as the first case where an employer had been sanctioned, and
accused the authorities of hypocrisy:
La mobilisation a ete considerable tant dans les organisations que dans les ateliers et les lycees
de Troyes ... Les pouvoirs publics vont faire semblant de lacher un patron pour essayer de se
blanchir et prendre l'initiative, mais la determination des plaignants de faire de ce proces tant
celui des pratiques gouvernementales que patronales de l'immigration a dissuade Dijoud de se
presenter a la barre, bien qu'il se soit fait annoncer a France-Soir. (Ibid.)
Here again, the MTA targeted the state and the authorities for being responsible for the
exploitation of Mauritian immigrants. Immigration Minister Dijoud was rhetorically put
in the dock ("[...] a dissuade Dijoud de se presenter a la bane") after the plaintiffs had
accused not only employers, but also the government. To some extent, this discourse
reflected that of the ENA/PPA which accused imperialism and the state of oppressing
the coloniaux. Indeed, the Mauritian immigrants' experience at the hands of their
employer and of the government was presented as another illustration of exploitation of
all immigrants, and the prosecution of Silveri° was also that of the government and
employers' treatment of migrants.
Other inter-ethnic protest actions took place which further highlight the greater
emphasis that the MTA put on protest action, as compared with the ENA/PPA. The
hunger strike by thirty-seven immigrants in rue Dulong in Paris in May 1974 which was
supported by 200 North African, Pakistani, Mauritian immigrants and French supporters
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(Liberation, 9 mai 1974), 135 and the occupation of a building in construction at 69, rue
Servan, in Paris by fifty North African, Pakistani and Mauritian immigrants on 22 May
1974 to draw the attention of public opinion and of the authorities to their difficult
living and working conditions in France (Le Monde, 24 juin 1974). 136 On 20 January
1975, seventy Maghrebi, Pakistani and Mauritian sans-papiers occupied the Direction
departementale de la main-dceuvre and some of them joined French militants who were
on hunger-strike in the St Hippolyte Church in Paris in support of illegal immigrants
('Les hors-la-loi. Scandaleuse intervention policiere contre une greve de la faim', 1975)
(5).
Both Pakistani and Mauritian movements shared much of the MTA's political
outlook. Indeed, they were autonomous groups which had opted for pro-active action
(strikes, hunger strikes, court cases, demonstrations, etc.) against what they saw as
employers' and the French authorities' discriminatory policies. They established links
with other immigrants and the wider French population and were highly critical of their
government's perceived complicity with European countries in supplying cheap labour
obediently to the West. Solidarity between the MTA and other immigrants in France
was based on class and on an awareness that immigrants represented "les couches
opprimees en France" (MTA document, untitled, undated) (3). Similarly, the Black and
Annamese workers and organisations with which the ENA/PPA had established close
links had comparable political objectives: to end imperialist oppression and fight for
independence.
135 This action led the French authorities to accept the demands of the thirty-seven strikers for a work
permit, housing and training (Liberation 9 mai 1974).
136 The protesters were arrested and taken to the Opera police station where they accused the police of
trying to gas them whilst they were in cells (Liberation, 24 mai 1974). A Commission of inquiry was set
up by the Mouvenient d'action judiciaire and thirty-five plaintiffs, with the participation of the Collate de
defense des droits et de la vie des travailleurs inunigres, the Syndicat de la Magistrature and CFDT
Police to examine this case (Le Monde, 26 juin 1974). This incident also led to an attack against the
commissariat by an antifascist group on 9 June 1974 (France Soir, 11 June 1974).
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8.4 Tensions between the MTA and French trade unions
In this section, the link between French and immigrant workers, often seen as
conflictual, and the way it has informed union strategies in relation to immigration will
be examined. I will then move on to analyse the MTA's discourse on, and difficult
relationship with French trade-unions which, in many respects, reflected that of the
nationalist movement during the inter-war period.
Beyond the political references to Socialism underlying the ideology of unions
such as the CGT, the Cl-DT or the more reformist stance of Force ouvriere, the subtext
in trade union discourse could also be rooted in nationalism (Lemarquis 1975). The
CGT's pro-assimilationist agenda in the colonies during the late 1930s (particuliarly
during the years of the Front Populaire), and Force Ouvriere's ambiguous position
during the Algerian war are good illustrations of this (see Gani 1972: 175-177). As
Lemarquis points out:
La guerre d'Algerie met h nu le point d'echoppement d'un syndicalisme qui porte les
revendications dune classe ouvriere de plus en plus economiquement conditionnee
nationalement ou etatiquement, dont les luttes sont reglees par les impulsions dune vie politique
elle aussi nationale, et qui en outre n'admet Faction des immigres que dans sa propre gravitation.
(Lemarquis 1975: 69)
The Algerian war highlighted the tensions between French trade unions marked by
nationalism and their stance on immigration. In order to assess the MTA's difficult
relationship with unions, the ambivalent nature of nationalism and its relationship to
racism need to be briefly discussed. As Balibar argues, "cette imbrication [du
nationalisme et du racisme] renvoie aux circonstances dans lesquelles les Etats-nations
... se sont efforces de contrOler les mouvements de population, et a la production meme
du 9euple» comme communaute politique superieure aux divisions de classe" (1988:
69). The tensions arising from the predominance of the sense of belonging first and
foremost to a "people" rather than a class was one of the key obstacles to the MTA's
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attempt to create a broad solidarity movement based on class which would encompass
both French and immigrant workers. Large unions and parties of the left were the locus
of such tensions in the 1970s just like they had been during the inter-war period.137
Trade unions argued that they had difficulties in reconciling the often contradictory
interests of French and immigrant workers (Frontieres, octobre 1973: 32-33).
It was generally acknowledged that racism, and the belief that immigrant
workers were the source of unfair competition and brought wages down was not
uncommon amongst French workers (see Denantes 1973: 1232-1240, Denantes 1973a,
Anizon 1973). In the 1970s, as during the inter-war period, this could create tensions
within union movements whose choices were informed by their mainly French base of
support. But as Tripier points out, this interpretation was too simplistic and did not take
into account the efforts made by the main trade-unions to develop strategies to
incorporate immigrants (1972: 332-323). 138 In her view, the combination of a process of
substitution of the French workforce by migrant workers in unskilled jobs, the increase
in "socio-cultural differences" and the isolation of immigrants led to a widening of the
gap between French and migrant workers both in the workplace and in the wider
society. However, Tripier's interpretation of the increasing "socio-cultural" gap between
French and immigrant workers (Portuguese, Yugosla ys, Maghrebis, Sub-Saharan
Africans, Turks, and so on) is problematic as those differences do not appear to have
been necessarily and fundamentally dissimilar to those which had previously "divided"
the French and older groups of immigrants such as Italians, Poles or Spaniards. For
example, Ponty shows that in the 1920s and 1930s, during what she describes as their
"difficult integration", Polish immigrants also suffered from racism and were viewed as
"inassimilables" and as competitors by French workers (1985: 51-58, see also Schor
1996: 121-123).
It could be agued that immigrants' rights within the workplace had not improved
significantly since the inter-war period. Until the mid-1970s at least, non-EEC foreign
workers were not allowed to manage or administer a union and the function of union
137 For an analysis of the conflictual relationship between the PCF and the ENA/PPF in the 1930s, see
Schweitzer (1972: 115-136).
138 See also Gani (1972) for a study of trade unions' efforts to incorporate immigrants.
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delegate was only open to those who could read and write in French. This condition,
which was to be partly abolished by the law of 11 July 1975, excluded almost 70% of
immigrants from holding positions within trade unions (Bonnechere 1976: 128). In
effect, legislation deprived most immigrants from union representation and just like in
other areas such as employment, housing, social rights and professional training,
"l'ensemble du cadre institutionnel francais lógalement ou de fait, enterine la
discrimination, la segregation et l'isolement du migrant" (Tripier 1972: 334).
In that context, unions such as the CGT and the CI-DT tried to develop policies
aimed at incorporating immigrant workers as members. This policy echoed that of the
CGTU which recruited colonial aid other immigrants in its ranks. The Third National
Conference on Immigration organised by the COT in Montreuil in November 1972
established the main lines of its policy towards immigrants. The trade union adopted a
number of measures and fundamental principles which emphasised its will to recognise
immigrants as an integral part of the working class whose rights and demands should be
incorporated into the programme of the CGT (Politique aujourd'hui, mars-avril 1975:
88-95).
The resolutions adopted by the CFDT during their 36th Congress which took
place in Nantes in June 1973 emphasised the fact that the fight against discrimination,
racism, colonialism and for equality were priorities for the union. By contrast with the
CGT, the involvement of immigrants in conflicts such as at Perranoya or Renault was
acknowledged by the CI-DT as further proof of immigrants' maturity in social conflicts
(Politique aujourd'hui, mars-avril 1975: 96-98). The CFDT called for a review of the
structures put in place within the union to deal with immigrants, as the units dealing
specifically with migrant workers within unions such as the "Secretariat des travailleurs
immigres" were deemed inefficient.
The dilemmas faced by trade unions in the 1970s were not dissimilar to those
they had experienced in the 1920s and 1930s. The COT and the CFDT wanted to
counter the racism and xenophobia attached to the image that a number of French
workers had of immigrants as "disloyal competitors" belonging to culturally distant and
somewhat inferior communities, a prejudice which had been wide-spread during the
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inter-war period. Instead, they wanted to promote the image of the immigrant as a
fellow worker who is both vulnerable and exploited. Unions condemned employers for
using cheap immigrant labour as a means of avoiding the need to invest and modernise
the tools and methods of production. Their claims that immigrants should be paid the
same salary as the French offered the advantage of both reflecting immigrants' demands
and defending the rights of their French members who feared that immigration might
have a negative impact on salaries (Tripier 1972: 341).
The CI-DT, for instance, favoured the universalist perspective that "la lutte avec
et pour les travailleurs immigres est partie integrante de la lutte syndicale «qui ne
connait pas de frontieres»" over the second option which "en isolant les immigres
«parce que plus defavorises», parce que omarginaux» ... nous conduit tout droit au
paternalisme, «a l'action sociale» que nous pretendons rejeter dans le systerne
capitaliste" (Formation, Numero 92, mars-avril 1971: 7-8). These choices were an
attempt made by that union, as well as others, to adopt a more universalist and inclusive
stance on immigration and distance themselves from the kind of paternalism and
nationalism tainted by xenophobia which had marked past union policy on immigration.
However, adopting the former whilst rejecting the latter was all the more difficult as the
universalist position was itself traversed by tropes of paternalism and potential
contradictions and tensions. Indeed, in spite of some real reflexion on ways of bringing
issues pertaining to immigrants to the heart of their activity, trade unions often proved
unable to cater for the specific demands of immigrants which were not necessarily
consistent with those of French workers, and they consistently stigmatised any attempt
made by immigrant workers to organise in an autonomous way. To some extent, this
illustrates the fact that trade unions's stance on immigration in the 1970s reflected that
of the inter-war period.
Furthermore, the CGT and the CFDT's choice to hold common talks with the
government on France's immigration policy and their attempts to take part in the
running of organisations such as the Office national de l'immigration (ONI) made them
less likely to support openly, or take the lead in the struggle for legal and illegal
immigrants' rights for fear of jeopardising their relationship and ongoing negotiations
258
with the government. This tension also marked French trade unions during the inter-war
period and informed much of their policy towards immigrants and colonial workers. In
the 1970s, the French authorities exploited the divisions between unions and immigrants
by introducing discrete measures and making promises in favour of immigrants in order
to keep unions on board (Politique aujourd'hui, mars-avril 1974: 41-50).
Hence, in a socio-political context which prevented many immigrants from
being involved in union activities and where trade unions did not always cater for their
needs, the emergence of the MTA marked a significant shift in the way Maghrebis
articulated their discourse and demands within the workplace. In the 1970s, the
development of such an ethnically based, autonomous organisation was perceived by
French unions as a threat. This was reminiscent of the impact that the emergence of the
ENA/PPA as a truly independent organisation had had on French trade unions and
political parties during the inter-war period.
In the 1970s, accusations made by unions about Maghrebis' lack of both political
motivation and experience in union activities were not always founded. Clearly, the
nature of the political system and of work relations in North Africa did not necessarily
equip Maghrebi migrants with the relevant political practices and traditions to fight for
their rights within a Western industrial environment. However, it could be argued that
historically, North African migrants had a tradition of protest action within the
workplace. The Algerian nationalist movement had been closely linked with the CGTU
from the mid 1920s to the early 1930s, and North African migrant workers had taken
part in strikes and other actions in the workplace from the inter-war period to the
1970s. 139 Furthermore, many Maghrebis had developed a sense of the political through
their struggle for independence on both sides of the Mediterranean, and immigration in
France had played a key role in this process as early as in the inter-war period. Indeed,
the MTA argued that the politicisation of the Maghrebi community was anchored in its
role in the movement for Algerian independence:
139 The CGTU admitted North African and Indochinese colonial workers as members and organised the
first "Congres des Travailleurs nord-africains de la region parisienne" in 1924 (Lemarquis 1975: 56).
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Les soufrances et les luttes des travailleurs arabes, sur le sol meme de la metropole colonialiste
dans les usines (par les greves) par les actions armees et surtout les immenses manifestations des
travailleurs arabes (algeriens, tunisiens, marocains) en 61 sont une contribution importante et
propre aux travailleurs arabes en France au mouvement de liberation du peuple algerien.
('Histoire des luttes des travailleurs arabes face au nouveau developpement du racisme et le role
du MTA', 1973) (3)
This sense of the political developed throughout history against capital and colonialism.
It had already started during the inter-war period, and was further reinforced by what
the MTA saw as a crucial socio-political phenomenon: May 1968 (see Tripier 1972:
338). The events of 1968 saw the establishment of links between French students and
workers, left-wing and anarchist organisations, and foreign workers and students, and a
significant number of immigrants became involved in strike action (Gastaut 1993: 9-
29). As Gastaut argues, "C'est dans le prolongement de la crise de mai que
s'organiseront, au debut des annees 70, des campagnes a l'initiative des immigres, plus
sars d'eux, car plus soutenus et plus politises apres la Revolution" (Gastaut 1993: 18).
Indeed, the involvement of Maghrebi immigrant workers in the events of May 1968 was
one of the inspirations behind the creation of a socio-political movement whose
ideology was grounded in its belief in autonomy of action and which gave primacy to
militants over structures:
Dejà en mai 1968, les travailleurs arabes avaient participe au mouvement de contestation, et
etaient sur la breche dans les usines occupees, le souffle de mai avait gagne la communaute
arabe et durant !es annees 68-70 des luttes se sont developpees dans toute la France, surtout des
revoltes dans les foyers pour des conditions de vie decentes et !es libertes essentielles chez eux.
('Histoire des luttes des travailleurs arabes face au nouveau developpement du racisme et le role
du MTA', 1973) (3)
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Therefore, the May 1968 events were one of the contributing factors behind the
mobilisation amongst North Africans for rights and better living and working
conditions.
The MTA's will to build on these past struggles and develop as an autonomous
force led to tensions and conflicts with French trade unions reminiscent of those which
had marked the ENA/PPA's relationship with French trade unions during the inter-war
period. However, the movement did make a clear distinction between the CGT and the
CI-DT. The Confederation Generale du Travail was openly hostile to the MTA, which
it accused of dividing the working class. On the other hand, the Maghrebi movement
accused the "centrale syndicale" of refusing to support the hunger-strike movement, and
of opposing immigrants' initiatives in the workplace. During the 1970s, the strike at the
Peugeot-Cycles factory in Beaulieu-Mandeur epitomised the tensions that existed
between the two organisations. The workers, who demanded better working conditions
and pay decided to go on strike in spite of the objections of the unions. The MTA
argued that the CGT, whose close links with the PCF meant that they were keen on
resolving the dispute as quickly as possible in order not to jeopardise the chances of the
Communist candidate (Paganeli) at the local elections, contributed to the relative failure
of the strike action ('Le bilan de la greve de Peugeot-Cycles a Beaulieu-Mandeur',
manuscript document, 1976) (3). By contrast, the main reason behind the conflict
between the inter-war nationalist movement and the COT was that it had adopted an
assimilationist stance on the colonial issue.
If the MTA's relationship with the CGT was always tense, the Maghrebi
movement believed that its disputes with the CI-DT were not fundamental ones, and that
"a la CI-DT on trouve toujours des gens qui sont de notre avis" (Frontiere, octobre
1973: 32). The relationship between the MTA and the C1-DT in the first half of the
1970s could, in that sense, be compared with that between the ENA and the CGTU until
the early 1930s. Indeed, the CFDT also offered tactical help and support to the MTA on
a number of occasions. The trade union's premises were sometimes used by the MTA
for their meetings, such as Place des Martyrs de la Resistance in Aix (MTA document,
untitled, undated) (3). A number of hunger-strikes, such as the one carried out by three
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Tunisians on 30 December 1972 in rue Montholon, Paris, also took place in the union's
building ('Lettre a un camarade en prison') (1) (3). MTA militants also participated in
some political meetings of the CFDT such as the one organised in November 1972 at
Barbes-Palace in Chateau-Rouge to discuss the implications of the Circulaire
Marcellin-Fontanet (Ibid).
However, the MTA was often critical of the CFDT. It regarded the union's
action against the Circulaire as being inefficient "parce qu'ils ne partent pas du besoin
des masses tels qu'ils se posent dans la vie mais qu'ils partent de textes: le Journal
officiel, d'idees toutes faites, de decisions bureaucratiques" (Ibid). In a document
produced on 5 May 1975, the MTA also accused the CI-DT of organising smear
campaigns against the movement and illegal immigrants in Montpellier who wanted to
regularise their situation. It marked a clear shift from their previously close relationship
with the union, and the MTA interpreted this attack as a sign that the CFDT was, in a
way, supporting the repressive policy of the government:
La commission executive de la CFDT ainsi que l'UR Languedoc-Roussillon viennent de prendre
la responsabilite de diffuser a la presse un compte-rendu mensonger et calomnieur sur la lutte
des travailleurs saisonniers et sans-papiers en France [...] Ce que la C.E. CFDT craint le plus
depuis 2 ans de lutte contre la circulaire Fontanet-Marcellin, c'est que les travailleurs immigres
s'organisent de maniere autonome a partir de leurs propres besoins et construisent sur cette base
l'unite avec les travailleurs francais. (Declaration du Mouvement des travailleurs arabes', 5
fevrier 1975) (3)
From the mid-1970s onwards, the MTA expressed its will to become more independent
from the "centrale syndicale". The movement's mistrust of unions was justified by
history and by recent confrontations. It rejected the unions' policy on immigration as a
"pseudo-unite des travailleurs qui aboutit a l'unite paternaliste avec le bougnoule"
(Frontiere, octobre 1973: 32). This type of discourse echoed that of the ENA/PPA
during the second half of the 1930s after the split between Maghrebi nationalists on the
one hand, and the PCF/CGTU on the other became more evident.
262
The clashes which had opposed Maghrebi immigrants and unions in Renault in
1970 or in the Chausson factory in 1971 where COT activists had torn Palestinan flags
brought by Maghrebi militants were seen as further proof that unions were hostile to the
movement's support for the Palestinian cause ('Notre politique par rapport aux
syndicats') (3). Further events highlighted the attempt made by unions to appropriate
militant actions initiated by immigrants. Even though the CGT opposed, and then
decided rather belatedly to join the antiracist protest movement in September 1973, it
tried nonetheless to confiscate it and marginalise the MTA. Representatives from the
movement were also prevented from speaking during the political meeting which took
place at the "Bourse du Travail" after the National Day of Action against Racism that
the CGT, the CI-DT and the FEN had organised on 25 September 1973 (La voix des
travailleurs arabes, octobre 1973) (3). In a letter addressed to Messrs Seguy and Maire,
respective leaders of the CGT and CFDT, the MTA claimed that it worked for the
development of a workers' movement and rejected accusations that creating an
ethnically-based organisation was playing into the hands of racism and dividing
workers. The movement's aim was to unite Maghrebi and French workers and
"expliquer aux travailleurs francais intoxiques par les syndicats, quel est le sens de notre
lutte, leur faire comprendre que si la C.G.T. a bouge, c'est parce qu'on a bouge"
(Frontiere, octobre 1973: 32-33).
MTA documents also highlight the extent to which the movement was divided
over its position vis-a-vis unions. In a meeting which took place on 24 January 1974,
MTA delegates from all over France (Avignon, Aix, Marseilles, Toulouse, Grenoble,
Lyon, Sochaux, Lille, Guebwiller, Nanterre and Paris) emphasised the importance of
developing as an autonomous force. They accused unions of having systematically
opposed any autonomy of action on the part of immigrants ('Deuxiême partie du
mouvement dans les usines: &bat') (3). The movement was faced with a dilemma:
should Maghrebi immigrants develop their autonomous movement within or outside
union structures? Because the MTA had not yet developed nation-wide structures
capable of founding a completely independent movement in the workplace, the
participation of MTA militants in the CFDT presented a number of material benefits,
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just like the Etoile had benefited from material and financial help from the CGTU until
the early 1930s. For the movement, Maghrebis' involvement in the CFDT could also
facilitate the establishment of a grass-roots front of solidarity between "Arab" and
French workers and bypass the trade union's leadership, as the Chausson delegate
acknowledged:
Je dis que le M.T.A. doit mener un combat sur tous les fronts ... on peut recuperer a la C.F.D.T.
ses sigles, son fric pour faire passer nos idees ... nous voulons faire de la C.F.D.T. un syndicat
qui reflate nos aspirations, on se fout de Maire, et de la confederation, on veut que la base prenne
en charge le syndicat. (Ibid)
However, the position adopted by the MTA did not manage to resolve the tension
between its will to develop as an autonomous force and the benefits that its involvement
in an established union might bring. The movement decided nonetheless to "composer
avec les syndicats" even though it was aware that its own aims often differed from those
of unions and that every important initiative it had taken had been opposed by them
only to be later appropriated ('Notre politique par rapport aux syndicats') (3).
To conclude, it appears that even though the MTA made a distinction between
the CliDT on the one hand, and the CGT on the other, it believed that unions
represented another conservative structure which prevented French and immigrant
workers from creating a united front against a racist and exploitative imperialistic order.
To some extent, the MTA's complex and often conflictual relationship with the CGT,
and to a lesser degree, with the CI-DT reflected that between the ENA/PPA and French
trade unions during the inter-war period.
In a society where immigrants felt marginalised, the MTA considered the
workplace as being one of the key spheres of socialisation and protest action for
immigrants. In that sense, it differed from the ENAJPPA. It did not want to see its
action, demands and experience being taken over by unions which it viewed as
paternalistic and motivated by an agenda which often differed from its own. What also
distinguishes the MTA from the inter-war nationalist movement was the former's
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conviction that as a political organisation, it should be inspired by the "masses" or the
rank and file. This put it at odds with traditionally hierarchical and "dirigiste" unions.
Also different was the movement's realisation that such trade unions could not address a
number of issues relating to their home country and to the Arab World - yet relevant to
Maghrebis' experience in France. The MTA's belief that the political groupings which
could legitimately represent North Africans had to be "ethnically-based" was also
shared by the Arnicales, which presented themselves as the natural representatives of
Maghrebis in France. The latter claim was to be challenged by the MTA.
8.5 The relationship between the MTA and the Anticales
After 1962, the Arnicale des Algeriens en France (later to become the Arnicale des
Algeriens en Europe) replaced the FLN structures in France, which had themselves
more or less eradicated and replaced Messali Hadj's MTLD in France during the early
years of the Algerian war. The Tunisian and Moroccan governments also created similar
official structures (Arnicale des Tunisiens and Arnicale des Marocains) whose mission
was to represent and "control" their nationals in France, and promote the policies of
their respective government. Their hierarchical and rigid political structure reflected the
one-party system of their home country.
Arnicales, which had no real equivalent during the inter-war period, were
strongly implanted amongst immigrants and, in their discourse, they often denounced
the racism and difficult working and living conditions that their nationals had to endure.
During the "JournOes d'Etudes sur les travailleurs immigres" organised by the journal
Croissance des Jeunes Nations on 1 and 2 December 1973, Abdellcrim Gheraieb,
president of the Arnicale des Algeriens en Europe condemned all forms of
discrimination against Algerian workers (1974: 5-6). But an assessment of this
organisation's role in the social and political conflicts which involved immigrants in the
1970s tends to show that the Arnicales' declarations were often at odds with their deeds
as they frequently tried to contain rather than fight for their nationals in France.
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One of the key objectives of the Arnicale des Algeriens, and by extension of the
Algerian government, was to promote the "politique du retour" amongst their fellow
nationals in France. Their mission was also to ensure that immigrants were not adopting
and developing political views and practices which may be hostile to, or critical of the
government in their home country.
In that context, the emergence of the MTA - a movement which wanted
immigrants to return to their home country with what the movement called "un petit
capital revolutionnaire" - was interpreted by the Arnicales as a direct threat to the
political order in the Maghreb. Even though the MTA openly declared that its position
was to ignore rather than fight the Arnicales, the relationship between the MTA and the
North African Arnicales was a very tense and difficult one (Frontiere, octobre 1973:
33). To some extent, this reflected the conflictual relationship which existed between
the ENA/PPA and North African reformist organisations during the inter-war period.
The wave of racist murders in Marseille in August-September 1973 showed the
extent to which the position of this official organisation was ambiguous. The Arnicales
both condemned racist aggressions and called for Maghrebi immigrants not to respond
to any provocation (Le Monde, 30 aoilt 1973). During the national day of strike action
against racism that took place on 14 September 1973, the Arnicales tried to withold the
strike action whilst officially supporting it. Militants of the Arnicale des Algeriens en
Europe in Barbes, for instance, could be seen distributing leaflets backing the
movement and at the same time advising immigrants not to go on strike and ripping up
MTA posters (Frontiere, octobre 1973: 33). In the workplace, in the "foyers" or in the
street, this strategy was also applied to most conflicts and actions in which Maghrebi
immigrants were involved in the 1970s.
The failure of the Arnicales to represent Maghrebis faithfully and fight for their
rights in France may explain the success of autonomous movements such as the MTA
amongst immigrants. As a social movement, the latter was able to shape its political
discourse and strategy independently from established socio-political structures. The
movement's emphasis on developing a democratic organisation based on the needs of
the "masses" and its rejection of all forms of paternalism appealed to many immigrants
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who felt segregated and marginalised by the state, as well as abandoned by the unions
and Arnicales which were supposed to defend their rights.
The MTA was a movement which encapsulated the binary nature of Maghrebi
migrants' experience which was both anchored in France and in North Africa. Like the
ENA/PPA, the 1970s movement was the locus where their longing for rights in France
and their will to question the undemocratic political status quo in their home country
could be articulated. In the social context of the 1970s, this was a role that the Ainicales
could not play, marked as they were by their rigid organisational structure, their close
links with North African regimes and their political programme which did not reflect
the complex democratic aspirations of North African workers.
By contrast, the MTA defined itself as a mass revolutionary movement of the
Arab left whose aim was to mobilise Maghrebis against reformist and reactionary
forces. During a training course for militants organised by the MTA on 6 and 7 July
1974 in Paris, the movement emphasised the need to prepare "l'affrontement pour briser
l'encerclement (reformismes, amicales arabes, partis traditionnels)" (MTA tract,
untitled, juillet 1974) (3). As had been the case in the ENA/PPA, the reactionary forces
which the MTA saw as threatening North African workers were not structured along
ethnic lines. Indeed, the Arnicales were perceived as an inherent part of the oppressive
forces against which Maghrebis should fight, and as "[des] structures repressives en
France ... en connivence avec le pouvoir reactionnaire (Hakbar el Haraka, Numero 2, 2
juillet 1975) (3). During the "rent strikes" which developed in 1975 in SONACOTRA
hostels in Bezons, Colombes, Argenteuil and Nanterre, the MTA condemned the
attempt made by the Arnicale des Algeriens and the Algerian Consul to stop the
residents' protest action and criticised them for siding with the management and the
Communist party (Akhbar el Haraka, ler mai 1976) (3). The role of the Arnicales was
interpreted by the MTA as central to France's repressive policy against immigrants:
Un des aspects de la nouvelle politique de repression de l'immigration est l'intervention
croissante des appareils de repression nationaux (amicales et neo-destour) qui se sont attaques
ouvertement cette armee aux initiatives des travailleurs arabes contre le racisme (amicale des
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Algeriens a Marseille et a Grenoble), dans les usines (amicale des Marocains) a Paris et a St
Etienne. (MTA document, untitled, undated) (3)
The Arnicales were not only seen as serving the interest of France's exploitative order
and actively opposing the antiracist protest actions of immigrants, but were also
described as part of North African governments' repressive apparatus: "l'arrestation des
travailleurs immigres rentrant au pays, tout comme la constitution d'une "amicale des
marocains" pour les encadrer en France, entrent dans le cadre du mouvement de
repression antipopulaire merle par le regime marocain" (La voix des travailleurs arabes,
numero 1, ler janvier 1973) (3). f he MTA's discourse on the Amicales was very much
reminiscent of that of the ENA/PPA on the evolues and on North African reformist
political organisations seen as the servants of imperialism.
In its documentation, the MTA mostly blamed the Amicales, rather than the
individuals who belonged to it, for their obstructionist role in the conflicts that the
movement was engaged in. This can be explained by the fact that those official
organisations were composed of Maghrebi workers who, the MTA argued, were
somehow duped by propaganda, but would one day rally to their cause.
In 1970s France, where immigrants' experience was often compared by the
MTA to that of Maghrebis under colonial rule, the Amicales' "collaboration" with
France's racist and imperialist project was evocative of the divisions and betrayals
amongst Maghrebis which had marked past struggles for rights and independence. The
MTA questioned the legitimacy of the revolutionary and anti-colonial credentials of the
Amicules and, by extension, of North African governments. Reflecting the ENA/PPA
denunciation of pro-assimilationist North African organisations such as Algerie
francaise (see chapter 2, section 3), the MTA accused the Amicales of being mere
servants of a racist neo-colonial and imperialist order and argued that "avec la fin de la
guerre de liberation d'Algerie, il n'y avait plus de lieu, de centre de mobilisation, de
drapeau pour unir les combats isoles des travailleurs arabes en France". This enabled the
MTA to portray itself as the true repository of revolutionary and anti-colonial values
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and principles ('Histoire des luttes des travailleurs arabes face au nouveau
developpement du racisme et le role du M.T.A.', 1973) (3).
8.6 The MTA's Arab Revolution in the home country
Much of the MTA's discourse and action which focused on the socio-political situation
in the Maghreb reveals the extent to which the movement's sense of nation-ness was
shaped by its contentious relationship with North African governments and by the
necessity for its revolutionary project to encompass the home country of North
Africans. To some extent, this was redolent of the ENA/PPA's political project which
aimed to defeat colonialism in North Africa. The movement consistently condemned the
regimes of the Maghreb (particularly Morocco and Tunisia) for being reactionary
machines at the pay of Western countries and called its militants to fight against the
"manceuvres d'ecrasement de la revolution arabe dans nos pays" (MTA document,
untitled, undated) (3). These reactionary regimes in North Africa were castigated for
furthering the interests of Western imperialism and for betraying North Africans who
had suffered during the colonial era, and made so many sacrifices during the fight for
independence. This highlighted the limits of the ENA/PPA's political project which
presented independence and the establishment of North African nation-states as the
precondition for the true emancipation of Maghrebis.
The MTA's will to mobilise Maghrebi immigrants in France and export its
revolutionary message to the home countries was a source of concern for the non-
democratic governments in North Africa. Indeed, not unlike the inter-war colonial
authorities, they feared that the process of politicisation of their emigration might
backfire on them. This was probably one of the reasons why Algerian President Houari
Bournedienne decided to stop officially emigration to France in 1973. 140 However, the
MTA seemed to be far more critical of Hassan II and Bourguiba than of Bournedienne,
140 The main reason given by Boum6clienne for stopping Algerian emigration was the rising number of
racist attacks against Algerians in France.
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who was the then president of "socialist" Algeria (Frontiere, octobre 1973: 31-33,
L'Express, 24-30 septembre 1973).141
In order to achieve its aim, the movement tried to reinforce the link between
Maghrebi workers in France and revolutionary groups of the Arab left in North Africa.
This echoed the ENAJPPA's efforts to establish structures and develop a front of
solidarity with progressive forces in North Africa. In 1975, this is what Arfaoui Bechir,
a Tunisian migrant worker and an ex-activist of the MTA, emphasised in his declaration
protesting against his expulsion from France. He stated that "nous, immigres, nous
avons besoin d'avoir des organisations autonomes de travailleurs immigres pour
organiser nos luttes ... et maintenir les liens avec les luttes des travailleurs de notre
pays" (Declaration', 1975) (3). The development of communication channels and the
collection of information on the situation in their home countries were therefore
perceived as crucial, given the unreliability of the national media there, as had been the
case in colonial times. The minutes of the "Conseil National des Travailleurs en Lutte",
which took place on 8 October 1972, show that participants were aware of the difficulty
of getting information. Collaborative work between Fedai (one of the movement's
publications) and Massira, written in the home country by the Arab left, was seen as a
way of addressing this problem (Proces verbal du Conseil National des Travailleurs en
lutte', 8 octobre 1972) (3).
Contacts in Morocco had also intensified since the expulsion of some of their
militants from France. 142
 The MTA also emphasised "la necessite d'etablir des liens plus
etroits et surtout plus reguliers [...] avec les copains en Algerie et les derniers expulses",
and a detailed report sent by a militant called Driss on his imprisonment, on the contacts
that he had established within Morocco and on the political situation within the country
141 Patrick Weil inaccurately defines the MTA as a "mouvement d'opposition au gouvernement algerien"
(1991:115). It was an organisation which was far more critical of the Moroccan regime, and to a lesser
degree, of the Tunisian government. To a certain extent, this reflected the fact that many, in the
leadership, were Moroccan.
142 Many MTA activists who returned or were expelled from France were imprisoned as they arrived in
North Africa. La vobc des travailleurs arabes (numero 1, ler janvier 1973) describes how forty-nine
political prisoners (including Anis Belafredj, who had been a pro-Palestinian activist in France until 1972)
started an unlimited hunger-strike to protest against their conditions of imprisonment. The same issue
published a statement by Mokhtar Mohamed Bachiri, an MTA militant and a member of the El Assifa
theatre company, describing his arrest and torture in Morocco (3).
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was welcomed and discussed by the movement's national meeting of 24 January 1974
(Akhbar el Haraka, Numero 2, 1975) (3). These contacts established between the
militants expelled to their home country and other revolutionaries were reminiscent of
those which developed when inter-war Messalist militants were arrested and deported to
North Africa.
Furthermore, the regular trips that Maghrebi immigrants made to North Africa
were seen as the most efficient way for supporters to develop links with the Arab left
there. This reflected the way in which Maghrebi militants in France during the colonial
era were able to spread the ENA/PPA's political message once they had returned to
North Africa. Like the ENA/PPA, therefore, one of the MTA's strengths was to exploit
some of the characteristics of its militants' diasporic experience (involvement in socio-
political conflicts in France, expulsions from France and immigrants' trips to their home
country ) to further its revolutionary aims in the home country.
The movement's attention focused on some key socio-political issues in the
Maghreb such as the crisis in the Western Sahara. This was evocative of the ENA's
discourse on the Rif War led by Abdel Krim during the mid-1920s. Indeed, both were
seen as wars waged by imperialists against North Africans. In the 1970s, the future of
the Western Sahara, a territory colonised by the Spanish and rich in natural resources,
was uncertain. Hassan II's claim on the Western Sahara and his hostility to a referendum
on self-determination which could lead to independence was supported by a large
section of the Moroccan population. It was also backed by Tunisia and by the United
States who feared the creation of another non-aligned country. 143 Algeria and Lybia, on
the other hand, opposed Morocco's ambitions and supported the pro-independence
agenda of the Front Polisario, which was the Saharaoui's political and military
formation (Junka 1975: 8-13). The MTA denounced the imperialist campaign which
aimed, through conflicts such as that of the Western Sahara, to prevent the creation of a
"Maghreb of the people". It argued that imperialism sharpened rivalries between North
African states and divided the people of the Maghreb by fostering "[le] chauvinisme
143 This territory was also claimed by Mauritania. For a study of the non-aligned movement, see Gupta
(1992).
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regionaliste" whose aim was to counter the will of the "Arabs" to establish an Arab
nation ('Liban: qu'y a-t-il derriere la guerre civile?') (3). In that respect, the movement's
discourse was at odds with that of the ENA/PPA during the inter-war period, as the
latter saw the establishment of independent nation-states in North Africa as the best way
of ensuring the liberation of the Arab people.
During the MTA's national meeting which took place on 24 January 1974,
delegates reiterated the movement's support for the Front Polisario (Hakbar el Haraka,
numero 2, 2 juillet 1975) (3). They criticised the previous "connivence avec le fascisme
espagnol" of the regimes of Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria. This mirrored the
ENA/PPA's criticism of North African reformist organisations serving the interest of
French imperialism during the inter-war period. MTA delegates denounced Hassan II
for persecuting Saharaoui and Moroccan revolutionaries under the orders of American
imperialism ('Liban: qu'y a-t-il derriere la guerre civile?') (3). They also accused him of
exploiting the Moroccan people's "natural" longing for re-unification with the Saharaoui
to further the regime's reactionary aims:
Le Front Polisario merle des luttes armees pour liberer le Sahara du joug colonial et tente de
dejouer les manceuvres et les tentatives reactionnaires et colonialistes de la liquidation. Reste
savoir si la carte jouee par le tortionnaire Hassan II et son confrere Quid Dadda peut-elle [sic]
effectivement sauver deux regimes fantoches et chancelants et entretenir des confusions au sein
du peuple. Queue est la position revolutionnaire qui mettra en echec les manceuvres colonialistes
dune part, [et permettra] d'avancer et d'amplifier la lutte de classe et le mouvement arme en
Mauritanie, au Maroc et au Sahara d'autre part[?[. (Akhbar el Haraka, numCro 2, 2 juillet 1975)
(3)
Therefore, the MTA considered that North Africa was still subjected to colonialism and
that the reactionary Maghrebi regimes were serving its interest. Even more so than in
the ENA/PPA, the movement's wider revolutionary project was a reflection of its own
sense of diasporic identity. Its endeavour to defeat imperialist forces on both sides of the
Mediterranean contributed to the development of a two-fold strategy. On the one hand it
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expressed a will to support the class struggle in North Africa as well as military
opposition to regimes which were deemed illegitimate. On the other hand, it insisted
that the Arab revolution in North Africa was intrinsically linked to the involvement of
North African immigrants in the class struggle in France.
Amongst MTA militants, the boundary of identity was informed by an
awareness that their experience was not only inscribed within the framework of the
working class and class struggle in France, but also informed by a sense of being
outside that framework, of belonging to the "Arab people" working for the "Arab
revolution". This, to some extent, also characterised the discourse of the ENA/PPA. For
the MTA, these two spheres were not contradictory, but complementary. Therefore,
belonging to the working class in France as immigrants did not mean that they were in
any way assimilated to French workers. They considered that the working class was a
framework within which processes of solidarity could be articulated to involve all
workers on equal terms and could be consistent with respect for national and cultural
differences. However, the MTA's discourse did not imply that both sides of Maghrebis'
identity were given equal importance. As in the inter-war nationalist movement, the
emphasis in the MTA could shift from one to the other depending on the circumstances
and challenges that it faced. When the movement's discourse focused on the need to
intensify their efforts on spreading the Arab revolution, it could distance itself
rhetorically from the French national context and from the broad-based universalist
principles that informed its vision of class-struggle to develop more "ethnically-marked"
responses:
Nous ne nous considerons pas comme etant integres aux travailleurs francais. Nous nous
rattachons au monde arabe et notre action se definit par rapport A la revolution qui se 'eve dans le
monde arabe. Les Arabes qui sont ici, en France, rentreront un jour dans leur pays et notre but
est qu'ils reviennent chez eux avec un petit capital revolutionnaire. (Frontiere, octobre 1973: 33)
The shift from the universal that characterised their role in the working class in France
to the ethnic ("nous nous rattachons au monde arabe"), and vice-versa, was a way of
273
transgressing the traditionally conflictual boundaries between the two. As in the
ENA/PPA during the inter-war period, it showed that the MTA's ethnically-based
revolutionary project could be inspired by universalist values. The movement's
contribution to the universal cause of the class struggle was a "capital", or an asset that
could be brought back home.
However, the balance could shift the other way: the MTA could also construct a
more inclusive image of the interplay between both aspects of its identity. Indeed, it
often emphasised the complementarity of its fight on both sides of the Mediterranean.
MTA militants argued that the movement's aim was to achieve Arab workers' autonomy
in France and ensure that the political action of Arab workers in France was part of the
wider plan of fostering the revolution in the Arab World (MTA document, untitled,
undated) (3). This illustrates the extent to which the identity of Maghrebi immigrants
could be shaped by a dual sense of belonging where class and ethnic points of reference
were never fixed, but constantly negotiated. This binary, yet shifting, discourse on
belonging also characterised that of the Etoile and the PPA, which could draw upon
themes and terminology which were both universalist and differentialist (mostly based
on religion rather than class).
The MTA's sense of national identity was also marked by a further tension
which distinguished it from Messali's inter-war nationalism. Maghrebi supporters of the
movement defined themselves as "Arabs" who belonged to the "Arab nation" which
would be unified once their revolution had ousted reactionary regimes and destroyed the
divisive borders of nation-states ('Proces verbal du Conseil National des Travailleurs en
lutte', 8 octobre 1972) (3). But they could also refer to their home country in the
Maghreb as "le pays" or "la patrie". 144 That tension between two apparently conflicting
evocations of nation highlights the shifting, but by no means contradictory, nature of
their sense of nation-ness. Whilst the former was informed by their revolutionary
political project, the latter was anchored in the sphere of the personal (place of birth,
family, etc.). It was all the more possible to reconcile those two references as their
144 For example, in 'Bilan sur la lutte pour la carte de travail, sur la base de Menilmontant par rapport a St
Maur (le passé) pour en tirer des enseignements et des regles de travail', 1973, and La voix des
travadleurs arabes, numero 1, ler janvier 1973 (3).
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political aim was to ensure that one would eventually be subsumed by the other. This
form of discourse varied from that of the Etoile and the PPA which put Maghrebis'
belonging to a nation-state to the fore, and referred to Arabness as a cultural, ethnic and
religious reference which sustained North Africans' fight for the establishment of
independent states.
The MTA's political vision, which was based on the movement's attempt to
justify dialectically the Arab nation as the ultimate result of the "natural will" of the
Arab masses and to denigrate the artificial character of post-colonial nation-states in the
Maghreb and the Middle East was no less problematic than the inter-war nationalists'. If
one accepts the contention that Arab nation-ness, just like race ("Arabness"), is a
constructed concept, then the validity of the MTA's political project, which was
grounded in the movement's belief in the tangible existence of an Arab nation, appears
questionable. As was the case with the ENA/PPA, the MTA's discourse could be
interpreted as an attempt to naturalise something which was constructed. I45
 However, it
could also be argued that this process of "imagining" a nation was no more illegitimate
than, or intrinsically different from, that which preceded the birth of other, already
established nations, which also emphasised the uniqueness of the national aspirations of
a given people or community.
8.7 The MTA, the Arab Left and the Palestinian Cause
The idea of Arab unity was first born in what is now Syria at the beginning of the 20th
century before spreading to the Middle East, and the Palestinian question soon came to
play a part at the heart of this ideology (Harbi 1974: 27-34). Even though nationalist
movements which fought for independence, and governments of North African
independent states in the 1970s, defined their countries as Arab both culturally and
linguistically, their political outlook was marked by a nationalism which tended to focus
on the nation-state, as was the case in the ENA/PPA. By contrast, the movements of the
Arab left such as the MTA, which opposed the regimes in North Africa, considered that
145 See section two, part two, for an analysis of ethnicity and nation-ness in the discourse of the MTA.
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even though national movements had defeated traditional colonialism, they proved
unable to find solutions to underdevelopment, Zionism and imperialism. For them, only
Arab unity could enable them to challenge these forces, and Palestinian resistance
constituted a rallying point for the Arab World (Ibid.). On the whole, therefore, the Arab
left adhered to the views of the Palestinian resistance (Boukhara 1973: 4-8).
This section aims to examine the role that the Palestinian revolution played in
the mobilisation of North African immigrants in France, and assess how the MTA
interpreted and fought against Zionism. In 1970, the repression of Palestinians in Jordan
during what was to be called Black September led to the creation of the Comite
Palestine in France, which became the MTA in June 1972. The movement referred to
the Palestinian revolution as an example and a catalyst for their own liberation
(Frontieres, octobre 1973: 30). In that sense, the Palestinian struggle played an even
more crucial role in the discourse of the MTA than it had done in that of the Etoile and
the PPA. Clearly, for the latter, the oppression of Palestinians at the hands of Zionism
was interpreted as an important illustration of colonial oppression against Arabs outside
North Africa, and inter-war nationalists certainly called for solidarity with Palestinians,
but this cause was not central to the movement's discourse and ideology.
For most North African activists of the MTA, the Palestinian Revolution was a
fundamental source of inspiration. It played a mobilising role and led to the
development of one of the most important Maghrebi autonomous movements in 1970s
France. The movement saw its support for the Palestinian struggle as an inherent part of
the "lutte de liberation nationale des peuples arabes" and as a humanising process which
enabled North African immigrants to regain their "droit A la parole" ('Bilan de la
campagne Djellali', p.143) (7). By contrast with inter-war nationalists, this cause
provided MTA militants with a means to regain their dignity and counter racism,
exploitation and the stigmas attached to their condition in France. This was highlighted
by Hamza Bouziri in his declaration denouncing his expulsion from France in 1971:
[D]es milliers de travailleurs arabes en France sont victimes de menaces, d'intimidations,
d'expulsions, de meurtres. Si l'ennemi nous frappe aujourd'hui, c'est qu'il se rend compte que
276
nous commencons h nous organiser pour rejeter l'esclavage, pour retrouver notre dignite foul&
aux pieds par la bourgeoisie francaise. Nous refusons d'être traites comme des "bicots"; le peuple
palestinien qui a pris le fusil pour retrouver sa dignite nous montre la voie Depuis qu'en
septembre dernier, des milliers de fedayins sont morts en luttant contre le boucher Hussein, nous
les Arabes nous relevons la tete. Nous nous sommes organises dans les Comites de Soutien a la
Revolution Palestinienne, parce que pour nous, les fedayins sont l'image de la lutte des peuples
arabes. (Declaration de Hamza Bouziri', 1971) (4)
The Palestinian Revolution epitomised Maghrebi immigrants own struggle for rights,
recognition and against racism in France. It created a favourable terrain for the
mobilisation of Maghrebis through the Comites Palestine, in which Maghrebis' support
for Palestine could be expressed, issues which affected their own experience in France
(such as racism, economic exploitation and housing difficulties) could be discussed and
antiracist strategies developed.
Because of its symbolic role, the Palestinian struggle constituted an ideological
framework within which Maghrebi's own experience could be interpreted, and it
inspired most of the Comite's and the MTA's discourse and actions. Palestine was often
evoked through speeches, discussions and films during the hunger strikes of the sans-
papiers, the strike actions in the workplace or in the foyers and antiracist
demonstrations. For example, Maghrebi workers who were on strike at Chausson
carried a Palestinian flag when they picketed in front of the factory, and Renault
workers gathered outside their plant and expressed their support for Palestine after the
repression against Palestinians in Israel in July 1972 (La voix des travailleurs urabes, 1
janvier 1973) (3).
However, and by contrast with the ENA/PPA, the MTA's discourse went further
than expressing support for the Palestinian cause. What it conveyed was a sense of
identification of Maghrebi's experience in France with that of Palestinians. During
immigrants' strike in the foyers SONACOTRA in the mid-1970s, a number of films on
immigration and on Palestine were shown, and discussions focused on the notion that
"la lutte que menent les immigr6s est identique a celle du peuple palestinien" (Akhbar el
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Haraka, mai 1976). 146 In 1973 , the MTA interpreted the action of the sans-papiers who
were on hunger strike in Menilmontant as consistent with the aims of the Palestinian
Revolution ('Bilan de la lutte pour la carte de travail, sur la base de Menilmontant par
rapport a St Maur') (3). The prominence of the Palestinian Revolution for the MTA, the
fact that it informed much of its discourse and action was therefore a distinctive trait
which differentiated it from the Etoile and the PPA.
Even though the MTA's representation of Maghrebis as Arabs facilitated this
identification with the Palestinians, its discourse on Palestine differed from that of
nationalists in the inter-war period in that it was also rooted in universalism. The
Palestinian struggle was also seen as epitomising the fight of the dominated against the
dominant, and was interpreted as a rallying cause for all the oppressed, whatever their
national or ethnic origin, as Hamza Bouziri's call for unity illustrates: "[...] tous,
Francais, Arabes, Antillais, Espagnols, Portugais, nous avons les memes ennemis et
nous menons le meme combat: pour la justice et pour la dignite. Et si l'un de nous
tombe, 10 se leveront comme en Palestine" (Declaration de Hamza Bouziri, 1971, p.
91) (4).
The MTA castigated Zionism as a racist ideology which had to be fought on all
fronts. This interpretation of Zionism was very much reminiscent of that developed by
North African nationalists during the 1920s and 1930s, but differed in that it saw
Zionism as closely linked to the racism affecting immigrants' life within France. In an
article denouncing Israel's repression of Palestinians, La Voix des travailleurs arabes (1
janvier 1973) referred to the Israeli Prime Minister as "le chef terroriste Golda Meir",
and called for French and Maghrebi workers to demonstrate during her visit to Paris.
The article also drew upon universalist terminology when it asserted: "travailleurs
arabes, travailleurs francais, epris de justice et de liberte, nous ne tolererons pas cette
criminelle". 147 In a declaration on his decision to start a hunger strike, Said Bouziri, a
leading member of the MTA, argued that his support for the Palestinian cause was the
146 See also El Assifa, Numero 12, janvier 1977 (3).
147 Golda Meir was received by Francois Mitterrand, the French socialist leader, and was due to address
the Socialist International at the Palais du Luxembourg. The MTA and Maoist groups organised a 2,000
strong demonstration in Paris during her visit on 15 January 1973 ('Lettre a un camarade en prison') (1)
(3).
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main reason behind the French authorities' decision to expel him, and added that "[c]ette
mesure fait partie d'une campagne menee par les racistes et les sionistes ('Aujourd'hui
dimanche 5 novembre [1972], Said Bouziri commence une greve de la faim illimitee')
(5).
Another distinction between the MTA and the inter-war nationalist movement
was that the former argued that the Zionist policies of the Israeli government were at
odds with the anti-Zionist views of many Jews ('Pour la liberation de Monseigneur H.
Capucci') (3). The fact that in Israel, Jews who supported the Palestinians were also the
victims of Zionist repression proved that "le sionisme, base sur le racisme anti-arabe
opprime aussi les Juifs" (La voix des travailleurs arabes, 1 janvier 1973) (3). In France,
it also welcomed the support of Patrick Farbiaz, a French worker of Jewish origin who
started a hunger strike in support of Said Bouziri in the St Bernard Church in Paris in
1972, and who in his declaration, compared the Zionist oppression against Palestinians
with the suffering of his family in Nazi concentration camps ('Patrick Farbiaz.
Travailleur intermediaire l ) (4). The movement's discourse on Palestine and on Jews was
therefore consistently marked by universalist and antiracist principles, and never
referred to Jews in derogatory and racist terms. In that sense, it differed from that of the
Etoile and the PPA. Indeed, the latter movements did not make an explicit distinction
between Zionism and Jewishness, and their discourse on Palestine and Jews could
sometimes shift from a predominantly universalist perspective to adopt a racist stance,
as the ENA's evocation of the events of Constantine in the summer of 1934 shows.
For the MTA, Zionist violence was not limited to Palestine and the Middle East,
it also affected "Arabs" in France and in the rest of Europe. It blamed the Israeli secret
services for the murders of Mahmoud Hamchari, Bassil Koubeissi and Mohamed
Boudia, all prominent supporters of the Palestinian cause in France:
Encore une fois, les services sionistes viennent d'assassiner lachement notre frere algerien
Mohamed Boudia le 28 juin a 11 heures du matin, en plein Paris, en mettant une bombe dans sa
voiture Apres l'assassinat de Mahmoud Hamchari et de Bassil Koubeissi, c'est le troisieme
frere qui tombe, lachement assassin& en terre francaise, pour une cause juste. Et le
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gouvernement francais continue a proteger les assassins sionistes et fascistes ... nous appelons
tous les freres arabes, tous les amis francais, tous ceux qui veulent barrer la route au fascisme,
nous rejoindre. ('Appel des travailleurs arabes en lutte contre les crimes sionistes', MTA tract,
undated) (3)
At an ideological level, Zionism was viewed as a racist force which served the interests
of Western imperialism in the Middle East and beyond. It could be argued that the
MTA's discourse on Zionism and Palestine was more complex and developed than had
been the case with the ENA/PPA. Unlike the latter, the 1970s movement interpreted the
political situation in Palestine in dichotomous terms and as a conflict between
progressive and revolutionary forces (the Palestinian/Arab people and anti-Zionist Jews
in Israel) and reactionary oppression (Zionism and imperialism) (Assifa Palestine, 1974)
(3). In Europe, the MTA argued that Zionism used colonial racism as a tool for
furthering its aims and as a way of preventing Arab unity:
Le sionisme a trouve en France et en Europe des bases ideologiques, politiques et militaires pour
son developpement. II puise une partie de ses forces dans le racisme anti-arabe qui s'est nourri en
France, dans les guerres coloniales perdues[,] pour monter la population contre mouvements
nationaux des peuples arabes et du peuple palestinien. (Ass(a Palestine, 1974). (3)
The movement's political discourse was shaped by this binary interpretation of the
political map which was very much marked by its universalist and anti-colonial tone. It
viewed Zionism, capital, racism in France and reactionary regimes in the Middle East
and North Africa as being consistent with each other and as forming part of the
imperialist project which aimed to oppress the working class and the Arab people. Its
call for the unity of all workers against "le veritable complot pr6pare par l'imperialisme
americain, les etats arabes et Israel" was presented as a revolutionary struggle against
slavery and for freedom (La voix des travailleurs arabes, 1976) (3).
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8.8 Conclusion
To conclude, it could be argued that for MTA militants, unlike their inter-war forebears,
Arabness had more to do with their condition as Maghrebi immigrant workers in France
and with the anchoring of their socio-political experience in the World Order of the
1970s than with a sense of ethnic belonging per se, tied to, or aspiring to be tied to
nation-states viewed as obsolete. Furthermore, the representation of North Africans as
Arabs in France and the awareness that the experience of the Palestinians epitomised
their own probably explains why the "Palestinian Revolution" played a far greater role
in the mobilisation of Maghrebi immigrants in France during the 1970s than it had done
with inter-war nationalists.
To some extent, the MTA's discourse reflected that of the inter-war nationalist
movement in that it viewed imperialism as being marked by the alliance of Zionist,
racist and reactionary forces. For the MTA, imperialism permeated not only Western
nation-states and the Zionist state of Israel, but also the post-colonial "reactionary"
governments in North Africa which had betrayed the legacy of the Algerian war of
independence. Within France, it also affected workers' organisations such as the CGT
which systematically opposed the MTA's fight against racism. Even though MTA
militants were closer to the CFDT, most trade unions attempted to prevent North
Africans from developing their own autonomous movement. This complex relationship
with unions echoes the one which linked and opposed the ENA/PPA to inter-war French
trade unions.
In its discourse which was reminiscent of the ENA/PPA's vilification of
reformist North African organisations in colonial times, the MTA portrayed the
Arnicales as another reactionary organisation whose role was not so much about
championing the rights of migrants as about controlling them, promoting the political
view of illegitimate regimes in North Africa, and serving Western states' interest.
To fight imperialism, the MTA developed a universalist discourse rooted in
class belonging. To some extent, it differed from that of the inter-war nationalist
movement whose anti-imperialism was inspired by universalism and religion.
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Furthermore, unlike the ENA/PPA, it devised more pro-active strategies in the
workplace, in the foyers and for the sans-papiers which aimed to open a front of
solidarity with other immigrants, French workers, intellectuals and the Catholic Church.
However, in spite of some success in its fight against racist violence and for the sans-
papiers, the movement failed to mobilise French public opinion consistently against
what it viewed as imperialist oppression.
The MTA also opposed the regimes of North Africa which it viewed as having
betrayed the revolutionary legacy of anti-colonialists. This reflected the ENA/PPA's
evocation of North African evolues and other reformist politicians in the inter-war
period. The 1970s movement presented itself as the heir of this anti-colonialist and anti-
imperialist tradition and tried to establish links with the Arab Left in the Maghreb to
further its revolutionary aims. Finally, the MTA's interpretation of the Palestinian
Revolution was marked by universalism: its support for Palestine was informed by its
belief that the struggle of the Palestinians against Zionism was of relevance to the whole
working class.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
9.1 Aims, structure, theoretical framework and methodology
In this study, I have set out to analyse the complex processes by which the North
African immigrant population in France was able, from the inter-war period to the
1970s, to construct a powerful and consistent political tradition in France. To carry out
this analysis, two case studies were examined: the first one is the Etoile nord-africaine
(later to become the Parti du peuple algerien) which was founded in 1926 at the apogee
of the French colonial empire and which, by the 1930s, a decade marked by economic
recession, racism and political unrest, became the most potent and independent voice of
Algerian nationalism. The second case-study is the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes,
a North African political organisation fighting for Arab nationalism and against racism
which developed in the 1970s in a post-colonial context also characterised by
heightened racist tension, economic crisis and hostility to immigration.
The concepts of ethnic identity and nation were at the heart of both nationalist
movements' ideologies. This thesis analyses some of the complex processes by which
these concepts were constructed and shaped in their discourse. At a theoretical level, my
study of the ENA/PPA and the MTA's discourse on ethnicity is, to a certain extent,
developed from a situationalist perspective (see, for example, Barth 1969a, Wallman
1979). This approach views ethnicity not as characterised by fixed cultural markers
rooted in history and tradition, but as the result of a process of negotiation of identity.
However, this perspective is also counter-balanced by the contention that ethnicity
should not be viewed exclusively as an "empty vessel", as Eriksen (1992: 30-31) puts it,
which is only shaped at the boundary between "us" and "them". It is a transactional and
synchronic process which is "context-sensitive", that is to say rooted in the socio-
political, economic and cultural context of its time.
As for nation, it is understood within this thesis, especially in the study of the
ENA/PPA, as a modern concept and phenomenon grounded not only in politics, as
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Breuilly (1996) argues, but also in ethnicity. Furthermore, the approach adopted here,
which is inspired by aspects of the work of authors such as Anderson (1983) and
Gellner (1983), posits nations as imagined communities shaped by nationalism, and
examines the complex processes by which the nation evoked in the discourse of the
ENA/PPA in the inter-war period and that conjured up by the MTA during the 1970s
were imagined. However, this analysis also incorporates, and evaluates the extent to
which the discourse of both movements was a hybrid discourse shaped by the diasporic
and historical experience and legacy of North African migrants in France.
I have examined the discourse of the Etoile and the PPA mainly through internal
documents, as well as political tracts and publications (especially El Ouma), French
police and governmental reports, and various other documents relating to the nationalist
organisation. I have also assessed the MTA's discourse, for the most part, through
internal documents, reports, minutes of meetings, as well as through their tracts and
publications such as Akhbar El Haraka and La Voix des travailleurs arabes.
Discourse is understood here as a way into ideology (Blommaert and
Vershueren 1998:32) and as a cognitive process. It is also posited as a "context-
sensitive" process of action and interaction in society (van Dijk 1997a: 21). This study
has also attempted to demonstrate that discourse is a representation, that it structures our
sense of reality and the way we perceived our own identity and that of other people
(Mills 1997, Pécheux 1982). On a political level, it can be used as a tool enabling the
dominated to challenge the dominant discourse and ideology.
The thesis is structured around two main parameters based on a situationalist
perspective of ethnic identity. This approach views ethnic identity as being shaped at
the boundary between "us" and "them", and by a sense of "us" which can also be very
much informed by and through difference and conflict. I have therefore considered each
case study from two angles. The first one is what is referred to as the "inner constitutive
elements of identity" (or the "ins"). It examines the way in which ethnic and national
identity is constructed in the discourse(s) of both movements, and looks more
specifically at some key features of kinship which may, or may not, have contributed to
the shaping of that identity (namely religion, class, history and memory and culture).
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The second dimension which I have analysed is the "outer constitutive elements of
identity" (or the "outs") which traverse both movements' discourses. These could belong
to the sphere of oppression and alienation (such as racism, French imperialism and
domination, economic exploitation and so on) or to that of solidarity in France, North
Africa and beyond: for example, the concept of universalism, the nationalist
movements' discourse on, and sometimes conflictual relationship with, political
organisations and unions of the left, their links with, and evocation of, other immigrants,
the French people, the Palestinian struggle, and so on. As I have demonstrated, these
markers of the "out" played a central role in the construction of identity in the two
political movements examined here.
9.2 The inner markers of ethno-national identity
Some of the conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis of the ENA/PPA and of
the MTA is that their discourse and action were rooted in the diasporic experience of
North African migrants in France, and traversed with a sense of dispossession,
alienation and exile ("le lieu de l'epreuve", as Hirt (1988) defines it). For both
movements, the interplay between ethnicity and nation-ness was at the core of their
ideology.
In the case of the EtoileIPP A during the inter-war years, Algerian nation-ness
was defined by what it was not, what it was against. It rejected France as a possible
repository of national identity for Muslim Algerians and other North Africans and
denounced naturalisation as a betrayal of Islam, yet aimed to establish an independent
nation-state within the confines of the colonial territory. The nationalists' sense of
belonging to a nation was marked by a discourse pertaining to the family and kinship
(which was posited as irreconcilable with Frenchness) and by a sense of faithfulness to
one's religion. Futhermore, the fact that they also expressed respect for the French
nation and nationalism can be explained by the fact that their own nationalism was
characterised by a modem political concept of the nation grounded in Revolutionary
principles, which bore many tropes of French nationalism. ENA/PPA nationalists
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developed a dichotomous, and somewhat problematic view of France whereby the
French people was seen as the legitimate heir of the Revolution and as being at odds
with French imperialism and the state. Another tension which was noted was that their
evocation of an independent Algeria could be based on inclusive concepts of
democracy, multiculturalism and tolerance (a nation rooted in the political), whilst their
nationalism posited the Algerian nation to be "restored" in exclusivist terms of ethnicity
and difference.
Similarly to the ENAJPPA, the MTA did not see France as a locus of nationality
for North Africans. Its conception of nation needs to be considered within the post-
colonial context where Arab nationalism was particularly strong as an ideology, and
where traditional nation-states were seen to have failed to deliver on a number of fronts
(from their inability to improve significantly the lives of their populations to bringing an
end to imperialism and to racism). In the movement's discourse, nation was
apprehended outside the framework of nation-states. The revolutionary aim of its
militants was to mobilise and unite in order to establish an Arab nation encompassing
all "Arab" people, from the Middle East to North Africa.
At the core of both discourses on nation was the concept of ethnicity, and the
assertion that North Africans were Arabs. But whilst the EtoileIPPA acknowledged the
existence of Berbers (only to present them as Arabs), the MTA consistently referred to
North Africans as Arabs without recognising the varied ethnic-make up of the Maghrebi
population. For the Algerian nationalists in the inter-war period, this process of
essentialising ethnicity aimed to create a unified sense of ethno-national identity shared
by all North African Muslims and mobilise against colonialism, as well as counter the
French colonial policy of division between Arabs and Berbers. To a certain extent, that
conception of ethnicity was problematic as it reproduced the stigmas of French
colonialism attached to Algerian vernacular cultures and languages. On the other hand,
the MTA's locating of Arabness at the core of national identity aimed to transcend
borders and create a new form of polity capable of challenging imperialism and all other
forms of oppression.
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The markers of kinship which underpinned the sense of ethno-national identity
within those two movements could overlap, but could also vary in their emphasis and
significance. For the ENA/PPA, Islam constituted the key reference and rallying force
which shaped the movement's discourse and embodied its national aspirations. Within
the colonial context, it was what characterised a dominated, oppressed and divided
North African population (Gellner 1983: 73). It was appropriated by nationalists who
gave it territorial shape, and was presented as a high and universal culture which was
incompatible with, and could challenge effectively, the cultural premise upon which the
French colonial project was constructed. By reasserting the close ties between Islam,
Arab culture and language, the process of reification of ethnicity and culture around
Arabness at work in the movement's discourse made its demand for the right to an
independent nation-state all the more legitimate. This process of politicisation of Islam
could be seen as a way of countering that of the Catholic Church which, through its
proselytising campaigns amongst Muslims, was viewed as closely linked to the politics
of colonial dispossession. Its aim, the movement argued, was to conquer the sphere of
the spiritual, of religious belief, the last dimension of Maghrebis' life that colonialism
had not yet controlled.
The Catholic Church was seen very differently by the MTA in the 1970s. Its
consistent support for the cause of the "sans-papiers" and against racism made it a
natural ally for the movement. However, North Africans' religion came to play a minor
role in its discourse and ideology, and Islam, or rather visible signs of this religion, were
mainly reduced to being markers of cultural identity and traditions to be sustained in
emigration. By contrast to the ENA/PPA, one of the MTA's key frameworks of
reference for kinship and identity was class consciousness. Its militants' sense of
belonging to the working class articulated much of their ideology, and establishing
solidarity and mobilising along class lines was seen as the best way of fighting
imperialism and racism.
Culture played a central, if differing, part in both movements' construction of
ethno-national identity. Their representation of their culture as authentic and rooted in
an immemorial past hid the fact that these were the result of complex h)brid processes.
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The visible forms of cultural celebration were encouraged to maintain traditions alive in
France and challenge the cultural alienation to which North Africans were subjected.
This approach enabled the ENA/PPA and the MTA to negotiate cultural strategies
aimed at addressing Maghrebis' concerns and experience, and sustain both movements'
political activity by linking various forms of cultural expression to political events and
actions. For the MTA, this translated into a binary process of politicisation of culture
and of culturalisation of politics. In the discourse of the ENAJPPA, evocations of
culture were, to some extent, more linked to the sphere of history and memory, which
constituted one of the most important characteristics of its ideology. Indeed, at the core
of the movement's evocation of history lay the concept of civilisation. Its reference to
civilisation and culture was an inherent part of a process of national consciousness in
formation which was presented as embedded in the past. This framing of the past was
historically problematic as it focused on the greatness of Arabo-Islamic civilisation and
ignored the history of North Africa prior to the Arab conquest. Nonetheless, identifying
with a great civilisation provided nationalists with an empowering sense of ethno-
national identity and emphasised difference by reinforcing the boundary between "us"
and "them". On the other hand, the historical perspective developed by the MTA
centred mainly on the evocation of past anti-colonial struggles in North Africa, and
more particularly in Algeria. Indeed, the Algerian revolution constituted an important
point of reference for the movement.
Both movements' discourses on the past were inherently hybrid. They were
informed by present circumstances and aimed to legitimise their political stance and
ends. Beyond the ENA/PPA's insistencc on the authenticity and uniqueness of its
Arabo-Islamic civilisation, it appears that the hegemonic terms in which it was evoked
mirrored France's own sense of civilisation in order to surpass it. In the case of the
MTA, the interplay between racism and exploitation in 1970s France and the Algerian
Revolution enabled its militants to make sense of the state of alienation they found
themselves in (and by extention to "re-interpret" the past), and to develop political
strategies which were marked by a tension between a dominant intra-ethnic discourse
and a demotic discourse rooted in inter-ethnic solidarity based on class. Immigrants'
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involvement in the events of May 1968 was also acknowleged by the movement as a
political watershed which contributed to the politicisation of immigrants and to their
will to develop autonomously and distinctly from established political and union
structures.
9.3 The outer markers of ethno-national identity
For both nationalist movements, racism epitomised the various forms of oppression to
which North Africans were subjected. They considered that there was a dichotomy
between the French state which was considered as imperialist and racist, and the French
people who were the repository of revolutionary legitimacy. This meant that the
boundary between "us" (Maghrebis) and "them" (the French people) was negotiated
positively. What made their universalist discourses problematic was their positing of
racism as somehow conflicting with universalist values which inspired them and the
French people, when in fact, racism and universalism are linked and affect each other
from the inside (Balibar 1994: 198). Furthermore, the ENA/PPA considered that racism
had created a chasm between Muslims and the French people, and as such constituted
an obstacle to emancipation. It viewed the violence which marked the relationship
between coloniser and colonised as informed by racism. For its militants, it
dehumanised and reified the "indigene". This had implications for the development of
Algerian nationalism as racism was posited as a justification for emancipation from
French rule. However, the anti-Jewish rhetoric which could be found in the Etoile's
discourse during the events of Constantine in the summer of 1934 shows that its
nationalism of liberation, like all other forms of nationalism, could also be informed by
racism.
As far as the MTA was concerned, post-colonial racism was inextricably linked
to colonial racism. The movement argued that it affected and pervaded all aspects of
North Africans' experience in France, Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, and
that it was at the core of imperialism. In its discourse, it highlighted the coherent,
organised and systemic nature of racism from the individual through racist organisations
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to the higher echelons of the state. Within that context, antiracism became the main
focus of its discourse and action. Support for, and identification with the Palestinian
struggle provided its activists with an empowering identity and inspiration for their fight
against racism in France. They saw each protest action undertaken by the movement
(strikes in the workplace and in the "foyers", demonstrations, hunger strikes and so on),
as contributing to fighting racism and establishing multi-ethnic fraternity. The
movement developed and sometimes combined several strategies to tackle racism such
as ethnically-based violent counter-action against racists, ethnically-based reformist
action, and multi-ethnic protest action. The latter strategy led to the creation, in October
1972, of the Comite de defense des droits et de la vie des travailleurs immigres, a cross-
ethnic antiracist organisation.
Whilst both movements' relationship with the French left and left-wing
organisations and unions was always complex and tense, the organisations which often
provided them with the most consistent support came from the extreme-left (such as the
Parti ouvrier internationaliste for the ENA/PPA, and Maoist groups for the MTA on
the basis of ideological commmonalities). The ENA was created by the French
Communist Party in 1926 and supported by the CGTU. But soon tensions appeared and
developed between both organisations until the French government banned the Etoile in
1929. The nationalist organisation was re-established in 1933, but its relationship with
the communists remained strained throughout that decade, particularly during the Front
Populaire era when the PC embraced the SFIO's reformist colonial policy. As for the
MTA, it was faced with constant opposition and hostility from the communist trade
union (the CUT) which feared the creation of an ethnically-based union. Its relationship
with the Cl-DT could be more constructive as it occasionally provided the movement
with tactical support. The inability of unions to cater effectively for the specific needs of
immigrants in France could be partly due to their fear of jeopardising their negotiating
position with the government if they supported immigrants' protest actions overtly, and
to the difficulties that they had in reconciling the interests of French workers (who
could be hostile to immigration) with those of migrant workers. Beyond party politics,
291
however, the ENA/PPA and the MTA both managed to attract support from prominent
French intellectuals and activists on the left.
Both nationalist organisations considered that the establishment of links with
other Maghrebi organisations and with other immigrants was crucial. In the inter-war
period, Messali Hadj's movement had successfully developed contacts with the Tunisian
Neo-Destour and the Jeunes Marocains in North Africa, with Tunisian and Moroccan
student leaders in France and with Chekib Arslan in Lausanne. However, it failed to
attract more reformist, mainly Algerian, movements on both sides of the Mediterranean.
In that context, those moderate political and union leaders whose movements remained
distant or hostile to its nationalist project were stigmatised as supporting colonialism
and betraying the cause of Muslims and their religion. The links which had also been
established with Annamese and Black anti-colonial organisations since the first years of
the Etoile were maintained, and common political rallies were organised in order to
build a united Front with all the colonised, as was shown by the common denunciation,
by the Etoile and the Ligue de defense de la race negre, of the Ethiopian war in the mid-
1930s.
Similarly, the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes worked with political
movements of the Arab left in North Africa (especially in Morocco) and condemned the
Arnicales in France for failing to truly defend North Africans' rights, and for serving the
interests of imperialism and of the illegitimate governments that they represented.
Furthermore, the movement saw it as essential that ethnically-based political solidarity
in France should not be an end in itself, but rather should constitute the foundation for
wider multi-ethnic mobilisation amongst immigrants. Various strike and protest actions
such as those which also involved Pakistani and Maurician immigrants, both inside and
outside the workplace, were seen as ideal frameworks within which such solidarity
could be built. This was all the more important as many could not express their
demands and concerns effectively through trade unions as, at least until the mid-1970s,
they were prevented from holding positions in such workers' organisations because of
their status as foreigners, as illegal immigrants, or because they were illiterate.
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On another level, the MTA's ideology was also shaped by its contentious
relationship with North African regimes and by the necessity for its revolutionary
project to encompass Maghrebi immigrants' home countries. The movement was far
more critical of the pro-Western governments in Morocco and Tunisia than it was of the
"socialist" Algerian regime. It focused primarily on Hassan II's systematic persecution
of Arab left-wing organisations and on the treatment of political prisoners (including
MTA militants who had been expelled from France). It also denounced the monarch's
taking over of Western Sahara and its integration into Moroccan territory at the end of
Spanish rule, and supported the Front Polisario, the Saharaoui independentist
movement.
However, what emerges clearly from both movements' discourses is the salience
of Palestine as an ideological reference and inspiration for their own political struggle.
In the inter-war period, the Algerian nationalist movement saw it as the most important
illustration of imperialist domination of Arabs outside North Africa. It castigated
Zionism as the stalking-horse of British, and by extension, Western imperialism, and
stigmatised the Zionist territorial claims based on history which echoed France's own
justification for colonial expansion. The Palestinian struggle played an even more
crucial role in the birth and political development of the Mouvetnent des travailleurs
arabes in the 1970s. It saw Arab resistance in Palestine as a rallying point for the Arab
world, and a catalyst for the Arab people's own liberation in France, Europe, North
Africa and the Middle East. Contacts were established with Palestinians in Paris, and
militants expressed their support by collecting funds, and organising meetings and
demonstrations such as the one which took place in Paris during Golda Meir's visit in
1973. In its support for the Palestinian cause and for the Fatah, which echoed the
discourse of the Etoile and the PPA, the MTA consistently denounced Zionism as a
racist and imperialist ideology aimed at furthering the West's domination of the Arab
people.
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9.4 Contribution to wider field of research
By studying the discourse of the ENA/PPA in the inter-war period and that of the MTA
in the 1970s, this multidisciplinary study (which draws on history, anthropology,
politics, sociology and discourse analysis) aims to make a contribution to academic
research on the concepts of ethnicity, national identity and nationalism, and to
understand the complex processes of interaction and tension that exist between them.
One of its main objectives is to historicise the experience of Maghrebis in France which
is too often described in the French media and through public opinion as a recent
phenomenon and problem, and show that the "diaspori-sation" (to use Hall's term) of
North African migrants in France has been accompanied by an empowering process of
politicisation which has led to the formation of a political tradition. It also aims to
reappropriate the "parcours" and discourse of the ENA/PPA in the inter-war period,
which has too often been assessed as part of North African politics and history (see, for
example, Julien 1972, Ageron 1972, Droz and Lever 1982) and frame it within the
context and history of Maghrebi emigration. This thesis also examines the political
discourse of the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes, a political organisation which, to
my knowledge, has not yet been the subject of any academic study. This analysis has,
therefore, allowed me to examine some of the ways in which Maghrebis' sense of
identity was constructed within those two diasporic movements, and show that some
striking consistencies existed in several areas of their discourse on ethno-national
identity.
Furthermore, by examining the ways in which ethno-national identity was
shaped amongst North African migrant workers and students in France, this thesis also
contributes to a better understanding of colonial and post-colonial nationalisms. Indeed,
many studies which have been carried out in this field have focused mainly on the
development of nationalist movements and discourses in the colonies themselves and
essentially amongst the autochton elite (see, for example Gellner 1983, Anderson 1983,
Horowitz 1985, Smith 1989, Hobsbawm 1992), while others have looked at the
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development of Zionism in the Jewish diaspora as a rare illustration of the development
of nationalism in a diasporic context.148
9.5 Project limitations and directions for future research
This thesis focuses on aspects of the discourse and ideology of two main immigrant
political organisations belonging to two distinct eras in France. This has enabled me to
carry out an in-depth analysis of their discourse on ethnic identity and nation-ness, as
well as on their relationship with their social, political, religious, cultural and economic
environment, both in France ana beyond, which also shaped their political beliefs,
strategies and actions. However, what constitutes a strength in this research may also be
perceived as a limitation. Because this analysis looked at two case-studies, the
conclusions that have been drawn need to be cross-examined by carrying out an
evaluation of the discourse of other autonomous Maghrebi movements which were
politically active at the time of the emergence and development of the ENA/PPA and of
the MTA, but also during different historical periods. Therefore, both synchronic and
diachronic discourse analyses of other Maghrebi political organisations in France are
required to further substantiate or challenge some of the conclusions which have been
made in this thesis. For example, further research could include the political discourse
of so-called "second generation" Maghrebis in the 1980s (particularly the case of Jettnes
Arabes de Lyon et sa Banlieue), and other groups and political activists who were
involved in the Marches of the 1980s.
A further limitation is that the question of gender has been broached only briefly
(see, for example, chapter two, section four). This can be explained partly by the nature
of the discourses of the ENA/PPA and of the MTA, which were addressed essentially to
a Maghrebi immigrant population mostly composed of single men. 149 But a discourse in
which women are rarely evoked also reveals something about gender, as male-oriented
148 Other cases of "diasporic nationalism" could include the development of nationalism in the Irish and
Cuban diasporas.
149 For a study of immigrant women in the 1970s and early 1980s, see, for example, Andezian and
Streiff-Fenart (1981), Wisniewski (1974).
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discourses do inflect the way in which ethno-national identity is constructed in both
movements. Clearly, given the wide scope of this study and the word limit which has
been set, it is an issue which cannot be looked at with the depth that it requires.
Therefore, further research needs to be carried out on this aspect in the discourse of
Maghrebi immigrants.
Other important areas need to be researched. Whilst the birth and development
of Algerian nationalism, of the Etoile nord-africaine and the PPA have been the subject
of several historical studies (see, for example, Stora 1982, 1986, 1992a, 1992b, Stora
and Daoud 1995, Carlier 1984, 1986, 1991, 1995, Collot 1971, Nouschi 1962, Ouamara
1986, Vatin 1974, Gallissot 1987a), the history and actions of the Mouvement des
travailleurs arabes have not yet been examined and charted in a systematic and
chronological manner in any academic work. Such a study would contribute to a better
understanding of Maghrebi immigrants' political history in France.
By extension, a detailed study of the Comite des Droits et de la Vie des
travailleurs iminigres, a movement closely associated to the MTA and involving French
intellectuals and political activists whose support for immigrants was crucial in the
1970s, would need to be carried out in order to apprehend the complex nature of the
links of solidarity between the French and immigrants and the way in which the former
mobilised in their favour. Another area which deserves more attention is the
examination of the role that other French political and religious organisations, groups
and individuals played in solidarity with immigrants during actions such as the hunger
strikes of illegal immigrants over the last three decades, the Marches pour l'Egalite of
the 1980s, and other forms of support to immigrants. While academics have looked at
the French political parties and unions' discourses on, and policies towards, immigrants
(see, for example, Gani 1972, Wihtol de Wenden 1988, 1988a, 1990 & 1991), no in-
depth historical and political study seems to have been carried out on the role played by
Catholic and Protestant priests and their respective Church, and also by extreme left-
wing political organisations and activists in immigrants' struggle for rights. In the
1970s, the former and the latter often appeared to constitute the main French base of
296
support for immigrants. 150 However, this thesis has contributed towards a better
understanding of the complex historical, social and political processes which inform
immigrants' diasporic identity, discourse and mobilisation in France.
150 Verbunt (1974) is one of the few analysts to have examined the role of Catholic priests in the
immigrants movement in the 1970s.
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